




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Submission No:64.....

13 July 2005



The Secretary
Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit
Aviation Security Review
Parliament House
CANBERRA ACT 2600

Dear Sir

Re: Aviation Security Review

SNP Security's prime role at Sydney Airport is to conduct the screening of all passengers and their carry-on baggage for weapons and other prohibited items and to conduct explosives trace detection (ETD) of passengers and their carry-on baggage, on a continuous, random basis.

These duties are carried out on behalf of Sydney Airports Corporation Limited (SACL) at the Sydney International Terminal and Terminal 2 and for Qantas Airways Limited at Terminal 3.

On an average week, at Sydney Airport, our staff will screen approximately 410,000 passengers and seize approximately 2,650 prohibited items.

SNP have continuously and successfully carried out the screening of passengers at Sydney Airport since the compulsory screening of all international passengers was Federally Legislated in 1978.

Prior to this, SNP were contracted, from the late 60s, on an ad-hoc basis, by individual airlines to screen specific flights considered to be at risk.

Apart from passenger screening and ETD, Airport Division staff operate the Checked Baggage Screening System (CBS), which is a computerized, fully automated, series of steps, designed to detect explosive devices, which may be carried in hold-stow baggage.

Ad-hoc functions carried out for the principal contractors, as well as for individual airlines, can include aircraft guarding, crowd control, catering and valuable cargo escorts, check-in counter and departure gate duties, deportee escorts, as well as control room duties.

SNP's Management Team, at Sydney Airport, is a group of widely experienced professionals, who possess individual expertise in the fields of aviation security, airline operations, airport services and human resources.

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SNP Airport Staff enjoy close working relations with other airport agencies, such as the AFPPS, the State and Federal Police Forces and are actively involved with Customs in the Frontline Program. SNP Management also holds membership of the Sydney Airport Security Committee, which is the principal forum for security matters affecting the airport.

Staff are fully accredited to the Federal Department of Transport and Regional Services standards and requirements. They hold the Certificate II & III in Security (Guarding) with Special Application to Aviation Security Accreditation.

SNP is VETAB accredited and a Registered Training organization. Training programs are subjected to constant scrutiny and revision.

After undergoing the 70 hours classroom training for Certificate II, all trainees commence specific airport training consisting of:

- 2-day intensive induction program
- 4 day "on the job" training
- 1-day competency assessment

Their training covers:

- Aviation Screening procedures
- Explosive Trace Detection
- Dangerous Goods
- Manual Handling
- Customer Service
- OHS/SH&E training
- Conflict Resolution

This initial training is followed through with:

- On-going refresher training
- Certificate 3 Traineeships
- Annual competency training reviews
- Specialised Team Leader/Supervisor training

All staff are trained to meet stringent standards set by:

- The Aviation Transport Security Act 2004
- The Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005
- Department of Transport and Regional Services
- Australian National Training Authority standards
- PRS03 Training Package
- SNP Standard Operating Procedures – Quality Controlled Documents

SNP screeners are subjected to more work performance testing than virtually any other employee in the Australian workforce.

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1. Federal Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTRS) Inspectors perform covert testing of the system and officially inform the respective Principals of any failures. (The Department has the power and prerogative to breach an organization or an individual employee, for a failure and very harsh fines and penalties may be applied).
2. Qantas Airways Limited has its Security Department carry out virtually weekly covert testing of all aspects of the screening system. Failures can be cited by Qantas as a valid reason for contract termination.
3. SACL regularly conduct covert testing of security measures and procedures for which SNP are responsible.
4. Because of its' commitment to the highest standards of performance and because it wishes to benchmark its staff, SNP Management conduct their own, in-house, covert testing regime.

In the event that an employee fails any test conducted by any of the above Agencies, they are immediately stood down from the duty in which they failed. They are then placed under the supervision of the Training Controller, who will arrange a retraining program covering the discipline in which they failed. They will not be permitted to reassume that particular function until the Training Controller is satisfied with their performance.

In the event that the same employee fails again in a similar test, depending on the circumstances, serious consideration would be given to removing them from the Airport Division.

5. In addition to all of the above testing by respective Agencies, the x-ray machines contain a random testing regime known as Threat Image Projection (TIP).

In every one of 200 bags, with a 20% diversification ratio either way, the x-ray monitor operator is presented with the image of a weapon or an IED in the bag currently being examined on the screen.

They immediately have to respond and the system will tell them that (a) it is a test or (b) not a test and to take further action.

Staff TIP records are maintained and those staff not meeting the required standard are stood down from monitor duties and subjected to retraining in this role. Ongoing failure to meet the required standard could lead to staff being transferred from the Airport.

In the last five years, the two most significant events experienced have been:

- a) the planned and anticipated additional arrangements connected with the 2000 Olympics, and
- b) the totally unplanned and unanticipated arrangements in the wake of September 11.

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In the case of the Olympics, all additional arrangements and requirements, with which we were tasked, were met efficiently, effectively and on time. Passenger queues were kept to a minimum and, despite the number of passengers involved, screening was carried out to DOTARS standards, without any contributing delays.

The impact of September 11 caused the greatest test and demand ever placed on SNP in its 80-year history.

Without notice, a supply of trained manpower, greater in number than that required for the first Gulf War or the peak period of the Olympics was needed, virtually overnight, to carry out the additional security measures dictated by the (then) US FAA, DOTARS and respective Airline Security Departments.

SNP are proud of the fact that not one of our Customer Airline's requests had to be denied and all additional requirements were met.

The above is a basic outline of the role and responsibilities of our screening personnel, as well as some background in relation to SNP's structure and involvement with Sydney Airport.

SNP is happy to support the Committee and provide any further information that may be of assistance.

Yours sincerely
SNP SECURITY



TOM ROCHE
Managing Director

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