


THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Chair of the Senate

INTERIM REPORT from the
JOINT COMMITTEE on
FOREIGN AFFAIRS and DEFENCE



THE LEBANON CRISIS

- Humanitarian Aspects

December 1976

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INTERIM REPORT
FROM THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

"In an age when we hear so much of progress and civilization, is it not a matter of urgency, since unhappily we cannot always avoid wars, to press forward in a human and truly civilized spirit the attempt to prevent, or at least to alleviate, the horrors of war?"

Henry Dunant, 1862.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

"The significance of the domestic crisis in Lebanon for the fragile Middle East situation and the possible international repercussions".

NOTE

The emphasis in this interim report is on the humanitarian aspects of the Lebanon crisis and on ways that Australia can help. It is the intention to issue a more comprehensive report during the next Session of Parliament.

MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

Chairman - Senator the Hon. Sir Magnus Cormack, K.B.E.

Deputy Chairman - The Hon. K.E. Beazley, M.P.

Senator the Hon. R. Bishop	The Hon. R.V. Garland, M.P.
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Senator K.W. Sibraa	Mr R. Jacobi, M.P.
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The Hon. G.M. Bryant, E.D., M.P.	Mr J.W. Sullivan, M.P.
Mr K.L. Fry, M.P.	

MEMBERS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST
(SUB-COMMITTEE B)

The following members of the above Committee investigated the terms of reference and reported to the whole Committee:

The Hon. K.E. Beazley, M.P. (Chairman)

The Hon. I.L. Robinson, M.P. (Deputy Chairman)

Senator D.B. Scott	Senator K.W. Sibraa
Senator the Hon. J.M. Wheeldon	Mr R. Jacobi, M.P.

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December 1976

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FOREWORD

Lebanon - Why It Matters to Australia

Australia has been involved in two World Wars, and in each war the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean were theatres of action for Australian armed forces. The outcome of the Suez Affair in 1956 may have modified the Australian conventional wisdom that the Suez Canal was a "jugular vein", "a lifeline", and the classic Imperial line of communication upon which Australians once believed themselves to be dependent is a thing of the past - the chain of naval coaling stations and bases represented by Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Bombay, Trincomalee, Singapore and Cockburn Sound. There is a significant strand of Australian opinion which seems unaware that this chain exists no longer, but most opinion has moved to the more relevant concept of the Middle East as the source of vital oil supplies.

Lebanon has a lesser strategic significance to Australia than the Persian Gulf generally and such nations as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Gulf Emirates specifically. Nevertheless the Lebanese disaster is unsettling the whole Arab world. It is too superficial a view to regard it as a postponement of an Arab Israeli conflict similar to those of 1967 and 1973. It is leading to a re-definition of Super Power attitudes to and relations with nations of the region, notably with Syria. But,

above all, for Australia, it is probably a litmus test of compassion towards a community which has a significant number of representatives in Australia in the form of the Lebanese ethnic community. It is a test of whether a relatively "lucky country" regards itself as having an obligation to set out to heal the hurts and hates in the world, and to bring the order implicit in the graces of compassion, responsibility and mediation into an insane situation. The first thing to note as background to everything in this interim report is that the Lebanese consensus has broken down and the Lebanese situation - factionalism rampant, pointless killing, denial of fellowship to other cultural groups than one's own and scarcely real fellowship in one's own - is insane.

The second thing to note is that the United Nations is doing nothing. There is a common vested interest in Palestinians, Maronites, Muslims and in Lebanon's neighbours - to try to get a settlement which their group can dictate. Hence the conflict continues. Hence the United Nations, despite the complete intelligence given by the world press, acts as if nothing is happening in and around Lebanon.

Despite these political considerations and pre-
tences it is the contention of this report that Australia should care about the fate of Lebanese people and act to bring help and healing into the situation, ameliorate its consequences for injured and displaced people, and inspire constructive motives in world counsels about Lebanon.

K. E. Beazley
(K. E. Beazley)

Chairman of the Sub-Committee
on the Middle East

December 1976

INTRODUCTION

The resolutions of 17 and 18 March 1976 passed by both Houses of Parliament establishing the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence empowered the Committee to consider and report on:

- a. foreign affairs and defence generally; and
- b. such matters as may be referred to the Committee by:
 - . the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
 - . the Minister for Defence, or
 - . by resolution of either House of Parliament.

On 4 May 1976, the whole Committee resolved "that a Sub-Committee to be known as the 'Sub-Committee on the Middle East' investigate and report on the significance of the domestic crisis in Lebanon for the fragile Middle East situation and the possible international repercussions." At this time it seemed that the Lebanon crisis could have serious international repercussions as well as in Lebanon and there was a natural concern in the Australian Lebanese community for their kinsmen in Lebanon.

On the same day, the Committee appointed six of its members to the 'Sub-Committee on the Middle East.' The Hon. K.E. Beazley, M.P. was appointed as Chairman. The Sub-Committee held its first meeting on 5 May 1976 and agreed that it should do more than just diagnose the agony of a nation, but rather it should suggest ways to bring healing to the situation.

It was decided that due to the sensitive nature of the inquiry that hearings would be held 'in camera', but some evidence has subsequently been published. It was considered that there was no need to advertise the inquiry in the national press and the Sub-Committee on the Middle East was able to obtain by invitation a large number of excellent witnesses expressing a broad spectrum of views. Informal discussions were also held with the relevant Ambassadors, Ministers of State, and persons with a first hand knowledge of the Lebanon crisis.

The Sub-Committee tried to ensure reasonable representation from the relevant ethnic communities. Although the Committee believes that this has been achieved there were a few persons who declined the invitation to make a submission. The Committee recognises the difficult position faced by witnesses and potential witnesses from the Australian Lebanese community.

So far the Sub-Committee of the Middle East has met on 20 occasions in Canberra or Melbourne. On 17 of these occasions the Sub-Committee heard evidence or held informal discussions, with the persons and organisations listed in Annex D. At this stage the transcript of the Sub-Committee's private hearings has amounted to over 1,100 pages but it is unlikely that there will be a need for many more hearings before the Committee makes its next report.

The Committee intends to make a more comprehensive report to the Parliament during the next session. By that time the intentions of some of the main participants in the Lebanon crisis (particularly those of Syria) are

likely to be clearer than at the moment. The Committee has been faced with a constantly changing situation. However, there is a clear need to report now on some of the humanitarian aspects mentioned in this interim report. This is particularly so because there is a probability that the situation in Lebanon may soon improve to such an extent that Australia can make a greater contribution to the alleviation of hardship of the Lebanese people.

The Sub-Committee on the Middle East saw benefit in bringing several matters to the early attention of the relevant Ministers. Its Chairman wrote to the Minister for Post and Telecommunications (20 August 1976), the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (24 August 1976) and the Minister for Foreign Affairs (1 October 1976), informing them of some of the Sub-Committee's tentative findings which are now contained in this interim report and seeking comment from the Ministers.

The report of the Sub-Committee has been examined by the whole Committee and adopted by it on 30 November 1976.

December 1976

1. BACKGROUND TO THE LEBANON CRISIS
AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Lebanon's Complex Society

1.1 To appreciate the crisis which has shaken Lebanon over the last 19 months, it is important to understand the complex nature of Lebanon's society which involves numerous religious, political, parochial and para-military groupings. In a country about one-sixth the size of Tasmania there are over twenty significant factions competing for power (see Annex A for details of the main factions). Rather than a straight-forward contest between "Christian" or "Moslem" or between "Right" or "Left" as frequently described by the Press, there has been a constant regrouping of alliances among the various factions which have cut across ideological or religious lines. These shifting coalitions dominated by a few traditional leaders demonstrate that the Lebanese political system is only superficially modern.

1.2 In recent years the Arab world has tried to obtain closer Lebanese identification with Arab causes, particularly in the conflict with Israel. Although the Lebanese have made a significant contribution to Arab culture, Lebanon differs from other Arab countries in many ways. Its emigrants over several generations have scattered throughout the world so that the people of Lebanese descent easily outnumber the three million people believed to be residing in Lebanon at the beginning of the crisis.

1.3 The overseas Lebanese maintain close contact with their kinsmen and their remittances continue to contribute to the well-being of their relatives in Lebanon. Through

them Lebanon is the centre of an international community extending throughout North and South America, France and Australia as well as the Arab world. This accentuates Lebanon's cosmopolitanism which is unique in the Arab world. Since the ancient Phoenicians the Lebanese have sought to trade with countries around the Mediterranean, and the French have exerted a strong cultural influence ever since the 1860s when they adopted a protective role towards the Maronite Christians.

Religious Balance and Communal Grievances

1.4 The mosaic Lebanese religious structure also differs from the other Arab countries in that Lebanon's combined Christian sects have usually made up about half the population. As politics and religion are closely interwoven, it is necessary to understand the intricate "Confessional Balance" in Lebanon. When modern Lebanon was founded in 1943 an unwritten "National Pact" was drawn up by the representatives of the various religious groups. This allocated Parliamentary representation on a ratio of 6 Christians to 5 Muslims based on the 1932 census.

1.5 All political, administrative and military positions, including the 99 seats in Parliament (Chamber of Deputies) are based on this confessional balance. The ratio of Parliamentary Representation has remained unchanged since 1960 based on the last accurate survey of confessional allegiance (1958) indicated in the following figures:¹

1. Source: The Middle East and North Africa 1975-76: A Survey and Reference Book (22nd Edition) pages 510 and 513.

<u>Religion</u> (1958)	<u>Parliamentary Representation</u> (Since 1960 Electoral Reform)	
<u>Christians</u> (792,000)		
Maronite Catholics	424,000	30
Greek Orthodox	150,000	11
Greek (Melkite) and Latin Rites	91,000	6
Armenian Orthodox	69,000	4
Armenian Catholics	14,500	1
Protestants	14,000	1
		<u>53</u>
<u>Muslims</u> (624,000)		
Sunni	286,000	20
Shia	250,000	19
Druzes	88,000	6
		<u>45</u>
<u>Jews</u>	6,000	-
		<u>—</u>
	TOTAL	99 (includes 1 for — Minorities)

1.6 The above-mentioned religious communities are not neatly separated in distinct regions of the country. However, some indication is given on the map at Figure 1 (to be compared with Table 1) showing the Lebanese electoral districts with the allocation of seats to religious groups in accordance with proportional representation.

1.7 The President is elected by Parliament every six years and in accordance with the National Pact he must be a Maronite Christian. He appoints the Prime Minister who is always a Sunni Muslim. The Prime Minister nominates a

TABLE 1
LEBANESE ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND
ALLOCATIONS TO RELIGIONS, 1968
(Illustrated on Map 1)

Electoral District Number	Locality	Number of seats in Parliament	Allocation to Religions									
			Sunnite	Shiite	Druze	Maronite	Greek Catholic	Greek Orthodox	Protestant	Armenian Catholic	Armenian Orthodox	Miscellaneous Minorities
1.	Beirut	8				1	1	1	1	1	3	
2.	Beirut	3	1	1								1
3.	Beirut	5	4					1				
4.	Baabda	5		1	1	3						
5.	Matn	5				3		1			1	
6.	Shuf	8	2		2	3	1					
7.	Alayh	5			2	2		1				
8.	Kasrawan	4				4						
9.	Jubayl	3		1		2						
10.	Saida (City)	1	1									
11.	Saida (District)	2		1			1					
12.	Nabatiyah	3		3								
13.	Tyre	3		3								
14.	Bint Jubayl	2		2								
15.	Marjuyun	4	1	2				1				
16.	Jazzin	3				2	1					
17.	Zahlah	5	1	1		1	1	1				
18.	Biqā	3	1		1			1				
19.	Baalbak	7	1	4		1	1					
20.	Tripoli (City)	5	4					1				
21.	Tripoli (District)	2	2									
22.	Akkar	4	2			1		1				
23.	Zgharta	3				3						
24.	Kurah	2						2				
25.	Basharri	2				2						
26.	Batrun	2				2						
TOTALS		99	20	19	6	30	6	11	1	1	4	1

Source: Adapted from Charles Rizk, *Le Regime politique Libanais*, 1966.

Cabinet for approval by the Chamber of Deputies which since the 1960 Electoral Reform Bill has continued the ratio of six Christians to five Muslims. The speaker of the Chamber of Deputies is always a Shia Muslim and the Army Commander a Maronite Christian; other key positions are similarly allocated to religious groups according to the original confessional balance.

1.8 Here lies one of the basic causes of the present conflict as the Muslims, including the ancient Druze sect, resent the dominating position of the Christians (especially the Maronites) both in political and economic terms. It is generally accepted that there are stark contrasts in living standards in Lebanon in which as a general rule the Muslim communities suffer by comparison in economic and educational achievements. However, class differences have a tendency to transcend religious differences. Regional contrasts are also marked, particularly with the underdeveloped south where the Shias are predominant.

1.9 The Muslims are confident that they now outnumber the Christians, as the latter have a higher emigration rate and the Christian annual rate of increase of 1.3 per cent is half that of the Muslims. Christian fears that they are outnumbered seem to be reflected by the fact that they have opposed a census in Lebanon ever since the "benchmark" census of 1932, and that they have not requested refugee status for the large number of "displaced persons" who have left Lebanon during the current crisis.

1.10 The precarious balance between Christians and Muslims has been altered from time to time because Lebanon has generously given refuge to people from various parts of

the Middle East including the Palestinians who are largely Muslim. Lebanon has also provided a livelihood to up to half a million Syrians. Ever since independence Lebanon's predominantly Muslim neighbour has always been treated with reserve by Lebanon's Christians because they fear Syrian ambitions for the revival of a "Greater Syria", involving at least parts of the former Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon.

The Palestinians and the Lebanon Crisis

1.11 After King Hussein moved against the Palestinians in Jordan during "Black September" 1970 their numbers in Lebanon swelled to over 250,000. This enlarged presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon, when superimposed on Lebanon's other problem areas, proved to be the vital factor in the current Lebanon crisis. Lebanon became increasingly important to the Palestinian guerilla organisations, as it was their last base contiguous to Israel. Of the other neighbouring countries, Syria and Egypt, while asserting friendship, have always closely controlled the activities of the Palestinians, and Jordan severely mauled them after they interfered in Jordanian internal affairs. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) cannot claim to have a significant military impact in the country it aspires to liberate and it is not given an unqualified welcome in neighbouring countries to Israel.

1.12 The Lebanese Government, possessing only a feeble Army, found itself confronted by a second authority inside Lebanon in the form of the PLO acting through a variety of factions. The Palestinians became almost a state within a state. Gradually the raids staged by the Palestinians

from Lebanese territory, against what were mainly civilian targets, provoked Israeli reprisals on Lebanese soil. This generated a demand by civilians in Southern Lebanon for protection by their government and also resentment against the Palestinians. This resentment existed particularly among the right-wing Maronites, who considered themselves the guardians of Lebanese sovereignty. Especially galling for such Lebanese was the indignity of being asked to produce their identity card to the Palestinians whom most Lebanese regarded as foreigners, and at best as guests.

1.13 The Right-Wing Christian leadership, particularly the Phalangists, began preparations for a showdown against the Palestinians with more intensive training of their private militias. All factions felt the need to retain militias, as the Army (which contained members of all the major communities) tried to keep itself "above" the internecinal communal strife. This meant it abdicated from any function of maintaining order or national unity.

1.14 However, the Palestinians had learnt a grim lesson in Jordan where they had been easily isolated by King Hussein's Army. They set out to merge with part of Lebanese society, involving themselves with the Left-Wing and Muslim organisations, which they helped to train and arm. It was this part of the Lebanese society which had a least some identification with the Arab struggle against Israel, but it probably had a prior commitment to changing the communal balance of power within Lebanon and moved readily to effect this.

1.15 In their new Lebanese sanctuary, some of the Palestinian "camps" were turned into underground fortresses and as Tel al-Zaatar were in key positions separating

Christian areas. Clashes with the predominantly Christian-
led Lebanese Army in 1969 and 1973 made it inevitable that
the Palestinians would be involved in an all-out Lebanese
civil war. It could be that to create a new Lebanon was
conceived to be a first step to launch attacks on Israel.

1.16 Despite the fact that the PLO was recognised at the
Rabat conference as the sole representative of the
Palestinians, many of the more moderate or conservative
Arab states treated it with suspicion because PLO left-
wing factions preached that revolution in these states
was a pre-condition for the destruction of the State of
Israel. The PLO rejected any notion of negotiation with
Israel and in this the PLO has been supported by Iraq and
Libya. The two latter "Rejection Front" members have been
to the fore-front in their support of the Left with money,
arms and even volunteers. The participation of Iraqi
soldiers in Lebanon, ostensibly as Palestinians, as well
as a variety of other mercenaries fighting with the Left,
were factors in the conflict whose existence was supported
by eye-witnesses before the Committee.

1.17 A number of incidents over several months preceded
the severe hostilities in Lebanon which were finally
sparked off on 13 April 1975. On that day a bus load
of Palestinians returning from a funeral drove through a
Maronite area where a church was being dedicated; the
Phalangists massacred the Palestinians and subsequently
the fighting spread throughout Lebanon. The initial
Christian attacks on the Palestinians were often deflected
by the Muslims who saw the developing civil war as an
opportunity to rectify political and economic grievances.
It is not the intention here to go into the details of the

fighting or the numerous efforts to achieve the various cease fires, except to say that the Muslim-Leftist-Palestinian coalition was getting the upper hand when an important development occurred which was to change the course of the civil war.

Syrian Influence on the Crisis

1.18 In April 1976 Syrian regulars commenced a slow advance into Lebanon, causing them to clash with Leftist and Palestinian forces. This was not widely predicted as the Syrians had been staunch supporters of the Palestinian cause. However, Syria had maintained close control of her own Palestinians including Al Saiqa (Syrian-backed Palestinian military group) and had tried to avoid their direct involvement in the fighting in Lebanon.

1.19 The influence of Syrian troops in Lebanon has been decisive despite their sometimes slow progress against entrenched Palestinian positions. The strength of Syrian troops has been alleged at various times to number somewhere between 8,000 and 40,000. Although their strength is believed to have been usually no more than 22,000, the Syrians due to their close proximity have the ability to deploy sufficient troops to achieve their objectives in Lebanon.

1.20 The Syrians were recognised as the leading "confrontation State" against Israel, and because of their "radical" nature have received massive Russian arms supplies. It is therefore important to report on the reasons for the crucial switch of Syrian support to the Christian-Rightists.

1.21 Ever since Dr Kissinger arranged the Sinai accords between Israel and Egypt, the latter has been able to concentrate on strengthening the Egyptian economy. In March 1976, Egypt abrogated her Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with Russia. This has left Egypt in a weakened military position until she establishes an alternative source of arms, and Syria would therefore risk fighting a war against Israel on her own.

1.22 Such a risk was always regarded as present while Syria was seen to be supporting the Palestinians in Lebanon. Israel would most likely consider an invasion of parts of Southern Lebanon unavoidable, precipitating a very dangerous situation in the Middle East with all its consequences for the world. Furthermore, if Lebanon was partitioned, Israel would be likely to react violently to a Leftist-Muslim state on her northern border in which the Palestinians and Syria had a major influence, enabling another front against Israel to be formed. Thus Syria could become involved in a conflict at a time not of her own choosing.

1.23 The Palestinians and their Muslim "Left-Wing" allies are in sympathy with radical Iraq. The rival and competitive Ba'ath regimes of Syria and Iraq regard each other with a great deal of suspicion and hostility. The real source of tension is deeper than the dispute over the Euphrates water or the oil pipeline, and their relations have deteriorated considerably since Hafez Assad assumed power in 1971. He is Syria's first Shi'ite Alawite President and is regarded with suspicion by Iraq's mainly Sunni leadership. The latter has given refuge to the former Ba'ath leadership of Syria which was overthrown in

1966; many of these military leaders are now with the Iraqi Army. This has caused Syria to maintain large forces on her border with Iraq and to spare no effort to avoid a victory by the pro-Iraqi Palestinian-Leftist coalition in Lebanon.

1.24 President Assad is a member of the Alawite minority (only 11.5 per cent of Syria's population) who are mainly a mountain people, in the sense of having been driven to refuge there in the past. It has been said that he has a natural sympathy for the Maronites of Lebanon who had historically sought refuge in the Mount Lebanon area. As Assad apparently has a vision of a Greater Syria, he would not like to be deprived of the expertise and comparative affluence of Lebanon's Christians. Assad's belief in the destined unity of Syria and Lebanon was shown in an interview he gave to "Al-Anwar" on 10 August 1972. Assad indicated that he regarded Syria and Lebanon as a single country and that Syria's economic prosperity guaranteed the future of the Lebanese people. At the time when Syria's troops intervened in strength in Lebanon, he said:

"It is difficult to distinguish between the security of Lebanon, in the wider sense of the word, and the security of Syria."

President Assad, in an interview with al-Hawadith, Middle East News Agency, June 25, 1975.

President Sarkis

1.25 Possibly indicative of Syria's influence in Lebanese affairs was the election on 8 May of Syria's preferred Presidential candidate, Elias Sarkis, a Maronite and former

Governor of Lebanon's Central Bank. Although Sarkis was not able to take over from President Franjieh until 23 September 1976, he is believed to have a better chance to enforce peace than his predecessor. In his conciliatory inaugural speech at Chtama, Sarkis admitted that the Lebanese political system needs to be reformed on a non-sectarian basis. However, the Left suspects Sarkis of being an extension of the old system and his term is likely to be overshadowed by the manner and timing of his election. In a situation with some Parliamentary members abstaining and the country overshadowed by Syrian guns it is inevitable that there is a loss of authority in his position.

1.26 The apparent determination of Syria to bring the Palestinians to order is posing serious problems for President Sarkis who believes that Lebanese problems cannot be negotiated until the Syrian-Palestinian conflict is resolved. Sarkis is under pressure from moderate Muslim leaders to secure some commitment from Present Assad for an eventual Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. As the Syrians want Sarkis to have sufficient prestige to conduct negotiations among the warring factions, they may have given him a pledge to withdraw their forces eventually, knowing that they can always return in strength if peace negotiations fail.

Recent Developments

1.27 In recent months the original struggle for greater political influence by the Muslims and Leftists against the Christian establishment has been eclipsed by the Palestinian struggle against Syria's growing dominance.

1.28 Although until recently there has been no real change in the pattern of numerous brief cease-fires interrupting the

fighting, it has become increasingly likely that in the end Syria will succeed in imposing its own solution in Lebanon which would preserve much of the Christians' position vis-a-vis the Palestinians and Leftist-Muslim Lebanese. Syria seems moreover to be committed to the maintenance of a united Lebanon on whose future it would exert a significant influence.

1.29 At the same time Syria is evidently determined to bring the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon under its own control so as to strengthen Syria's position in future Middle East negotiations. This is the situation as seen by Syria's Middle East opponents. Syria could argue that it is trying to bring rationality and discipline to an anarchic force which has wrecked the possibility of intelligent action against Israel. Syria's interests may involve the dissolution of the current PLO leadership, including replacement of Yasser Arafat, and its replacement by pro-Syrian Palestinians. Given Syria's military strength (there may be as many as 22,000 Syrian-controlled troops as well as 150 tanks and some aircraft in Lebanon at the present time) it is quite likely that most, if not all, of these aims will be achieved.

1.30 While Syria is militarily the superior force in Lebanon, it has moved with caution against its opponents, and whether right or wrong in its objectives, Syria's objectives do appear to be rational ones in a largely irrational situation. For domestic political reasons the Syrians have been anxious to avoid sustaining heavy casualties against the Palestinian-Leftist forces. Evidence was given that some Syrian casualties were being treated in Jordanian hospitals to avoid the adverse reaction at home consequent upon

apparent casualties.

1.31 Syria has interspersed its military advances with offers to conduct bilateral negotiations with the Palestinian-Leftist alliance. Numerous attempts have been made to hold these negotiations, but they have normally foundered on the tough demands of the Syrians (for example that PLO units should return to their barracks and that a PLO change in its leadership is necessary). It could be that Syrian offers to negotiate were tactical. Syria's leaders were apparently seeking to deflect Arab criticism from their actions, to expose the essential absence of other effective actions for bringing peace to Lebanon than those taken by Syria, and to wear down the military capacities and upset the preparedness of their Palestinian opponents.

1.32 The decision of Syria's President Assad to attend the Riyadh conference (also attended by Presidents Sadat of Egypt and Sarkis of Lebanon, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, Prince Sabah of Kuwait and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat) from 16 to 18 October and the ensuing Arab League summit in Cairo from 25 to 26 October appears to reflect a major change of attitudes in the Arab World probably under pressure from Saudi Arabia. The decisions of the Riyadh conference, which have been ratified by the Cairo meeting (significantly with the sole opposition of Iraq) represent a hopeful development in the trauma of nineteen months of fighting in Lebanon.

1.33 Under the conference agreement a 30,000 man peace-keeping force is to be set up to oversee and protect the cease-fire declared at Riyadh. Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, South Yemen, Sudan and Libya will contribute to the force but the bulk of the force will be Syrian troops (Syria has

offered 20,000). Also as part of the settlement the Palestinians have agreed to abide by the 1969 Cairo agreement (for details see Annex B), which regulated the carrying and possession of firearms by Palestinians and restricted them to their refugee camps and the Arkoub area in Southern Lebanon. If they accept this in reality it will be contrary to their behaviour for years past and will be a major move towards sanity.

1.34 So far the most recent truce has held reasonably well in most of Lebanon but realism must take account of more than fifty temporary cease-fires in the past. Furthermore in the south, Christian forces have launched a sustained offensive against Palestinian positions, allegedly and probably with some Israeli support. So far the Lebanese Christians have declared their refusal to permit the Palestinians to re-form in the south of Lebanon. They have reluctantly received the new Arab peace-keeping force into Christian-held areas. Previously the Christian military leaders had announced the formation of their own peace-keeping force to oversee the cessation of hostilities.

1.35 Israel's support for the Christians, if in fact this support was given, was no doubt motivated by a desire to prevent the Palestinians from re-establishing their bases in the south of Lebanon as a springboard for attack on Israel; but any Israeli intervention will certainly complicate the problems of enforcing Lebanon's cease fire. Part of the Riyadh agreement was that the Palestinians should return to the bases set aside for them and the Syrians are committed to fulfilling this requirement. Already there have been signs of strain in Syrian-Christian relations. However, the Christians have had no option but to stand aside and allow

the Syrian Army (now turned "peace keepers") to take control.

1.36 While the continued unrest will make peace-making more difficult, it is premature to belittle the arrangements worked out at Riyadh because the major participants in the conflict, except the Christians, have accepted the Riyadh accord and are attempting to make the Riyadh agreement effective. It is reasonable to assume that the Syrians will exert steady pressure on the Lebanese Christians to make them adapt their policy to the Riyadh arrangements.

1.37 The success of recent Syrian advances against the Palestinians has led to new problems. The number of refugees in the Christian and Syrian zones enlarged rapidly, and there have been reports of atrocities committed by the Christian militia against Druzes (and by the Christian militia against other Christians for alleged collusion with Muslims). In villages recently captured from Palestinian-Leftist forces, there are reports of atrocities seemingly in retaliation for earlier desecrations and atrocities against the Christians. Syria is, after all predominantly Muslim, and such incidents have reportedly created strains between the Syrians and their Christian allies. Rivalry between the various Christian militias is also a significant problem. In Lebanon factionalism is a disease.

1.38 Strains are apparent on the Palestinian side and there has been fighting in Beirut between conciliatory Palestinians who might be willing to negotiate for an end to the fighting and uncompromising Palestinians, who, with Iraqi support, are hostile to the idea of any negotiations. Iraqi troops and members of the Iraqi-sponsored Arab Liberation Front in Lebanon reportedly number some 4,000. This internal division on both sides of the conflict represents a major obstacle to

Syrian plans and threatens the recent cease fire.

1.39 It is probably Iraq's willingness to support strategies of annihilation within Lebanon that has convinced Syria, despite her Muslim sympathies, that Iraqi objectives are insane. Syria is suspected of aiming ultimately for a "Greater Syria" which would include Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Egypt would oppose that. Syria is alternatively suspected of aiming to create an effective anti-Israeli front of the same elements. Immediately however, Syria's interest is clearly to secure Lebanese stability.

Israel's Attitude

1.40 Because Israel is the focal point of conventional Arab hostility, the Israeli ability to influence developments in the Lebanese civil war was always very limited. In the early stages of the conflict when a Leftist-Palestinian victory appeared likely the Israelis made adjustments preparatory to accepting the fact of a hostile government in Beirut - "adjust and endure" might almost be an Israeli watchword. Syria's direct entry into the civil war, has been welcomed privately by Israel so long as Syria has pursued the objective of pacification in Lebanon.

1.41 Although the Israelis made clear to Syria, through the United States, the unacceptability of Syrian military activity near the Israeli border, it was also made clear to Syria that Israel would not intervene in response to Syrian actions which did not transgress this obvious Israeli strategic interest. So far Syria has carefully abided by this informal arrangement. There has been no evidence of the introduction of Syrian military installations in Southern Lebanon that would occasion the direct threat which would

concern Israel.

1.42 The Israel-Syria understanding has meant that until October there has been little fighting in the southern area of Lebanon. The Israelis have provided humanitarian aid to villages in the region and have been encouraging Christian villagers not to co-operate with the de facto PLO administration in Southern Lebanon. There have even been reports of Lebanese Arab Army co-operation on administrative matters with the Israelis but this is likely to cease.

1.43 Israel's support for Syria's actions against the Palestinians is based on its desire to have the Palestinians kept within the bounds of rational action by the Arab states. Palestinian actions against Israel would then be attributable to one or other of the Arab Governments. Responsibility could be assigned and negotiations would be possible on a government-to-government basis about the role of the Palestinians in a possible Middle East settlement.

1.44 Israel is not expected to object strenuously to a Lebanon indirectly dominated by Syria, particularly if Syrian forces and offensive missile sites are not introduced into the area south of the Litani River. This tacit understanding is possible provided the Israelis do not sense that Syria is developing a "Northern and Eastern Front" against Israel including at least Jordan and Lebanese territory - the strategy, in effect, of the Greater Syria to which Egypt also might object.

Likely Developments Within Syria and Lebanon

1.45 Initially there appears to have been considerable opposition within Saiqa (the Syrian-controlled Palestinian guerilla force) and to a lesser degree within the Syrian

regular forces to the idea of fighting Palestinians and fellow Muslims. The determination of the Syrian government not to bow to this opposition and its policy of offering to negotiate with Palestinians-Leftists appears to have undermined any challenges to President Assad's regime which might have developed within Syria arising out of the Lebanese situation. In fact the President's position may well have been strengthened domestically, and his prestige heightened in the Middle East and with the U.S. and U.S.S.R., as a result of the present success of his policies. In the wider Middle East situation Syrian dominance of the Palestinian movement in Lebanon, and the close ties President Assad has been establishing with Jordan, will give Syria considerable military and political bargaining power in any Middle East negotiations.

1.46 While Syria may well succeed ultimately in imposing its own solution in Lebanon, the current uncertain situation can be expected to continue for some time. In the longer term, it would seem inevitable that while the important position of the Christians will largely be maintained, they will have to accept political adjustments which will remedy the principal Muslim grievances. The remedy could take the form of the agreement worked out in February of this year, which proposed a half-and-half distribution of major political and administrative positions in Lebanon between Christian and Muslims together with limitations on the activities within Lebanon of the Palestinian movement.

Implications for Middle East Peace

1.47 One of the most destructive effects of the continued fighting in Lebanon is that it is a barrier to the development

of a new Arab thinking - which may motivate a united Arab position from which to negotiate a settlement of the Middle East conflict with Israel. The Arab unity achieved by Egypt's President Sadat up to the October 1973 war has now been completely undermined. The Lebanon crisis has caused further distrust of Gaddafi, distrust of Iraq, and, in Egypt's case, distrust of the Soviet Union for Soviet continued support of Syria.

1.48 Furthermore, reduced Arab expectations of effective American diplomacy occasioned by the recent U.S. Presidential election campaign has slowed the momentum of any efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Middle East problem. President-elect Carter has not made many commitments on the Middle East situation but he has pledged to reduce US defence expenditure. This may not be a good omen for Israel which will be expected to make concessions to the Arabs in exchange for the continued large scale United States support. Expectations are held that renewed moves toward negotiations will take place early next year under American and perhaps Soviet prompting.

1.49 Syria's determination to achieve control and rationality in the PLO, however, may augur well in the longer term. The possibility exists that the Arab governments would be able to ensure an operative agreement with Israel for a settlement which takes some account of Palestinian demands and sensibilities - for example a Palestinian "homeland" in the West Bank-Gaza Strip area - but one which falls short of the ultimate Palestinian objective of eclipsing Israel and creating a State of Palestine, almost

certainly involving the expulsion of Jews. This could involve, in fact, the expulsion of all Jewish families not antedating 1882 in their occupancy of land in Palestine.

1.50 The Committee intends to make a more comprehensive analysis of the matters raised in this chapter in its next report. As noted before, by that time the intentions of the main participants - particularly Syria may be clarified. The aim in this chapter has been to give background material so that the humanitarian considerations in the following chapters can be seen in their proper context. However the conclusions and recommendations that follow are relevant to the theme of this report.

Australian Representation in the Levant

1.51 Syria through successful intervention in Lebanon has greatly extended national influence not only in the Levant but in the Arab World generally. Syria is the leading confrontation state against Israel notwithstanding the bellicose war of words and the financial support for anti-Israeli action that emanates from Libya and Iraq.

1.52 Since there is no likelihood of an early return of full Australian resident representation in Lebanon, the Committee urges that Australia establish a diplomatic mission in Damascus. (This would also facilitate the establishment of an Australian Immigration post in Syria - see Para. 3.37). The Ambassador in Damascus could also be accredited to Amman, and to Beirut with a resident Chargé d'Affaires, as soon as the situation in that city allows.

Australian Diplomatic Initiatives

1.53 There has been blatant interference in Lebanon's internal affairs by several countries; this is quite apart from the Palestinians who were accepted in good faith as refugees and who have since adopted such a destructive role in Lebanon's internal affairs. This outside intervention in different ways is especially attributable to Syria, Iraq and Libya. While there may well be some benefit from Syrian intervention, whatever Syria's motives, without doubt the intervention of Iraq and Libya has tended to frustrate a solution to the Lebanon crisis.

1.54 There has been a great reluctance on Australia's part, as well as in the cases of many other nations, to raise this issue of foreign intervention in international forums such as the United Nations, despite the fact that there has been a flagrant breach of the United Nations' Charter. This cannot simply be due to the apparent futility of taking such matters to the United Nations and is more likely due to the one sided selection of issues involved in deference to the fact that it would not be welcomed by some Arab states. However if enough member states of the United Nations try to bring the plight of Lebanon into the United Nations forum, if they do not hesitate to designate the callousness and cruelty in the situation, and try to limit the supply of arms to Lebanon then there is at least some hope that moral persuasion can have some effect.

1.55 This is particularly so if countries like Australia can privately convince the United States and other Western

powers to give a firm lead in this regard. The Committee recommends that the Australian Government take such action. It should not be precluded by a view that there is scant hope of success.

1.56 In this Chapter the Committee has given the necessary background for this interim report as well as a brief assessment of recent developments. The Arab Peace Keeping Force dominated by Syria is now in position in most parts of Lebanon. This does not mean an end to Lebanon's problems. The traditional 'National Pact' between Lebanon's Christians and Muslims has disintegrated and both sides will retain their hatreds and most of their arms. There are still the problems of constitutional reform, Lebanon's social contrasts and the Palestinians.

See also: Conclusions 2 to 6 (pages 79 to 81), 20 (page 86)
Recommendations 1, 2 and 4 (pages 88 and 89).

2. LEBANON'S NEED FOR HELP AND
PROSPECTS FOR AUSTRALIAN AID

The Human Tragedy and Devastation in Lebanon

2.1 One of the important considerations for the Committee was to assess what help the people of Lebanon needed during and after Lebanon's civil war, and what contribution Australia could make to meeting Lebanon's need. In order to do this, the Committee needed to ascertain the damage to the Lebanese infrastructure and the human toll, including the large number of "displaced persons". It was also necessary to pay due regard to the difficulties of operating any relief programmes in such a stricken land.

2.2 Estimates as to the number of killed in Lebanon since April 1975 vary, but they have been as high as 60,000, with a further 200,000 wounded.¹

2.3 Some people who are believed dead or missing may have fled to another part of Lebanon or overseas. A more conservative estimate of casualties is 37,000 killed and 90,000 wounded. Even this figure must be seen as horrifying in view of Lebanon's small population of three million. The psychological wounds and the breaking down of national consensus as a result of atrocities and the development of vendettas constitute a dangerous sickness in Lebanon. When compared with the total number of United States servicemen killed in action in Vietnam (from 1961-73) which was 46,163, the Lebanese figure in a small population appears a very serious haemorrhage indeed. When compared with the total Arab casualties in the three wars 1956, 1967 and 1973, which were 40,000,

1. Mr. Tuani, Lebanon's Information Minister 16.11.76.

Lebanon's death toll is shattering. Relatively, the casualties represent a much more serious loss to Lebanon than Arab casualties to the rest of the Arab world.

2.4 The Committee was informed of atrocities being committed in Lebanon; of mutilations and random killings frequently involving innocent bystanders not involved in lethal conflict. Hatred extended not merely to military opponents but to all Lebanese of other faiths. Apparently there is a super abundance of ammunition in Lebanon as in the Middle East generally, and the Leftists in Beirut were apparently sometimes paid according to their ammunition expenditure. It is inevitable under such conditions that civilian life and property suffers without the killing and the destruction having any rational military objective. Terrorism for terrorism's sake has produced a hate which is simply insanity.

2.5 Some witnesses had a feeling that there were outside forces operating in Lebanon bent simply on the destruction of the country. They claimed that most atrocities and most wanton destruction were carried out by non-Lebanese in the pay of other Arab governments. The Committee had evidence that Iraqi, Libyan and Somali volunteers, as well as men from several other countries, were serving with the so-called "Palestinian" forces in Lebanon.

Displaced Persons or Refugees

2.6 In addition there have been a large number of persons driven from their homes while remaining in Lebanon itself, or driven out of Lebanon altogether to overseas or neighbouring destinations due to the heavy fighting or destruction of their homes. By far the largest number of

refugees from the conflict have crossed the border to nearby Syria. President Assad of Syria announced on 22 July 1976 that half a million Lebanese have entered Syria and a further half a million Syrians working in Lebanon have returned to Syria and that 50,000 Palestinians formerly in Lebanon have also fled to Syria. Similar estimates were offered to the Committee by several sources.

2.7 A religious analysis of the composition of these groups of "displaced persons" is as uncertain as their number. It is understood that those who fled to Syria are poorer than those fleeing to other countries, but the cost of living is relatively cheap in Syria and those in Syria can return to their homes in Lebanon when the situation improves.¹

2.8 The Christians of Lebanon who possess sufficient funds have tended to flee to Cyprus and to Greece which have assumed the character of staging posts to other countries. Many of these displaced people are retaining the option to return to Lebanon when the situation improves. There have been 8,000 to 10,000 Lebanese at any one time in Cyprus and they have numbered about 10,000 in Greece. Possibly 30,000 Lebanese have fled to France but they are usually the more wealthy and able to retain the option to return. A large number of Lebanese have also gone to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. A few in Southern Lebanon have even crossed the border to Israel.

2.9 Although estimates vary, it would appear that approximately a million people have left Lebanon if the Syrian nationals formerly residing there are included in this figure. This is over a third of the population of

1. Although most are with relatives, about 20,000 Lebanese are supported by the ICRC at Tartous (15,000), Homs (4,000) and Damascus (1,000).

Lebanon. A proportion has managed to move to countries where Lebanese have traditionally resided (South America, the United States, Canada, France, Egypt and Australia). Others have sufficient funds to escape the war in nearby countries for a few more months. A large proportion of these Lebanese, however, have not found permanent or reasonable temporary sanctuary from the war in Lebanon. Their dwindling resources must make their situation desperate, necessitating a need for organised relief if they are not to be involved in further disaster.

2.10 The acceptance of Lebanese "displaced persons" has been hampered by the fact that they have not been declared "refugees" by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.¹ It is likely that this is because the Christian residual group constituting former President Franjieh's regime has not made such a request to the United Nations, motivated in their reticence by the fear that the precarious demographic balance might deteriorate further against the Christians. The Christians have always had a higher propensity to leave Lebanon and they would have a better chance of taking advantage of refugee status in another country, because they are more likely to have the means to escape Lebanon. For example, the fare to Cyprus in an overcrowded ship is about £Stg100 and before gaining entry refugees must offer evidence that they will not be a financial burden.

Damage to Infrastructure

2.11 Lebanon's economic infrastructure has been severely damaged. Fifty to sixty per cent of factories have been damaged, burnt or looted. Destruction in Beirut has been

1. See also paras 1.9 and 3.15 (for definition).

widespread and it is reported that in some rural areas 80 percent of homes have been damaged or destroyed. There has been widespread destruction and looting of businesses and shops as well as looting in residential areas deserted by fleeing inhabitants. Transport and communication links - particularly through Beirut's port and international airport - have been severed much of the time. The same applies to other public utilities such as power, telecommunications and water supply, although the situation is believed to be least serious in the Christian-controlled area.

2.12 The destruction of office buildings and the withdrawal of foreign companies and their staffs is going to make it extremely difficult for Beirut to resume its role as the major Middle East commercial centre. There are already other factors eroding Beirut's pre-eminence as the financial centre of the Middle East, such as the fact that much of the surplus oil revenues accruing to Arab Governments are being utilised directly by the latter. Furthermore, Lebanon's public sector was already considered inadequate before the civil war in its defective provision of necessary services and infrastructure to cope with developments in the private sector.

2.13 Since 1975, foreign firms have set up temporary operations in other parts of the region, Athens attracting the largest number of such firms. Even when peace returns, Beirut is unlikely to attain its former pre-eminence and this will cause particularly serious consequences, as the foreign business community in the past has generated the major proportion of Lebanon's Gross National Product.

2.14 On the other hand, the Lebanese have proved to be

a resourceful people, and there is evidence of their efforts at reconstruction whenever there is a lull in the fighting in Lebanon. With peace and the necessary outside assistance, they can be expected to make every effort to re-establish their former enterprises. Due to the large scale dislocation in the country, it is estimated that it would take at least 18 months to two years after the fighting ceases before a reasonable infrastructure would re-appear.

Difficulties for Aid Programmes

2.15 The most serious problem in Lebanon, particularly as far as any outside aid programme is concerned, is the chronic state of insecurity, often violent chaos, which has prevailed in many parts of the country since the outbreak of civil war. Instrumentalities of the Lebanese Government have ceased to function and many agencies of the United Nations and many diplomatic missions have been withdrawn. The latter are important in the customary support they would give to any aid teams.

2.16 Quite apart from the increased difficulties of day-to-day operations, aggravated by the collapse of the infrastructure referred to previously, there remains very little organisation to receive, administer and distribute humanitarian assistance from any source. There is a scarcity of essential commodities such as petrol and medical supplies, and there is no guarantee that any aid given will reach the people most in need. The Committee received evidence that there was a large black market in essential drugs and other medical supplies, and that there was discrimination by some of the remaining institutions in the

dispensation of medical services, according to religious or political affiliation.

2.17 Two agencies have been regarded as attempting to be neutral, namely the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the American University of Beirut Hospital; but their assistance to any particular elements in the conflict is dependent on their location. They have been able to function on a reasonably continuous basis, although with difficulty, during the period of the Lebanese crisis.

International Committee for the Red Cross

2.18 Australia has the practice of channelling aid through the recognised international agencies, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It may be useful therefore to comment briefly on what this organisation is doing under the extreme difficulties of the anarchic situation in Lebanon. The organisation and work of the ICRC is deliberately hindered in Lebanon. The assumption underlying the normal activities of the ICRC is that people will co-operate in works of mercy. It is a measure of the degradation and division in Lebanese society that many impede any act of mercy. In recent months the ICRC increased its delegate force in Lebanon to 62 people but this figure included fewer than 20 doctors and nurses. The medical teams have been mainly provided by the Scandinavian countries. The ICRC delegates are supplemented by 60 local staff. Despite the praiseworthy motivation and efforts of the volunteers working for the ICRC, it is impossible to comprehend how such a small force, no matter how dedicated, can cope with the situation in Lebanon.

2.19 The ICRC delegation in Lebanon has branches in Beirut, Jounie, Tripoli and Bekaa. There are also delegations in Damascus (which facilitates access to some Syrian controlled areas of Lebanon), in Amman, in Cairo and in Jerusalem. There is also an ICRC logistic base in Cyprus, from whence relief supplies can be transported to Lebanon, mainly by an ICRC chartered vessel. In the year since October 1975, the ICRC has sent 470 tons of medical supplies and 1180 tons of other supplies to Lebanon. Donations have been promised to enable dispatch of an additional 1556 tons, which will consist mainly of food.

2.20 After May 1976, the ICRC tent hospital was transferred to a more secure building in the immediate vicinity of the ICRC delegation in West Beirut. It is conducted by 16 Scandinavian doctors and nurses, frequently treating over 1000 patients per week. There are about 60 beds and the hospital is very overcrowded. People who have been cured in a therapeutical sense frequently do not know where to go.

2.21 The ICRC relief operation for the Palestinian "camp" at Tel al-Zaatar took up a large part of ICRC resources. When this was completed, the ICRC set out to establish a network for medical and other supplies throughout the country. As the network is now complete, the requirement to direct into Lebanon regular supplies of food, clothing and medicine has grown tremendously. It should be borne in mind that the Red Cross is operating in a situation which, on moderate estimates has produced 37,000 dead, 90,000 wounded and nearly a million displaced. The inadequacy of the ICRC effort is manifest.

2.22 The ICRC has set itself a programme for the four months commencing November 1976 which will include the

critical winter period. The programme is to include the following:

- a. Continued protection and assistance to people whose safety is threatened in various enclaves in hostile surroundings. Comment: ICRC protection is presumably the moral effect of its presence, which again makes very regrettable the limited numbers of the ICRC force.
- b. continued supply to hospitals and dispensaries in Beirut and the provinces which are still receiving many wounded. The ICRC hospital in Beirut will continue to work to capacity. Comment: The ICRC force available could be fully occupied with its Beirut hospital alone.
- c. the ICRC will continue to supply extra food and comforts (such as blankets) to the 400,000 war victims which depend on it for their elementary needs. This figure does not include people receiving assistance from other organisations; and
- d. the ICRC expects to step up its efforts to trace missing persons and to transmit news between members of dispersed families. Comment: This is a statement of hopes. The realisation of these hopes must await a much larger ICRC effort.

2.23 To implement the above programme, the ICRC appealed in October 1976 for \$A14 million. This is 50 per cent greater than all the contributions received and promised for the ICRC programme for the year ending 22 September

1976. Nearly two-thirds of the latter amount was given by various governments and nearly one-fifth was given by national societies. Over half was given in cash. Power to determine what is purchased gives greater flexibility to the ICRC.

2.24 The Committee heard allegations in evidence that the ICRC has not been very forthcoming in its assistance to the Christian side. However, the Committee has noted from recent media reports that there has been similar criticism emanating from the Palestinian side. These allegations probably illustrate the difficulties encountered by any relief organisation in the dispensing of aid to whatever faction, and are a reflection of the palpable inadequacy of the ICRC and the callous hypocrisy of the situation in the United Nations. There is an atmosphere of deceit about the Lebanese crisis which compounds the tragedy of the Lebanon disaster. There is a reluctance to call people in flight refugees. The leaders of Lebanese Christians, Palestinians, and Syrians want the United Nations to stand aside and until recently appeals for world aid have been minimal. One cannot help feeling that Dag Hammarskjold would have insisted on action.

2.25 One of the reasons why the Christians may have received less aid for a time is that the ICRC authority has been located in the Palestinian-controlled section of West Beirut; it has been alleged that urgently needed drugs and other medical supplies were being forcibly intercepted before reaching hospitals in the Christian-controlled areas. Furthermore, it has been suggested that in recent times the Leftist-Palestinian side has been in greater need than the Christian side as the latter was receiving aid from

other organisations, such as Caritas Internationalis, a Catholic relief group. During 1976, ICRC relief supplies were distributed as follows:

Leftists-Palestinians	365 tons
Christians-Rightists	191 tons
Local organisations working in both sectors	203 tons

This is an argument about the distribution of ludicrously inadequate supplies.

2.26 In addition to the above international organisations, the Palestinians have their own Red Crescent organisation and an ad hoc "Lebanese Red Cross" has been established at Jounie in the Christian sector. This is because the latter did not always have access to the Lebanese Red Cross with headquarters in West Beirut, which normally serves all Lebanese. The Committee received evidence from representatives of the "Lebanese Red Cross" at Jounie regarding its acute problems and the situation appeared very serious. The problems are equally catastrophic throughout Lebanon. The combatants, when they are not injuring non combatants are monopolizing food and medical supplies. They have the guns to ensure they can take them.

Australian Aid to Lebanon

2.27 The people of Lebanon are in a situation of disaster beyond anything Australia has experienced and are in need of outside aid. This aid can be categorised into three types: aid to Lebanon to meet the crisis during the violence of hostilities; aid to the people who - without hesitation we should call them refugees - have fled Lebanon; and aid to assist Lebanon's postwar reconstruction when a

situation of calm allows such aid.

2.28 The provision of immediate aid to Lebanon ought to be considered the most critical and urgent issue, as such timely aid can make a substantial contribution to the preservation of life and limb; United Nations indifference should not lull us. However, it is also the most difficult form of aid to implement because of the deliberate interference of ruthless belligerents. While Australia will also want to be seen to be impartial in the dispensation of its aid, it should not be cautious to the point of ineffectiveness. Frequently, the effort at impartiality has presented special problems, as at various times one side or the other has probably not been very accessible to overseas aid from Australia. We do not think the magnitude of attempted aid has been great enough to test the field. The Committee believes that such impartiality is very important, but effective aid to people in need is even more important. The ruthless and indifferent belligerents are no authorities on impartiality.

2.29 So far Australia's aid to Lebanon has been limited apart from the acceptance of some Lebanese "displaced persons" with relatives in Australia as immigrants (see relevant sections Ch. 3). The Committee would like to be convinced that the aid Australia has given has been other than due to the concern of Australia's substantial Lebanese community. This community has been vigorous even if somewhat divided in its efforts to help Lebanese kinsmen at home. The Lebanese community in Australia organised the despatch of 15,000 doses of typhoid vaccine in special containers to Lebanon. Australian Lebanese also remit

money donations regularly to relatives in Lebanon and also to those Lebanese in neighbouring countries who have fled the civil war.

2.30 The Lebanese community, because of the intensity of its desire to alleviate suffering in their homeland, has become somewhat frustrated with the problems of getting the proceeds of their collections to Lebanon, and then ensuring impartial distribution in Lebanon. For example the Australian Lebanese have collected a large amount of warm clothing, but as yet have to solve the problem of transporting this aid to Lebanon. There is an opportunity for the Australian Government to help in this regard by providing air transport at least as far as Athens (used as a landing place by Qantas), if not to Cyprus.¹ Apparently the Lebanese community in Australia would arrange further transshipment to both sides in Lebanon thus obviating the need for the Australian government to show impartiality at this stage. However the Committee does not believe that the main onus for aid to Lebanon should be left on the Lebanese community in Australia.

2.31 The Australian Government has increased its annual contribution of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) by \$30,000 bringing the total for this calendar year to \$300,000. A large proportion of this sum will benefit Palestinians in Lebanon. Australia has also made two donations of food to Lebanon, a donation of \$50,000-worth of skim milk powder through the ICRC and \$400,000-worth of canned meat, distribution of which is to be divided equally between the ICRC and Caritas Internationalis.

1. See Recommendation 7 on page 90.

2.32 The Australian Red Cross Society has forwarded \$15,000 in cash and goods to the ICRC for relief in Lebanon in the year ending 30 October 1976; this has been largely contributed by the Lebanese community and \$6,000 from Red Cross funds. Other organisations such as World Vision and Australian Catholic Relief have also contributed. Austcare conducted a nation-wide appeal for Lebanon using newspaper advertisements which apparently met with limited response, except perhaps from the Lebanese community. This small response encountered by private welfare organisations may reflect a lack of confidence by the Australian public that money or items donated to the Lebanese people will actually reach the needy non-combatants of Lebanon. On the other hand, the problems of Lebanon may just seem too remote for most Australians. The contrast with the public reaction to the natural disaster in Darwin is marked but this is not unexpected.

Possibilities for more Australian Aid

2.33 The Committee would normally agree with the policy of Australian governments to work through recognised international organisations, provided such organisations can and wish to cope with the magnitude of the problem. The Committee is convinced that it is not possible in a largely devastated country for the bulk of foreign aid to be administered by only 60 delegates of the ICRC. From evidence it has received it feels that there is a greater requirement for medical aid than can be provided by the less than 20 ICRC doctors and nurses, despite their valiant efforts. Australia has been asked to contribute money,

but no appeal was made for medical personnel, as these can be provided from Europe, including some French speakers. There is little doubt that Australian medical teams properly supported from home, would volunteer. Language ability is not essential. Interpreters could probably be recruited. The wounded in need are not likely to be hypersensitive to a doctor's linguistic deficiency.

2.34 It is recommended that Australia give much greater support to the ICRC's programme in Lebanon. If there are indications that the ICRC cannot absorb much more aid from Australia apart from money, then it is suggested that as soon as the security situation allows, other agencies be investigated as instruments for channelling aid to the Lebanese people. These agencies could include Australian volunteers. The aim should be to achieve the best administration of any aid programmes to ensure that what is given is of maximum benefit to those most in need, and genuinely aimed at meeting the needs created by the crisis.

2.35 It is unfortunate in this regard that the Australian Embassy in Beirut had to be withdrawn, as its advice on Lebanese agencies would have been important. This consideration is additional to the loss of support that the Embassy would normally be expected to give to Australian aid teams. As with all aid programmes, it is essential that the assistance is given within the ethic of the Red Cross - aid is provoked by need. Nothing else matters. The administration of the aid must be adequately supervised under the auspices of the authority recognised by the people in that locality where the aid is needed.

2.36 The Committee received evidence which made it incontestable that there was a chronic shortage of doctors

and para-medical personnel, an urgent need for life-saving drugs and for a variety of medical and life sustaining supplies and equipment. Normally Lebanon has had sufficient doctors (2,300 in 1973), but they were largely in private practice and tended to work in Beirut and the wealthier areas. They showed the same urban concentration as in Australia. Apparently there is nothing to retain them in some of the war ravaged rural areas where there is a shortage of facilities and supplies, quite apart from the chronic insecurity. It is understood that half of Lebanon's doctors have left the country. The desperate situation is illustrated by the fact that there is only one anaesthetist out of eight remaining in Jounie serving the Christian sector. Australia should sponsor action to encourage and support Lebanese doctors to return.

2.37 Medical supplies can be expected to remain a high priority item until reconstruction is well under way and essential utilities are again functioning. At present hospitals are overcrowded, are short-staffed and they lack sufficient supplies of essential equipment and medicines. Vaccines against typhoid and smallpox are desperately needed, as the country is becoming prone to epidemics. Evidence was given that the vaccines from the Commonwealth Serum Laboratory in Melbourne were particularly suitable due to their 30-day heat resistance. However, generators are required for emergency power in hospitals to sustain refrigeration for the preservation of medical supplies, as electricity is only available for a few hours a day - if at all. Already thousands of doses of medicine have been spoiled due to lack of refrigeration caused by a lack of electricity.

2.38 Lebanon urgently needs ambulances, blankets, emergency shelter, emergency power and communications equipment. Many Lebanese non-combatants have apparently been evacuated to mountainous areas to escape the fighting. These areas are covered in snow for several months of the year, and dangerous hardship and health hazards ensue from shortages of warm clothing. Australia could provide most of the above-mentioned items in addition to the normal contributions of food which we have made available to countries in need. However, if goods from Australia would not make a quick impact due to our remoteness, unless air transport is used, the Australian effort could be to finance efforts of reliable foreign or British authorities who are nearer.

2.39 Probably the best way that Australia could help is with the provision of medical teams similar to civilian medical teams Australia contributed in South Vietnam or the teams Australia sent to the Nigerian civil war. (The latter were under the auspices of the ICRC). Such teams need to be self sustained providing their own medical supplies and transport if they are not attached to an existing medical installation. They would need to include people with a variety of medical skills and experience and they could be financed to recruit local staff including interpreters.

2.40 These medical teams would have the advantage of ensuring that the much needed drugs, vaccines and other medical supplies would reach the accessible needy through Australian efforts, rather than the supplies be stolen or reach the black market as has frequently been the case. The

Committee feels that the deployment in Lebanon of foreign medical teams may have the further advantage in that their mere presence may discourage the excesses that are frequently perpetrated in a civil war. If foreigners can show a concerned and responsible interest it may provoke some Lebanese to a concern beyond their extreme vindictive factionalism.

2.41 The difficult question to resolve is who is to sponsor the aid teams if no single authority (like the ICRC) can administer them. As there is a need for the Government to be impartial, it may be better for private welfare organisations with experience in this field to sponsor the medical teams, partly with the aid of private subscription but realistically with a national contribution from the Australian government commensurate with the disaster which has befallen a friendly people.

2.42 The Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) which has 32 affiliates such as Austcare, Catholic Relief and World Vision, has an International Disaster Emergency Committee on which the ICRC is represented. This could be one suitable channel for the despatch of additional Australian aid. The Australian aid program has a component devoted to support for developmental projects of non-government organisations but it has so far been agreed with them that the principle should not extend to relief operations. The Committee does not agree with this restriction on relief operations.

2.43 The Committee recommends that the Australian Development Assistance Agency channel further Government support for Lebanon through ACFOA, and some of its

affiliates, as well as through the ICRC. The Government should consider supporting action by the Australian Red Cross and asking the United Nations to take humanitarian action. The Australian Lebanese community may also find it useful to use these welfare agencies when they wish to send money to ease the suffering of their kinsmen. They will then be assured that their donations will not be used for the purchase of arms.

2.44 The Committee considers that the Australian Government would be better placed to give effective humanitarian aid to other countries in an emergency if Australia were to promote a more generous and far sighted scheme. Australia should not be afraid to show a lead to the rest of the world, and should consider what could jolt the United Nations out of its Pontius Pilate attitude. The Committee has in mind for Australia to obtain a suitable ship that can be properly fitted to provide a largely Australian manned "medical care ship" near combat areas and later to assist with medical care in the reconstruction phase. West Germany provided such a hospital ship off South Vietnam apparently without pleading remoteness.

2.45 A medical care ship would be an expensive project, but had Australia owned one over the last few years the dignity of a constructive role in disaster relief would have been available to the Australian people. The ship need not be as large as the one remaining United States hospital ship "USS Sanctuary". It is understood that the United States has a number of large and suitable amphibious ships with helicopter pads. They are "in mothballs" and the convertability and availability of one of these

ships should be investigated.

2.46 Obviously a medical care ship would also be of immense use in the event of disasters in and near Australia. It would rightly enhance Australia's standing in the countries where it was used. The Committee believes that such a ship would be of great assistance to Australia's own Natural Disasters Organisation in coping with any disaster in an Australian coastal city. If the organisation's role is extended to give assistance in the event of natural disasters in the South East Asian and South West Pacific regions, as would be logical, then despatch of this ship could be a very visible demonstration of Australia's willingness to give aid.

Post War Aid to Lebanon

2.47 Finally, once the war is over there will be an enormous amount of reconstruction necessary. It has been estimated that if security was to return to Lebanon now, there would be a requirement for US\$300m to US\$500m¹ for essential reconstruction. Once there is an end to civil war the provision of aid will be much simpler than during the chaos that has accompanied the fighting.

2.48 It has been reported that the United States is prepared to play a major part in Lebanon's reconstruction, and that Congress would agree for the United States to provide a quarter of the total sum needed.¹ If this is correct it would mean that the United States would be increasing its aid to the embattled Lebanon by about 50 times the recent war-time amount.

2.49 The Arab States could also be expected to play a major role, particularly wealthy States like Saudi Arabia

1. Agence France Press Report, Washington, 27 October 1976.

and Kuwait. Potential donors will also be looking for signs of political reform to ensure Lebanese unity and stability.

2.50 The Committee believes that Australia should be prepared to contribute as generously to the reconstruction of Lebanon as proposed by the United States, at least in proportion to our Gross National Product. With peace the type of aid that would be required would be guided by observation and by advice from a reconstructed Lebanese Government.

2.51 On 16 November 1976, the Director General of the World Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) authorized US\$4.7 million in immediate aid from the World Food Programme emergency resources, for the relief operations for 1,350,000 victims of the civil war during the first month of a four month's emergency programme. The cost of the full four month period is estimated at US\$27 million¹. FAO has been contacting major donor countries to organise bilateral aid to cover the remaining three months of the emergency period. The Committee urges that Australia give generous support to this programme.

2.52 In addition under emergency provisions of FAO's new technical cooperation programme, the following has been approved: US\$200,000 for potato seeds and US\$150,000 to help reactivate a wheat and barley seed multiplication programme. FAO's international fertilizer scheme will contribute 3,000 tons of urea, valued at US\$600,000 to be sold within Lebanon. Proceeds will be used to create a revolving fund to purchase more fertilizers.

2.53 In regard to food aid to Lebanon, a Lebanese Ministerial delegation while visiting Rome in mid-November

1. The statistics on the FAO relief programme were provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

1976 announced that:

- a. The immediate and most urgent phase (already dealt with above) was due to the civil war's destruction of the economy and the huge number of displaced persons, and persons who have lost work.
- b. The second phase would begin as soon as rehabilitation and reconstruction were under way. Additional food rations would still be required to make up for insufficient wages.
- c. The long-term phase concerned problems of displaced persons, particularly children. Large masses of people will have to re-locate and will need food assistance for some time.

2.54 The United Nations relief work is to be coordinated by Mr William Buffum, a former U.S. diplomat and now Deputy United Nations Secretary General. The huge emergency food programme is necessary because the latest grain harvest is only 16,000 tons, compared with 74,000 tons two years ago. Lebanon's desperate farmers have had to resort again to growing hashish which had been discouraged before the civil war. The Director of FAO has announced that the food aid programme will be directed at "the poorest section of the population" including the nation's farmers.

2.55 In this Chapter, the Committee has outlined Lebanon's tragic need for help. Some of the sources of aid have been mentioned but the Committee is aware that there are many other praiseworthy efforts. The Committee has suggested several further ways Australia can help. See also: Conclusions 1 (page 78), 7 to 11 (pages 81 to 83) Recommendations 4 to 11 (pages 89 to 91).

3. IMMIGRATION ASPECTS
OF THE LEBANESE TRAGEDY

Introduction

3.1 Early in its investigations, it became apparent to the Committee that one of the most important ways in which Australia could ease the suffering of the Lebanese people was for Australia to be generous in accepting people from Lebanon who had become "displaced persons" as a result of the civil war. The Committee examined the factors involved and the outreach for the Australian community including the sizeable number of Australian Lebanese.

Residents from the Middle East

3.2 A large number of people who were born in the Middle East and are now living in Australia came from Lebanon or have at least one parent from there, as is shown by the following figures for selected countries:¹

<u>Country</u>	<u>Persons in Aust.</u> <u>born overseas</u> (to 30/6/75) (a)	<u>Persons in Aust.</u> <u>with at least one</u> <u>parent born there</u> (to 31/12/73) (b)	<u>Total</u> (a + b)
Lebanon	34,300	16,187	50,487
Iran/Iraq	3,600	-	3,600
Jordan)			
Saudi Arabia)			
Kuwait)	1,500	-	1,500
Oman)			
Yemen)			
Syria	2,600	-	2,600
Turkey	21,000	2,390	23,390
Egypt (UAR)	32,000	18,525	50,525
Israel	5,500	1,892	7,392
	<u>100,500</u>	<u>38,994</u>	<u>139,494</u>

1. Source: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs.

The figures in column (a) are based on the 1971 census plus net permanent migration to 30/6/75. Since that time there have been an additional 2,557 permanent arrivals, giving their country of last residence as Lebanon as at 30 September 1976.

Lebanese in Australia

3.3 Of the 36,857 people in Australia born in Lebanon (as at 30/9/76) about four fifths are located in N.S.W. Three-quarters of the remainder are located in Victoria. It is believed that the 16,000 Australians with at least one Lebanese parent are distributed in a similar fashion. Lebanese community leaders in Australia regard their community as much larger than the 50,000 referred to above. They speak in terms of 100,000, no doubt including people of Lebanese descent going back several generations.

3.4 Most people of Lebanese descent live in the capital cities, particularly Sydney and Melbourne, but there are also pockets of Lebanese in several country areas. A large proportion of these people belong to one of several Christian faiths found in Lebanon. However, in more recent times there has been an increasing number of Muslims from Lebanon.

3.5 The Australian Lebanese are believed to be a thriving community. They are proud of their heritage but they are anxious that the divisions in their homeland should not be repeated in Australia. Nevertheless it has sometimes been difficult for the Lebanese community

in Australia to speak with one voice as some of the Lebanese associations in Sydney and Melbourne represent the various factions in their homeland. This has sometimes presented difficulties for the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in its dealings with the community.

3.6 It is obvious to the Committee that the leaders of the Australian Lebanese Associations are deeply concerned for their kinsmen in Lebanon. They appreciate that because of current unemployment levels and trends Australia cannot accept an unlimited number of Lebanese and therefore they have concentrated mostly on gaining more generous entry criteria for relatives of Australia's Lebanese community. While the Lebanese community is careful to express gratitude for anything done, they have made useful suggestions for streamlining immigration procedures for the benefit of relatives who have fled from Lebanon.

Lebanese Arrivals Since the Civil War

3.7 Table 2 indicates the number of permanent arrivals from Lebanon since the civil war; the figures for 1974 are shown for comparison.

3.8 It can be seen that the number of Lebanese migrants entering Australia was more than halved in the 12 month period 1975-6, amounting to 1,558, compared with before the civil war in 1973-74 when there were 3,444 Lebanese migrants. It was not until July 1976 that they reached the pre-civil war level again, rising to 418 in September. However, it is likely that this figure will be considerably increased when statistics for subsequent months become

available. This can be predicted from the number of applications received in Nicosia which increased from 247 in June to 1,149 in August 1976. In September, the government announced measures (see below) which will further increase the number of Lebanese entering Australia.

Table 2
Permanent Arrivals
Country of Last Residence: Lebanon¹

Month	1974			1975			1976 (a)		
	Total	Asst	Un-asst	Total	Asst	Un-asst	Total	Asst	Un-asst
Jan	195	105	57	162	56	26	82		
Feb	182	89	39	128	101	95	196		
Mar	331	113	33	146	67	97	164		
Apr	234	81	42	123	18	86	104		
May	291	85	22	107	6	117	123		
Jun	311	80	28	108	9	158	167		
Jul	331	99	42	141		325	325(b)		
Aug	319	103	33	136	1	255	256(b)		
Sep	287	50	19	69		418	418(b)		
Oct	265	39	42	81					
Nov	238	108	45	153					
Dec	194	98	44	142					
Year ended December	3,178	1,050	446	1,496	258(c)	1577(c)	1835(c)		
Year ended June (a)	3,444	1,248	1,160	2,408	754	804	1,558		

1. Source: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs

- (a) All data for the period January to June 1976 is provisional and subject to revision.
- (b) Figure based on incomplete count of data. Final figure expected to be somewhat higher.
- (c) Up to 3/9/76.

Comparison with Canada

3.9 It is interesting to make a comparison with Canada's recent intakes of people from Lebanon. Before the civil war (1974) Canada took only 1,530 Lebanese. Australia's intake was about double this figure. In the second half of 1975, there was a marked increase in Canada's total Lebanese intake and the total for the year reached 3,274. This was double Canada's pre crisis intake. It was also double that of Australia, whose intake had been cut in half in 1975. During the period 1 April to 5 November 1976, 6,067 Lebanese were granted Canadian entry visas.¹

Comparison of Applications, Visas Issued and Arrivals

3.10 The number of applications and visas issued relating to Lebanese migration to Australia for the periods specified was as follows:¹

	<u>Applications</u> <u>1/4/76 to 1/10/76</u>	<u>Visas Issued</u> <u>1/4/76 to 22/10/76</u>
Ankara	882	150
Athens	953	185
Cairo	581	104
Damascus	1,887	440 (b)
Nicosia	3,921 (a)	1,915
Paris	166	7
TOTAL	<u>8,390</u>	<u>2,801</u>

- (a) Included in Nicosia figures are 1,149 applications in August and 1,139 in September.
- (b) Estimate

1. Source: Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs

3.11 There is a time lag between the issuing of visas to a person and the person's arrival in Australia, but it is obvious from Table 2 which shows only 1,835 arrivals for the first nine months of 1976; that the total number of arrivals for 1976 will be much lower than the total number of visas issued during 1976. This is because many applicants decide to return to Lebanon or manage to gain entry into another country.

Australian Emergency Procedures after Beirut Evacuation

3.12 Following the closure of the Australian Embassy in Beirut on 28 March 1976, emergency procedures relating to the handling of applications for entry into Australia were introduced. These were chiefly designed to assist those Lebanese who had some form of association with Australia.

3.13 The closure of the Australian Embassy was regarded as premature by several witnesses before the Committee who were unconnected with Australia's Lebanese community. However, an indication of the severe difficulties encountered by Australian migration officers in Beirut and subsequently elsewhere in the Middle East is given in a cable sent by the Australian Migration Officer in Nicosia in August 1976 (see Annex C). He had previously been in charge of migration matters in Beirut.

3.14 Before their departure from Beirut, Australian staff arranged for a notice in the Lebanese press on 29 March notifying applicants of the closure of the Embassy and the Australian Government's willingness to consider applications from Lebanese migrants who have a

close association with residents of Australia and who could make their way to Australian offices in Cairo, Ankara or Athens.

3.15 The Commonwealth Government's attitude was that it would give earnest consideration to ways in which it might play a fuller part if a formal refugee situation eventuated. At the same time it considered that such a crisis could be of a magnitude beyond the capacity of Australia or any one country to handle alone. The Government placed importance on the fact that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees has not designated Lebanese as "refugees" according to the definition in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which states:

"Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."

3.16 The Government initially proposed that normal migrant eligibility would apply to people from Lebanon lodging applications in other countries. Cases whose nature is outside definitions of the eligible classes were to be considered sympathetically on their merits as they arose. In the cases of spouses, dependent children and aged and dependent parents it was proposed to dispense with the routine checks, including health checks, if conditions did not permit these tests to be undertaken.

3.17 Whenever possible, however, it was the intention that normal tests would be carried out. A Ministerial statement on 1 April 1976 showed that extension of the eligible categories of migrants or visitors was not then foreseen.

3.18 Major problems of identification were present and extreme difficulties were faced in obtaining the necessary checks on potential migrants. Such arrangements were seen as justifying careful control of entry to Australia from areas of international dispute. Initially, the immigration officers were evacuated from the Beirut Immigration Office to Athens where the Senior Migration Officer was directed to co-ordinate immigration activities concerning those Lebanese who were able to reach Immigration posts in nearby countries. Later on these activities were to be co-ordinated from Nicosia.

3.19 On 14 April 1976, the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs announced that an Australian migration office had been established in the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Damascus. The potential importance of this post could be gauged from estimates that the number of Lebanese who had fled to Syria varied between 200,000 and 600,000. Later President Assad announced that over a million people had entered Syria including the Syrians who had lived in Lebanon.

3.20 Australia was not able to maintain this post after 26 June 1976. The Committee was told that the Syrians wanted an assurance that Australia would

establish a permanent mission in Syria before extending the arrangement with the Royal Netherlands Embassy. This was a serious impediment to any Lebanese wishing to come to Australia as Damascus was only a few hours drive from any part of Lebanon. It did not involve the expense and difficulty associated with movement to other Australian posts in the Middle East.

3.21 In May 1976, instructions were issued to all Australian posts to accept applications from all Lebanese people who had been able to reach them. Those within the normal acceptable categories - such as spouses, dependant children and aged or dependent parents of Australian residents - were to be given visas immediately, provided they identified themselves and conformed with normal health and character requirements. Those who were outside these categories but who could establish a family relationship with an Australian resident, and who had suffered hardship would have their cases referred to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs in Canberra for prompt and sympathetic consideration. Very few "hardship" cases¹ have actually gained entry into Australia so far.

Recommendations sent to Minister

3.22 After hearing from a number of witnesses, including Lebanese community leaders and the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the Sub-Committee became convinced that some urgent action was required to remedy some unsatisfactory aspects of the position of Lebanese "displaced persons". On 24 August 1976 the Chairman of the Sub-Committee

1. They do not meet normal entry criteria (in Category A) as defined in para 3.21

(the Hon. K.E. Beazley,) wrote to the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (the Hon. M.J.R. MacKellar), informing him of the Sub-Committee's concern regarding a number of important matters. The Minister was also invited to comment on these matters in order to assist the Committee in their final deliberations. The following excerpts are quoted from Mr Beazley's letter:

"1. Possibly a million people have left Lebanon for nearby countries to escape the ravages of a ferocious civil war and a virtually complete breakdown of law and order. While undoubtedly most of these people would want to return to Lebanon as soon as the situation allows, there is also a relatively small percentage including many extreme hardship cases who would welcome more permanent sanctuary in countries like Australia.

2. The people fleeing Lebanon have not been declared refugees by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. This is almost certainly because one side in the civil war does not want the precarious demographic balance in Lebanon to deteriorate even further from its point of view. The Sub-Committee does not regard this as a sufficient reason to deny destitute people the sort of minimum assistance that should be afforded to 'refugees' wherever they may be.

3. While Australia may not be able to make a major impact on the number seeking more permanent

sanctuary away from the Middle East, it can at least set an example to other countries (such as Canada, the United States and Brazil) by willingly taking a number that we can successfully absorb without significant detriment to the Australian community. Despite the present economic situation, Australia is better placed than most countries in the world to do this.

"4. In order for Australia to be seen to be taking its fair share of refugees (and we are aware there are other refugee commitments besides those generated from the Lebanon crisis), Australia must develop a clear-cut policy on refugees. This would have the following additional advantages:

- a. It will enable reasonable intake targets to be set before a refugee situation develops. If necessary these targets can be subtracted from the planned annual immigration intake should the situation develop;
- b. Overseas governments, the United Nations, Australian and International Voluntary Organisations would have a clearer indication of what Australia's contribution is to be, and can plan accordingly in the event of a sudden upheaval;
- c. It will assist Commonwealth budgetary and staffing arrangements relevant to refugee matters; and

- d. It will avoid the building up of false hopes by giving clearer guidelines as to likely refugee intakes.
- "5. The admission of Category A entrants originating from Lebanon, i.e. spouses, dependent children, aged and dependent parents appears to be proceeding in a satisfactory manner. However, the number of "hardship" cases (outside Category A) is very small considering that Australia has a large Lebanese community that could bear the major burden of their establishment in this country. It has been suggested that Australia's interpretation of "hardship" has been tougher than that of other Western nations.
6. The Lebanese community is naturally concerned for its relatives and kinsmen. While not wishing to appear ungrateful for the assistance that it has already received, it is keen to see a larger influx of Lebanese displaced persons, particularly those with a family connection with those Lebanese already resident in Australia. The Sub-Committee is very sympathetic with these aspirations but these wishes need to be tempered by the difficulties being encountered by your Department. The Sub-Committee is particularly mindful of the need to screen displaced persons before entry into Australia in order to prevent undesirable elements entering the country.
7. Every effort must be made that the antagonisms of the Lebanon situation and the Middle East

generally are not transferred to Australia. However, there are indications that the Arab language press and radio in Australia have had a divisive and sometimes inflammatory influence rather than being a force for healing the situation. The Sub-Committee instructed me to write to your colleague the Minister for Post and Telecommunications in regard to the radio aspects and I have enclosed a copy of the letter which gives further details.

"8. Officers of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs working in Australian posts in countries with a large influx of Lebanese displaced persons, and particularly in Beirut until 28 March 1976, have been working under difficult and often hazardous conditions. The Sub-Committee believes their difficult task could be alleviated by the following:

- a. Temporary increases in staff ceilings to cope with the numbers involved (the Sub-Committee noted that interview time was already taken up until 15 September in Cyprus). Normal peacetime staffing should not be the criterion in such a chaotic situation;
- b. Staff should include sufficient personnel conversant with the Lebanese situation, language and community groups even if this means temporarily enlisting assistance from Australia's Lebanese community. The Sub-Committee is mindful that care must be taken

to select people who will work in an even-handed manner without favouritism towards particular factions; and

- c. An increase in the number of doctors serving in Australian posts abroad (the Sub-Committee noted that their number has been reduced from 25 to 8 in recent times). In particular there appears to be a current need for access to a radiologist stationed in the Middle East area to obviate lengthy delays while X-Rays are read in London.

"9. As the major proportion of Lebanese displaced persons are located in Syria, there are strong humanitarian reasons for the re-establishment of a reasonable sized immigration team in Damascus. The Sub-Committee has noted the diplomatic and administrative difficulties involved, and that the establishment of a diplomatic post in Bagdad is imminent. Re-establishment in Damascus in reasonable strength would obviate displaced persons using up scarce resources to travel to other diplomatic posts only to find entry into Australia is unsuccessful.

10. Although it has been suggested that there is a requirement for clearer guidelines on what involves a hardship case eligible for entry into Australia, this could necessitate criteria which may be so strict as to result in a very inflexible system with no discretion. Despite the fact that clearer

guidelines would obviate displaced persons undergoing a long and expensive wait in a neighbouring country in the false hope of coming to Australia, the Sub-Committee would not wish to see a situation where even less Lebanese "hardship" cases can enter Australia.

"11. In regard to hardship cases (not involving a family connection with Australia), preference should be given to families with young children and those families who have suffered traumatic experiences through no fault of their own who require a new life elsewhere. They must be families with a reasonable chance of assimilation in Australia.

12. There seems to be a strong case for a Standing Committee on Refugees in Australia which would pool the resources and knowledge of both government and international voluntary agencies represented in Australia. This would take from government some of the responsibility for refugee policy and would have the desirable effect of extending community involvement.

13. Despite the fact that there is a need for Australia to be generous in its acceptance of refugees, it would seem socially more desirable to contribute even more generously towards their care in nearby countries such as Syria and Cyprus. There must be an urgent need for medical care, food,

clothing, and rudimentary shelter. The cost of living is comparatively cheap in countries like Syria and there are not the same language or assimilation problems. Most important of all this would facilitate early return to their homeland once the situation in Lebanon allows."

3.23 In his letter, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on the Middle East acknowledged that some of the above matters, such as the question of Australian diplomatic representation in Damascus and the question of overseas aid were the responsibility of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Accordingly on 1 October 1976 Mr Beazley wrote a letter to the Hon. Andrew Peacock on these matters.

3.24 There has been no evidence given to the Committee since last August to change the tentative conclusions expressed above in correspondence. The Committee believes that Australia could be more generous to "refugees", whether they are declared to be "refugees" by the United Nations or not, and that Australia could justifiably make more sacrifices without necessarily placing the major burden of relief and assistance on the Australian ethnic community primarily concerned. At the same time the need to protect the Australian community from "undesirable elements" is recognised. The Committee was particularly referring to criminal and violent elements, and those likely to carry on the antagonisms of the Middle East situation after their arrival in Australia. The criminal elements of Lebanon were released from prison during the chaos. The Lebanese gunmen have often committed crimes on a scale beyond the criminals. Much of the hostilities in Lebanon is simply organised crime and an opportunity for vendettas.

Government Announces New Measures

3.25 On 9, 15, and 23 September 1976, the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs announced a number of new initiatives or modifications regarding Lebanese immigration. The Minister replied to Mr Beazley's letter of 24 August 1976 on 1 November 1976, informing him of the Government's new measures which he had announced during September. These included the measures referred to in the next three sections of this Report.

Creation of Cyprus Task Force (6 October 1976)

3.26 A special Immigration task force was established in Cyprus to centralise and co-ordinate the processing of applications by Lebanese who could travel there from Lebanon or adjacent countries in which there is no Australian representative. On 4 September 1976 a senior migration officer was sent to Nicosia to assess and report on the most effective way of organising operations in Cyprus.

3.27 As a result of his recommendations, Cabinet approved on 23 September the despatch from Australia of a task force comprising two immigration officers, a liaison officer, a medical officer and an interpreter to supplement the existing staff. There are now nine Australia-based officers in Nicosia and twelve locally-engaged staff.

3.28 The leader of the Cyprus Task Force had appeared before the Committee on 19 August 1976 and he has extensive experience of Lebanese migration. Another of the officers selected in the task force has been closely associated in his official duties with the Lebanese community in Australia, and is able to converse in Arabic. An interpreter from the Lebanon now resident in Australia has also been included.

The medical officer selected has the capacity to examine and clear the findings of both medical and radiological tests, thus obviating the delays occasioned by the earlier need for reference of chest X-rays to London.

3.29 The task force became operative on 6 October and as a result of streamlined procedures which have been introduced it is expected that the backlog of applications will be cleared within four weeks, after which the intake will be handled on a daily basis with an expected visa issue within five days.

3.30 Liaison with the Cypriot authorities has also been improved to facilitate the granting of visas for entry into Cyprus for those persons within the acceptable categories for entry to Australia.

Broadening of Entry Criteria

3.31 Normal entry criteria were relaxed to permit the entry not only of sponsored spouses, children, dependent parents and their dependent children, but also (as from 1 October 1976) the following persons normally resident in the Lebanon were also eligible to come to Australia, (after meeting normal health and character requirements) - viz the parents of working age of Lebanese resident in Australia, nominated brothers and sisters, and persons eligible under the normal acceptable occupations list. The dependants of persons in the above groups, where appropriate, will also be eligible.

3.32 In extending the categories of Lebanese acceptable for entry under relaxed criteria to sponsored brothers and sisters, the Government took into account the practical difficulties which had arisen in respect of the earlier

criteria which provided for sympathetic consideration to be given to relatives of Australian residents who had suffered hardship. The hardship test had become unrealistic because of similarity of claims being made by applicants who had apparently become aware of the criteria, and of Australia's inability to verify such claims. This is not to suggest dishonesty, as the whole country, wherever there is conflict, is an area of hardship. The new criteria, which are subject to review at the end of 1976, do not preclude consideration of applications outside the designated categories where compelling humanitarian considerations exist.

3.33 However, a new requirement has been introduced to apply generally (that is to persons of any nationality) that persons must be permanent residents for a minimum of one year before being eligible to nominate persons overseas for migration to Australia. This requirement will not apply to nominations of spouses and dependent children.

Special Arrangements with Lebanese Community

3.34 Special arrangements have been made with the Lebanese communities in Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide for their representatives to travel overseas to assemble and arrange group transportation of acceptable close relatives of Australian residents.

3.35 Under these special arrangements the Lebanese communities in Australia present to the Department lists of acceptable sponsored people who are close relatives of Australian residents and the Lebanese communities subsequently arrange for their assembly overseas, for their documentation and for their group travel to Australia. This has resulted in the sponsorship of some 4,300 spouses, children, and

parents and their dependent children, of whom 255 have already arrived in Australia. Many of those nominated may subsequently not wish, or prove finally to be unable, to come to Australia even if approved, and it is expected that the number of arrivals will be well below the total nominated. Nevertheless, as already indicated, the number of persons covered by visas issued is increasing rapidly and the Committee warmly commends this acceleration and the increased sensitivity under which it is bounded.

3.36 While not wishing to take any credit for recent Government measures in regard to Lebanese migration, the Committee is pleased with the action that has been taken. However, there are a number of matters still to be resolved, including the matters raised in the following paragraphs.

Immigration Post in Damascus

3.37 The Committee notes that no satisfactory arrangements have yet been made for the handling of those Lebanese "displaced persons" already in Syria who would certainly come within the new and old eligibility criteria for entry into Australia. The Committee believes that this problem could be solved in a very short time if the Committee recommendation concerning the opening of a diplomatic mission in Damascus is accepted. (See also Paragraph 1.51 for other reasons).

3.38 Once a decision to open the Embassy is made, it is believed that the Syrian Government will have no objection to an Australian migration team returning to Syria before

the official opening of the Embassy.

An Australian Refugee Policy

3.39 The Committee is still concerned that successive Australian Governments have not found it necessary to announce a clear-cut refugee policy (along the lines recommended to the Minister) which would set intake targets before a refugee situation develops. The Committee believes that a world which appears to be increasingly intolerant will continue to create refugee situations for many years to come and that Australia is well placed to be imaginative in policy and generous to refugees. Indeed, the world has the right to expect that countries like Australia should express ideas and adopt policies which enlightened and humane people would want adopted wherever possible.

3.40 In the past Australia has been accused of discrimination in its immigration policy. It has sometimes been said that in more recent times political parties have tended to speculate on how ethnic groups, including refugees, may vote. The Committee believes that need especially consequent upon persecution and danger, and the ability to integrate, are the important criteria, and that refugee policy should not be an area of party politics.

3.41 The Committee acknowledges that real difficulties are involved in taking more Lebanese refugees. These difficulties include those inherent in the present economic situation in Australia, a situation of recession which affects adversely the capacity of the Lebanese community to assist its countrymen. The Lebanese community cannot be expected to bear the full burden of a large intake of their kinsmen. Australia is a beneficiary of this migration.

3.42 We cannot conscientiously claim that Australia has been particularly generous towards genuine refugees from Lebanon. Those people who have no association with Australia should not be outside the scope of a generous concern and of such people Australia has so far taken an insignificant number. With regard to those Lebanese who have relatives in Australia, policy has been much less restrictive but, in 1976 the number is unlikely to greatly exceed the 3,178 admitted in 1974.

3.43 The Committee understands that the Australian Population and Immigration Council has been investigating the whole question of refugee intake and the Committee hopes for more comprehensive recommendations from that body as well as from responsible agencies of the Government.

3.44 In this Chapter, the Committee has given details of the relatively limited intake into Australia of Lebanese "refugees" since the outbreak of the Lebanon crisis and of the Government's more recent reaction to changing needs caused by Lebanon's civil war. The Committee has made a number of recommendations with a view to making Australian policy in this area more humane and efficient.

See also: Conclusions 12 to 20 (pages 83 to 87)

Recommendations 12 to 16 (pages 91 to 92).

4. THE MEDIA AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

Transfer of Foreign Quarrels to Australia

4.1 In its consideration of the likely impact upon Australia of an increased number of Lebanese immigrants (as well as immigrants from other countries in the Middle East), the Committee found it necessary to look for any obvious signs that the destructive factionalism of the Lebanon situation and the conflicts of the Arab world generally, were reflected to any extent in Australia, especially in the form of incitement to conflict in the Australian media. The Committee sought informed opinion as to whether there was agitation which was divisive, which incited hatred, or which so misrepresented communities that even violence could be the result.

Arab Language and Community Access Radio

4.2 During its investigations, the Committee received serious allegations about some Arab language broadcasts and community access radio stations. The Committee was aware that the stations concerned were not all under the direct jurisdiction of the Minister for Post and Telecommunications but the latter had previously indicated in a letter to the Chairman that he would like in the first instance all matters relevant to his portfolio to be referred to him. The Sub-Committee

was very disturbed by the nature of allegations of responsible witnesses and its Chairman wrote to the Minister for Post and Telecommunications (the Hon. Eric Robinson) on 20 August 1976 informing him of the complaints and requesting transcripts of the offending programmes to enable verification or refutation of the allegations. The following is an extract of the letter.

"Representatives of two different ethnic groups mentioned that some Arab language broadcasts heard recently were of such an inflammatory nature that they could possibly lead to violence. Although the allegations were not always very specific, the following stations were mentioned:

3ZZ:

- a. It was alleged that programmes on this station which apparently broadcasts on Thursdays between 9.30 and 10.30 p.m. favour one faction in the Lebanese community while denying access to the President of the Victorian Chapter of the Australian-Lebanese Association who purports to represent the majority of Australian-Lebanese in Victoria. In particular he was prevented from making a reply on 5 August 1976 to a statement made by an opposing faction during a previous programme.
- b. It was alleged that Arab language programmes have from time to time in recent weeks been very offensive to the Jewish community in Australia. It was said that prior to the visit of General

Moshe Dayan to Melbourne there were calls for demonstrations, made in such a way that violence would be encouraged. Apparently the latter were made during the period 15-29 July 1976.

3CR:

It was alleged that this station in a recent series (apparently on Sunday nights 6.30 to 7 pm.) has broadcast programmes that are very offensive to the Jewish community. It has been asserted that the Jewish community does not have the opportunity to answer distortions mentioned in this English language programme.

2EA and 3EA:

No specific mention was made of any programmes on these stations. It is apparent that there is some controversy about ethnic programmes in the Arab language. It has, for example, been alleged at another time that the 3EA programme on Saturdays (1-2 p.m.) and Sunday (3-5 p.m.) consistently favours one faction in the Lebanon crisis.

"The Sub-Committee appreciates that not all the stations mentioned above are under your direct jurisdiction, nevertheless I am writing to you because you requested in your letter of 1 June 1976 that Sub-Committee Chairmen contact you in the first instance.

"The Sub-Committee on the Middle East has asked me to request copies of transcripts of the

programmes referred to in this letter for the period 15 July - 12 August 1976. I would be grateful for any comment that you or the Chairmen of the responsible bodies may have on this matter.

"You will appreciate that all the members of the Sub-Committee are concerned that radio stations in Australia do not unduly assist the transfer of the antagonisms of the Middle East situation to some members of the Australian community, while at the same time not wishing to prevent a balance of all viewpoints being heard. The Sub-Committee also noted that in some cases (not including 3CR) public funds are involved and that it was not the intention that the stations present political comment in the way it has been alleged."

4.3 The Minister for Post and Telecommunications replied on 27 September 1976 to the effect that he had referred the requests for information to the Australian Broadcasting Commission (in regard to 3ZZ) and the Australian Broadcasting Control Board (in regard to 3CR) and that he would arrange to send tapes of the Arab language broadcasts from station 3EA. Only 3EA tapes were received three weeks later and the sample had no material which was judged to be offensive. However the Committee had to make its own arrangements for translation in the absence of any apparent monitoring system by the controlling bodies. In fact the Committee has received no recent allegations about station 3EA.

4.4 The Committee was informed by the Minister that there are very real difficulties in monitoring foreign

language broadcasts and as yet has not received tapes or transcripts from stations 3CR and 3ZZ despite a further letter to the Minister on 7 October 1976. Furthermore, the Committee is still receiving complaints of dishonest agitation in broadcasts over the stations 3CR and 3ZZ. It has been alleged that radio station 3ZZ continues to have a seriously divisive influence in Melbourne's Lebanese community, including spreading misrepresentations which could lead to violence.

4.5 The following are some excerpts from a broadcast by station 3CR on Sunday 15 August 1976 at 6.30 p.m. (this is a regular programme "Palestine Speaks" and on this occasion was contributed by the "Palestine Australian Solidarity Committee"). The purport of this campaign is to allege that a category of Jews who were "Zionists" collaborated with Nazis in extermination policies directed against Jews who were not Zionists. It is quite clear Nazism had no sympathy whatever with Zionism and in Auschwitz, Buchenwald and other Nazi death camps Jews were destroyed regardless of such sympathies. Four separate samples from the broadcast are:

"What has saved the Zionist dream from oblivion more than anything else was the rise of Fascism in Europe. The events the Zionists prayed for and worked for occurred when German Fascism took control of Germany. This was the turning point for Zionism. It was European Fascism that aided Zionism Fascism implement its plans in Palestine and establishing the State of Israel."

"One outstanding example of such victim of Zionist Nazi collaboration, is that of the young Jewish Hungarian Channa Senesh. Now, in Israel, she is honoured as a heroine but in actual fact the Zionists collaborated with the Nazis in her murder during 1944 in Budapest as it was revealed during the Jerusalem trial in criminal case No. 124 of 1953, a trial known in Israel as the 'Kastner Trial'."

"So the conclusion is clear. What is wrong with the destruction of dry branches? What is wrong with the destruction of 800,000 Hungarians of Jewish background who refused to support Zionism? So Kastner, and Zionism with him are O.K. as far as Zionist justice goes."

"Recently we had a visit from a notorious Zionist War Criminal from occupied Palestine. This man is Moshe Dayan who came to Australia on an official visit. The aim of his visit was to encourage young Australians of Jewish background to migrate to Israel as well as to extort more money from the pocket of the Australian people of Jewish background so that Israel can finance its plans of aggression against the Arab people."

4.6 The Committee as already stated, does not wish to curtail the right of 'normal' free speech in Australia but exercising the same freedom it condemns these broadcasts as cynical misrepresentations of history to incite

hatred of Jews. The purpose of ethnic access radio is to give opportunities for expression of the culture and dignity of minorities, not to denigrate, incite, and import foreign quarrels to Australia. The Committee is concerned that a faction should think such broadcasts should take place in this country. Apparently no official steps are being taken to monitor foreign language or community radio broadcasts. Even if the freedom to incite is held to be inviolable, the Government should be in a position to draw attention to malevolence and unworthiness. The stations do have a moral obligation to have high ethical standards and a motive of keeping peace in Australia. The Committee makes this judgement in view of the fact that despite the Committee's wide powers derived from the Parliament of the Commonwealth, it has not been possible to obtain official transcripts of the broadcasts since 20 August 1976.

4.7 The Committee does not urge suppression of 'normal' free speech but does urge better monitoring and better self control within the stations mentioned. The Committee notes that the proposed Australian Broadcasting Tribunal will have quasi-judicial powers over the issue of licences and the authority to hold public inquiries into broadcasting. The Committee recommends that early attention be given by the Tribunal to the matters raised in this section of the report. The lacerations of other nations must not be transferred to Australia, and the misuse of ethnic radio to dignify the vicious conflicts of the world needs exposure if nothing else.

4.8 It was submitted in evidence to the Committee, that one way of preventing one extreme faction from taking over programmes aimed at ethnic communities would be for the Australian Broadcasting Commission to take an active interest in the selection of the relevant programme's organising committee and to also ensure the right of reply. The Committee believes these ideas have merit and suggests that the Chairman of such a committee should be widely respected as truthful and devoid of factionalism throughout the ethnic community, and that the composition of the committee should reflect the balance and variety of viewpoints in the ethnic community.

Arab Language Newspapers

4.9 Six Arab language weeklies in Australia represent a Lebanese political party or faction or a particular point of view. It is alleged that several papers receive a subsidy from factions overseas in order to propagate a particular line of propaganda, and in this respect they have been accused by some Lebanese of intentionally creating division and hostility within their community. As with the broadcasts referred to earlier, some of the papers can also be offensive to the Jewish community when they cross the dividing line between free speech to incitement of hatred. It is not for a moment suggested that Israeli policy should not be criticized and the policies of Arab Governments supported. The nature of the broadcasts to which attention has been drawn show that the media can be perverted beyond such legitimate ends into the

denigration of a race and into the representation of people with whom one disagrees as arch-criminals.

4.10 Most of the papers have the beneficial effect of keeping their readers informed on Middle East and Australian news and how events may affect migrants. In many cases articles are reprints of articles from Lebanese, Libyan, Iraqi or other Arab newspapers.

4.11 It has been submitted that there is hostility between the various individuals and groups who operate the papers, both on the basis of sheer economic competition and on the basis of political animosities stemming from the Lebanese trauma. Yet such sentiments of hostility are apparently not out of hand, and the various groups and factions continue to place advertisements in papers that are operated by individuals known to be of differing views. Thus, for example, Phalangists continue to advertise their meetings in papers operated by leftists.

4.12 The Committee is hopeful that in the longer term, the Arab community in Australia will be able to exercise the pressure of a responsible readership over the owners and management of the Arab press in Australia, in order to divert their newspapers from any divisive or inflammatory activity which is usually generated by a faction not representative of the ethnic community as a whole. It goes without saying that the Committee expects high ethical standards of the Jewish press. In the Middle East, however, as in Europe in the 1940's, it is conceivable that the Jewish population could be wiped out. It is not possible for Jews to wipe out the Arabs. No assertion of "even handedness" can disguise this tremendous disparity

of risk, and experience of Nazi Germany should make Australians hyper sensitive. The Arabs have never been threatened with extinction but the Jews have repeatedly experienced that threat. The sparks of Arab hostility could create a blaze which engulfs to extinction millions of Jews; there is no comparable threat to the Arabs.

4.13 In this Chapter, the Committee has shown concern that the antagonisms of Lebanon, and the Middle East may be transmitted to parts of the Australian community - even although it is generated by small unrepresentative factions. Without trying to stifle 'normal' free speech the Committee has suggested some ways of overcoming this transfer of hatred to Australia.

See also: Conclusions 21 to 23 (pages 87 and 88)

Recommendations 17 and 18 (pages 92 and 93).

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee expresses the following main conclusions:

Human Tragedy and Devastation

1. The human tragedy and devastation resulting from the Lebanon crisis is so immense that it creates claims of great moral weight on other nations to take action to alleviate suffering. The number of dead may be as high as 60,000 with a further 200,000 wounded. Possibly a third of Lebanon's three million people have fled the country. The Lebanese people are desperately in need of assistance but aid programmes face the following difficulties:

- a. There is a chronic state of insecurity and chaos in many parts of the country;
- b. Many instrumentalities of the Lebanese government and many foreign and United Nations agencies have ceased to function. There remains very little organisation to administer and distribute humanitarian assistance; in the faction ridden society there is too frequently a lack of will to assist;
- c. Damage to Lebanon's infrastructure is widespread with public services non-existent for long periods, and there is a chronic scarcity of essential commodities. There has been wilful destruction;

d. The distribution of aid to the most needy is frequently hindered, or scarce items are forcibly taken by combatants for their own selfish reasons; and

e. There is an atmosphere of deceit in the crisis. Leaders of the various participants including those Arab states involved want the United Nations to keep out. Therefore appeals for more aid are minimal and people in flight have not been declared refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

(Paras 2.1 to 2.16, 2.23 to 2.26)

Communal Grievances

2. The traditional 'National Pact' between Christians and Muslims in Lebanon has disintegrated. Hatreds, aggression and violent retribution are not simply confined to persons seen as military opponents but are extended to non-combatants of other faiths, often in a capricious manner. The factionalism and economic contrasts in Lebanon will make the reconciliation process very difficult unless there is a disposition to see people of other communities as worthy of the dignity of equal citizenship. Political and economic reform is overdue in Lebanon and in particular it must take account of the fact that the Christians may no longer comprise the majority of the Lebanese people. The confessional division of the country and allocation of representation have been important factors in the crisis. (Paras 1.1 to 1.10, 1.37)

Interference in Lebanon's Affairs

3. A necessary pre-condition for the healing process in Lebanon is the cessation of outside interference in a country which for many years has managed to live a much more prosperous existence than other Arab states, except where such states were great sources of oil. This outside intervention (from a number of countries) is initially and tragically attributable to the Palestinians; Syria, Iraq and Libya have, subsequently intervened. The recognized Government may benefit from Syrian intervention, whatever Syria's motives. Without doubt it would view the intervention of Iraq and Libya as tending to frustrate a solution to the Lebanon crisis. (Paras 1.16, 1.18 to 1.46, 2.5)

4. The existence of a recognized authority in Lebanon however disintegrated and impotent has contributed to a great reluctance by Australia as well as many other nations, to raise this issue of foreign intervention in Lebanon in international forums, such as the United Nations. This is despite the fact that there has been a flagrant breach of the United Nation's Charter, and despite a clear threat to peace. This is not simply due to the apparent futility of taking such matters to the United Nations but also in deference to the fact that it would not be welcomed by some Arab states. (Paras 1.53 to 1.56)

5. The interference of the Palestinians in Lebanon's internal affairs has had particularly serious consequences and has also helped to upset the precarious demographic balance between the Christians and Muslims. The Palestinians who had been accepted in good faith as refugees have

since adopted a destructive role in Lebanon. A solution to the problem of where they are to settle is as important to Lebanon as it is to the attainment of peace in the Middle East. Like a number of Arab States a Lebanese nation free of conflict would be convinced that the Palestinians should be elsewhere, but certainly no longer in Lebanon whose feelings they have flouted and whose hospitality they have abused. (Paras 1.11 to 1.18, 1.49, 1.56)

Lebanon's Future

6. It is difficult to make a confident prediction about any cease fire in Lebanon (over fifty ceasefires have had limited success in the past). However, the most recent cease fire (November 1976) resulting from the decisions of the Riyadh and Cairo meetings and backed by the determination of Syria to avoid partition of Lebanon, appears to give this latest truce a good chance of being adhered to by most factions in Lebanon. This is an opportune time for the world to give much needed aid to Lebanon. (Paras 1.27 to 1.38, 1.46)

7. It will be difficult for Beirut to resume its pre-eminence as the main Middle East commercial centre and after the fighting ceases it may take 18 months to 2 years for a reasonable infrastructure to reappear in Lebanon. This will depend on the extent of foreign aid and the ability of the Lebanese people to make an earnest effort at reconciliation. (Paras 2.11 to 2.14, 2.47 to 2.54)

Aid for Lebanon

8. Despite the praiseworthy motivation and efforts of the 62 delegates of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) working in Lebanon (including less than 20 doctors and nurses), it is difficult to visualize how such a small force can cope with the immense humanitarian task confronting it in Lebanon. There is a need to support the efforts of the ICRC to the extent that the assistance can be effectively absorbed, for the benefit of the needy people of Lebanon. However, there is also an urgent requirement to look for additional ways to send aid to Lebanon, including perhaps finance for aid from geographically nearer States. (Paras 2.18 to 2.28, 2.33 to 2.38)

9. Lebanon has an urgent need for medical support including supplies of drugs and vaccines, ambulances, emergency shelter, emergency power and communications equipment. As many non-combatants have been evacuated to the mountains where with the onset of winter there is a need for blankets and clothing, Australia could assist with many of these items as well as with its more usual donations of food. (Paras 2.27 to 2.32, 2.36 to 2.39)

10. The deployment of foreign medical teams in Lebanon would be one of the most effective forms of aid and would have the following advantages:

- a. They would ensure that the aid would actually reach the needy rather than be misused on the black market as has frequently been the case.
- b. Their mere presence may discourage the excesses often perpetrated in a civil war. (Paras 2.39 to 2.41)

11. One of the most effective ways of giving aid to a seaboard country with a medical crisis of the magnitude in Lebanon would be the provision of a medical care ship. Such a ship could give aid impartially to both sides without the security problem which has been such an impediment to aid in Lebanon. (Paras 2.44 to 2.46)

Lebanese "Displaced Persons" and Australian Immigration

12. Australia (and countries like Canada and Brazil) can ease the suffering of the Lebanese people by being more generous in accepting Lebanese "displaced persons", and thereby set an example to other countries in the world. This need not involve the acceptance of an unmanageable number of people who should realistically be termed "refugees", because the major proportion of those Lebanese who have fled to countries nearby to Lebanon will wish to return when the security situation allows. It may be socially more desirable to contribute even more generously to the Lebanese "displaced persons" in countries such as Syria, Cyprus, Jordan and Egypt until they can return to their homeland. (Paras 3.7 to 3.11, 3.22)

13. The large majority of Lebanese who have entered Australia since the onset of the Lebanon crisis have been close relatives of members of the Australian Lebanese community. For the nine months ending 30 September 1976 only 1,835 people from Lebanon arrived in Australia. Although this number is likely to increase considerably in the following months due to some recent Government measures, including some suggested by the Committee in correspondence, the Lebanese migrant intake for 1976

is unlikely to exceed 4,000. The acceptance of 4,000 Lebanese is far from a generous intake, but it has been estimated that due to the high propensity to nominate, the annual consequential immigration in ten years time would be at least three times as high and even much higher, if present entry criteria were still to apply. (Paras 3.7 to 3.11, 3.22 to 3.35)

14. The Number of "hardship" cases (that is those applicants who do not have close family ties with Australia),¹ who have gained entry to Australia is very small, considering Australia has a large Lebanese community which can assist their integration. (Paras 3.15 to 3.17, 3.21, 3.22, 3.32, 3.42)

15. The Lebanese community is naturally concerned for its relatives and kinsmen. While acknowledging the assistance that it has already received, it is keen to see a larger influx of Lebanese displaced persons, particularly those with family connections in Australia. The Committee is very sympathetic with these aspirations but they need to be tempered by the difficulties being encountered by the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs. Lest this should encourage minimal effort, the agonies of the Lebanese should rate higher than administrative difficulties of the Department. (Paras 2.29, 2.30, 3.2 to 3.8, 3.12, 3.13, 3.22)

16. There is a continued need to carry out health checks; and also for normal screening of Lebanese "displaced persons" in order to prevent the entry of criminal and violent elements into Australia. Every effort must be made so that the antagonisms of the Lebanon situation and the Middle East generally are not transferred to Australia.

(Paras 3.16 to 3.18, 3.21 to 3.23)

1. As defined in para 3.21. These Criteria later modified, see paras 3.31, 3.32

17. Officers of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs working in Australian posts in countries with a large influx of Lebanese displaced persons, and particularly in Beirut until 28 March 1976 (when the post was withdrawn) have been working under difficult and often hazardous conditions. Their difficult task should have been alleviated by the following action during the early build up of applications for entry to Australia:

- a. Temporary increases in staff ceiling to cope with the numbers involved, as normal peace-time staffing should not be the criterion in such a chaotic situation;
- b. Inclusion of sufficient personnel conversant with the Lebanese situation and language; and
- c. An increase in the number of doctors serving in Australian posts abroad (their number had been reduced from 25 to 8 in recent times and there was until recently no radiologist in the Middle East causing lengthy delays for otherwise approved applicants).

The urgent need to reverse this situation was acknowledged in September 1976 with the establishment of a special Immigration task force in Cyprus. (Paras 3.12, 3.13, 3.18, 3.22, 3.26 to 3.30)

18. In any refugee situation there is a requirement for clear guidelines on eligibility for entry into Australia. This would obviate displaced persons undergoing a long and expensive wait in another country in the false hope of coming to Australia. Ministerial discretion would need to be retained to ensure a humane flexibility.

(Paras 3.22, 3.31, 3.32)

A Refugee Policy for Australia

19. In order for Australia to be seen to be taking its fair share of refugees (and there are and will be other refugee commitments besides those generated from the Lebanon crisis), Australia must develop criteria for a humane and clear-cut policy on refugees. This would have the following additional advantages:

- a. It will enable reasonable intake targets to be set before a refugee situation develops. If necessary these targets can be subtracted from the planned annual immigration intake should the situation develop;
- b. Overseas governments, the United Nations, Australian and International Voluntary Organisations would have a clearer indication of what Australia's contribution is to be, and can plan accordingly in the event of a sudden upheaval;
- c. It will assist Commonwealth budgetary and staffing arrangements relevant to refugee matters; and
- d. It will avoid the building up of false hopes by giving clearer guidelines as to likely refugee intakes. (Paras 3.22, 3.39 to 3.43)

Representation in Damascus

20. As the major proportion of Lebanese displaced persons is located in Syria, there are strong humanitarian reasons for the re-establishment of an immigration team in Damascus. Re-establishment in Damascus in reasonable strength would obviate displaced persons using up scarce

resources to travel to other diplomatic posts only to find entry into Australia was not possible. This seems to the Committee to involve the establishment of an Australian diplomatic mission in Damascus and there are good political reasons, as well as humane reasons for doing so. Syria through successful intervention in Lebanon has greatly extended national influence not only in the Levant but in the Arab World generally. Syria is the leading confrontation state facing Israel. Diplomatically it is therefore of significance and this significance is likely to be enhanced.

(Paras 2.6, 2.7, 3.19, 3.20,
3.23, 3.37, 3.38, 1.51, 1.52)

Ethnic and Community Access Radio

21. The Committee received allegations of inflammatory commentary and of denial of access of certain groups to some ethnic and community access stations in Melbourne. The Committee had difficulty in substantiating these allegations due to an apparent inability of the Minister for Post and Telecommunications to obtain transcripts or tape recordings of the programmes on 3ZZ and 3CR, from the Australian Broadcasting Commission and the Australian Broadcasting Control Board respectively. The Committee concludes that no satisfactory monitoring procedures are enforced. Appropriate action should be taken to rectify this.

(Paras 4.2 to 4.5)

22. While the Committee does not wish to curtail the right of 'normal' free speech it condemns the use of radio stations in Australia for the creation of divisions, hostility or hatred in this country, and the management

of these stations should be publicly told when their stations are channels of racial and religious incitement. The stations have a moral obligation not to disseminate hate loaded ideas. (Paras 4.5 to 4.8)

Ethnic Press

23. It would be for the long term benefit of the Arab community in Australia if the Arab community could exercise the pressures of responsible readership over the owners and management of some Arab newspapers and periodicals in Australia whenever they indulge in divisive or inflammatory activity. This applies to much of the ethnic press which continues in Australia the disputes of the homelands. The Committee appreciates that when such activity occurs it is invariably generated by a faction not representative of the ethnic community as a whole. (Paras 4.9 to 4.12)

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of its inquiry, the Committee recommends that:

1. Australia should work in international forums as well as in private consultations with friendly powers to minimize interference by other powers, in the internal affairs of Lebanon and to support policies of limitation of arms to the combatants.

(Paras 1.53 to 1.55)

2. Australia establish a diplomatic mission in Damascus which would also be accredited to Amman. It could be accredited to Beirut as soon as normality returns to that city, pending re-

establishment of full diplomatic relations
with Lebanon. (Paras 1.51, 1.52)

3. As soon as approval is given for an Australian diplomatic mission in Syria, Australia should send ahead a migration team to Damascus to facilitate the handling of Lebanese "displaced persons", who meet the revised immigration criteria for Lebanese.
(Paras 3.19, 3.20, 3.37, 3.38)

4. Australia should take seriously the position of the Palestinians and the need for solving their problems. All those represented as Palestinians are not Palestinians however, and there is little doubt they are being used as a weapon against Arab Governments. In the meantime, Australia should continue to make contributions to their welfare through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees until there is a permanent solution to the Middle East problem.

(Paras 1.11 to 1.16, 1.49, 2.31)

5. Australia should give generously to the current urgent four months programme of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Lebanon, which is estimated to cost A\$14 m., and to any subsequent appeals from that organisation to alleviate the suffering of the people of Lebanon.
(Paras 2.22, 2.23)

6. Australia should seek additional ways to assist the ICRC to send aid to Lebanon and should urgently investigate all possible strategies of

assistance. While impartiality between the communities in Lebanon is very important, Australia should bear in mind that effective aid to people in need is even more important.

(Paras 2.22, 2.28 to 2.35, 2.41 to 2.43)

7. Australia should help the Lebanese community in Australia with the provision of transport for goods they wish to send to alleviate the suffering of their countrymen. This applies particularly to urgent items such as winter clothing, medical supplies and vaccines which should be air transported to Athens for impartial distribution onward to Lebanon. (Paras 2.29, 2.30)

8. Australia should change its aid policy so that relief operations through the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) and any of its 32 affiliates receive government support in addition to the usual developmental support.

(Paras 2.41, 2.42)

9. The Australian Development Assistance Agency should channel increased support to Lebanon including to the November 1976 appeal by the World Food and Agricultural Organisation and that Australia should be prepared to contribute generously to the reconstruction of Lebanon, and should work in the United Nations and elsewhere for an international reconstruction effort. (Paras 2.43, 2.50, 2.51)

10. The Australian Government encourage and support non government welfare organisations to

despatch medical teams to Lebanon to work in any areas where they are needed and welcomed.

(Paras 2.39 to 2.41)

11. Australia should initiate international action for a suitable medical care ship to assist with the alleviation of the medical and health crisis in Lebanon.

(Paras 2.44, 2.45)

12. Australia develop an enlightened, humane and clear cut refugee policy that will enable intake targets to be set before a refugee situation develops, and facilitate a quick response during the early stage of an emergency.

(Paras 3.22, 3.39 to 3.43)

13. The Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs initiate a National Committee on Refugees in Australia which would pool the resources and knowledge of both government and international voluntary agencies represented in Australia; this would have the desirable effect of extending community involvement. (Para 3.22)

14. Australia should not insist excessively on the criterion of family ties with Australia, while avoiding the entry of violent and criminal elements. In dealing with hardship cases during Lebanon's reconstruction phase, preference should be given to families with young children and those families who have suffered traumatic experiences through no fault of their own and who require a

new life elsewhere. A reasonable chance of integration in Australia should be one criterion but not too rigorously applied.

(Paras 3.22, 3.24)

15. Australia, when dealing with a refugee problem, should ensure that need and the ability to integrate are equal criteria with a bias to humane assistance rather than use simple self interest in selection. Australians themselves should not seek to play ideological favourites by furthering the migration of elements deemed to be congenial to particular Australian political groups.

(Paras 3.22, 3.40)

16. Provision should be made in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs so that on the onset of a refugee situation, normal staff ceilings do not prevent the efficient and humane handling of applications in overseas posts, as well as in Australia. (Paras 3.22, 3.26 to 3.28)


17. As a matter of priority the proposed Australian Broadcasting Tribunal hold an inquiry into the activities of both ethnic and community access radio stations with a view to seeking ways of reducing broadcasting that is inflammatory and divisive in the Australian community.

(Paras 4.6, 4.7)

18. The Australian Broadcasting Commission should take an active interest in the selection of qualified and responsible organising committees

for ethnic radio stations and that while censorship
is not recommended, standards should exist to
prevent incitement to race prejudice and communal
conflict. (Paras 4.6, 4.8)

2 December 1976


Magnus Cormack, Senator
Chairman

ANNEX A

COMPOSITION OF CONTENDING FACTIONS IN LEBANON as at 1/10/76
(NB: There are many shadings and cross connections)

Christians-Rightists (led by
Maronite Subcommune)

1. The Phalanges under the leadership of Pierre Gemayel (al-Kata'ab Party). There are about 10,000 regulars plus 8,000 irregulars.
2. El-numour (the Tigers) - the armed forces of the Free National Party - under the leadership of Camille Chamoun. His militia is about 2,000 strong.
3. The Liberation Army of Zghorta under the leadership of President Suleiman Franjeh. This militia is of unknown strength but is supported by about 300 ex-Lebanese Army Regulars.

Muslims-Leftists

1. The Progressive Socialists under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt - including Druze, Moslem, and Greek Orthodox. Jumblatt commands over 3,000 Druze militiamen.
2. The National Socialist Party (the Syrian Nationalist Party) under the leadership of Inaam Raid. Under the influence of Libya.
3. The Communist Party under the leadership of George Hawi. Under the influence of the Soviet Union.
4. The Nasserite faction which include:
 - a. The Reformist Movement Organization - loyal to Egypt - under the

4. The Cedar Guards Front - right-wing militant group known to favour partition - under the leadership of Dr Fuad Shimaali.
 5. The Maronite Monasteries Organization under the leadership of Father Charbel Cassis. Known to favour partition.
 6. The forces of Colonel Antoine Barakat - a faction of the Lebanese army which works closely with Christian irregulars.
 7. The Tashnaq Party - an Armenian rightist organization whose paramilitary units operate closely with the Phalanges.
- a. leadership of Isam Al-Arab,
 - b. The Socialist Union.
 - c. The Nasserite Forces (or Union of National Workers' Forces) under the leadership of Jajah Wakim and Kamal Shatila which are under the influence of Libya, and
 - d. El-Murabitun (or independent Nasserites) under the leadership of Ibrahim Quleilat. There are 2,000 Nasserite extreme left radicals based in Beirut.
 5. The 24th of October Movement under the leadership of Farouk El-Muqaddam.
 6. The Lebanese Arab Army numbering about 4,000 Muslim ex-Lebanese Army members under the leadership of Lieutenant Ahmed Khatib. Coordinates its activities with Jumblatt and Arafat, their main strength being in the South.

The Pro-Syrian Forces

1. Al-Saiqa, a component of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under the leadership of Zuhair Muhsin who is the head of the military department of the PLO and a strong

- rival to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Muhsin is also an executive member of the Syrian Ba'ath Party.
2. The Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) under the leadership of General Misbaah Boudiri. The PLA receives its military supplies from the Syrian general staff.
Al-Saiqa and the PLA have numbered 5,000-8,000 men, but many have switched support to Arafat.
 3. The Lebanese Ba'ath Party under the leadership of Isam Kanzo.
 7. The Army units of Brigadier General Aziz Ahdab in Beirut.
Both Ahdab and Khatib are now members of the Revolutionary Council which is headed by Ahdab.
 8. Prime Minister Karami's militia (Arab Liberation Army) used for the Defence of Tripoli.
- The Pro-Arafat Palestinians
1. Fatah under the leadership of Arafat - the largest Palestinian component of the PLO - has about 8,000 regulars and many irregular Palestinians.
 2. The Arab Liberation Front (ALF) under the leadership of Abdel Wahhab Kayyali. It receives its military supplies from the Ba'ath Party of Iraq.
 3. The PLA unit of Ain Jalut - under the control of Egypt.
 4. The Popular Front factions which include:

- a. Popular Front-General Command (PFGC) of Ahmad Jebril,
- b. the Revolutionary Popular Front of Wadi Haddad,
- c. the Marxist Popular Democratic Front (PDFLP) of Nayef Hawatmah, and
- d. the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) of Dr George Habash who has Marxist tendencies.

These Popular Front forces are probably 1,000 strong and include "volunteers" from Left Wing regimes and organisations.

Summary. Christian-Rightist-Pro-Syrian Forces

The total Christian regular militias are believed to number about 12,000 to 14,000. The regular Syrian Forces since April 1976 have numbered at least 8,000 but they have the ability to increase this number very quickly and the Palestinians have claimed there have been as many as 40,000 Syrians. Syrian regulars have also been supported by Palestinians under Syrian control - principally from Al-Saiqa whose allegiance is changing to Arafat. In more recent times there have been about 22,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon supported by aircraft and tanks.

Summary. Muslim-Leftist-Palestinian Forces

The total pro-Muslim-Leftist side has numbered 24,000 to 28,000 Lebanese and Palestinians plus some "volunteers" from the "Rejection Front". The latter has included 4,000 Iraqis.

Source: Adapted from E.M. Koury, The Crisis in the Lebanese System 1976 and amended in accordance with the Committee's evidence.

TEXT OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT 1969

(The Agreement was to regulate the activities of the Palestinians in Lebanon, p. 16 refers)

"On 3 November 1969 a meeting was held in Cairo between a Lebanese delegation headed by army commander Major General Emile Boustani and a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The meeting was attended on the Egyptian side by the Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad, and the War Minister, General Mohammad Fawzi.

In view of their brotherly ties and common fate, the relations between Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution are bound always to be characterized by confidence, frankness and positive cooperation for the benefit of Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution, within the framework of Lebanon's sovereignty and security. The two delegations have agreed upon the following principles and measures:

The Palestinian presence

It was agreed to reorganize the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the bases below:

1. The rights of work, residence and movement for Palestinians now resident in Lebanon.
2. The formation of local Palestinian committees in the refugee camps to look after the interests of their inhabitants, in cooperation with the local authorities and within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty.
3. The establishment of posts for the armed Palestin-

ians struggle within the camps to cooperate with the local committees in ensuring good relations with the authorities. These posts will handle the organization and limitation of arms in the camps, within the framework of Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian revolution.

4. Permission for Palestinians resident in Lebanon to participate in the Palestinian revolution through armed struggle, and within the framework of Lebanon's sovereignty and security.

Commando action

It was agreed to facilitate commando action by the following measures:

1. Facilitating the movement of the commandos, and defining points of passage and observation in the border area.
2. Securing the road to the Arkoub region.
3. Assumption by the Armed Struggle Command of the task of controlling the actions of all members of its organizations and ensuring their non-interference in Lebanese affairs.
4. Establishment of liaison between the armed struggle and the Lebanese army.
5. Suspension of the information campaigns exchanged by the two sides.
6. Holding a census of armed struggle elements in Lebanon through their command.
7. Appointment of representatives of the armed struggle to the Lebanese general staff to participate in the solution of all future problems.
8. Studying the location of suitable points for concentration in the border area, to be agreed with

the Lebanese general staff.

9. Regulation of the entry, exit and movement of armed struggle elements.
10. Abolition of the Jiroun base.
11. Facilitation by the Lebanese army of the work of medical, evacuation and supply centers belonging to the commando action.
12. Release of detainees and seized weapons.
13. Acceptance of the principle that the Lebanese authorities, civilian and military, will continue to exercise their full responsibilities and authority in all Lebanese territory and under all circumstances.
14. The two delegations emphasize that the Palestinian armed struggle is an undertaking as much in the interests of Lebanon as of the Palestinian revolution and all Arabs.
15. This agreement shall remain highly secret, accessible only to the resistance."

Signed: Emile Boustani,
head of the Lebanese delegation

Yasser Arafat
3 November 1969.

EXTRACTS FROM NICOSIA CABLE 0.NC 0706 OF 18 AUGUST 1976

SENT BY THE AUSTRALIAN SENIOR MIGRATION OFFICER

IN CYPRUS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED IN BEIRUT¹

1. PRE-EVACUATION DIFFICULTIES

FROM COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN MARCH 1975 OPERATION DIFFICULTIES EXPERIENCED IN BEIRUT OFFICE. DEPENDING ON INTENSITY OF FIGHTING APPLICANTS AT TIMES UNABLE TO ATTEND FOR MEDICAL AND X-RAYS AT PANEL PHYSICIANS. ALSO DISRUPTIONS TO OFFICE ROUTINE CAUSED BY PERIODIC ABSENCE L.E.S. WHEN ROADS UNSAFE. SOME A-BASED LIVED IN INSECURE AREAS AND FAMILIES EXPERIENCED OCCASIONAL HARASSMENT BY ROAD BLOCKS, SOLICITING DONATIONS FOR VARIOUS FACTIONS, ETC. NEVERTHELESS AS FAR AS I CAN ASCERTAIN OFFICE ATTEMPTED TO OPERATE NORMALLY DURING THIS PERIOD.

LOCATION OF KANTARI DIRECTLY BETWEEN MURR TOWER AND HOLIDAY INN EVENTUALLY RECOGNISED BY FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECURITY OFFICER AS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS. SPORADIC INCIDENTS HAD OCCURRED IN VICINITY OF BUILDING. HENCE:

2. EVACUATION OF KANTARI - 26 OCTOBER 1975

OFFICE MOVED TO CARLTON HOTEL IN RAS BEIRUT AND ACCOMMODATION IN HOTEL ROOMS. MAIN COUNTER WAS HOTEL HALLWAY. IN MOVE ONLY ITEMS ESSENTIAL FOR OPERATION WERE TRANSFERRED. SITUATION AT THIS TIME CAUSED IMMIGRATION STAFF TO OPERATE WITHOUT ACCESS TO CARD INDEX, PAST FILES, NORMAL SAFE CUSTODY FACILITIES, CLASSIFIED CABLE FACILITIES ETC. I UNDERSTAND DURING THIS PERIOD L.E.S. WERE GENERALLY UNAVAILABLE. MOVE PROVED PROPITIOUS AS KANTARI EMBASSY SUBSEQUENTLY SCENE OF SEVERE FIGHTING WITH CONSIDERABLE DESTRUCTION.

3. EMERGENCY VISA PROCEDURE

WITH MOVE TO CARLTON HOTEL OPERATION BECAME ESSENTIALLY EMERGENCY IN NATURE. DEPARTURE OF LIAISON OFFICER AND A-BASED GIRL MEANT L-CHECKS NO LONGER AVAILABLE. MEDICAL AND X-RAY PROBLEM OF ACCESS STILL

L.E.S.: Locally engaged staff

A-BASED: Australia based

L-CHECKS: Liaison checks

ACUTE. CONCENTRATION AT THIS TIME ON PART PROCESSED CASES. NEW CASES JUDGED ON MERITS WITHOUT RECORDS ACCESS. PROCEDURE INTRODUCED, MAINLY FOR CATEGORY A, FOR TEMPORARY ENTRY VISA ISSUE, SUBJECT MEDICALS AND X-RAYS IN AUSTRALIA.

4. CHANGEOVER OF A-BASED STAFF

PRE AND POST EVACUATION OF KANTARI A-BASED STAFF WAS PROGRESSIVELY WITHDRAWN DUE TO SECURITY SITUATION. MANY HAD FAMILIES AND PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED WITH SCHOOLING, GENERAL SECURITY ETC. AT THIS TIME S.M.O. DETERMINED EMERGENCY OPERATION COULD BE SUSTAINED WITH THREE A-BASED MIGRATION, NINE L.E.S. (THIS LEVEL L.E.S. NEVER ACHIEVED). NEW A-BASED OFFICERS. APART FROM S.M.O. WITHOUT FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES, INTRODUCED AT THIS TIME. OPERATING DIFFICULTY HEIGHTENED BY INABILITY TO UNDERTAKE NORMAL INFLOW, CHAOTIC NATURE OF EMERGENCY OPERATION DUE ACCOMMODATION, STAFF AVAILABILITY, LACK OF RECORDS, (INCLUDING POLICY RECORDS).

IN SPITE OF THESE PROBLEMS 111 VISITOR VISAS WERE ISSUED BETWEEN EVACUATION AND END DECEMBER AND 274 MIGRATION AND TEMPORARY ENTRY VISAS FROM 12 NOVEMBER TO END DECEMBER (EARLIER FIGURES UNAVAILABLE). THESE INCLUDED 20 WITH MEDICALS AND X-RAYS IN AUSTRALIA.

5. JANUARY ROUND

FIGHTING COMMENCED AGAIN EARLY JANUARY, SPREADING SOUTH FROM TRIPOLI TO BEIRUT IN ABOUT FIVE DAYS. DURING THIS PERIOD MANY APPLICANTS DESPERATE TO LEAVE AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON INDIVIDUAL CASES EXTREME (FROM PRESIDENT DOWN). THREATS WERE COMMON AND PERSONAL SECURITY DETERIORATED. CARLTON HOTEL AREA OCCASIONAL SCENE OF SHOOTING (ALTHOUGH NOT HEAVY FIGHTING). DUE INABILITY TO TRAVEL LATE IN AFTERNOON ENORMOUS TASK OF ORGANISING OFFICE, AND LACK OF L.E.S. (NONE ATTENDED AT THIS STAGE), I FREQUENTLY SLEPT IN MY OFFICE/HOTEL ROOM. MAINTENANCE ON APARTMENTS HAD DETERIORATED, FOODSTUFFS BECAME SCARCE AND THREATENED ATTACK ON WATER SUPPLY MADE SITUATION CRITICAL. ABOUT 15 JANUARY AIRPORT CLOSED AND SUBSEQUENT DECISION FOR PARTIAL EVACUATION OF A-BASED STAFF UNABLE TO BE

S.M.O.: Senior Migration Officer

IMPLEMENTED. BRITISH ORGANISED CONVOY SEEN AS SOLUTION BUT AIRPORT REOPENED 25 JANUARY AND SECURITY SITUATION IMPROVED. EVACUATION DECISION RESCINDED.

DURING THIS PERIOD HEAVY FIGHTING MEANT FEW CALLERS AT CARLTON HOTEL BUT IMMEDIATELY PRESSURE RELEASED ON ROADS APPLICANTS FLOODED IN AND CONDITIONS IN OFFICE BECAME CHAOTIC.

DURING JANUARY ROUND (AND UNTIL MARCH WITHDRAWAL) A-BASED LIVING CONDITIONS EXTREME. TYPICAL PROBLEMS RELATE TO CONSTANT CALLS FOR DONATIONS TO VARIOUS FACTIONS AND MILITIAS, REQUESTS USUALLY BEING AT GUNPOINT. SMALL TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS OFTEN END IN SHOOTING, TO VISIT OTHER STAFF DIFFICULT (AND MEANS STAYING OVER), TO VISIT OTHERS IMPOSSIBLE, DURING TROUBLE TELEPHONES CEASED TO OPERATE AND 2 WAY RADIOS ONLY MEANS OF CONTACT.

INDICATION OF OFFICE ACTIVITY DURING JANUARY ROUND - 22 VISITOR VISAS, AND 120 MIGRANT AND TEMPORARY RESIDENCE (INCLUDING 16 T-82) VISAS ISSUED IN JANUARY.

6. FEBRUARY LULL.

FROM CEASEFIRE LATE JANUARY CONDITIONS IMPROVED A LITTLE BUT PRESSURE OF APPLICANTS EXTREME. DEPARTURE OF PRITCHARD REDUCED A-BASED MIGRATION TO TWO AND NEW CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ARRIVED. LULL IN FIGHTING MADE RECOVERY OF ESSENTIAL RECORDS FROM KANTARI POSSIBLE, AND FREQUENT TRIPS UNDERTAKEN AS PRELUDE TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AUSTRALIAN PROPERTY AND RECORDS. WE RECOVERED ALL INDEX CARDS, 75 and PART 74 FILES, POLICY FILES AND INDEX, AND MANY OTHER ITEMS NECESSARY TO OPERATE. ACCOMMODATION IN CARLTON HOTEL BECAME MORE ORGANISED, L-CHECK PROCEDURE AND MEDICALS AND X-RAYS AGAIN INSTITUTED AND GENERALLY SITUATION STABILIZED. SOME L.E.S. RETURNED END JANUARY AND STAFFING DURING FEBRUARY ADEQUATE.

AT THIS TIME POLITICAL PRESSURE EXTREME. DAILY CALLS RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, POLITICIANS AND DEPUTIES, SECURITY FORCES, OTHER EMBASSIES AND ANYONE WHO THOUGHT THEY COULD EXERT INFLUENCE. SECURITY AND TRAVEL STILL DIFFICULT AND L.E.S. COULD NOT REMAIN ON MOST DAYS BEYOND 2 P.M. RADIO BROADCAST FREQUENT WARNINGS OF UNSAFE ROADS AND TRAVEL ALTHOUGH POSSIBLE WAS HAZARDOUS.

MAJOR PROBLEM HERE NOT ORGANISED FIGHTING AND MILITIAS, BUT SPORADIC INCIDENTS, THUGGERY, VANDALISM AND LOOTING. AT THIS TIME I WAS HELD UP IN A RESTAURANT AND ALL MY MONEY TAKEN AND WAS LUCKY TO COME OUT ALIVE (SEE MY REPORT). CANADIAN S.M.O. WAS ROUGHED UP IN SIMILAR EXPERIENCE. OTHER INCIDENTS OCCURRED WHEN CANADIAN EMBASSY WAS SHOT UP BY IRATE CUSTOMER, DUTCH VISA OFFICER HELD AT GUNPOINT BY REJECTED APPLICANT, ITALIAN AMBASSADOR WAS STOPPED AND ROBBED OUTSIDE CARLTON HOTEL AT MIDDAY AND MANY OTHER SIMILAR INCIDENTS OCCURRED. DURING THIS TIME ONE OF THE L.E.S. MESSENGERS WAS EMPLOYED TAKING GUNS FROM PEOPLE SEEKING ATTENTION IN THE OFFICE.

LOOTING OF FEW STORES WITH STOCKS CAUSED FOOD SHORTAGES, PETROL BECAME UNAVAILABLE AND PRICES SOARED FOR WHAT FEW THINGS REMAINED. (ALLOWANCES BORE NO RELATIONSHIP TO COSTS AND ALL OFFICERS IN BEIRUT FROM JANUARY ROUND SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE FINANCIAL LOSS).

DURING FEBRUARY 62 VISITOR VISAS AND 357 MIGRANT AND TEMPORARY ENTRY (INCLUDING 9 T-82) VISAS WERE ISSUED. AS RECORDS, MEDICALS AND X-RAYS WERE AVAILABLE ISSUE OF VISAS WITH MEDICALS AND X-RAYS IN AUSTRALIA WAS GENERALLY SUSPENDED.

7. MARCH ROUND.

ABOUT 10 MARCH FIGHTING AGAIN COMMENCED WITH ADDED INTENSITY. AGAIN MIGRATION LOCAL STAFF, WITH ONE EXCEPTION WERE UNAVAILABLE. THIS TIME FREQUENT SHOOTING OCCURED AROUND CARLTON HOTEL AND APARTMENTS. CALLERS WERE MORE DESPERATE AND GENERAL SITUATION IN THE OFFICE DETERIORATED. TURNING POINT CAME WITH LOSS BY FALANGISTS OF HOTEL AREAS TO LEFTISTS FORCES. CHRISTIAN FORCES COMMENCED RANDOM SHELLING FROM BEIT MERI INTO HEAVILY POPULATED MIXED COMMUNITY OF RAS BEIRUT WITH HEAVY CARLTON CELLAR. SHELLING CONTINUED THROUGHOUT FOLLOWING WEEK, AND ON 24 MARCH EMBASSY STAFF REDUCED TO CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, THIRD SECRETARY POLITICAL AND MYSELF. CONTINUED OPERATION IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. DURING MARCH 23 VISITOR VISAS AND 128 MIGRANT AND TEMPORARY ENTRY (INCLUDING 5 T-81) VISAS WERE ISSUED.

8. WITHDRAWAL TO ATHENS.

ON 28 MARCH REMAINING A-BASED DEPARTED FOR ATHENS. RESIDUAL EMBASSY TASKS LEFT IN CUSTODY L.E.S. DRIVER

(SECURITY OF OFFICE AND RESIDENCE) CONTRACT CLEANER (GENERAL ASSISTANCE IN EMBASSY) ACCOUNTANT (SECURITY OF RESIDENCE AND SUPPLY OF FOOD TO RESIDENCE DOMESTICS) AND ONE IMMIGRATION LOCAL (HANDLING ENQUIRIES AND REDIRECTING PEOPLE TO OTHER POSTS). ADVERTISEMENTS PLACED ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND IN PRESS ADVISING A1 APPLICANTS TO GO TO CAIRO, ANKARA, ATHENS OR NICOSIA. I COORDINATED LEBANESE OPERATION FROM ATHENS, MONITORING NUMBERS ARRIVING IN OTHER COUNTRIES AND ACTIVITIES OF NEARBY POSTS AND MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATION LINK WITH BEIRUT VIA PARIS.

TO ASSIST LEBANESE FLEEING TO SYRIA, CAMERON WAS MOVED TO NETHERLANDS EMBASSY DAMASCUS AND OPERATED THERE FROM 9 APRIL TO 26 JUNE. ON 3 MAY HAYNES, WHO ARRIVED FROM MALTA VIA ATHENS, WAS SET UP IN NICOSIA WITH SIMILAR TASK, AT THIS TIME I TRAVELLED TO NICOSIA THEN DAMASCUS AND AMMAN TO ASSIST.

ON 29 APRIL DECISION TAKEN TO RECEIVE ALL APPLICATIONS AND SYMPATHETICALLY CONSIDER THEM. SITUATION BEFORE THIS OF COURSE GAVE SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION BUT CASES OUTSIDE ELIGIBLE CATEGORIES REFUSED AT ENQUIRY STAGE.

9. TRANSFER TO NICOSIA.

ON 8 JUNE I MOVED TO NICOSIA, INITIALLY TO HANDLE CYPRIOT REFUGEES AND LEBANESE IN CYPRUS CASE LOAD. ON 16 JUNE MINISTER AND SECRETARY SEEN IN ATHENS AND DECISION TAKEN TO CENTRALIZE LEBANESE MIGRATION OPERATION IN CYPRUS. NUMBERS ARRIVING IN CYPRUS WERE GROWING, THE CANADIANS WERE ALREADY BASED IN LIMASSOL AND CENTRAL LOCATION WAS NECESSARY FOR WITHDRAWAL OF RECORDS FROM BEIRUT. NEWS-PAPER NOTICES AGAIN PLACED IN LEBANON AND LATER, ON WITHDRAWAL OF CAMERON AND L.E.S. INTERPRETER MADINI FROM DAMASCUS. DURING DAMASCUS OPERATION 21 VISITOR VISAS AND 516 MIGRANT AND TEMPORARY ENTRY VISAS WERE ISSUED. (THIS INCLUDED 259 T-82).

10. SITUATION TODAY (18/8/76)

OPERATION IN NICOSIA HAS GROWN DRAMATICALLY, EACH WEEK TWICE THE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS THAN CAN BE HANDLED

ARE RECEIVED. LEBANESE PRESENTING ARE IN FAR WORSE CONDITION THAN BEFORE. MOST HAVE UNDERGONE HARDSHIP, MANY ARE DESTITUTE. SITUATION IN OFFICE HIGHLY EMOTIONAL WITH FREQUENT THREATS AND OUTBURSTS. TWICE POLICE HAVE HAD TO BE CALLED.

PRESSURE AND ATTEMPTS TO EXERT INFLUENCE ARE EQUALLY PRESENT IN NICOSIA. LOCAL STAFF NOW PROVIDED STILL INSUFFICIENT AND INEXPERIENCED. PRESENT OPERATION SET UP UNTIL END SEPTEMBER BUT NUMBERS PRESENTING SHOW NO END. FOR VISAS ISSUED SEE STATISTICS.

18 August 1976

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Committee would like to thank all those who have contributed their time, knowledge and experience to the inquiry or who have assisted the Committee in various ways by making available services or facilities. Special thanks is due to all those who appeared in person before the Committee, and to those individuals and organisations providing written information to the Committee.

It should be noted that the assistance given by many of the persons mentioned below has been more relevant to the Committee's final report and will be reflected therein .

Informal Discussions

The Committee is grateful for the opportunity to have had informal discussions with:

His Excellency Mr Ahmed W. Marzouk, former Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt

His Excellency Mr Michael Elizur, Ambassador of Israel

His Excellency Mr Antoine Yazbek, Ambassador of Lebanon

The Hon. Andrew Peacock, M.P., Minister for Foreign Affairs

The Hon. M.J.R. MacKellar, M.P., Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs

General (Res) Moshe Dayan, M.K.

Lt-Col R.I. Soumrany, Envoy of His Excellency, the President of the Republic of Lebanon

Dr T.R. Benkendorser, American Doctor working for "the Lebanese Red Cross"

Mr G. Kirby, British diplomat recently in Lebanon
Mr I.G. Bowden, Australian Ambassador to Iran
Mr F.R. Dalrymple, former Australian Ambassador to Israel,
now First Assistant Secretary, (Western Division)
Department of Foreign Affairs
Mr I.M. Haig, former Australian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait
Mr D.J. Kingsmill, former Chargé d'Affaires, Australian
Embassy, Lebanon, now Ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Witnesses

At the time of the tabling of this interim report,
the following witnesses have appeared before the Committee,
in most instances after having presented a written
Submission:

ANDERSON, Mr D.S. - Field Leader, Lebanon Evangelical
Mission
BECHARA, Mr J. - President, Friends of Palestine Movement
in Australia, journalist for Middle East newspapers in
Australia
BONNAR, Commander R.S. - Directorate of Joint Services
Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence
CHAHINE, Mr A.D. - President, Australian-Lebanese
Association of Victoria
DOUEIHI, Mr J.C. - President, Regional Council of
Australian and New Zealand World Lebanese Cultural Union
FARAH, Mr N.G. - President, Australian-Lebanese Association
of New South Wales
GARTLAND, Mr C.F.J. - First Assistant Secretary, Hydro-
carbons Division, Department of National Resources
GRAY, Commodore K.D., D.F.C. - Deputy Director (Military),
Joint Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence
HALLAM, Mr A.D. - Senior Lecturer, Department of Middle
Eastern Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of
Melbourne

- HEWITT, Mr D.R. - Senior Research Officer, Petroleum Branch, Hydrocarbons Division, Department of National Resources
- HUTTON, Mr P.N. - Assistant Secretary, Economic Organisation Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, and former Australian Ambassador to Lebanon
- INDYK, Mr M. - Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Australian National University
- JOHNSON, Mr B.A. - National Assessment Staff, Joint Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence
- LAWRENCE, Mr M.N. - Assistant Secretary, Petroleum Branch, Hydrocarbons Division, Department of National Resources
- LEIBLER, Mr I.J. - President, Victorian Jewish Board of Deputies and Senior Vice-President, Executive Council of Australian Jewry
- LINDENMAYER, Mr I.K. - Assistant Secretary, Planning and Research Branch, Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
- LIPSKI, Mr S. - Editor, Australian-Israeli Publications and freelance journalist
- McINTYRE, Sir Laurence, C.B.E. - Director, Australian Institute of International Affairs
- MANNING, Dr R.C. - Assistant Secretary, Programmes and Appraisals Branch, Australian Development Assistance Agency, Department of Foreign Affairs
- MIRZA, Dr N.A. - Senior Lecturer, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Melbourne
- MORDUE, Mr I. - Principal Research Officer, Petroleum Branch, Hydrocarbons Division, Department of National Resources
- ROBERTSON, Mr R.H. - First Assistant Secretary, Management and Foreign Service Division, Department of Foreign Affairs
- ROSEN, Dr S.J. - Senior Research Fellow, Department of International Relations, Australian National University
- STAREY, Mr J.M. - former Chargé d'Affaires, Australian Embassy, Lebanon, now Chargé d'Affaires, Australian Embassy, Iraq

VOLKER, Mr D. - First Assistant Secretary, Planning and Program Review Division, Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs

WATERMAN, Mr C.L. - Chief Migration Officer, Selection and Review Branch, Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, currently leader of the Immigration task force in Cyprus

WILLMAN, Ms D.C. - freelance reporter in Beirut

WOODBERRY, Mr B.W. - Acting Assistant Secretary, Middle East and Africa Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs

Written Submissions

The following individuals and government departments have provided written Submissions to the Committee, but have not given oral evidence:

ABOU KATER, Mr R.N., Melbourne Manager of "El Telegraph" newspaper

DEPARTMENT OF OVERSEAS TRADE

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

FRY, Mr I.R. - "Lifeline", Melbourne

KASPER, Dr W. - Senior Research Fellow, Department of Economics, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University

PRICE, Dr C.A. - Chairman, Refugee and Migration Committee, Australian Council of Churches

SPRINGBORG, Dr R. - Lecturer, School of Politics, Macquarie University

Other Assistance

The Committee acknowledges the assistance it has received from:

Joint Intelligence Organisation, Department of Defence
Department of Foreign Affairs

Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
The Australian Red Cross Society
The National Library
The Parliamentary Library

2-12-76

THE SENATE

ROLL

SENATORS—

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|-------------------|------------------------|
| 1. ARCHER | 33. McARDIFFE |
| 2. BALME | 34. MCGEEBANDY DOUGLAS |
| 3. BISHOP | 35. MCGEEBANDY JAMES |
| 4. BONNER | 36. MCTOOTH |
| 5. BROWN | 37. McLEAREN |
| 6. BUTON | 38. MARTIN |
| 7. CAMERON | 39. McQUEEN |
| 8. CARRICK | 40. MESSER |
| 9. CASHMAGH | 41. MESSNER |
| 10. CLANEY | 42. MISSON |
| 11. COLLEMAN | 43. MULLAGHILL |
| 12. COLLARD | 44. O'BRIENE |
| 13. COLLEON | 45. PRATTNER |
| 14. COLMACK | 46. RAE |
| SIR MAGNUS | 47. ROBERTSON |
| 15. COTTON | 48. RYAN |
| 16. DAVENSON | 49. SCOTT |
| 17. DEWITT | 50. SHILL |
| 18. DRAKE ROCKMAN | 51. SIBBATA |
| 19. DUNACK | 52. SIMP |
| 20. GEORGES* | 53. TELLAN |
| 21. GREFFET | 54. THOMAS |
| 22. GREENWOOD | 55. TOWNLEY |
| 23. GRIMES | 56. WADEN |
| 24. GUNFOYLE | 57. WATERS |
| 25. HALL | 58. WATSON |
| 26. HARRADINE | 59. WILKINSON |
| 27. JESOP | 60. WITHERS |
| 28. KEENE | 61. WOOD |
| 29. KILGARIFF | 62. WRIGHT |
| 30. KNIGHT | 63. WRIGHT |
| 31. LAMVIC | 64. YOUNG |
| 32. LAUCKE | |

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THE SENATE

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SENATORS—

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| 1. WROGGER | 33. McKENNITT |
| 2. BROWN | 34. McGILLIVRAY DOUGLAS |
| 3. BURTON | 35. McGILLIVRAY SYDNEY |
| 4. BONNER | 36. McINTOSH |
| 5. BROWN | 37. McKENNELL |
| 6. BURTON | 38. McKENNELL |
| 7. BURTON | 39. McKENNELL |
| 8. GARRICK | 40. McKENNELL |
| 9. CAYANAGH | 41. McKENNELL |
| 10. CHANEY | 42. McKENNELL |
| 11. COLEMAN | 43. McKENNELL |
| 12. COLLARD | 44. McKENNELL |
| 13. COLLISON | 45. McKENNELL |
| 14. CORNACK | 46. RAE |
| McKENNELL | 47. ROBERTSON |
| 15. COTTON | 48. RYAN |
| 16. BURTON | 49. SCOTT |
| 17. DEVITT | 50. STEWART |
| 18. DRANE BROOKMAN | 51. STEWART |
| 19. DRANE | 52. STEWART |
| 20. OSWALD | 53. THOMAS |
| 21. OSWALD | 54. THOMAS |
| 22. GREENWOOD ✓ | 55. THOMAS |
| 23. OSWALD | 56. WATSON |
| 24. GUILFOYLE | 57. WATSON |
| 25. WATSON | 58. WATSON |
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2-12-76

THE SENATE

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SENATORS—

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| 1. ABERNETHY | 33. McLEOD |
| 2. BARNETT | 34. McLEOD |
| 3. BISHOP | 35. McLEOD |
| 4. BOWEN | 36. McLEOD |
| 5. BROWN | 37. McLEOD |
| 6. BUTLER | 38. McLEOD |
| 7. CAMPBELL | 39. McLEOD |
| 8. CAMPBELL | 40. McLEOD |
| 9. CAMPBELL | 41. McLEOD |
| 10. CAMPBELL | 42. McLEOD |
| 11. CAMPBELL | 43. McLEOD |
| 12. CAMPBELL | 44. McLEOD |
| 13. CAMPBELL | 45. McLEOD |
| 14. CAMPBELL | 46. RAE X |
| 15. CAMPBELL | 47. RICHMOND |
| 16. CAMPBELL | 48. RICHMOND |
| 17. CAMPBELL | 49. SCOTT |
| 18. CAMPBELL | 50. SMITH |
| 19. CAMPBELL | 51. SMITH |
| 20. CAMPBELL | 52. SMITH |
| 21. CAMPBELL | 53. SMITH |
| 22. GREENWOOD X | 54. THOMAS |
| 23. GREENWOOD | 55. THOMAS |
| 24. GREENWOOD | 56. THOMAS |
| 25. GREENWOOD | 57. THOMAS |
| 26. GREENWOOD | 58. THOMAS |
| 27. GREENWOOD | 59. THOMAS |
| 28. GREENWOOD | 60. THOMAS |
| 29. GREENWOOD | 61. THOMAS |
| 30. GREENWOOD | 62. THOMAS |
| 31. GREENWOOD | 63. THOMAS |
| 32. GREENWOOD | 64. YOUNG |