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Print Dissenting Report (PDF 226KB) | < - Report Home < - Chapter 6 : Appendix A - > |
Recommendation 1:
Nuclear Proliferation
Safeguards
Recommendations:
China: Trust and Accountability
Environmental Case
Economic case
Conclusion
Recommendations:
Senator WORTLEY —Would it be possible for Australian uranium to end up being used in other ways under this sort of a treaty? Are we relying on trust here? Mr Carlson —Obviously, there is a degree of trust in any international treaty… ...(27) If we want to "put teeth", real teeth, into the nuclear arms control regime, then not only must we examine the structure of the regime, but equally important, we must examine the social and security environment in which this regime operates. International Atomic and Energy Agency (IAEA) Director Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei1 |
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1.1 | The Democrats believe the majority report failed to provide a compelling argument that the sale of uranium to China is in the national or global interest. The ease with which Australian uranium could find its way into Chinese nuclear weapons was not addressed by the Committee report. I agree with the Australian Conservation Foundation observation that:
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1.2 | The committee report outlined China’s lack of accountability and track record but had no answer to the concerns outlined. China has not demonstrated that it can be trusted on sticking to agreements and continues its nuclear proliferation. China is not alone in this regard, but this proposed Treaty action only relates to China. |
1.3 | The economic, social and environmental arguments given in favour of exporting uranium to China were unconvincing. The risks (security, social and environmental) of selling uranium to China far outweigh the economic benefits. It makes more sense to engage with China on renewable energy to avoid those risks. |
1.4 | Using Australia's National Interest as the sole criterion by which to assess whether to sell uranium to China is a fundamentally flawed approach. Selling uranium to China has global implications. I believe this agreement is not in the net national interest of Australia in any case, but the risk to humanity worldwide and Australia’s responsibility as a good global citizen should be the ultimate test. This was not addressed by the Committee's report. Given the increasing tensions around the world and appropriate concerns about weapons of mass destruction, increases the risk of the proliferation on nuclear weapons is clearly not in the global interest. |
1.5 | Contributing to Chinas development, through the development of clean safe energy is far more responsible. |
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Recommendation 1: |
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Nuclear Proliferation |
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Global |
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1.6 | The strong link between the use of uranium for civil and nuclear purposes and the dangers of a nuclear arms race led to the international community putting in place the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) aimed at halting the spread of nuclear weapons and providing a framework for disarmament by the nuclear weapons states. |
1.7 | The NPT has 189 members - an almost universal membership - with the notable exceptions of India, Israel and Pakistan. The NPT provides important security benefits - by giving assurance that, in the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, enriched uranium is not being used for weapon purposes. |
1.8 | The NPT is the only legally binding agreement in which the five nuclear-weapons states have committed to disarmament. |
1.9 | However in the 60 years since the UN called for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, they have been taken up by Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea, disarmament has stalled and there are almost as many nuclear weapons around the world now as there were when the NPT was first signed. |
1.10 | IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei has said that much has changed since the introduction of the NPT which has undermined the regime and the ability to prevent nuclear proliferation:
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1.11 | The IAEA has recorded over 650 confirmed incidents of trafficking in nuclear or other radioactive material since 1993. In 2004, there were almost 100 such incidents. Much of the nuclear smuggling is from civil nuclear programs. |
1.12 | The Report Nuclear Power No Solution to Climate Change notes that of the 60 countries that have built research reactors or nuclear power plants, over 20 are known to have used their ‘peaceful’ facilities for covert weapons research and/or production. In some cases nation states have succeeded in producing nuclear weapons under cover of a peaceful nuclear program – India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and North Korea.4 |
1.13 | In November this year, former UN weapons inspector Dr Blix took Britain and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council - USA, China, Russia and France - to task for failing to comply with their obligations under the NPT by failing to do more to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. |
1.14 | Dr Blix expressed his frustration at the way nuclear nations are in the process of developing new types of weapons rather than examining how they could manage defence needs with non-nuclear weaponry. |
1.15 | The Australian Democrats support calls from Dr Blix for the UN General Assembly to call a world summit on disarmament to revive the NPT efforts to reduce the risk of a nuclear war. |
China's Track Record |
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1.16 | China's nuclear arsenal is not considered as modern as the other states, but it is reported to be modernising. |
1.17 | The Committee report notes that China currently sources the majority of its uranium domestically. China has made it quite clear that Australian uranium will free up China's domestic supplies for military purposes. |
1.18 | Of the five declared nuclear weapon states, only China has not yet officially declared that it is no longer producing fissile material for weapons purposes for weapons.5 |
1.19 | The ACF/MAPW report AnIllusion of Protection argues that China's large stockpile of fissile material is a proliferation concern:
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1.20 | The report An Illusion of Protection also raises concerns about Chian's nuclear protection, control and accounting:
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1.21 | There is substantive evidence to show that China has provided nuclear weapons technology, materials and designs to Pakistan; stolen US nuclear weapons designs; proliferated WMD missile technology, weapons systems and components to countries including Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and North Korea; and has provided assistance to Iran’s nuclear program.8 |
1.22 | ASNO in its submission to the committee argued that China has improved upon its past proliferation record since it joined the NPT in 1992 and became obligated under the treaty to not assist any non-nuclear weapons state to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons:
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1.23 | However, the ACF and MAPW submission cited evidence from a 1999 US House of Representatives investigation into commercial and military concerns with China:
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1.24 | Mr James Courtney from ANAWA also cited a criticism by the US Department of State in its August 2005 report that China had broken its article 1 commitment, which is a ban on sharing nuclear technology.11 |
1.25 | The report An Illusion of Protection cited further evidence of ongoing proliferation concern:
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1.26 | ACF, MAPW and FOE argued that the unacceptable proliferation record should invalidate China for consideration as a potential customer for exports of Australian uranium. |
1.27 | The Committee report states that "in addition to IAEA safeguards, Australia was relying on trust that AONM would not be diverted to non-peaceful uses by China" |
1.28 | The Democrats agree with ACF and MAPW in their assertion that given China’s track record on proliferation and concerns about China's own protection control and accounting system, Australia can not be confident in this or future Chinese Governments' compliance with key international non-proliferation norms on weapons of mass destruction and associated military technology. Trust alone just won't cut it. |
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Safeguards |
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IAEA and the NPT |
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1.29 | The IAEA is a United Nations organisation created in 1957, tasked with promoting safe, secure and peaceful global cooperation in nuclear technology. The IAEA is charged with verifying through its inspection system that member states comply with their obligation under the NPT and other non-proliferation agreements. |
1.30 | The IAEA safeguards system still suffers from flaws and limitations, despite improvements over the past decade. |
1.31 | The Report Nuclear Power No Solution to Climate Change notes that at least eight NPT member states have carried out weapons-related projects in violation of their NPT agreements, or have carried out permissible (weapons-related) activities but failed to meet their reporting requirements to the IAEA – Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Romania, South Korea, Taiwan, and Yugoslavia.13 |
1.32 | As noted earlier, the Director of the IAEA has acknowledged that much has changed since the introduction of the NPT, which has undermined the regime. |
1.33 | The IAEA is charged with verifying that for a given period no significant quantity of nuclear material has been diverted or that no other items subject to safeguards have been misused by the State, and that this is to be done in a timely manner. |
1.34 | In their report An Illusion of Protection, ACF and MAPW argue that the definitions of significant quantity and timeliness are now out of date. Advances in technology mean that smaller quantities of plutonium can be used to make a devastating weapon, and countries have the means and technology to move and convert in shorter periods of time:
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1.35 | ACF and MAPW warn that the most serious problem facing the IAEA regime is reprocessing plants, where it is almost impossible to detect the diversion of quantities of weapon-usable plutonium from a reprocessing plant:
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1.36 | IAEA Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, acknowledged that the verification system is inadequate and that, even with the newly expanded verification rights under the “additional protocols”, until all countries sign on to the additional protocol this cannot come into force:
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1.37 | It is significant to note that although China has signed on to voluntary application of the 'additional protocol', it has restricted it to a few facilities. |
1.38 | China has also failed to ratify the Compressive Test Ban treaty (CTBT). The CTBT aims to ban all nuclear weapons testing. China is one of the countries (along with the USA) that must ratify the Treaty in order for it to come into effect. |
1.39 | Dr Elbaradei, has argued that a lot more needs to be done to address nuclear proliferation. In a speech earlier this year he outlined 5 key measures that should be done to strengthen the existing order for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and move towards nuclear disarmament:
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1.40 | Dr Elbaradei emphasised that international support would be needed for the implementation of such measures. |
1.41 | Australia is undermining the current NPT agreement by allowing the USA to sell Australian Uranium to Taiwan, which is not a signatory to the NPT:
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1.42 | There seems to be little motivation by key countries to do anything and. as noted earlier, inaction has drawn criticism from ex-weapons inspector Hans Blix. |
1.43 | One of the key problems for the IAEA however is the severe lack of funding. |
1.44 | The Friends of the Earth in their submission note that:
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1.45 | In a speech this year Dr ElBaradei stated that the IAEA is severely under funded:
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1.46 | The Democrats support the majority committee report's recommendation to increase funding to the IAEA, but note that funding alone will not fix the flaws in the system outlined above. |
1.47 | The system is far weaker for declared Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) than for Non-Nuclear Weapons States.
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Australia and China Agreement |
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1.48 | As a Declared Nuclear State, China is not obliged to conclude safeguard agreements with the IAEA, although they have agreed along with the other states that IAEA safeguards may be applied to all or part of their civil nuclear programs. |
1.49 | ACF and MPAW noted in their submission that:
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1.50 | The Committee report notes that while China would have the right to choose which facilities are eligible for IAEA inspections under its agreement with the IAEA, any facilities using Australia Originated Nuclear Material (AONM) must be jointly agreed by ASNO and the CAEA, and must be subject to the China-IAEA nuclear material safeguards agreement. |
1.51 | ASNO told the Committee that there are ten facilities on the IAEA's list of agreed facilities for inspection. |
1.52 | Evidence suggests that while there might be ten facilities agreed for inspection, the reality is that last year only 3 of those facilities were examined by the IAEA in 2005.22 |
1.53 | It's also important to point out that Australia does not have the capacity or systems in place to directly inspect and monitor China's facilities. Australia relies purely on the under resourced IAEA to undertake the inspections. |
1.54 | ACF and MAPW pointed out that when Australia’s safeguards are reliant on an inadequate and under resourced system they are not foolproof:
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1.55 | ASNO told the Committee that Australia would withdraw sale of Australian uranium if China reneged on the safeguard agreements. |
1.56 | However, the ACF noted that while Australia could cancel its sales, they have no inspection capacity and have no ability in practice to recover nuclear materials. Australia will then be powerless to stop its uranium from ending up in nuclear weapons.
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1.57 | China will not be reliant solely on Australia for uranium. They currently have agreements with Canada and Kazakhstan. There are other countries that also export uranium, so there is no real threat to China from Australia withholding supply. |
1.58 | This raises the question; if this treaty were to go ahead and Australia significantly expanded its uranium mining operations, would Australia really then take the commercial risk and cancel its sale to China? This point was also made by ACF to the Committee:
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1.59 | A critical loophole in the agreement is that Australian uranium will not be subject to safeguards when it first arrives in China and enters the uranium conversion. At this stage Australian uranium could be diverted for use in nuclear weapons:
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1.60 | ASNO argued that an "equivalent" amount of uranium is tracked and that the outcome is the same as if AONM has been tracked through the conversion part. |
1.61 | While this might be the case at a purely semantic level, the Australian Government cannot claim that Australian uranium will only be used for peaceful purposes. On a practical level, while an equivalent amount will only be used for peaceful purpose, Australian uranium frees up domestic and other imported materials for use in nuclear weapons. Either way, Australia is facilitating China to increase their nuclear material potential for domestic or international use. |
1.62 | Another area of concern is the reprocessing of uranium for further use. Reprocessing facilities in China are dual use facilities (domestic and military) with capability for production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
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1.63 | ACF, MAPW, and FOE argued that reprocessing should be removed from the treaty text:
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1.64 | The Democrats are also concerned with the failure of the Government to provide public access to the "Administrative arrangements" that underpin the deal. As ACF and MAPW argued in their submission, how can Parliament or the public know if the proposed practices of safeguards can match the claims?
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1.65 | International and Australian safeguards are inadequate to guarantee that Australian uranium to China will not end up in nuclear weapon material. The Democrats are concerned that the current international and national regime is not effective in preventing nuclear weapon proliferation, and that as a major uranium exporter Australia should use its influence to strengthen safeguards and stop nuclear weapons proliferation. |
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Recommendations: |
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China: Trust and Accountability |
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1.66 | Given that nuclear safeguards are based, to a large degree, on the ability of China to set up effective and independent regulators of Australian uranium, China's track record on accountability should be considered. |
1.67 | The Friends of the Earth argued that China is considered one of the most undemocratic nations on earth. Friends of the Earth further argued that:
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1.68 | Mr Aran Martin, from La Trobe University, in the Paper Nuclear Safeguards and Chinese Accountability, outlined China's abuses of World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements. The paper identifies a lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR), lack of transparency, poor adoption of international product standards, and hidden import barriers and industry subsidies. The paper argues that non-compliance with WTO agreements has implications for Australia's agreement with China on uranium:
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1.69 | ACF and MAPW in their submission noted that:
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1.70 | ACF and MAPW also noted that China has a track record of failure to sign and comply with international norms and international treaties and conventions on a range of issues.33 |
1.71 | A number of submissions to the inquiry raised concerns about human rights abuses and freedom of expression in China. Many of these submissions argued that Australia should not sell uranium to China unless Australia addresses these human right and other abuses. |
1.72 | The Committee report notes the evidence from DFAT explaining that the Australian Government’s approach to pursuing human rights issues with China is through direct discussion and practical cooperation. |
1.73 | The Democrats believe that Australia has a responsibility to protect human rights both at home and abroad; that we need to make it clear that our commitment to human rights is non-negotiable and that we should not ignore human rights abuses for the sake of trade, economic or security deals with other countries. Clearly Australia should be doing more than we currently are to address human rights abuses in China. |
1.74 | Friends of the Earth argued that the lack of civil society safeguards such as lack of labour and human rights and whistleblower protections, and press freedom, actually impact on the potential to safeguard Australian uranium. |
1.75 | Friends of the Earth questioned the Prime Minister's willingness to rely on faith that Australia's uranium will not end up in nuclear weapons, when China has not earned this trust:
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1.76 | China's Government is considered by many countries, organisations and individuals as undemocratic, secretive and has a poor international track record on compliance and accountability. The majority Committee report acknowledges this and provides no convincing evidence that contradicted accountability and transparency concerns raised during this inquiry, and yet still recommended the approval of the treaty. The Democrats believe given China's lack of accountability and transparency, no dependable guarantees can be given that Australia's uranium will not end up in nuclear weapons. |
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Environmental Case |
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1.77 | The Committee report argues that one of the benefits of selling uranium to China was the assistance it would give to China in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. |
1.78 | The Minerals Council told the committee that nuclear power would be a great benefit to China:
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1.79 | In making this claim the Minerals Council has not taken into account the greenhouse gas emissions released as a result of mining, transport, enrichment, reprocessing and waste disposal. While nuclear power may produce less greenhouse gas than coal, other energy sources such as renewable energy are far superior. |
1.80 | Renewable energy sources such as wind, hydro, geothermal, wind and wave produce less than a third of the CO2 emissions of nuclear. |
1.81 | The nuclear industry leaves a huge environmental waste legacy. Thousands of tonnes a year of radioactive waste is the result across the nuclear fuel cycle, whether mine tailings, chemical waste from enrichment, or spent nuclear fuel and the waste from reprocessing plants. |
1.82 | Uranium mining in Australia has a poor environmental track record. Uranium mining creates waste in the form of mine tailings. Tailings can contain up to 80% of the radioactivity of the original ore. |
1.83 | In Australia, tailings are stockpiled and the run-off stored on the mine site in large dams. Ranger mine has so far produced over 30 million tonnes of radioactive tailing waste. Olympic Dam has produced over 60 million tonnes, growing at 10 million tonnes annually. There have been many recorded leaks from tailings dams at Australia's existing mines. In 2002 a Democrats initiated and chaired Senate inquiry examined the regulation, monitoring and reporting of environmental impacts at Ranger and Beverly mines in response to numerous leaks and spills. The majory report of that inquiry concluded that changes were necessary in order to protect the environment and its inhabitants from serious or irreversible damage. Despite the report, questions about the long-term management of toxic tailing waste remain. |
1.84 | Uranium enrichment also produces a massive amount of chemical waste. Every tonne of natural uranium mined and enriched for use in a nuclear reactor produces about 130 kg of enriched fuel, leaving 870 kg of waste. The bulk (96%) of this waste is depleted uranium (DU), for which there are few applications; the United States Department of Energy alone has 470,000 tonnes in store. There is about 1.2 million tonnes of DU now stored around the world. |
1.85 | A typical power plant produces 25-30 tonnes of spent fuel annually. About 12,000 to 14,000 tonnes of spent fuel are produced by power reactors worldwide. This waste is radioactive for hundreds and thousands of years. |
1.86 | ACF noted that the agreement between China and Australia does not include any information or agreement on how China manages its nuclear waste.
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1.87 | There is concern that China would consider using untested and highly risky technology to dispose of a deadly form of waste. |
1.88 | ASNO in its submission to the Committee noted that China had recently joined the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and therefore will be subject to international scrutiny. |
1.89 | The Democrats argue that until China develops an internationally acceptable waste management plan that Australia should not sell uranium to China. |
1.90 | The nuclear cycle also uses a lot of water. Australia is one of the driest continents on earth, and scientists predict that because of climate change our rainfall will decrease by 15%. Uranium mining uses a large quantity of water. Olympic Dam uranium mine in one of the driest parts of Australia extracts over 30 million litres of water from the Great Artesian Basin which has an adverse impact on the fragile mound springs. Expanding uranium mining will place an extra burden on our already fragile water resources. |
1.91 | The negative environmental impact of the nuclear cycle, whether it is here in Australia, Chian or else where in the world, cannot be uncoupled from Australia's decision to contribute to its creation by expanding mining and export. |
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Economic case |
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1.92 | The Committee report argues in its conclusions that the sale of uranium to China will provide economic benefits to Australia. As the Committee report notes, ASNO told the committee that it is estimated an additional $250 million per annum could be derived from sale of uranium to China. |
1.93 | The Committee report also noted the evidence provided by Friends of the Earth, ACF, MAPW and ANAWA that the export value of uranium to China is equivalent to only 0.33 per cent of the value of current Australian exports to China in 2005. |
1.94 | Mr Noonan from ACF told the committee that compared to a recent renewable energy sale to China, the value of uranium exports is small:
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1.95 | Labor MP, Mr Wilkie, appeared to argue that Mr Noonan's argument was a false choice when both uranium and renewable export can be had. The Democrats agree with Mr Noonan's response that renewable energy is clean and sustainable and does not contribute to unresolved nuclear hazards and weapons proliferation:
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1.96 | I agree with the views expressed by environment and nuclear groups, highlighted in the majority Committee report, that "for such a small return, Australia was risking the misuse of its uranium (namely weapons manufacture) and contributing to the environmental and social problems associated with nuclear waste management". |
1.97 | I agree that in the case of uranium the risks (security, social and environmental) clearly outweigh any economic benefit. |
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Conclusion |
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1.98 | The evidence presented to the committee as outlined in this report has led me to a different conclusion to other Committee members. |
1.99 | I remain concerned that the international safeguards remain flawed and there appears to be little political will to address the issues. I agree with the sentiments reflected by ACF and MAPW that:
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1.100 | The Democrats believe that nuclear industry is not necessary, it poses unacceptable proliferation, security and health risks, and there is no solution to the intractable waste problem. |
1.101 | If Australia is concerned about how China will meet its increasing energy needs, the Government should be doing more to promote gas and renewable energy. Renewable energy is cleaner, safer, sustainable, does not lead to nuclear weapons proliferation and does not leave behind an environmental legacy. |
1.102 | I am concerned that, while the Committee report suggests that the Government should promote renewable energy, it does not include this in its recommendations, whilst including a recommendation to investigate Thorium reactors. |
Recommendations: |
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Senator Andrew Bartlett Australian Democrats |
1 | Putting Teeth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime, speech by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, 25/03/06, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n004.html Back |
2 | ACF and MAPW, submission No. 26, p.1. Back |
3 | Putting Teeth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime, speech by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, 25/03/06, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n004.html Back |
4 | Dr Jim Green (2006) Nuclear Power No Solution to Climate Change, p.4. Back |
5 | An Illusion of Protection , ACF and MAPW, p.37. Back |
6 | An Illusion of Protection , ACF and MAPW, p.37. Back |
7 | An Illusion of Protection , ACF and MAPW, p.37. Back |
8 | Dr Jim Green (2006) Nuclear Power No Solution to Climate Change, p.4. Back |
9 | ASNO, Submission No.30, p.5. Back |
10 | ACF and MAPW, Submission No. 26, p.3. Back |
11 | Mr James Courtney , Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006 , p.2. Back |
12 | An Illusion of Protection , ACF and MAPW, p.37 Back |
13 | Dr Jim Green (2006) Nuclear Power No Solution to Climate Change, p.4. Back |
14 | An Illusion of Protection , ACF and MAPW, p.ii-iii. Back |
15 | An Illusion of Protection , ACF and MAPW, p.iii Back |
16 | Putting Teeth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime, speech by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, 25/03/06, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n004.html Back |
17 | ACF and MAPW, Submission No. 26, p.7. Back |
18 | Friends of the Earth, Submission No. 24, pp.10-11. Back |
19 | Putting Teeth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime, speech by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, 25/03/06, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2006/ebsp2006n004.html Back |
20 | Friends of the Earth, Submission No. 24, p.12. Back |
21 | ACF and MAPW, Submission No. 26, p.6. Back |
22 | FOE, Submission no. 24, p.15. Back |
23 | An Illusion of Protection , ACF and MAPW, p. 5. Back |
24 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript Evidence, 5 October 2006, p.8. Back |
25 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript Evidence, 5 October 2006, p.8. Back |
26 | ACF and MAPW, Submission No. 26, p.6. Back |
27 | Dr Jim Green , Transcript Evidence, 25 October 2006 , p.10. Back |
28 | ACF and MAPW, Submission No. 26, p.1. Back |
29 | ACF and MAPW, Submission No. 26, p.7. Back |
30 | Friends of the Earth, Submission No. 24, p.7. Back |
31 | ACF and MAPW, Submission No.26, pp.21-22. Back |
32 | ACF and MAPW, Submission No.26, p.2. Back |
33 | ACF and MAPW, Submission No.26, p.2. Back |
34 | Friends of the Earth, Submission No. 24. p.7. Back |
35 | Mr Peter Morris, Minerals Council, Transcript of Evidence, 16 October 2006, p.2. Back |
36 | WILPF, Submission 29, p.4. Back |
37 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript Evidence, 5 October 2006 , p.8. Back |
38 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript Evidence, 5 October 2006 , p.8. Back |
39 | An Illusion of Protection, ACF and MAPW, p. 5. Back |
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