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Print Chapter 3 (PDF 424KB) | < - Report Home < - Chapter 2 : Chapter 4 - > |
Postal voting
The problems experienced in regional Queensland
Working out what went wrong
Pre-poll voting
3.1 | The primary method of voting in an election is “ordinary” voting, where electors attend at a polling booth in the division for which they are enrolled, have their name marked off the certified list of eligible voters, and cast their vote.1 |
3.2 | The CEA provides alternative methods by which those electors, who may, for reasons such as being more than eight kilometres from the nearest polling place on polling day, undertaking domestic or overseas travel that would prevent attending a polling place in the elector’s enrolled division, or serious illness or carer responsibilities, be unable to cast an “ordinary vote”.2 |
3.3 | The alternative methods of voting are collectively called “declaration” voting, because, when using one of these alternatives, the elector must complete a declaration that they are entitled to vote, in place of having their name marked off a certified list. |
3.4 | The declaration is later compared against the elector’s enrolment record to determine the admissibility of the vote by checking the information contained in the declaration.3 |
3.5 | The two methods of declaration voting that electors may utilise in the pre-election period are postal voting and pre-poll voting. |
3.6 | The 2004 election was conducted during school holidays in Western Australia, South Australia, New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory. School holidays inevitably have an impact on the number of declaration votes cast, as many electors are absent from their re al place of living. |
3.7 | The 2004 election timetable al lowed for an election period of over five weeks, providing electors with an extra week in which to lodge post al vote applications, however, there was no such increase in the time available for those who wished to cast pre-poll votes. |
3.8 | This chapter details the Committee’s examination of the conduct of post al and pre-poll voting in the lead up to and during the 2004 election period. |
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Post al voting |
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3.9 | The post al voting provisions in the CEA date back to Federation. The provisions have been significantly amended over time, but the principles involved remain the same. Postal voting is one of two mechanisms to enable electors who cannot attend a polling place on polling day to fulfil their voting obligations under the CEA. |
3.10 | There are two mechanisms for obtaining a post al vote. The first is to complete a post al vote application (PVA) after an election has been announced or the writs have been issued, whichever is first. The second is to apply to become a general postalvoter (GPV). An application to become a GPV can be made at any time. GPVs are automatically sent postal votes at each election. |
3.11 | In each case, the elector must have grounds for making the application. Generally, the grounds are that the elector is unable to attend a polling place on polling day. |
3.12 | During an election, postal voting packages are sent to GPVs and electors who submit PVAs. The packages generally contain the ballot papers, a postal voting certificate envelope, and some information on how to complete and return the postal vote. |
3.13 | Postal voters must fill in the ballot papers, seal the ballot papers in the postal vote certificate envelope, and complete the declaration on the postal vote certificate envelope on or before polling day. The elector must then return the completed package to the AEC, where the appropriate Divisional Returning Officer must receive it within 13 days after polling day.4 |
3.14 | The AEC received 793,904 v alid PVAs from electors at the 2004 federal election. This compares to 562,733 in 2001 and 606,991 in 1998.5 Submission No. 168 (AEC), p. 14, Table 2, (includes GPVs). |
3.15 | The number of GPVs has increased from 62,677 to 132,929 in the same period, accounting somewhat for the growth in applications processed at each election. |
3.16 | Postal voting was by far the largest single issue identified as causing concern to those who made submissions, and to a large degree, by those who gave evidence during the inquiry. |
3.17 | Those concerns can geneally be categorised into 2 groups:
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3.18 | The major issues caused by, or related to, the use of APVIS were:
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3.19 | Other postal voting issues of a more gener al nature were:
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The problems experienced in regional Queensland |
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3.20 | In order to gain an insight into the effect on electors and to hear from those possessing first hand knowledge of the difficulties caused by the 2004 Feder al Election postal voting experience, the Committee held its first round of hearings in Dalby, Longreach and Ingham, as many of the submissions and complaints about post al voting had originated in regional Queensland. |
3.21 | As it turned out, electors in this region had experienced the full range of issues that the Committee sought to understand and were the most affected by the postal voting failures. |
3.22 | Those electors and their representatives provided the Committee with a great deal of insight into the distress and confusion caused to electors by the postal voting failings. |
3.23 | The Hon. Bruce Scott MP, the Member for Maranoa, summed up many of the concerns in his evidence to the Committee at Dalby:
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3.24 | The Committee was made aware that the postal voting problems were not just confined to the late or non-issue of ballot papers through APVIS. |
3.25 | The AEC only became aware on the Thursday night prior to the election (7 October 2004) that 1,832 postal voting packages that it believed had been previously sent to electors, had in fact not been sent.7 |
3.26 | On Friday 8 October 2004 (the day before the election) the Governor Gener alissued a proclamation under section 285 of the CEA, which extended the time during which certain affected postal voters could vote and return their ballot papers to the AEC. |
3.27 | The AEC instituted action to despatch postalvoting packages to those affected. Postal voting packages were hand packed by AEC staff and despatched from the AEC divisional office for Maranoa. |
3.28 | Shortly after polling day it became apparent that some of those postal voters, for whom special arrangements had been made and whose postal voting packages had been re-issued directly from the Maranoa Divisional office in accordance with the special proclamation, had been incorrectly issued with New South Wales Senate ballot papers, instead of Queensland Senate ballot papers. The Hon Bruce Scott stated:
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3.29 | The AEC then took action in respect of the 577 electors who might have received the wrong ballot papers. |
3.30 | Mr William Woolcock of the AEC told the Committee:
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3.31 | In later evidence to the Committee the AEC indicated that, of the 563 electors reissued with postal voting packages in accordance with the proclamation, only 12 electors had actually voted on and returned the NSW Senate Ballot paper to the AEC.10 |
3.32 | The Committee was told that complaints about non-delivery of postal voting material were raised with the AEC early in the pre-election period, but that it appeared to those raising concerns, that the AEC wasn’t listening, or didn’t understand the nature of the problems. Mrs Sonja Doyle commented:
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3.33 | In response to a question from Senator Mason about whether she was happy with the service she received from the AEC, Mrs Doyle said:
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3.34 | The Nationals claimed:
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3.35 | The Committee became aware that the AEC’s communication failures were not limited to external stakeholders. Communications between the AEC, its systems and its staff were also found wanting. |
3.36 | This exchange during the Dalby public hearing outlines some of the problems:14
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3.37 | The Committee further explored the communication issue:15
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3.38 | The Committee was thus informed that the APVIS was unable to track the issue of postal vote packages at all. It was, in fact, only able to provide an indication that the postal voting had been extracted from the system on a particular day, not that the postal voting packages had in fact been posted. |
3.39 | The Committee sought information and recommendations from affected postal voters about alternative strategies that might be adopted for future elections. |
3.40 | The Hon. Bruce Scott MP recommended a return to the issuing of postal vote material from State or Divisional Offices, and claimed such a return would see an improvement in the delivery of that material because local AEC officers would have a better local geographic knowledge of the area and the its postal services.16 |
3.41 | The Hon Mr Scott also claimed that on line checking of postal vote application status by applicants could be considered. This would allow applicants to satisfy themselves that their applications had been received and processed, or alternatively allow them to lodge another application if necessary.17 |
3.42 | Ms Shandra Baker suggested that call centres should be state based:
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3.43 | Mrs Doyle indicated that pre-poll voting and electronic voting should be considered as alternatives:
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3.44 | Mr Bob Hoogland, Chief Executive Officer, Winton Shire Council favours pre-poll voting as used for state elections:
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3.45 | Mrs Lindsay MacDonald notes the lack of pre-polling facilities and suggests that technology may assist those wanting to vote:
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3.46 | Ms Shelley Colvin provided an overview of the concerns of electors and others in the region when she stated during evidence:
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3.47 | In hearing evidence from witnesses in regional Queensland, the Committee gained a deeper understanding of the issues faced by such electors when delays to postal voting materials were occasioned. |
3.48 | Electors in other areas also faced the problems experienced by postal voters in regional Queensland. The Member for Brisbane, the Hon. Arch Bevis MP made a submission to the inquiry where he stated:
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3.49 | The Hon. Mr Bevis’ concerns were supported by the ALP which was:
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3.50 | The Nationals stated that:
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3.51 | Senator Ruth Webber later told the Committee that postal voting problems had occurred in Western Australia:
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3.52 | The Hon. Dick Adams MP, Member for Lyons, noted that electors in Tasmania also experienced delays:
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3.53 | Mr Brian Loughnane, the Federal Director of the Liberal Party told the Committee:
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3.54 | The Department of Defence indicated that it had concerns with postal voting arrangement and had raised them:
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3.55 | The Committee was left in no doubt that the postal voting problems were widespread; however, it noted that it appeared the worst effects had been felt by electors in regional Queensland. |
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How does APVIS Work? |
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3.56 | The AEC describes APVIS thus:
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3.57 | After reviewing all material provided to it, the Committee understands the major operations involved in treating a PVA for Central Printing to be:
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Working out what went wrong |
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3.58 | A number of submissions indicated that the problems in postal voting were associated with the AEC’s decision to outsource its postal voting operations. Senator Ruth Webber commented:
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3.59 | Other submissions and evidence suggested that the trend to an increase in the number of postal votes might have been responsible. The Nationals stated that the Party understood that:
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3.60 | Dr Kathryn Gunn stated:
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3.61 | In its first submission to the inquiry the AEC identified the problem as a contract management issue:
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3.62 | The AEC commissioned an independent inquiry into postal voting at the 2004 Federal Election:
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3.63 | The AEC provided a copy of the Minter Ellison report, inquiry into Postal Voting Administration in the 2004 Federal Election, and recommendations to the Committee as part of the AEC’s first submission to the current inquiry.36 |
3.64 | The Committee accepted the submission into public evidence while authorising the submission’s Attachment A (the Minter Ellison report) and Attachment B (the AEC contract for the production of postal voting material) as confidential evidence to the Committee. |
3.65 | The Committee, therefore, has access to information that was not made public because of the nature of some of the content, which contain commercial-in-confidence material. |
3.66 | The Committee has relied on the evidence contained in submission and that presented orally at public hearings as well as the matters contained in the Minter Ellison report in reaching its conclusions. |
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The Committees view |
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APVIS |
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3.67 | In reviewing all of the material placed before it, the Committee is of the opinion that the problems experienced by electors who applied for postal votes during the 2004 election period were not directly related to an increase in the volume of postal vote applications received by the AEC. In this respect, the Committee disagrees with those who submit otherwise. |
3.68 | The Committee believes that the AEC was well aware of the trend for postal voting to increase. The AEC has made submissions to the Committee about this trend in a number of inquiries. |
3.69 | Similarly, there have been elections conducted during school holidays in the past, for which the AEC holds relevant data. |
3.70 | Therefore, the Committee is of the opinion that the AEC should have anticipated the growth in PVAs and ensured that it was geared to handle any increase in postal voting resulting from that trend and the school holidays. |
3.71 | The Committee notes that the AEC successfully implemented and utilised APVIS for the 1999 Referendum and 2001 Federal Election. This experience, coupled with the AEC’s anticipation that postal votes would increase, should have resulted in the AEC being better prepared. |
3.72 | The Committee is, therefore, not convinced that the problems experienced during the 2004 Federal Election were caused by the AEC’s decision to outsource some of its postal voting operations. Accordingly, the Committee does not accept the argument presented in some submissions and evidence. |
3.73 | The Committee notes that the APVIS used for the 2004 election was fundamentally the same as that used in 1999 and 2001, notwithstanding the increased number of small files transmitted to the Contractor, and the other changes to processing. |
3.74 | The Committee agrees, therefore, with those that submit that the AEC may have been lulled into a false sense of security by the success of APVIS at previous electoral events. |
3.75 | The Committee considers that there were failings on the part of the AEC to implement and effectively carry out its contract management and project management obligations in respect of APVIS: |
3.76 | These failings are evident to the Committee in:
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3.77 | The Committee recognises that the contractor failed to meet some of its contractual obligations, and that circumstances, such as the closure of the Sydney envelope making plant in the months before the election, will have impacted on the effective operations of APVIS. |
3.78 | The Committee does not accept, however, that the closure of the plant should have had such a significant impact on the success of the operation. Indeed, the AEC should have immediately implemented a mitigation strategy, which it should have previously developed from a comprehensive risk analysis process. This thorough risk analysis appears never to have been done. |
3.79 | Despite this, the recovery strategy adopted by the AEC in consultation with the contractor after the closure of the envelope making plant would probably have been successful, if the AEC had ensured that adequate quality assurance processes and procedures were in place, and had been tested, prior to the election being announced. |
3.80 | Whilst throughput at the mail house would have remained an issue, and postal voting material would still have been delayed, issues such as the failure to regenerate spoilt material, the incorrect addressing of postal voting packages, and the duplication of some postal voting material would have been detected and corrected much earlier, with much less consequence for affected electors. |
3.81 | The Committee considers that AEC may have been too optimistic in its expectations that the mail house would cope with the initial deluge of PVAs and GPVs, and that the AEC should have examined the output from the insertion machines, by thoroughly testing the processes at each site before the election. |
3.82 | It appears to the Committee, however, that little if any testing was carried out, following changes to processes in APVIS in the period leading up to the election. This is despite the fact the AEC knew an election was imminent and that APVIS was an election critical system. |
3.83 | When it became apparent to the AEC, in the early stages of the mail house processing, that delays were inevitable because of the slow output from the insertion machines, immediate steps should have been taken to elevate the matter to more senior AEC management attention. |
3.84 | This would have enabled the AEC to be more proactive in its advice to external stakeholders and might have resulted in the AEC discovering that there were problems other than slow production, as alluded to by the Electoral Commissioner in evidence to the Committee:
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3.85 | Earlier, more focussed attention to the problems may have greatly assisted the AEC to understand them and thus have been better able to respond to the many electors who contacted them about missing postal voting material. |
3.86 | The Committee believes that the Sydney operation (despite its problems) should have been geared to provide services 24 hours a day and for a greater number of days in the initial stages of production. |
3.87 | This should have been identified as a potential issue by the AEC during its initial contract negotiations by testing the Contractor’s claimed throughput. The AEC even had a second chance to identify throughput as a problem when it was made aware of the closure of the envelope plant. |
3.88 | As mentioned earlier, if the AEC had followed proper risk management methodology this throughput problem would have been detected at that point. |
3.89 | However, the Committee accepts that AEC may have been misguided in accepting the optimistic projected insertion machine throughput advised by the contractor at face value. |
3.90 | The Committee asserts that the contractor was unable to sustain that throughput even with full capacity being maintained in two sites for 24 hours a day, given that the contractor was required to make changes to the insertion machines every time a different run was to be processed. |
3.91 | The AEC had clearly not anticipated that this was the case. This is demonstrated by the AEC’s expectation that only two quality assurance officers would need to be provided at each site. This effectively indicates that the AEC expected that only two shifts would be required to process the volume of postal voting packages through the mail house. |
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Committee conclusions regarding APVIS |
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3.92 | The Committee has formed the opinion that there were major failings in the AEC’s project management of the APVIS, and that these failures lead to a compounding of the problems faced by both the AEC and the contractor when production delays were initially experienced. |
3.93 | The AEC was (and is) under an obligation to monitor postal voting trends and to ensure the APVIS, and its internal and external support systems, were fully tested and ready to respond to evolving demands. |
3.94 | If the handling of spoilt and diverted postal vote material had been clearly resolved before the commencement of production, those packages would have been treated effectively and delivered expeditiously. |
3.95 | Similarly, if the volume had been correctly anticipated, the backlogs would not have occurred, and postal voting packages would not have been delayed nor misdirected. |
3.96 | Proper and timely communication between the AEC and the contractor would have been more effective in uncovering the cause of the delays, and as a consequence, the despatch of postal voting packages would have been dealt with expeditiously. This would have avoided the subsequent voter confusion, and the potential (and in some cases actual) disenfranchisement of electors. |
3.97 | The Committee, therefore, has concluded that the majority of the postal voting problems encountered at the 2004 Federal Elections were directly caused by, or related to, failings on the part of the AEC to carry out effective project management and contract management of the APVIS processes. |
3.98 | Responsibility for these failures must ultimately rest with the AEC. |
3.99 | Whilst the Committee is justly critical of the AEC in its contract and project management of postal voting for the 2004 election, the Committee notes with a degree of appreciation, the frankness with which the Electoral Commissioner addressed the AEC’s performance to the Committee during evidence. |
3.100 | The Committee recognises that, for an organisation of such high repute as the AEC to so frankly admit its failings and take responsibility for them, it first requires the organisation to accept that it has not performed to a standard that it would expect of itself. |
3.101 | The Committee considers that the AEC has done this in respect of postal voting, which, as the Committee acknowledges, was only one aspect of an election at which in excess of 13,000,000 electors were able to cast effective votes, most of whom encountered no problems at all. |
3.102 | The Committee notes the recommendations made in the Minter Ellison report inquiry into Postal Voting Administration in the 2004 Federal Election, the AEC’s response to those recommendations, the material contained in submissions to the Committee and the evidence taken on this matter, and recommends that the AEC should continue to develop and utilise the APVIS for future elections. |
3.103 | Recommendation 7The Committee recommends:
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3.104 | Recommendation 8The Committee recommends:
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3.105 | Recommendation 9The Committee recommends:
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Postmarking of postal votes returned to the AEC |
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3.106 | The Committee notes the AEC’s response to the Minter Ellison recommendation number 12 and accepts that there are technical difficulties associated with the postmarking of mail in some locations, which leads to postal votes not being accepted into the count, despite being lodged with Australia Post after last mail clearances on the Friday prior to election day and on election day but prior to the close of polling. |
3.107 | There is evidence to suggest that when those postal votes are collected by mail contractors, or processed by Australia Post, they are postmarked as having been lodged on the Sunday which is the day after election day. |
3.108 | Under the current rules for preliminary scrutiny, those postal votes are excluded from the count, because the date of the postmark is taken to be the date on which the vote was completed. |
3.109 | The Committee is of the view that this situation leads to the votes of electors in some regional, rural and remote areas being unnecessarily rejected, as the votes have in fact been cast, and posted prior to the close of the poll. |
3.110 | The Committee therefore makes the following recommendations: |
3.111 | Recommendation 10The Committee recommends:
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Facilitating Postal Voting |
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3.112 | The Committee notes that there were submissions and evidence which indicated that other actions on the part of the AEC may facilitate the postal voting process, including allowing forms to be faxed to the AEC and encouraging electors to vote earlier in the election period. |
3.113 | In response to these issues the Committee makes the following recommendations: |
3.114 | Recommendation 11The Committee recommends that the AEC:
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Guidelines for the management of problems |
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3.115 | In its response to Minter Ellison recommendation no. 26, the AEC makes a commitment to develop guidelines for the timely management of problems emerging during an election period. |
3.116 | The Committee, while noting that the AEC’s relationship and interactions with the Minister is a matter for the Minister and the AEC to resolve, nevertheless recognises that other stakeholders also have valid expectations that they should be kept informed of significant issues that emerge. |
3.117 | The Committee endorses the AEC’s commitment to developing such guidelines, and recommends that the AEC progress this commitment as soon as practicable. |
3.118 | Recommendation 12The Committee recommends that prior to the next election: The AEC discusses with the Minister’s office options for establishing a process for the provision of information about emerging issues during the election period; including:
And, that following those discussions:
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Privacy concerns |
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3.119 | The Committee has also considered the issue of the privacy of the postal vote certificate envelopes used at the 2004 Federal Election. |
3.120 | The Committee notes the representations made by concerned electors and others in submissions to this inquiry and during evidence. |
3.121 | The Committee is, however, persuaded that there has been a demonstrable reduction in the number of ballot papers excluded from the count as a result of the envelopes used during this election. |
3.122 | The Committee is concerned to ensure a suitable balance between the privacy of electors and protecting the franchise. This balance is not achieved when postal ballot papers are excluded from the count because they are not contained within the postal vote certificate envelope. |
3.123 | The Committee has not drawn any conclusions about this matter at this stage. However, it intends to seek further information by recommending that the AEC consult widely with stakeholders—including, political parties, Commonwealth, State and Territory Privacy Commissioners, privacy advocates and others—to canvass possible solutions to the postal vote privacy issue that will not require a return to double enveloping. |
3.124 | The Committee is concerned to ensure, however, that electors who wish to use a second envelope to satisfy their own privacy concerns are not precluded from doing so. |
3.125 | The Committee will recommend that the AEC report back to the Committee before the end of June 2006, with details of its consultations and provide the Committee with recommendations about how the AEC should address the privacy concerns of electors, whilst minimising the number of ballot papers excluded from the count. |
3.126 | Recommendation 13The Committee recommends that the AEC:
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PVAs lodged prior to the election announcement |
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3.127 | The Committee also examined the issue of postal vote applications that were signed by electors and forwarded to the AEC prior to the announcement of the 2004 election. |
3.128 | The Committee notes that; as a result of parties and candidates distributing postal vote applications to electors prior to the issue of the writ, the AEC was required to contact a number of postal vote applicants to advise them it was unable to accept the applications lodged by them, because they were lodged too early. |
3.129 | The CEA provides that an application for a postal vote may not be made until after the issue of the writ for an election or the public announcement of the proposed date for the election. |
3.130 | The Committee is not persuaded that this provision requires any amendment, but does recommend that political parties and candidates take some action to advise electors about the relevant provisions for lodgement. |
3.131 | Recommendation 14The Committee recommends that political parties and candidates should ensure that any material they provide to electors in advance of the writ issue or public announcement of the election date, advises electors of the relevant provisions relating to the lodgement of postal vote applications. |
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Pre-poll voting |
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3.132 | Pre-poll voting is a form of declaration voting for electors who will not be in their home state or territory or who are unable to attend a polling place on election day. |
3.133 | An elector may attend an AEC Divisional office or one of the pre-poll voting centres set up before polling day to cast their vote. |
3.134 | In order to assist Australian electors overseas to vote, the AEC, with the cooperation and assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, opens a number of pre-poll voting centres in overseas missions. These missions also offer postal voting services to electors overseas who are not able to vote in person |
3.135 | An elector must have grounds for making a pre-poll vote. Generally, the grounds are that the applicant is unable to attend a polling place on polling day.38 |
3.136 | An elector seeking to make a pre-poll vote is required to personally attend a pre-poll voting centre, complete the declaration on the pre-poll certificate envelope, and sign the declaration. |
3.137 | The elector then receives ballot papers which they fill out, fold and return to the officer who issued them. The ballot papers are placed into the pre-poll certificate envelope which is sealed before being placed in a ballot box. |
3.138 | All pre-poll certificate envelopes are ultimately sent to the DRO for the Division for which the elector claims to be enrolled, whereupon they are checked to determine the eligibility of the elector before being included or excluded form the count. |
3.139 | The AEC is required to gazette the location and opening times of pre-poll centres.39 |
3.140 | In some instances this requirement may prevent the AEC responding quickly to changing circumstances where pre-poll voting might be required, such as was caused by delays in postal vote materials for the 2004 election. Ms Jennie Gzik from the AEC stated:
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3.141 | The AEC submitted that it believed that:
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3.142 | Conversely, the Liberal Party expressed some concerns with the way the AEC advises the opening of pre-poll voting centres:
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3.143 | In addition to being open prior to election day, the AEC’s Divisional Offices and some pre-poll centres are open on election day to take the votes of those electors who are not in their home state or territory. |
3.144 | These pre-poll centres and Divisional Offices are often not located in the most appropriate locations for travellers. The Nationals Hinkler Divisional Council stated that:
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3.145 | The AEC recognises that electors who are interstate on polling day may only vote at pre-poll centres and notes that:
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3.146 | Many submissions to this inquiry expressed concern that pre-poll centres were not located in locations where they were deemed to be required. |
3.147 | In the case of electors in regional areas of Queensland who were unable to cast postal votes because of delays in receiving them, there were no alternatives such as pre-poll located within hundreds of kilometres of where they were required. Mrs Lindsay MacDonald wrote:
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3.148 | The Nationals, in their submission from the Hinkler Division, advised that:
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3.149 | Mr Michael Parker, Chief Executive Officer, Warroo Shire Council considered that while there were practical obstacles to installing a sufficient number of pre-polling locations, there would be advantages in taking the pressure off the postal voting system:
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3.150 | The ALP submits that there is a need for additional pre-poll centres and that they should be more accessible:
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3.151 | The ALP also believes that the electoral system must be responsive to family needs:
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3.152 | The Minter Ellison inquiry into postal voting at the 2004 election made recommendations in relation to pre-poll voting. These included that the AEC undertake a thorough review of current pre-poll voting arrangements. |
3.153 | The AEC’s response to that recommendation indicates that the review will be:
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3.154 | The AEC also notes the criticisms levelled at it during and since the 2004 election by:
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The Committee’s view |
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3.155 | The Committee recognises that concerns about the location of pre-poll facilities have become more prominent in the light of the postal voting delays during the 2004 election, especially in regional Queensland. |
3.156 | There is also a need to find a balance between the expectations of a society that demands electoral convenience, with the desire of that same society to retain the ability to participate by voting in person. |
3.157 | This is the fundamental problem that presents itself when polling places are closed down for economic reasons and are replaced by postal voting. |
3.158 | Postal voting suits many people, but as pointed out by those electors in regional Queensland, the desire to vote in person is still important to many. |
3.159 | Pre-poll voting on the other hand, satisfies the desire to vote in person, and provides a measure of electoral convenience to all involved in the electoral process, be they electors, electoral authorities, political parties or candidates. |
3.160 | The Committee believes, therefore, that the AEC should review its pre-polling arrangements with a view to ensuring that, wherever practical, pre-poll voting centres are located at appropriate Commonwealth, State or Territory government or local government agencies in regional areas, as suggested by the AEC in its response to the Minter Ellison recommendations. |
3.161 | The Committee notes that there will be costs associated with this proposal, however, it believes that there should be no electoral disadvantage suffered by electors in regional areas, wherever a reasonable case for providing pre-poll voting facilities exists. |
3.162 | Where the same case exists in respect of interstate travellers, and the AEC has an expectation that a reasonable number of electors would utilise those facilities on election day, the pre-poll facilities should remain open on election day to allow interstate travellers to vote. |
3.163 | The AEC should comprehensively publicise and advertise the location of all pre-poll voting centres. |
3.164 | Similarly, the AEC must also ensure that standardised, prominent signage is used to identify pre-polling centres, so that electors and other stakeholders can immediately recognise and locate them. |
3.165 | The Committee notes the AEC’s concerns about the requirement to gazette pre-poll voting locations and times, however, it is not convinced that removing the requirement for gazettal of the times would provide significant benefits to electors, candidates or other stakeholders. |
3.166 | However, the Committee believes that an amendment to the CEA is required to allow the AEC to set up and operate pre-poll voting centres in circumstances where the AEC is required to quickly ensure that electors are able to cast votes. |
3.167 | In such circumstances, the AEC must do everything it practically can to advise relevant candidates and political parties of:
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3.168 | The AEC must gazette the pre-poll centre or centres as soon as practicable after it becomes aware of any circumstances that require it to set up and operate a centre or centres. |
3.169 | Recommendation 15The Committee recommends that the AEC should review its pre-polling arrangements with a view to ensuring that, wherever practical, pre-poll centres are located at appropriate Commonwealth, State or Territory government, or local government, agencies in regional areas. |
3.170 | Recommendation 16The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth Electoral Act and the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act be amended to provide that:
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Recommendation 17The Committee recommends:
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1 | Submission No. 165, (AEC), p. 16. Back |
2 | Application for postal and pre-poll voting is provided for in sections 183 and 200A of the CEA and the grounds of application are specified in Schedule 2 of the CEA. Back |
3 | Submission No. 165, (AEC), p. 16. Back |
4 | Submission No. 74, (AEC), p. 2. Back |
5 | Submission No. 168 (AEC), p. 14, Table 2, (includes GPVs). Back |
6 | The Hon. B Scott MP, Evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, Dalby, p. 4. Back |
7 | Mr D Orr, Assistant Commissioner Elections, AEC, Evidence, 28 April 2005, Ingham, p. 17. Back |
8 | The Hon. B Scott MP, Evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, p. 4. Back |
9 | Mr W Woolcock, (DRO, Groom), Evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, pp. 16-17. Back |
10 | Mr I Campbell, (Electoral Commissioner, AEC), Evidence, Friday 5 August 2005, p. 8. Back |
11 | Mrs S Doyle, Evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, p. 2. Back |
12 | Mrs S Doyle, Evidence Wednesday, 27 April 2005, p. 4. Back |
13 | Submission No. 92, (The Nationals). Back |
14 | See Transcriptof evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, p. 28. Back |
15 | See Transcriptofevidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, pp. 28–29. Back |
16 | Submission No. 1, (The Hon. B Scott MP). Back |
17 | Submission No. 1, (The Hon. B Scott MP). Back |
18 | Ms S Baker, Evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, p. 35. Back |
19 | Mrs S Doyle, Evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, p. 7. Back |
20 | Mr B Hoogland, Evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, p. 12. Back |
21 | Submission No. 47, (Mrs L MacDonald). Back |
22 | Ms S Colvin, Evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, p. 24. Back |
23 | Submission No. 94, (The Hon. A Bevis MP). Back |
24 | Submission No. 136, (ALP), p. 8. Back |
25 | Submission No. 92, (The Nationals). Back |
26 | Submission No. 49, (Senator R Webber). Back |
27 | Submission No. 10, (The Hon. D Adams MP). Back |
28 | Mr Brian Loughnane, Federal Director of the Liberal Party, Evidence, Monday 8 August 2005, pp. 23-24. Back |
29 | Submission No. 132, (Department of Defence).p. 1. Back |
30 | Submission No. 192, (AEC), p. 18. Back |
31 | Submission No. 49, (Senator R Webber). Back |
32 | Submission No. 92, (The Nationals). Back |
33 | Submission No. 28, (Communication Project Group—Dr K Gunn). Back |
34 | Submission No. 74, (AEC) p. 3. Back |
35 | Submission No. 74, (AEC) p. 3. Back |
36 | Submission No. 74, (AEC). Back |
37 | Mr I Campbell, (Electoral Commissioner, AEC), Evidence, Friday, 5 August 2005, pp. 6, 9. Back |
38 | The Grounds for application for a pre-poll vote are contained in Schedule 2 of the CEA. Back |
39 | CEA, section 200D. Back |
40 | Ms J Gzik, (Australian Electoral Officer for Western Australia), Evidence, Wednesday, 3 August 2005, p. 59. Back |
41 | Submission No. 74, (AEC), Attachment C. Back |
42 | Submission No. 74, (AEC), p. 11. Back |
43 | Submission No. 95, (Liberal Party of Australia). Back |
44 | Submission No. 53, (The Nationals Hinkler Divisional Council). Back |
45 | Submission No. 74, (AEC), Attachment C. Back |
46 | Submission No. 47, (Mrs L MacDonald). Back |
47 | Submission No. 53, (The Nationals Hinkler Division). Back |
48 | Mr M Parker, CEO, Warroo Shire Council, Evidence, Wednesday, 27 April 2005, p. 13. Back |
49 | Submission No. 136, (ALP), p. 7. Back |
50 | Submission No. 136, (ALP), p. 7. Back |
51 | Submission No. 74, (AEC), Attachment C. Back |
52 | Submission No. 74, (AEC), Attachment C. Back |
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