


THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA



Report of the
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence



THE PROVISION OF DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND
HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE HORN OF AFRICA

(December 1983)

Australian Government Publishing Service,
Canberra, December 1983.

The first sentence of para. 5.33 on p. 94 should read:

" The fact that little assistance and relief aid gets through to Eritrea is due mainly to the fact that donor governments are not willing to deal directly with the EPLF or the ERA."

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ISBN 0 644 02733 9

Printed by C.J. Thompson, Commonwealth Government Printer,
Canberra



Terms of reference

On 4 December 1980, at its first meeting during the last Parliament, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence combined the Sub-Committee on Southern Africa and the Sub-Committee on the Middle East into a new Sub-Committee on Southern Africa and the Middle East. The terms of reference for the new Sub-Committee were:

- . That the Sub-Committee consider, investigate and report to the full Committee on the significance of events in Southern Africa, with particular reference to the economic, political, social and strategic implications for Australia.
- . Monitor the political, economic and strategic situation in the Middle East and peripheral countries, and report on any significant events and their possible effects on Australia.

On 8 September 1981, the Sub-Committee's title was altered to 'Sub-Committee on Middle Eastern and African Affairs', and its terms of reference were altered to read as follows:

- . Monitor the Middle East and peripheral countries, Africa, and the Indian Ocean, and report to the full Committee from time to time on significant developments.

On 19 August 1982 the Sub-Committee agreed to undertake the following inquiry under the above terms of reference:

- . Examine the geo-political situation in the Horn of Africa and peripheral countries, and report to the Parliament, through the full Committee.

Parliament was dissolved on 4 February 1983. On 24 May 1983, at its first meeting during the present Parliament, the Joint Committee re-established the Sub-Committee. At a subsequent meeting it was agreed that the Sub-Committee should continue with its general terms of reference for the time being, and that the inquiry into the Horn of Africa commenced in the previous Parliament should be completed. This Report is an account of the international development assistance and humanitarian relief aid provided to the Horn including Australia's participation.

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(*Senator Hill joined the Sub-Committee on 20 October 1981
replacing Senator J.P. Sim, who retired on 30 June 1981)

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABAD	Arab Bank for Agricultural Development
ACC	Australian Council of Churches
ACIAR	Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research
ADAB	Australian Development Assistance Bureau
AMC	(Ethiopian) Agricultural Marketing Corporation
CAA	Community Aid Abroad
CARE	Council for American Relief Everywhere
COMPE	Commission for Organizing the Working People of Ethiopia
CRDA	Christian Relief and Development Association
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
Dergue	(Ethiopian) 'Committee'. See PMAC
EC	European Communities
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Communities
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
ELU	(Somali) Emergency Logistics Unit
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front (formerly 'Forces')
ERA	Eritrean Relief Association
ERC	Eritrean Relief Committee
ERCCS	Eritrean Red Cross and Crescent Society
ERCS	Ethiopian Red Cross Society
FAO	(United Nations) Food and Agriculture Organization
FFW	Food for Work Programs
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)

ICARA International Conference on Assistance to Refugees
 ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
 IDA International Development Association
 ILCA International Livestock Centre for Africa
 ILRAD International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases
 IMF International Monetary Fund
 LICROSS League of International Red Cross Societies/or LRCS, League of Red Cross Societies
 LRCS League of Red Cross Societies/or LICROSS, League of International Red Cross Societies
 MSF Medecins sans frontieres
 MT Metric Tonnes
 MTSC (Ethiopian) Maritime Transit Services Corporation
 NFD (Kenyan) Northern Frontier District
 NFU (Somali) National Refugee Unit
 NGOs Non-government Organizations (Aid Agencies)
 OAU Organization of African Unity
 ODA Overseas Development Assistance
 OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
 ORA Oromo Relief Association
 PDRY People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
 PHC Primary Health Care Program (in Sudan and Somalia)
 PMAC (Ethiopian) Provisional Military Administrative Council (formerly Committee)
 RAN Royal Australian Navy
 REST Relief Society of Tigray
 RHU (Somali) Refugee Health Unit
 RRC (Ethiopian) Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

SDR Somali Democratic Republic
 SMP Skim Milk Powder
 UN United Nations Organization
 UNDP United Nations Development Program
 UNDRO United Nations Disaster Relief Organization
 UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
 UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
 UNSO United Nations Sahelian Office
 US United States of America
 USAID United States Agency for International Development
 WFP World Food Program

Preface

The Horn of Africa and Australia

1. The Horn of Africa, like Central America, the Middle East, Southern Africa, and Afghanistan, is regarded as one of the world's 'trouble spots' where regional conflicts are complicated by superpower rivalry. Australian concerns in the Horn have principally involved the provision of humanitarian aid to the victims of droughts, wars and famines. Because of this the Committee has produced this Report on international and Australian aid to the Horn of Africa.

Conduct of the Inquiry

2. The Sub-Committee on Middle Eastern and African Affairs began collecting information on the Horn of Africa region in mid 1982. Since then it has held a number of public and in-camera hearings. A large amount of the evidence heard and submissions made related to the question of Australian and international contributions to humanitarian relief efforts and development assistance. A list of witnesses who appeared before the Sub-Committee and a list of those persons and organizations who provided written material are appended to the end of the Report. The Committee expresses its appreciation to all those persons and organizations who assisted the Sub-Committee in the provision of information.

3. The Committee intends to present two documents to the Parliament on the Horn of Africa. This Report deals with the humanitarian relief aid and development assistance provided to the Horn countries by the international community. A separate background report is being prepared for the full Committee's consideration relating to the regional conflicts on the Horn, recent internal political developments in Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, and major outside power involvement. By producing this Report on aid separately from the other report now, the Committee hopes to bring the aid question to the attention of the Committee to Review the Overseas Aid Program (Jackson Committee) before the latter Committee finalizes its Report.

Organization of the Report

4. The Report is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides some background about the geography, economic situation, and social organization of the core countries of the region: Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti. Chapter 2 - Endemic war and drought and the refugee crisis - outlines the major requirements of the region for humanitarian aid. Chapter 3 - International assistance to the region - outlines the international efforts to provide assistance to the people of the Horn and serves as a context in which to see Australia's

contributions, which are spelt out in Chapter 4 - Australian relief aid and development assistance to the Horn of Africa. Chapter 5 - Some problems with aid - discusses those allegations which came to the attention of the Sub-Committee during its inquiry relating to misuse and misappropriation of aid, the provision of inappropriate aid, and allegations about the Ethiopian government's refugee returnee and resettlement projects. Chapter 6 - Prospects and proposals for self-sufficiency on the Horn - describes some of the successful projects which have been developed to ameliorate food production problems, and to improve health care of refugees and others, and mentions some of the areas where the international community, including Australia, might best direct its assistance in the future. The Observations, Recommendations and Conclusions of the Committee are extracted from the text and summarized in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 1

SOME FACTORS UNDERLYING THE DEPENDENCE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AID

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND POVERTY

1.1 The physical landscape and agricultural and economic potential of the Horn of Africa are subject to widely different perceptions and estimates.

1.2 In one widely quoted book, War Clouds on the Horn of Africa, Tom J. Farer gave the following impressionistic introduction to his description of the region in 1976:

The Horn of Africa is roughly three-quarters of a million square miles in the northeast of the continent, consisting largely of eroding, ravine-slashed plateaus, seared bushland, and rubble-strewn volcanic desert. Being a metaphor rather than a political entity, it has no precise boundaries; but it is conventionally thought of as embracing Ethiopia, the Somali Democratic Republic and the Territory of the Afars and the Issas [Djibouti]. The life of the vast bulk of its people is nasty, brutish, and short. An acute famine, which began in 1972 and killed at least 100 000 people and possibly several times that number has obscured the chronic decimation by disease and malnutrition.¹

1.3 A quite different perception, in relation to Ethiopia's potential, is presented in The Ethiopian Revolution by Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, published in 1981:

Ethiopia is potentially a very rich country. Up to 65 per cent of its total land surface is suitable for some agricultural purpose,

either growing crops or herding, and the World Bank has estimated that it could support a population of 310 million, ten times the present figure.²

1.4 Halliday and Molyneux add however, that regardless of the potential, Ethiopia's agricultural production, both before and since the 1974 Revolution, has been poor:

Yet in the decade up to 1974 agricultural output was growing at around 2.5 per cent per annum, equal only to the rise in population. Ultimate responsibility for the failure to develop its productive potential - Ethiopia was the poorest country in Africa in 1974 and one of the half-dozen poorest in the world - must lie with the archaic social system that persisted there. This paralysis was accompanied by a remarkably low level of integration into the international economic system. Total foreign investment in 1974 was estimated to be \$300 million, of which two-thirds was Italian and only \$22 million American. The most substantial link was via the state itself - a direct subsidy by the US government to the imperial apparatus. Ethiopia had a permanent deficit on its foreign trade, and exports were dominated by primary commodities, in the first place coffee, sales of which accounted for over 60 per cent of total export earnings in 1965-75, most of these from the USA and Italy. It was therefore an economy dependent on one crop, whose price fluctuated widely on the world market and whose production affected only a small part of Ethiopian agriculture. Indeed, the absolute size of Ethiopia's coffee exports was meagre: at \$300 million these were no larger than the coffee sales of El Salvador, a country with less than a fifth its population.³

1.5 According to the World Bank's 'Basic Indicators' for low income economies, the figures for Ethiopia and Somalia are as follows:

TABLE 1.1
BASIC DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS

Country	Population mid 1981 (millions)	Area Sq. kms.	GNP Per Capita \$(1981)	Average Annual Growth 1960-81	Average Annual Rate of Inflation (%) 1960-70	Average Annual Rate of Inflation (%) 1970-81	Adult Literacy (%) 1980	Life Expectancy at Birth (yrs) 1981
Ethiopia	32.0	1 222 000	140	1.4	2.1	4.1	15	46
Somalia	4.4	638 000	280	-0.2	4.5	12.6	60	39
Australia	14.9	7 687 000	11 080	2.5	3.1	11.5	100	74

SOURCE: World Development Report, 1983, The World Bank, Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C., July 1983, pp. 148-149.

1.6 Of Ethiopia's total territory, fifty per cent is permanent pasture, eleven per cent is cultivated, twenty per cent is barren desert or swamp and nine per cent is forest. Eight of every ten Ethiopians are estimated to be peasant farmers.

1.7 A large cattle population of 26 million occupies the rangelands, principally in the Ogaden. Other pastoralists concentrate on camels, goats and sheep. Principal crops include cereals, sugarcane, roots and tubers, maize, barley and sorghum. Some coffee, as referred to above, which grows wild in the forests, is cultivated and exported.

1.8 Djibouti is comprised primarily of rock strewn desert, only a small percentage of land being cultivable. Apart from the non-urban and non-refugee population, Djiboutiens are primarily nomadic herders of camels, sheep and goats.

1.9 Somalia's landscape is primarily one of low rainfall savannah. There are only two permanent rivers, the Juba and Shebelle, which rise in Ethiopia. Between them crops of maize, sorghum and bananas are grown. The principal occupation is, however, the herding of camels, sheep and goats. There is some potential for fishing, and Somalia has an extensive coastline. From time to time in the past Somalia has been able to export mutton, fish and bananas in relatively significant quantities.

1.10 Despite claims by critics of the pre-revolutionary regime in Ethiopia that the social structure that accompanied it underlay Ethiopia's poor agricultural performance, it has become clear since that the post-revolutionary regime has not had the success it hoped for or promised in increasing agricultural output. Neither have poverty and starvation been ameliorated in Somalia since the advent of 'scientific socialism', and there is evidence to suggest that, even taking into account the problems caused by war, drought and a massive influx of refugees since

1977, agricultural output has not increased to the extent promised or foreseen when the present regime came to power, and its growth, in relative terms, is less than it was in 1969.

1.11 In relation to growth of production for different sectors of the economies of Ethiopia and Somalia, the World Bank's figures are as follows:

TABLE 1.2
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF ECONOMIES BY SECTOR

	Average annual growth rate (per cent)													
	GDP ^a		Agriculture				Industry				Manufacturing		Services	
	1960-70	1970-81	1960-70	1970-80	1960-70	1970-80	1960-70	1970-80	1960-70	1970-80	1960-70	1970-80		
Ethiopia	4.4	2.2	2.2	0.7	7.4	1.4	8.0	2.4	7.8	4.2				
Somalia	1.0	3.9	-0.6	3.0	3.4	2.6	4.0	3.8	4.2	6.9				

Source:

World Development Report 1982, The World Bank, Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C., 1982, pp. 110-115.

^aWorld Development Report 1983, The World Bank, Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C., July 1983, pp. 150-151.

1.12 The problem of food production on the Horn has thus not been satisfactorily resolved by political decision or changes in political, economic and social organization.

1.13 The production of food on the Horn takes place in a context of a long history of endemic war, drought and famine. While certain areas of Ethiopia and Somalia offer potential for greatly increased production of foods, especially grain, a great many people on the Horn have traditionally been nomadic herders without a social organization adapted to modern sedentary agricultural practices. The Horn countries do not have, generally speaking, infrastructure developed by way of roads, railways, vehicles and other forms of communication. Nor do they have the technological expertise to implement modern and more productive forms of agricultural production. The infrastructure is required for this modernization as well as for distribution of produce. In Ethiopia, ethnic variety and differences are another barrier to progress.

1.14 In addition, archaic forms of agricultural production which denude the soil, which do not use modern fertilizers or seeding techniques, and which do not rely on mechanization are difficult to change given the lack of education and lack of technological understanding among the great majority of the population. A lack of technological capability and financial resources adds to these problems. In Ethiopia there is much scope for hydro-electricity and irrigation from the damming of rivers. Such schemes would have potential for providing a cheap source of power on which to establish a manufacturing base and to increase agricultural output. These in turn would create problems during the phase of introducing manufacturing plant, because it is doubtful if this could be undertaken without foreign capital. If widespread irrigation were to be introduced, generation-old forms of farming would have to be changed with the aid of experts from abroad. Most potentially productive

areas are in the lowlands and river valleys where Ethiopians have traditionally chosen not to live because of widespread malaria.

1.15 Against a background of drought, war, famine and inefficiency in food production, millions of people in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and in the neighbouring countries of Sudan and Kenya, rely on massive food aid from the food exporting countries of the world. In 1980 Ethiopia reported drought in 10 of its 14 provinces. In 1974 two million Ethiopians alone were estimated to be receiving food aid, 350 000 living entirely on rations in camps. Somalia has had problems of similar proportions in respect of refugees, and refugee camps in Sudan, Djibouti, and to a lesser extent Kenya see some more tens of thousands of people in need of food which the host countries are unable themselves to provide adequately. The droughts which periodically afflict various parts of the Horn cause population movements on a large scale. The conflicts in the Ogaden have seen this number swell by some hundreds of thousands. In Tigray and Eritrea, at least some tens of thousands have become refugees from the conflicts there. Eritrea has experienced droughts in 1970, 1973, 1974, 1977, 1980, 1981, 1982 and early 1983. The devastation is greater in such a region when it is remembered that, even in years of adequate rainfall, Eritrea is not self-sufficient in food production. Despite war and conflict being a clear cause of a significant proportion of the refugee problem, drought is often present at the same time, making identification of 'refugees from war' a difficult process for international authorities.

1.16 In a survey of the drought situation in September 1983 The Economist noted that the Horn had been less severely affected than other areas of Africa. The scale of the problem is nevertheless immense:

... in the Horn of Africa, the battle scarred Ogaden has had more rain than usual. But the highlands of North Ethiopia have been unusually dry. The Government claims that 3m people are short of food, although aid workers say the worst of the drought is restricted to an area in the northern province of Wallo.⁴

1.17 The massive problems caused by war and famine, and the ensuing refugee crisis, have seen the countries of the Horn become ever more dependent on outside countries for the provision of food. The amount of aid sought frequently exceeds the amount given. The scale of the crisis, and the difficulties encountered in distribution have been accompanied by accusations of corruption and misappropriation of aid. The growing dependence on food aid by vast numbers of people not themselves engaged in economically or agriculturally productive pursuits has raised questions relating to the need for resettlement and long-term proposals for the need for agricultural self-sufficiency. While short-term food aid has been essential recently to save hundreds of thousands from death by starvation, the long-term provision of food aid from outside countries is causing problems of its own - population growth in refugee camps is increasing at the same time as a 'mentality' is said to be developing which accepts the provision of aid as a permanent situation.

1.18 The slow growth in agricultural output in Somalia and Ethiopia reflects the general crisis in African food production which began in the 1970's.

TABLE 1.3

AFRICA: PER CAPUT ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF MAJOR FOODCROPS

(kg per caput)

	1961-65	1975	1977	1978	1980
Wheat	21	21	20	22	18
Maize	54	62	62	64	58
Millet and sorghum	64	51	45	49	44
Rice (paddy)	19	19	19	18	18
Cassava	102	109	105	102	100
Groundnuts	16	13	11	12	10
Pulses	13	13	12	11	11

Source: FAO, Production Yearbook, 1980 in Africa South of the Sahara, 12th Edition, Europa Publications Ltd, London, 1982-83, p. 33.

1.19 The Horn countries like the rest of Africa too have suffered from the general world economic downturn, the commodity slump, and increasingly expensive petroleum imports.

1.20 The FAO has recently reported that more than twenty million people are facing starvation in eighteen African countries, and that an extra 600 000 tonnes of grain will be needed this year to keep them alive.⁵

1.21 According to a Report in The Economist of 10 September 1983, food production in Africa has increased by less than two per cent per year since 1960 while population growth has increased by well over two per cent and the rate of growth is rising. Africa is now the only continent which grows less food per person than it did twenty years ago.⁶ The FAO has predicted that Africa needs to double food production during the forthcoming decade to have enough to feed itself.⁷

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES

1.22 World Bank figures for the 'Structure of Production' are as follows:

TABLE 1.4
STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION

	GDP ^a (millions of dollars)	Distribution of gross domestic product (per cent)					
		Agriculture		Industry		Manufacturing Services	
	1960 1981	1960 1980	1980	1960 1980	1960 1980	1960 1980	1960 1980
Ethiopia	900 3 870	65 51	12 16	6 11	23 33		
Somalia	160 1 230	71 60	8 11	3 7	21 29		

Source: World Development Report, 1982, The World Bank, Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C., 1982, pp. 110-115.

^a World Development Report, 1983, The World Bank, Oxford University Press, Washington, D.C., 1983, p. 152.

Ethiopia

1.23 Between 1947 and June 1981 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank had made twelve loans to Ethiopia worth \$US 108.6 million. The World Bank's aim is to assist economic development by making loans to finance productive investments in cases where private capital is not available on reasonable terms. The International Development Association (IDA), which is affiliated to the World Bank and advances credit on more flexible terms, provided credits worth \$US 443.1 million to Ethiopia between 1960 and June 1981. Between July 1980 and June 1981 credits were negotiated worth \$US 75 million for agriculture and rural development and for education. After a number of nationalizations of foreign companies in the post-revolutionary period the World Bank implemented a moratorium on new spending during 1978-80. Some progress is now being made in compensations, and the World Bank approved a \$US 35 million package in December 1980 on the condition that progress on the issue continued.

1.24 Although Ethiopia had a balance of trade deficit of \$US 427 million in 1981-82, its commercial reputation is good. It also has a first-class record on repayments on loans. In mid 1982 Ethiopia's total non-military debt was estimated at \$US 1080 million. The debt servicing ratio was at below 9 per cent of total exports. In 1980 the figure for Sudan was 35 per cent. By 1981 international reserves stood at \$US 118.3 million. Ethiopia is regarded as an efficient user of aid, and has been able to keep clear of the stringent conditions applied by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to other Third World countries in the internal running of their economies. These factors have made Ethiopia attractive to the World Bank which, during mid 1983 was hoping to triple lending from \$US 150 million/\$US 250 million planned for 1982-83 to \$US 400 - 500 million before 1990. There remains, however, some nervousness about the

compensation for the nationalization of foreign firms, Ethiopia's closeness to the Soviets, and the announced intention to form a Communist Party. Further loans will be dependent on developments in these areas.

1.25 The single biggest provider of loans to Ethiopia is the European Development Fund (EDF). Ethiopia is, in turn the largest single recipient with, currently, loans of \$US 111 million and \$US 116-134 million under the first and second Lomé conventions.

1.26 The economic situation of Ethiopia is therefore on a sound footing in the context of its ability to borrow on the world's capital markets. Its overall indebtedness may be somewhat different, however, if loans outstanding to the Soviet Bloc are taken into account. Information as to the amount owed to the Soviet Bloc is not available to the World Bank or Western financial institutions. It is thought that a significant amount has been made available, however, for the purchase of military equipment. Ethiopia is dependent on the Soviet Union for its oil requirements. Nevertheless, even when estimates of these loans are taken into account, Ethiopia's position is still sound relative to most non-oil producing Third World countries.

1.27 Other major donors to Ethiopia include the Scandinavian countries, Italy, France, Canada and West Germany. The UK, US and Japan suspended all but humanitarian aid in the wake of the revolution and the nationalization of foreign owned enterprises.

1.28 The often made assertion that Third World countries who profess a commitment to socialism nevertheless need Western aid, capital and expertise for economic development is underlined in Ethiopia's case. Project financing in Ethiopia from the Eastern Bloc is estimated to be at about \$US 30 million per year.

1.29 Ethiopia's major requirements are to increase food production and to establish a manufacturing sector. Exports of any kind at present are meagre, the major one being coffee of which there has been a world surplus recently. While oil exploration has taken place in recent years in the Ogaden and offshore from Eritrea, no major finds have occurred. Gold and copper may be available in commercial quantities, but exploration has not been undertaken on a significant scale to date. A large potash deposit in the Dallol depression may provide the basis for a chemical industry, but this will require major infrastructure development and capital before it is feasible. In general, the prospects of Ethiopia soon becoming a net exporter seem remote.

1.30 The Ethiopian Government's two principal economic priorities are to increase food production and establish a manufacturing base. The latter priority explains the policy of allowing, albeit under confusing guidelines, the participation of foreign capital in a number of enterprises.

Somalia

1.31 Between 1947 and June 1981 the World Bank had not made loans to Somalia. Somalia had, however, between 1960 and June 1981, received 22 credits from the IDA worth \$US 157.4 million. \$US 10.2 million worth of credits were negotiated in the 1980-81 financial years for educational purposes.

1.32 Between 1960 and 1969 the major donors of aid were the United States, Italy and the Soviet Union. From 1969 until 1977 the Soviet Union became the major donor, although China assisted with the construction of a major North-South road. Since 1974 Arab States, including the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have provided considerable aid; Libya provided aid for a time until it switched sides to become an ally of Ethiopia. The

United States is now the major provider. The EDF provides some capital as do Arab aid institutions such as the Islamic Development Bank.

1.33 Somalia is not in as sound a position in the context of international finance as is Ethiopia. Despite reported Saudi financial assistance during the Ogaden war, that war proved expensive for Somalia and saw its current deficit on balance of payments increase by seventy five per cent and continue to increase until 1980. In 1980, the IMF, OPEC and the Arab Monetary Fund had to intervene to stabilize the Somali economy.

1.34 A fishing venture commenced in the mid 1970's with Soviet assistance provided valuable exports, employment and the establishment of packing and processing enterprises. When the Soviet advisors were expelled in 1977, this suffered a severe setback. Italy is now attempting to re-establish a fishing enterprise, and the FAO too has taken an interest in fishing projects. Somalis are not traditional fish eaters, however, and the fish catches have not made a significant impact on food shortage problems.

1.35 There seem to be only faint prospects of significant mineral and oil production at this stage. Some uranium was discovered to the west of Mogadishu in 1972. There are also deposits of meerschaum, nickel, bauxite, iron ore, tin and chromite, as well as natural gas. Imports of refined oil have added to Somalia's financial problems since 1980. Prior to 1980 Iraq provided oil which the Somalis themselves refined, but since the Iraq-Iran war, this source of oil has not been available.

1.36 The 1979-1981 development plan allocated a budget towards agriculture and fisheries of 35.4 per cent, economic infrastructure 18 per cent, and education 7.4 per cent, which is indicative of Somalia's needs as seen by its government. Roads,

irrigation projects and the improvement of livestock and crop production are major considerations. Major exports in 1980 were live animals, bananas, and hides and skins.

Djibouti

1.37 Djibouti has virtually no natural resources or agricultural productivity to enable it to export in significant quantities. The economy is based on trade through the port of Djibouti, an international airport, and the rail link with Addis Ababa. The severance of the rail link during the Ogaden war caused severe disruption to the economy in 1977. Labour is expensive in Djibouti relative to surrounding countries because of the presence of a 10 000 strong expatriate French population. Attempts to establish manufacturing industries have therefore not been successful. Hopes by the Djiboutien Government that it might become a major export and re-export port for landlocked African countries have not come to fruition. However, recent policies of allowing a very free environment for all forms of free enterprise including particularly banking and money changing, do seem to be attracting foreign business. Land prices were reported to be climbing in anticipation of an economic boom at the beginning of 1983.⁸

1.38 Djibouti's major donors are France and Saudi Arabia. The former is also Djibouti's largest trading partner. Djibouti's major exports, which are minimal, include coffee, tea, skins and leathers.

1.39 Other aid donors in the recent past have included Libya, Iraq, the Gulf States and West Germany. Despite some prospects for economic growth, Djibouti has applied to the UN for classification as a 'least developed state' so as to attract more aid. The Djiboutien Government claims its average per capita income is less than the UN estimate of \$US 400 annually.⁹

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CHAPTER 2

ENDEMIC WAR AND DROUGHT AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS

2.1 Drought and war can be termed endemic to the Horn of Africa region. The severe drought of the early 1980's in the northern provinces of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tigray and Wollo follows previous droughts in the early 1970's when an estimated 200 000 deaths were reported in the Wollo region alone.¹ Drought affected a majority of Horn countries in this period and there has been little time for recovery. Nine of Ethiopia's fourteen provinces were recently declared drought areas although the drought has eased in southern regions and the Ogaden. The extent of the famine in these areas was not fully recognized by the international community until fairly recently. When the drought hit both Somalia and Ethiopia in 1974, the Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, refused to admit to the outside world that Ethiopia was suffering severe drought and millions of people suffered as a consequence. Famine victims from the Ogaden province of Ethiopia fled to Somalia, although the latter was already burdened with severe drought.

2.2 People displaced by drought and famine are difficult to distinguish from refugees from war. The long-standing internal disputes within Ethiopia and border disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia serve to exacerbate the already disastrous consequences of drought. The conflicts are constant: in Eritrea for twenty-two years and in the Ogaden for more than seven.

2.3 The repercussions of both drought and war over many years have created large and apparently permanent displaced and refugee populations in the peripheral countries, Sudan, and to a lesser extent Kenya, as well as within Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti themselves.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED POPULATIONS ON THE HORN

2.4 An analysis of the current refugee crisis together with what are termed 'displaced' persons within the region provides a factual background against which to judge the need for international assistance for the humanitarian crisis on the Horn.

2.5 Currently, there are estimated to be up to two million refugees and displaced persons in the Horn of Africa. Through the consequences of either drought or war within Ethiopia, inhabitants have either fled the country and settled as refugees in Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya, or become displaced, within their own country, totally reliant on relief agencies. Of the rising number of refugees in the world, the greatest single proportion originate from Ethiopia. The largest contingent consists of those from the Ogaden who have fled to Somalia, followed by Eritreans who have sought refuge in Sudan.

2.6 The Sub-Committee received diverse estimates of the actual numbers of displaced persons and refugees. One submission claimed that there were up to six million refugees and displaced persons in the Horn² but this figure is higher than most other estimates. Such a figure may be arrived at if all displaced persons and uprooted peoples from all causes, including war, drought and famine, within countries, and across borders, are counted.

2.7 The following UNHCR figures were received from the Department of Foreign Affairs in evidence.

TABLE 2.1

UNHCR Estimates of Refugees

Somalia	500,000	(The Somali Government estimate is 700,000 while the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs estimate is 350,000.)
Ethiopia	1,000,000 displaced 100,000 returnees	(Ethiopia claims 2.4m displaced) (Ethiopia claims 150,000 returnees)
Djibouti	30,000	(45,000 claimed by Djibouti)
Sudan	570,000	(627,000 claimed by Sudan)

Source: Evidence, Department of Foreign Affairs,
11 November 1982, p. 14.

2.8 The Sub-Committee did not receive conclusive evidence to suggest that significant numbers of refugees have returned to Ethiopia. Submissions made to the Sub-Committee contained estimates of refugees in Sudan and Somalia which were greater than UNHCR estimates. These estimates together with an analysis of the composition and ethnic background of refugees are presented below.

Somalia

2.9 Somalia's indigenous population is estimated at 4.6 million. One to two million refugees were estimated to reside in Somalia according to evidence received by the Sub-Committee.³

2.10 The majority of refugees are of Somali ethnic background, originating from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Over half a million have fled from the Ogaden into Somalia. Oromos also constitute a significant component of the refugee population.

2.11 While nomads are predominant, large numbers of refugees have a farming background. A recent demographic breakdown showed that 80 per cent were women and children and 20 per cent adult men. Many of the men are thought to use the refugee settlements less often than women and children, preferring to tend their flocks and herds on the rangelands. Refugees live in 35 camps in the four regions of Hiran, Gedo, the north-west, and Lower Shebelle.⁴

2.12 It was asserted in evidence that refugees have been returning recently to the Ogaden although estimates received have shown that the Somali Government still hosts 500 000 refugees.⁵ This figure does not include the vast numbers of displaced persons from drought areas within Somalia itself over the last fifteen years.

2.13 The refugee camps in Somalia are split into two separate groups. Drought refugees in the north of Somalia have been resettled in the less affected regions of the south. War refugees from the Ogaden have been settled in camps that stretch along the border between Ethiopia and Somalia. As a general rule, the Somali Government does not resettle refugees from the Ogaden as the refugees are predominantly herdsmen and are not easily resettled on a permanent basis and because the Somalis wish to emphasize that the refugees should be able to return to the land which is claimed to be their birthright in the Ogaden. In August of 1983, however, it was announced that the Somali Government had agreed in principle with the UNHCR to the resettlement of war refugees in Somalia and 2000 refugees from the Jalalqsi groups of camps would be resettled on land and assisted by the Chinese Government in developing an agricultural program.⁶

Sudan

2.14 It is generally accepted that there are over half a million refugees in camps situated in Sudan. The majority originate from the war zones of the provinces of northern Ethiopia, especially Eritrea. Of the estimated total, it was claimed in evidence that approximately 350 000⁷ are of Eritrean origin. Refugees from the war in Eritrea have been entering Sudan since 1967, the largest influx occurring in 1977 and 1978. These refugees are settled along the eastern border strip from central eastern Sudan to north eastern Sudan. The regions they inhabit encompass Kassala and Blue Nile provinces. The main towns they are found in are Gedaref, Kassala and Port Sudan. The Ethiopian Government has recently claimed that 70 000 Eritreans have returned to Eritrea. Such assertions are difficult to authenticate.⁸

2.15 Lord Avebury, in a submission to the Sub-Committee, estimated that there are also some 90 000 people from Tigray (northern Ethiopia) and other parts of Ethiopia in camps in

Kassala Province of Sudan. It was also estimated that over 10 000 refugees from Wollega and provinces in the south were situated in Sudan's Blue and Upper Nile provinces.⁹ Refugees from other African nations are resident in Sudan. The majority originate from Uganda whilst a minority derive from Chad, Zaïre and the Central African Republic.¹⁰

Djibouti and Kenya

2.16 Djibouti became independent in 1977 and was reported to have received 3000 refugees in that year. By mid 1979, the number had swelled to some 18 000. More recently it has been reported to host an estimated 35 000 to 42 000 refugees.¹¹ Information received by the Sub-Committee indicates that 'a trickle' of refugees is still entering today.¹² It has also been reported that most of the refugees are located in two camps, at Dikhil and Ali Sabieh and that 10 000 others not registered with UNHCR are living with parents or friends in the town of Djibouti.¹³ Because of Djibouti's geographical position, refugees there originate from every ethnic and national group within the Ethiopian empire. A majority are Afars and Somalis, although there are a small group of Tigreans, Eritreans, Oromos, and Amharas from Addis Ababa. Kenya has also hosted an estimated 3500 refugees from Ethiopia since 1980, the majority of whom are Oromo.¹⁴

General

2.17 With the recent exception of Djibouti, the most notable feature of host countries' responses to refugees has been hospitality, even if reluctant hospitality.

2.18 With respect to Sudan, internal government debates in Khartoum regarding refugee policy are on occasions sharp over land and services offered to refugees. There is concern that

funds and resources are diverted from projects aiding Sudanese citizens and that refugees will be provided with superior facilities, thereby provoking popular discontent. Riots have broken out in Port Sudan and Khartoum in the past because of such concerns. However, no Ethiopians, especially of Eritrean origin, have been turned back or forcibly repatriated. On occasions refugees have been forced to move from one settlement to another, or from cities such as Khartoum to reside elsewhere, but borders remain open, even though numbers surpass half a million. There are limitations on political activity, however, especially on the Eritreans.

2.19 Somalia's ethnic, linguistic and tribal ties with the majority of its refugees originating from the Ogaden facilitate easy assimilation and acceptance which counteracts grounds for resentment by indigenous Somalis.

2.20 Djibouti does not appear to be as hospitable to refugees as Sudan and Somalia as evidenced in an announcement in February 1983 by the then Ethiopian Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation (RRC) that all Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti were to be repatriated to Ethiopia. The repatriation proposal has been corroborated by the Djiboutien Government, and elements of the repatriation proposals are reported to have the support of the UNHCR. The Australian section of Amnesty International expressed its concern at refoulement and mistreatment of refugees, in its submission to the Sub-Committee.¹⁵

2.21 The following message was sent to the Ethiopian RRC by President El Haj Hassan Gouled Aptidon earlier this year:

Given the spreading economic crisis and the impossibility of assimilation, the time has come to envisage new arrangements for the refugees and to consider first of all their return to their own country. It is to this end that I would ask you to direct all your thoughts ...¹⁶

2.22 Relief workers in Djibouti maintain that refugees do not want to return. Although the voluntary nature of refoulement has been stressed by Ethiopia and Djibouti, the nature of the resettlement plans requires all refugees to be registered and sent to final residence 'without undue delay'. International support for the refugees has been forthcoming from human rights leaders, politicians and churchmen. Presently, however, no organization appears to be effectively protecting refugee interests and repatriation seems imminent.

2.23 In a recent Le Monde report it was stated that 'voluntary' repatriation of 35 000 or so Ethiopian refugees in Djibouti was due to begin in the 'next few weeks' and that UNHCR was financing the plan at a cost of \$US 8 million. Because a majority of refugees are nomadic stock-rearers whose 'secular nomadism' was broken up by the 1977 Ogaden war, a spokesman for UNHCR in Djibouti has said that the rural refugees in Djibouti 'have proposed to send a delegation to assess the conditions for returnees on the spot and would report to those in the camps about the situation'.¹⁷

2.24 The flood of refugees creates burdens on any host country. Somalia appears to have been the hardest hit in terms of numbers and its limited resources. Sudan has also played host for predominantly Eritrean refugees for over thirteen years. The situation does not appear to be stabilizing. The endemic war and drought will continue to create problems, not only for the refugee host countries but within the war and drought regions themselves where hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of displaced persons are totally reliant on relief agencies. Unreliable and widely differing estimates of the number of people involved make it difficult for the Committee itself to provide a firm estimate.

2.25 It is against this background that the international community is currently providing humanitarian aid to the refugees and displaced persons in the Horn countries.

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CHAPTER 3

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE TO THE REGION

3.1 The international community responded in a modest way to pleas for humanitarian support by the Horn countries in the early and late 1970's. More recently there have been further calls for renewed international support through bilateral, multilateral and non-government channels.

3.2 The international community has contributed humanitarian aid to the region through multilateral agencies, bilateral contributions and assistance through non-government agencies. Aid agencies of the United Nations have played a predominant role. The major countries providing direct bilateral assistance have been the United States and the European Economic Communities. Numerous voluntary non-government aid agencies, including especially those of European origin, are providing additional support.

3.3 Within the Horn countries indigenous organizations are operating in an effort to provide some humanitarian support. The international community assists such organizations. International multilateral organizations' participation responds to the need for sophisticated or efficient approaches to cope with the current crisis. The non-government agencies provide an essential back-up at the grass roots level without the frustration of bureaucratic structures seen in larger international agencies. Bilateral support provides an effective way of allocating donor preferences for specific countries and projects.

3.4 The following is an analysis of the current international aid effort within each country of the Horn and those peripheral countries affected by refugee influxes originating in the Horn.

ETHIOPIA

Indigenous Organizations

Government

3.5 The official government organization responsible for all activities related to assistance to people affected by drought, war and other disasters in Ethiopia is the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). The RRC, which was created in 1974, has grown into one of the largest government organizations in Ethiopia and one of the most important government bodies operating in the Horn region. It currently employs 4000 people with local offices and facilities all over the country. It operates a fleet of 1000 vehicles and also has its own airline.

3.6 The RRC, under its Rehabilitation Division, operates land conservation and agricultural technology services. However, the main activity of the Rehabilitation Division is the running of 81 settlements with a total of 108 000 inhabitants. The settlements include 29 schools, 64 clinics, 32 shops, 78 stores and 60 flour mills.

3.7 The Relief Division employs 2700, and co-ordinates relief assistance to drought and war victims through 582 distribution centres, 120 shelters and 54 feeding centres, serviced by 153 main stores. Of these, the central stores are located in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Arba Minch to which large quantities of food aid are shipped before eventual distribution to other stores.

3.8 The RRC is currently conducting resettlement programs for drought victims, and for refugees claimed to be returning from Sudan and Somalia.

Non-government

3.9 Within the war zones of Tigray and Eritrea, and Oromo populated areas, indigenous non-government relief organizations are operating, namely: the Oromo Relief Association (ORA), the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) and the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA).

3.10 The Sub-Committee received substantial comment on the ERA which has Committees located worldwide financing a significant proportion of its operations in Eritrea.¹

3.11 A number of charitable and church organizations with affiliates in other countries operate inside Ethiopia with Ethiopian personnel, such as the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) and World Vision. (See also in this Chapter - 'Non-government organisations - paragraphs 3.23-3.25, and in Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.68-4.80.)

International aid

Multilateral organizations

3.12 The World Food Program (WFP) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are the major multilateral organizations operating in Ethiopia.

World Food Program (WFP)

3.13 The WFP is a joint United Nations and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) effort to stimulate economic and social development through food aid and provides emergency relief, using contributions of commodities of cash and services made by member governments of the UN and the FAO.²

3.14 The WFP is the largest supplier and intermediary for food aid, especially grain, for Ethiopia. The largest share, about 75 000 MT annually is used for Food for Work (FFW) programs, implemented in co-operation with the Soils and Water Conservation Department of the Ministry of Agriculture. The WFP contributes some food to the RRC for its present 'settlement' programs. A number of governments channel their aid through the WFP. A large share of the WFP grain originates from the EEC (26 400 MT in 1982) as does skim milk powder (SMP) and butter oil.³

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

3.15 UNHCR was established in 1951 to provide international protection for refugees and seek permanent solutions to their problems. UNHCR General Programs spending in the Horn of Africa and Sudan in 1982 was expected to amount to \$US 89.6 million.⁴

UNHCR attempts, in co-operation with host governments, to promote permanent and speedy solutions for refugees in many countries of Africa through assistance towards their voluntary repatriation, rehabilitation in countries of asylum or resettlement in other countries.⁵

3.16 Within its range of multi-purpose programs the UNHCR currently works in association with the RRC in Ethiopia on a major resettlement program for refugees Ethiopia claims are returning from 'host' countries. In June of 1982 the League of

Red Cross Societies (LICROSS) and the UNHCR signed an agreement by which LICROSS became the operational partner of the UNHCR in a major program to assist returnees in Ethiopia. Under the agreement LICROSS administers the contributions received by the UNHCR, assists the RRC in co-ordinating the work of the various executing agencies and monitors international assistance.⁶ The program is designed to provide basic relief and material assistance to refugees who have returned to the Hararghe and Eritrean regions of Ethiopia. The UNHCR presented the Sub-Committee with an analysis of the stage reached in this program:

Phase one implementation of the programme which included procurement of equipment and establishment of offices and logistical facilities was completed on 10 February 1983. Phase two implementation is expected to begin by mid-April 1983. The programme of work projected for phase two and three includes:

- Distribution of basic relief items and self-sufficiency kits
- Installation and maintenance of clean water systems
- Construction of education and health facilities
- Improvement and expansion of irrigation systems.⁷

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

3.17 The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) also operates in Ethiopia and it was recently reported to have established an emergency unit in Addis Ababa as well as releasing \$US 310 000 from a special account for additional supplies, transportation and fuel for relief trucks. It plans to reopen a factory to produce 'faffa', a dry mix of wheat and corn, soya flour, milk powder and vitamins which forms a high-protein porridge when mixed with water.⁸

Bilateral assistance

3.18 A majority of aid is given to the region on a bilateral basis. The United States, the European Economic Communities (EEC) and numerous European countries have provided food aid under bilateral arrangements to Ethiopia. Bilateral assistance has also been allocated for projects, technical expertise, equipment and goods associated with ongoing development projects, and funds earmarked for local costs or specific small scale projects.

3.19 Recently appeals have been launched by the Ethiopian Government in the international media for assistance in view of the recent drought in northern Ethiopia and to support the RRC returnee program discussed above. Among others, Canada, West Germany, Italy, Britain and the EEC responded and have sent bilateral assistance in the form of food aid.

3.20 Traditionally the US and EEC have been the major bilateral donors to Ethiopia. US humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia slowed to a trickle when revolutionary forces seized American property in 1974 and refused to pay compensation. Some media reports have suggested that the United States has not been responsive to Ethiopia's food shortage because of Ethiopia's strong ties with the Soviet Union. This contention has been rejected by the US State Department which, on 28 June 1983, issued a statement claiming that the US had provided \$US 4.8 million in assistance to help meet food needs in Ethiopia. It was reported that \$US 354 000 worth of food aid was distributed to the drought affected province of Tigray through Catholic Relief Services (CRS) for an emergency material and child health care program and that \$US 180 000 was also provided through the WFP.⁹

3.21 On 30 September 1983 it was announced that the US (through USAID) had provided the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) with \$US 800 000 to help overcome transportation problems in the distribution of emergency relief to victims of drought in Ethiopia. In addition, the US was reported to have earmarked 15 000 MT of wheat and wheat flour valued at \$US 6.7 million for distribution in Ethiopia in October and November of 1983.¹⁰

3.22 The EEC began delivering food aid to Ethiopia in 1973, following the drought in Wollo and have continued to do so ever since. At present the EEC food aid is supplied directly to the RRC or through international organizations or non-government organizations (NGOs). The EEC has provided emergency food aid to UNICEF, UNHCR and ICRC and also donated 50 trucks to the Emergency Transport Unit in Ethiopia in 1978.¹¹ It has also assisted Ethiopia in developmental projects. For example, it has provided project aid for the construction of two hospitals, and a fisheries development project.¹²

Non-government organizations (NGOs)

3.23 NGOs in Ethiopia work closely with the government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission with which they have formal agreements governing their activities in Ethiopia. For example, all NGO imports, even personal effects of NGO personnel, are handled by the RRC Shipping Department.¹³

3.24 The Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) in Addis Ababa and the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA) are the main co-ordinating bodies for NGOs activities located in Addis Ababa.

3.25 A large number of NGOs operate in the war and drought affected regions providing relief and specific project assistance. Amongst them are:

- Christian Relief and Development Association (representing about twenty NGOs and widely used as intermediary for organizations not represented in Ethiopia)
- OXFAM, U.K.
- Lutheran World Federation/World Service
- World Vision
- Catholic Relief Service
- Catholic Secretariat (acting on behalf of various national Caritas Organizations)
- Terre des Hommes
- Baptist Conference
- Seventh Day Adventist Church
- Save the Children, U.K.
- Save the Children, Norway
- Save the Children, Sweden
- Concern
- Norwegian Church Aid
- LICROSS
- ICRC¹⁴

SOMALIA

3.26 Although the Somali population itself has been suffering from the effects of severe drought since 1974, international assistance is directed primarily towards Somalia's large refugee population.

3.27 The international community responded to pleas for assistance by President Siyad Barre in 1980 and has provided relief assistance in the form of food, medical supplies, sanitation, water supplies, transport and logistics.

Indigenous organizations

3.28 The National Refugee Commission is the government organization responsible for refugee affairs. In 1980 it set up a Refugee Health Unit (RHU) within the Ministry of Health to initiate and co-ordinate the 35 refugee camps in Somalia. Health services within these camps are organized by the RHU with the emphasis placed on primary and preventative health care. (See also paragraph 3.32 below.)

International aid

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

3.29 UNHCR is the major multilateral organization assisting in refugee affairs in Somalia. In addition the UNHCR has funded and organized multi-purpose assistance including food, health, transport and logistics, education and community development, agriculture and improved water installations.

3.30 UNHCR provided emergency water supply installations which are now being upgraded and maintained on a regular basis and provides technical assistance and equipment to the Ministry of Water and Mineral Resources which is presently in charge of refugee water installations. A joint UNICEF/UNHCR well drilling project has also been in operation and by May 1982, 39 production wells had been constructed in the Hiran and Gedo regions of Somalia.

3.31 UNHCR has assisted in the refugee health services organized by the Refugee Health Unit which has trained community health workers and birth attendants, conducted immunization programs, malaria and tuberculosis control health and education programs. This resulted in the general health situation being stabilized and the mortality rate falling below the national average.

3.32 The organization responsible for the transport and logistics sector of relief operations in Somalia is the Emergency Logistics Unit (ELU) of the National Refugee Commission which is managed, under UNHCR funding, by the Council for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), an American non-government agency with logistics expertise. CARE was called in to assume this role in view of the highly complex nature and large scope of logistical facilities which are required for relief assistance to hundreds of thousands of destitute refugees scattered around the vast country. ELU/CARE presently operate 236 trucks and trailers, an independent network of fuel supply and distribution, six regional warehouses and five mechanical workshops for vehicle repair and maintenance. It fields a number of food monitors in the 35 camps.¹⁵

3.33 The impediments to effective distribution of aid between camps have now been largely overcome. Since the beginning of 1982, measures have been taken to improve accessibility, and road construction has been undertaken in the lower Shebelle, Gedo and Hiran regions.

3.34 UNHCR provides financial support to agriculture. The depletion of forests around refugee camps coupled with the problem of land erosion make reafforestation projects necessary and the UNHCR is presently implementing two reafforestation projects near refugee camps at Lebon and Qoquane in the Qoriolei and Belet Weyne regions.

3.35 UNHCR has assisted in the training of primary school teachers with a view to extending basic education to school age refugee children. Other features of the program include the granting of scholarships to 1344 lower secondary refugee students, vocational training for 150 students, and construction of classrooms. UNHCR earmarked \$US 3 million for the 1982 program which featured a functional literacy training program for some 6000 refugees.¹⁶ Additionally, a Food for Work Program (FFW), with sugar supplies as the incentive, was introduced in all refugee camps to involve refugees in self-help projects mainly in the field of construction.¹⁷

World Food Program (WFP)

3.36 The WFP has been operating in Somalia since the early 1980's providing food and other relief supplies. For example, in 1981 it provided \$US 12.5 million in the form of emergency supplies, food and other commodities,¹⁸ and an emergency grant of \$US 7.5 million was recently announced to meet the needs of refugees up until September 1983.¹⁹

Bilateral assistance

3.37 As in the case of Ethiopia, the United States and the European Economic Communities have been the major donors of aid, primarily food aid, to the refugee population in Somalia. For example, the EEC granted assistance in the form of food aid in 1981-82 as follows: in 1981 emergency aid to Somalia was made up of 30 000 tonnes of cereals, 3500 tonnes of skimmed milk powder and 1500 tonnes of butter oil; and in 1982 Somalia received 35 000 tonnes of cereals, 3500 tonnes of skimmed milk and 1500 tonnes of milk fats.²⁰

3.38 Developmental projects in Somalia have also been assisted through the EEC. For example the EEC has assisted in a rural experimental centre at Saakow in the creation of an irrigated area with all facilities and equipment; in the construction of Bardheera Dam which will provide power and irrigation in the Juba Valley; and a feasibility study is presently underway for the construction of a shipway and ship repair facilities at Mogadishu.²¹

3.39 The United States, as well as providing bilateral assistance to the Somali Government in the form of food aid channelled under UNHCR auspices, has provided funds for specific development projects. For example, an agreement was signed between the US and Somalia in March 1983 whereby the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is to give the Somali Range Management Agency nine million Somali shillings for planting several thousand hectares of indigenous and other exotic hardwood forests which could produce the charcoal needed in the country. The two year agreement also concerns the supply of fodder for several livestock fattening projects jointly funded by Somalia and USAID.²²

3.40 The US has also given refugee assistance to Somalia. For example, on 22 December 1982 an agreement was signed between the Somali Government and US Government in association with USAID whereby the United States gave \$US 11.209 million in assistance to 'alleviate the plight of the refugees in Somalia'.²³ By comparison, US bilateral assistance to Somalia has been greater than that to Ethiopia in recent years.

Non-government organizations (NGOs)

3.41 Non-government assistance to Somalia has primarily been in the form of 'relief' with the long-term goal of initiating self-help/self-sufficiency capabilities within refugee camps. World Vision and the Australian based Community Aid Abroad (CAA)

have been forerunners in initiating a health program for the community as a whole in view of the present stabilization of relief activities in the refugee camps.

3.42 There are a number of non-government agencies of diverse origins, including the following, presently assisting in refugee camps in Somalia:

Voluntary agencies in medical care:

1. Community Aid Abroad (Australia)
2. Oxfam (United Kingdom)
3. Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom)
4. M.S.F. (French)
5. Belgium Medical Committee
6. German Emergency Doctors (West Germany)
7. International Rescue Committee (USA)
8. International League of Red Cross
9. Swiss Disaster Relief
10. Africare
11. Italian Development Aid Programme

Religious Organizations:

1. Interchurch Response to Horn of Africa
2. World Concern International
3. International Christian Aid
4. Tear Fund (United Kingdom)
5. World Vision International
6. Swedish Church Relief
7. World Muslim League

Non-medical organizations:

1. Mininite (sic) Central Community
2. EDRGS (European Church Group)
3. Council for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) (USA logistics contractor)
4. Oxfam (USA)
5. Save the Children Fund (USA)²⁴

SUDAN

3.43 Sudan has hosted Ethiopian refugees for the past sixteen years. The Sudanese Government, through its Ministry of Health, appointed a National Refugee Commission responsible for refugee affairs to cope with refugee influxes. Indigenous non-government organizations currently operating are the Sudanaid Catholic Agency and Sudan Council of Churches which channel aid into existing projects in Sudan. Sudan's limited resources in health, housing and employment are overstretched and like Somalia are severely burdened by refugee settlements. International assistance, however, has not been as forthcoming in the case of Sudan.

3.44 The UNHCR and the WFP are the major multilateral organizations providing refugee programs and relief assistance in the numerous refugee camps located in the urban areas of Sudan, and in resettlement programs in rural provinces.

3.45 The UNHCR, which was established in Sudan in 1968, co-ordinates food, health, logistics and other activities within its expertise in refugee affairs under policies formulated by the National Refugee Commission. By the 1970's a complex program of relief and rural relocation had taken place. It has been reported that the UNHCR over the past decade has established 23 refugee settlement camps near the Ethiopian border.²⁵

3.46 Eritreans, who make up the majority of refugees in Sudan, are situated in camps in the urban areas of Port Sudan, Kassala and Gedaref and the rural provinces of Kassala and Blue Nile.²⁶ In 1980, the majority of refugees, particularly those in urban areas, received no aid from UNHCR, from bilateral programs or humanitarian organizations. By 1981 UNHCR was making an annual grant of \$US 2 million and in 1982 had provided funds for buildings, water and a school, as well as for grass huts and food.²⁷

3.47 Food aid supplied to refugees through the WFP under the auspices of the UNHCR is distributed under the management of the National Refugee Commission. It was asserted in evidence received by the Sub-Committee by a relief worker familiar with refugee camps in Sudan that progressive projects in Sudan have failed due to the Government's lack of expertise in management and planning. Furthermore, transport, communications and office infrastructure are poor. The determining factor, it was claimed, has been the exclusion of foreign expertise other than the UNHCR.²⁸

3.48 A lack of significant foreign attention to Sudan is manifested in the lack of bilateral contributions to the region. For example, the Sudanese Government organized a donors' conference in Khartoum in June 1980 to gain new commitments. Delegates highlighted the marginal assistance Sudan was receiving compared with South East Asia. In response a number of governments pledged donations including:

UK - Pounds Sterling 850 000 for 1980 subject to Parliamentary approval

Netherlands - 2.5 million Dutch florins in addition to support through EEC and UNHCR

Sweden - 5 million Swedish crowns

Italy - 60 million lira and the equivalent of 4000 tons wheat

Switzerland - through projects of the Swiss Red Cross around Kassah

Norway - already provided \$US 3m and supports Euro Action Accord with half its project cost

USA - \$US 100m in AID program to Sudan - this includes refugee aid

EEC - \$US 4.2 m²⁹

3.49 Only about half the funds sought were pledged and even this money will only be paid once detailed projects have been formulated. The donors contended that they would have been more generous in their response if the planning of projects had progressed further. The inference drawn is that there exists the need for effective management of the refugee program by the Sudanese Government. This was verified by a United Nations interagency mission which visited Sudan in 1980 to assess the needs of refugees and observed a pressing need to strengthen infrastructure and services.³⁰

3.50 In 1980 only seven non-government relief agencies were operating in the area. These included:

1. Catholic Relief Services - Southern Sudan - development.
2. Medicans Sans Frontiers - Port Sudan - Medicine.
3. Save the Children Fund - Gedaref, Kassala Province - medicine.
4. Swedish Church Relief - Eastern Sudan - education and medicine.
5. Swiss Red Cross Society - Kassala - medicine.

6. Norwegian Church Relief - Southern Sudan - development.

7. Aene Humanitas (German) - Eastern Sudan - medicine.³¹

CHAPTER 3 - NOTES AND REFERENCES

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25. Hugo Gurdon, 'Political refugees pose a crisis for Sudan', The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 April 1983.
26. Valerie Browning, Submission No. 25, p. 2.
27. D.R. Smock, 'Eritrean Refugees in the Sudan', The Journal of Modern African Studies, 20 March 1983, p. 452.
28. Valerie Browning, Submission No. 25, p. 3.
29. Valerie Browning, Submission No. 25, at Appendix 1, p. 3.
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CHAPTER 4

AUSTRALIAN RELIEF AID AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE HORN OF AFRICA

AUSTRALIAN AID TO AFRICA IN GENERAL

4.1 Australian aid to the African nations has been modest in comparison with the principal focus of our aid programs in the South East Asian and Pacific region. Nevertheless, in recent years, African nations have received an increased proportion of Australia's aid. While this increased proportion is expected to be maintained, fluctuations are likely to occur as a result of yearly changes in demands for emergency food aid and other factors. In 1976/77 Africa received only two per cent of Australia's total bilateral aid program. In 1981/82 this figure reached 11.35 per cent,¹ but in 1982/83 was reduced to 10.18 per cent. (See Table 4.2). In dollar values, overseas development assistance (ODA) increased from \$7 million in 1976/77 to \$57.7 million in 1981/82, and stood at \$56.4 million in 1982/83.² Sixty per cent of Australia's total food aid budget was directed to Africa in 1981/82 (for 1982/83 figures see Table 4.1). The substantial assistance provided by Australia in recent years for African refugee programs merits particular attention.

TABLE 4.1

SUMMARY OF AUSTRALIA'S FOOD AID PROGRAM 1982/83 - AFRICA

Country	Channel	Commodity	Quantity Mtn	W/E	Cost of Commodity	Freight and Associated Costs/ Traded Charges	Total Cost of Shipment	Total Country Cost
1. AFRICA								
Botswana	WFP-C	Veg. Oil	1 500	-	1 531 201	-	1 531 201	1 531 201
Burundi	FAC/WFP-B	Rice	700	2 030	284 200	P	284 200	284 200
Cameroon	FAC/WFP-B	Rice	295	856	119 770	P	119 770	119 770
Comoros	IEFR/WFP-A	Rice	2 000	5 800	770 382	324 260	1 094 642	1 094 642
	WFP-C	Veg. Oil	162	-	165 239	4 313	169 552	1 264 194
Djibouti	FAC/WFP-B	Rice	300	870	123 000	P	123 000	123 000
Egypt	FAC/Bilat.	Wheat	40 000	40 000	6 999 300	-	6 999 300	6 999 300
Ethiopia	FAC/Bilat.	Wheat (c)	15 000	15 000	2 582 612	624 073	3 206 685	3 206 685
	H-WFP							
Ghana	IEFR/WFP-A	Rice	3 000	8 700	1 231 398	226 742	1 458 140	1 458 140
Gambia	FAC/WFP-B	Rice	1 750	5 075	710 500	P	710 500	710 500
Guinea	FAC/WFP-B	Rice	115	336	46 690	P	46 690	46 690
Kenya	FAC/Bilat.	Flour	7 300	2 049 989	690 364	2 740 353	2 740 353	2 740 353
	WFP-C	Flour	7 300	20 000	2 146 045	740 357	2 886 402	2 886 402
Lesotho	WFP-C	Veg. Oil	60	-	81 432	-	81 432	81 432
Madagascar	FAC/Bilat.	Wheat	5 000	5 000	937 675	205 697	1 143 372	1 143 372
	WFP-C	Canned Fruit	7	-	4 332	180	4 512	4 512
Malawi	FAC/WFP-B	Rice	60	174	24 360	P	24 360	24 360
Mali	FAC/WFP-B	Rice	10 000	29 000	4 060 000	P	4 060 000	4 060 000
Mauritius	FAC/Bilat.	Flour	3 920	5 369	1 140 055	321 179	1 461 234	1 461 234
Mozambique	FAC/Bilat.	Rice	4 000	11 600	1 646 200	396 000	2 042 200	2 042 200
	WFP-C	Veg. Oil	101	-	102 808	-	102 808	102 808
Seychelles	WFP-C	Sugar	10	-	4 012	-	4 012	4 012
Somalia	IEFR	Flour	3 066	4 200	900 447	-	900 447	900 447
	IEFR	Rice	2 000	5 800	820 120	476 946	2 197 513	2 197 513

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NOTES:

- WFP-A Signifies quantities channelled through the World Food Program in addition to the regular pledges by donors to that Organisation.
- FAC/WFP-B Signifies quantities pledged under the Food Aid Convention counted by donors as part of their regular pledges to the WFP.
- WFP-C Signifies quantities given to WFP under the cash and commodities pledge.
- H-WFP Signifies bilateral aid which is handled or distributed by the WFP.
- P Denotes that freight costs for the shipment were part of \$7.2 million paid to WFP (on the basis of \$60 per tonne).
- Wheat (C) Denotes Canadian wheat.
- Wheat (P) Denotes wheat bought in Pakistan.
- Maize (Z) Denotes Zimbabwe maize.
- IEFR International Emergency Food Reserve.
- W/E Wheat Equivalent.
- Source: Food Aid Unit, ADAB, Department of Foreign Affairs.

4.2 Project aid has been minimal. In mid-1982 Australia had 29 projects (estimated cost \$21.1m) in Africa and the Middle East compared with 158 in the South Pacific (\$73.0m). Such aid is spread over a large number of countries most of which receive only a small amount of assistance. Bilateral project aid, together with support for staffing assistance schemes and Development Import Grants to Africa and the Middle East in the period 1982/83 amounted to \$8 848 800.

4.3 Support is also given, through training schemes such as the Staffing and Assistance Scheme which provides funds to the recipient country to enable it to recruit skilled Australians to work in African countries.

4.4 ADAB assists Africans to participate in training courses and programs in Australia and elsewhere. For example, in the period 1982/83 a total of 61 Africans from the Horn region deriving from Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan were sponsored by Australia to undertake training in a total of 27 disciplines. There have been no awardees from Somalia and Djibouti in this period but in projected estimates prepared by ADAB for the forthcoming 1983/84 period Australia is expected to sponsor six Somalis to be trained in the fields of agriculture and forestry amongst a total of 69 sponsored awardees from Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya. A majority of awardees are sponsored under the Australian International Award Scheme.

4.5 The Australian Development Import Grants Scheme is funded through ADAB whereby ADAB agrees to finance the purchase of Australian goods for developmental purposes. Another important development has been the creation of the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) which held its first conference in July of 1982 in Nairobi to discuss research collaboration with African scientists.

4.6 Because more than half of the the world's estimated 10 million refugees are found on the continent, especially in the Horn of Africa region,³ an International Conference on Assistance to Refugees (ICARA) was held in Geneva in 1981 as a result of which Australia contributed an additional \$10 million (\$2 million to the UNHCR general program and \$8 million for refugees in Ethiopia and Zaïre). Australia was the ninth largest contributor at the Conference.⁴

4.7 Another factor underlying Australia's increased assistance to Africa other than the current humanitarian crisis caused by severe drought and conflicts in many of the regions has been the increased contact between Australia and Commonwealth African States since the mid-seventies, especially since Australia's role in the resolution of the Zimbabwe conflict. (See Committee's Report on Zimbabwe, tabled in May 1980.)

4.8 For Australian bilateral aid to Africa in 1982/83 see Table 4.2

TABLE 4.2
AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA
BILATERAL AID BY COUNTRY AND NATURE OF ASSISTANCE
YEAR ENDED 30 JUNE 1983

RECIPIENT AREA/COUNTRY	CAPITAL PROJECT ASSISTANCE	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE			FOOD AID	DEVELOPMENT IMPORT GRANTS	OTHER BILATERAL AID	TOTAL BILATERAL AID	AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BILATERAL AID
		PROJECT AID	STAFFING ASSISTANCE	TRAINING AID					
North of Sahara	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	%
Algeria	19			59	6 999		x	59	0.01
Egypt				186			24	7 228	1.31
Tunisia				41				41	0.01
TOTAL	19		286		6 999		24	7 328	1.33
South of Sahara									
Botswana			86			213	204	585	0.11
Comoros		63		167	1 095		654	1 095	0.20
Ethiopia				60	3 447			4 331	0.78
Gambia				508	1 459		34	60	0.01
Ghana	28			384	5 632	x	25	2 029	0.37
Kenya	790		250	225			13	6 811	1.23
Lesotho				15	1 143			488	0.09
Madagascar				205				1 158	0.21
Malawi	150	1		148	1 461	1 000		2 05	0.04
Mauritius	70			188	2 044		107	2 760	0.50
Mozambique				351				2 114	0.38
Nigeria							45	45	0.01
Rwanda								357	0.07
Senegal	78		200	53				53	0.01
Seychelles				109				387	0.07
Sierra Leone				71	2 197		100	2 308	0.01
Swaziland				235	3 261			3 496	0.42
Sudan									0.63

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RECIPIENT AREA/COUNTRY	CAPITAL PROJECT ASSISTANCE	TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE			FOOD AID	DEVELOPMENT IMPORT GRANTS	OTHER BILATERAL AID	TOTAL BILATERAL AID	AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BILATERAL AID
		PROJECT AID	STAFFING ASSISTANCE	TRAINING AID					
South of Sahara (contd)	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	\$'000	%
Swaziland			50	66			1	117	0.02
Tanzania	1 332	112		811	6 388	501	13	9 045	1.64
Uganda			204	454	3 143	1 015	14	4 738	0.86
Zambia		64	1 451	349	2 175		8	2 738	0.49
Zimbabwe	-2			360		10	232	2 115	0.38
East Africa Community				2				2	x
Unallocated				31				31	0.01
TOTAL	2 446	240	2 241	4 675	33 445	2 741	1 450	47 238	8.55
Unallocated Africa	608	732		74			272	1 676	0.30
TOTAL AFRICA	3 073	962	2 241	5 035	40 444	2 741	1 746	56 242	10.18

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SOURCE: Statistical Summary, Australian Official Development Assistance for Developing Countries, 1982-83.
Research and Statistical Reporting Section, Australian Development Assistance Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs.

AUSTRALIAN AID TO THE HORN

4.9 In comparison with other international aid donors Australia's response to pleas for assistance have been modest. However, in view of traditional aid priorities, our relief effort has served to contribute to the alleviation of the suffering evident in the current humanitarian crisis on the Horn and in peripheral countries.

4.10 A significant component of Australia's aid program to Africa has been directed to the Horn over recent years. Principally, Australia's bilateral contributions to the Horn countries or through multilateral aid agencies have been in the form of food aid, primarily grain.

4.11 Bilateral assistance in the form of project aid, with the exception of Kenya, has been marginal, although assistance to non-government aid agencies has been significant.

4.12 The current programs carried out by Australian non-government organizations such as Community Aid Abroad (CAA) and international non-government organizations with Australian branches such as the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) are detailed in this sub-chapter to illustrate the role of non-government organizations in view of the Australian Government contribution to them.

4.13 As will be seen some bilateral aid is given by Australia under the umbrella of international, multilateral organizations. This slightly blurs the distinction between 'multilateral' and 'bilateral' assistance.

Assistance to multilateral organizations and bilateral assistance

4.14 Multilateral aid refers to assistance provided to international bodies. Contributions from donors like Australia are pooled by the international agency for use in their development or relief programs.⁵ Australia contributes to some of the major multilateral organizations operating in the Horn, such as the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF).

The World Food Program (WFP)

4.15 The WFP is a United Nations Organization established jointly with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and was founded in 1963. Australia has contributed to it since its inception. It was established in order to provide food for social and economic development purposes and to cover emergency food shortages in developing countries. The kind of aid provided is in the form of grain, grain freight, cash and commodities.

4.16 Australian support for the WFP in general has increased according to a news release from the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Mr A.A. Street, MP, on 20 April 1982. Mr Street said that over the next three years Australia will increase the amount of wheat and flour channelled through the WFP from 80 000 tonnes a year to 200 000 tonnes a year. In addition Australia will provide cash and commodities to the value of \$20 million to WFP for the 1983-84 calendar year biennium. The total value of Australia's pledge to the WFP for the 1983-84 biennium was estimated at \$97 million.⁶

4.17 The WFP has been operative in Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan. Food aid contributions from Australia have been channelled through the WFP and earmarked for specific projects on the Horn. For example, the WFP operates, in association with governments, a developmental 'Food for Work Program' (FFW) in Ethiopia, to which Australia has recently contributed. The Food for Work Program provides food in return for 'developmental' project tasks.

4.18 In September 1982 an Australian food aid mission visited Ethiopia where an agreement was reached with the Ministry of Agriculture for a FFW program for land rehabilitation and reafforestation in the Gamo Gofa Administrative region. The project concerned rehabilitation of forest, grazing and agricultural land implemented by the Ethiopian Soil and Water Conservation Department and Forestry and Wildlife Conservation Authority.⁷

4.19 A spokesman from the Department of Foreign Affairs stated in March 1983 that \$2.8 million worth of food aid (grain) would be distributed before July of 1984 through WFP and World Vision, of which 6600 tonnes would be distributed through a FFW development program organized by the WFP.⁸

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

4.20 Australia also provides aid to the Horn of Africa through UNICEF, an organization targeting its assistance towards children and their mothers in the developing countries of Africa in the areas of health, nutrition, education and social welfare.

4.21 UNICEF's main source of revenue (about 70% of total income) from voluntary contributions from governments declined in 1982 because of foreign exchange variations. Because of these financial difficulties UNICEF has been forced to cut back its approved program substantially and in this process has shelved a large number of its important African projects.

4.22 Australia contributes to selected African projects of UNICEF. For example, Australia's multilateral contribution to UNICEF was \$2 million in 1981-82 which funded (amongst others) joint Australian/UNICEF projects such as a rural water supply and sanitation project in Ethiopia and a Primary Health Care Program in Sudan.⁹

4.23 The former Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. A.A. Street, MP, announced in a Press Statement of 20 April 1982 that Australia would provide \$2 million to UNICEF in support of four African programs. Mr. Street said:

Specific activities in the UNICEF programs were being 'adopted' as joint Australian/UNICEF projects. They were aimed at improving the health and sanitation standards of the children, their mothers and local communities in developing African countries.

4.24 Australia provided the UNICEF Primary Health Program in Sudan with \$430 000 in assistance.¹⁰

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

4.25 Australia contributes to UNHCR, a multilateral organization established to provide international protection for refugees and seek permanent solutions to their problems.¹¹ The UNHCR currently operates in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan. Details of UNHCR operations in each country are summarized in Chapter 3.

4.26 Australia participated in the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA) in April 1981 held under the auspices of the United Nations, OAU and UNHCR. The following evidence was received by the Sub-Committee from the

Department of Foreign Affairs in relation to Australia's commitment to the Conference and UNHCR's estimated expenditure for 1982:

Australia's own commitment at ICARA was \$2m to the UNHCR's program for Africa, plus a contribution of \$8m worth of food aid for Ethiopia, Somalia and Zaire. In the period 1980-82 we gave over \$20m to assist African refugees and displaced persons. The total since 1978 is some \$30m. The UNHCR estimated expenditure for 1982 ... for the Horn region is as follows: in Djibouti \$US 4.5m, Sudan \$US 23m, in Ethiopia it has allocated \$US 14m for returnees and \$US 0.7m for refugees, in Kenya it has allocated \$US 2.3m and in Somalia \$US 35m, giving a total of \$US 79.5m.¹²

4.27 A majority of Australian aid is given bilaterally. Almost three quarters of Australia's aid in 1982-83 will be given on a bilateral basis, that is, assistance provided to a specific developing country for specific development purposes.¹³

4.28 Apart from aid to Papua New Guinea, almost all Australia's bilateral overseas aid is given in the form of goods and services from Australia. As with all government purchasing, public tenders must be invited where the estimated cost of the goods exceeds \$10 000. Contracts are awarded to the lowest tender which meets the specifications after adjustment of the tender price to accord with preference for Australian content.¹⁴ However, recently and for the first time, Australia has had to purchase grain for the Horn of Africa region from overseas as the drought in Australia precipitated a shortage of wheat.

4.29 Bilateral assistance is extended to the Horn of Africa region in the following forms:

- a) Food Aid
- b) Project Aid
- c) Training
- d) Emergency and Distress Relief
- e) Development Import Grants

4.30 The amount of Australian bilateral assistance to each country in the Horn of Africa region is contained in Table 4.3 in which it can be seen that the major bilateral contributions to the Horn are in the form of 'food aid'. (See also Table 4.1 - Summary of Australia's food aid program 1982/83 - Africa.) Food aid is provided in the form of four separate sub-programs:

- (i) bilateral food grain aid
- (ii) non-grain food aid
- (iii) emergency food reserves
- (iv) assistance to World Food Program¹⁵

TABLE 4.3

AUSTRALIAN BILATERAL OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE TO THE HORN OF AFRICA

YEAR ENDED 30 JUNE

\$A'000

COUNTRY AND FORM OF AID	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
<u>DJIBOUTI</u>						
EMERGENCY AND DISTRESS RELIEF						
Flood Relief	-	-	-	15	-	-
TOTAL DJIBOUTI	-	-	-	15	-	NIL
<u>ETHIOPIA</u>						
EMERGENCY AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE						
Refugee Relief						200
PROJECT AID						
Livestock Adviser						63
Grain stores construction	-	-	-	-	480	-
Grain storage silos	77	35	95	18	9	-
TRAINING	4	1	-	-	55	167
HOMDA*	1	3	-	-	3	6
FOOD AID (INCL. EMERGENCY FOOD AID)	-	1788	848	3824	5486	3895
TOTAL ETHIOPIA	82	1827	943	3845	6033	4331
<u>KENYA</u>						
PROJECT AID						
Staffing Assistance	-	-	5	-	-	-
Magarini Land Settlement	791	983	1358	1805	1140	790
TRAINING	198	163	275	202	341	364
HOMDA	12	22	20	33	37	25
DIGs (Development Import Grants)	-	-	-	-	250	-
FOOD AID (INCL. EMERGENCY FOOD AID)	515	722	1440	3425	3697	5632
TOTAL KENYA	1516	1890	3098	5465	5465	6811
<u>SOMALIA</u>						
PROJECT AID						
Rural Water Resources Project (U.N.S.O.)	-	-	-	-	300	-
Sand Dune Stabilization (" ")	-	-	-	100	100	-
TRAINING	-	6	4	-	-	9
FOOD AID (INCL. EMERGENCY FOOD AID)	-	243	1	1538	4896	2197
EMERGENCY AND DISTRESS RELIEF						
Refugee Relief (Save the Children Fund)	-	-	-	-	150	-
Refugee Health Project (C.A.A.)	-	-	-	-	100	100
TOTAL SOMALIA	-	249	5	1638	5546	2306

* Head of Mission Discretionary Aid Fund is a small sum available to Heads of Mission accredited to developing countries. Funds are disbursed according to guidelines.

Source: ADAB

4.31 A representative from ADAB presented evidence discussing the aid contributions contained in Table 4.3 with particular reference to expenditure in 1981/82:

In the document that I have given you is a table setting out the composition and level of aid in the five-year period to each of those countries, with the exception of Djibouti which receives no bilateral aid except one grant of \$15 000 in 1981 for flood relief. The total level of aid to Ethiopia in the financial year 1981-82 was \$6m. That was made up of approximately \$0.5m for grain storage construction funded through FAO, and approximately \$5.5m on emergency food aid. Aid to Kenya last financial year totalled approximately \$5.5m, about \$1m of that was for a major bilateral land settlement project at Magarini, and \$3.5m was for emergency food aid. There were smaller amounts for training assistance, provided in Australia, and development import grants. For Somalia the total expenditure last financial year was \$5.5m; approximately \$5m of this was for emergency food aid, with smaller amounts for multilateral projects for water resource development and sand dune stabilisation. In addition to the official program there are smaller levels of funding through non-government organisations. The official contribution to those non-government programs totalled about \$800 000 in the Horn of Africa last year.¹⁶

Ethiopia

4.32 In view of the large component of food aid given to Ethiopia, amounting to \$6 million in 1981/82 (see Table 4.1 for 1982/83 food aid program to Africa) further examination of the specific consignments is contained in answer to a Question on Notice put by Senator Jones on 18 May 1983 to Senator Evans, the Minister representing the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Senate. Senator Jones asked:

(1) Did Australia grant \$6 033 000 in foreign aid to Ethiopia last year?

Senator Evans provided the following analysis of the components of the program to Ethiopia in 1981/82:

With the exception of aid to Papua New Guinea, all Australian bilateral aid is given for specific developmental purposes. For example, in the case of aid to Ethiopia in 1981/82, we provided food aid totalling \$5 486 000. This consisted of 24 400 tonnes of Australian grain, the bulk of which was channelled through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to feed refugees and displaced persons. A further 900 tonnes of wheat and 100 tonnes of high protein biscuits was channelled through World Vision. Australia met the freight costs amounting to \$1 300 000 associated with these consignments. In addition, grain storage facilities were provided at a cost of \$489 000 and assistance totalling \$55 000 allowed some 9 Ethiopians to study in Australia.¹⁷

4.33 Project aid to Ethiopia includes food security measures which include: the provision of Australian storage silos erected in Shoa, Wallega, Bale and Gema Gofa administrative regions; and assistance in the construction of grain storage facilities, using local materials, at the Harewa settlement which is a project implemented through the FAO. Assistance to these projects is channelled through the RRC. A scholarship program through which Ethiopians are studying agricultural techniques in Australia is also being developed as a complementary activity to food aid and food security assistance.¹⁸

4.34 ADAB has recently appointed the WFP and World Vision, as agents to monitor Australia's food aid contributions in Ethiopia.

Somalia

4.35 Somalia has also been a major recipient of food aid in the period 1981/82. Total bilateral assistance in this period amounted to \$5.5 million of which \$5 million was provided in the form of emergency food aid. The former Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Street, announced that food aid to Somalia worth approximately \$4 million in the form of flour and rice would be shipped to Somalia between April and June of 1982, channelled through the UNHCR.¹⁹

4.36 Australia has recently appointed UNHCR, which in turn appointed CARE, an American logistics organization to monitor Australia's food aid contributions to Somalia. The project component of bilateral assistance to Somalia consists of a water resources project and a sand dune stabilization program. Both projects are organized under the United Nations Sahelian Office (UNSO) and Australia has contributed \$500 000 worth of bilateral assistance to the projects in the period 1981/82. (See Table 4.3)

Kenya

4.37 Kenya is a major recipient in Australia's aid program to Africa. It is relevant to the Horn in view of its refugees of Ethiopian origin, and the bilateral assistance it receives in the form of project aid for an experimental land settlement scheme, the success of which will be an important indicator of the viability of self-sufficiency projects in the wider region.

Australia is assisting in the implementation of a land settlement scheme with associated rural development in the coastal Magarini region of Kenya. Settlement schemes to develop semi-arid marginal lands and make them productive arose from the need to increase employment opportunities and to improve income distribution for Kenya's

rapidly growing population and large number of landless. The project, which began in 1978, involves the settlement of 4000 farm families within an area of 60 000 hectares. Each family is to be settled on a farm (average size of 13 hectares) with road access, domestic water supply and social service facilities provided. Existing land occupiers of the project area will be settled on identified plots with individual title and residual land will then be settled by poor landless Kenyans from elsewhere in the country. The project area lies within the semi-arid belt covered mainly with lowland dry forest and semi-arid bush growth. Population is sparse and farming is mainly small scale and subsistence in nature. The project aims to establish an environmentally appropriate rain-fed farming system for the area. Before settlement each farm is to be demarcated, with 4 hectares cleared and ploughed and conservation works in the form of contour banks provided where necessary. The project also includes the establishment of a field station to investigate the most suitable crops, livestock and farming techniques and to provide extension services to the settlers.²⁰

Djibouti and Sudan

4.38 Humanitarian assistance to Djibouti has been small. Sudan received relief in the form of food aid (grain) between 1978 and 1982. Australia has appointed the WFP to supervise Australia's aid program to Sudan. Australia provided UNICEF with \$430 000 to assist with its present Primary Health Care Program in Sudan.²¹

Assistance to non-government organizations (NGOs)

Government assistance

4.39 Australia assists projects carried out by non-government aid organizations with Australian affiliations and the total official development assistance (ODA) to non-government programs totalled \$800 000 in 1982.²²

4.40 Table 4.4 sets out the ODA provided to specific countries in the Horn via non-government agencies for the period 1977/78 to 1982/83.

TABLE 4.4

AUSTRALIAN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
VIA NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS TO
THE HORN OF AFRICA

\$A

Country	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80.	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83
Djibouti	-	-	-	-	40 000	-
Ethiopia	-	53 000	5 000	68 195	271 440	85 175
Kenya	50 438	18 900	6 000	23 000	231 788	222 474
Somalia	-	-	-	20 000	222 145	6 398
Sudan	90 000	135 339	180 650	187 641	87 040	58 929
TOTALS	140 438	207 239	191 650	298 836	852 413	372 976

Source: ADAB

4.41 The figures represent a significant contribution to the Horn of Africa via non-government organizations. Contributions netted a significant increase in the period 1981-82.

4.42 Australian non-government organizations depend on funds received from the public in the form of national appeals, that is door knocks, walkathons or media campaigns to finance their aid activities. Church agencies differ in that they receive special support through affiliated churches.

4.43 The Australian Government, through ADAB, allocates funds to Australian non-government agencies operating in the Horn through the Project Subsidy Scheme. This scheme provides official funds to the NGOs in support of their own activities.

4.44 In recent evidence received by the Sub-Committee from ADAB the following Australian non-government organizations were listed as currently operating in the Horn:

- . Austcare
- . Australian Freedom from Hunger Campaign
- . Australian Council of Churches
- . Australian Catholic Relief
- . Australian Institute of Urban Studies
- . Community Aid Abroad in Somalia
- . Foster Parents Plan
- . For Those Who Have Less
- . Lutheran World Service
- . Quaker Service Council
- . Rotary
- . Sudan Interior Mission
- . Save The Children Fund

- . UNICEF Committee of Australia
- . World Vision
- . Young Men's Christian Association²³

4.45 Among international non-government organizations operating in the Horn with Australian branches are:

- . International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia)
- . League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan)
- . Eritrean Relief Association (Eritrea)

Current programs - non-government organizations and assistance provided

4.46 The Sub-Committee has received submissions from several Australian non-government organizations operating in the region. The following, is an analysis of the current operations of those non-government organizations brought to the attention of the Sub-Committee.

Community Aid Abroad (CAA)

4.47 CAA began supporting relief programs in Ethiopia during the famine of 1974. More recently its assistance has been directed to refugees and displaced people from Eritrea and Somalia.

4.48 The submission received from CAA described its program in Eritrea as follows:

Since 1978 CAA has been giving financial assistance to the Eritrean Relief Association based in Khartoum. This wholly indigenous organization has the ability to channel relief supplies, food and medicine, and rehabilitation materials to the displaced people in northern Eritrea. Specifically CAA has assisted a refugee camp Solomuna, where 11 500 refugees, mainly women and children, are sheltered; and the ERA clinic at Port Sudan, a rehabilitation centre for those permanently maimed by war injuries.

CAA funds have been given, over the years, to specific aid programs in the types of areas mentioned above. Reports received from the ERA and independent sources such as John Larkin and other aid organizations are used to assure CAA that their aid to this group is well spent and assists those in need both with short-term relief and longer-term development assistance. ADAB has provided grants to assist some of these programs.²⁴

4.49 Since 1981, CAA has been involved in the Somali Refugee Assistance Program in the fields of health and agriculture. There are presently 35 refugee camps in Somalia, nine in the northwest and the rest in the southern regions. The Somali Refugee Health Unit (RHU) was established in 1978 to co-ordinate health-related activities within the camps with the aim of training indigenous Somalis to take over the administration of the camps. In line with this philosophy CAA assistance to the refugee camps has taken a preventative rather than curative approach. CAA's submission to the Sub-Committee summarized its activities as follows:

Via a formal agreement with the Somali Government and after initial survey work, CAA undertook responsibility for the total health care of refugees at Jalalagasi IV camp. Initially CAA placed an Australian team of 3 nurses, one doctor and a co-ordinator in the camp.

In line with CAA's development philosophy concentration was given to preventative rather than curative health care and to training of refugees as Community Health Workers and Traditional Birth Attendants. CAA also gave special support and encouragement to Somali government medical staff placed in the camp. CAA's aim was to hand over the health care program of the camp as soon as the refugees and Somali health workers felt able and confident to cope. This basic objective will have been fulfilled by the end of 1982, however limited financial assistance will still be required from CAA for a further period...²⁵

In 1982 CAA sent two agriculturalists to work with the National Refugee Commission at Jalalaqsi camp with a view to involving refugees in farming as a means of income generation and a move towards self-reliance. Again the emphasis of our program is to train, motivate, share skills and knowledge and support refugee farmers and withdraw our personnel when their presence is no longer needed...²⁶

CAA has also provided a pharmacist to the Refugee Health Unit and has sponsored the Director of the Refugee Health Unit to study for the Master of Public Health degree at Sydney University.²⁷

CAA also finances an indigenous Somali medical team at Agabar Camp who are running their own camp health program.²⁸

Primary Health Care in Sanaag

4.50 With the reduction in its role in the Jalalaqsi camp, the CAA team was asked by the Somali Ministry of Health to become involved in a primary health care program in the remote Sanaag region. The Somalis are applying the model used in the refugee camps to their own national population.

4.51 The Ministry of Health in Mogadishu recently appointed a team of six comprising administrators and medical health workers which will form the nucleus of a team which will help

the semi-nomadic communities of Sanaag establish their own village-based health care service. Each community will select its own health workers for training in basic health care principles and practice, construct and maintain its own small 'health post', and, through a village health committee, supervise and direct its own health service. Training of health workers will be carried out stressing the prevention of the common health problems in the area such as diarrhoea, anaemia, malaria, TB and the often fatal childhood diseases such as measles and whooping cough.²⁹

Like most other Third World countries, and Australia's own Black community, Somalia suffers from few exotic diseases which require high technology to control. The main causes of the high infant, child and maternal mortality are fairly easily preventable through improved water supply and sanitation, nutrition, health education and simple curative measures using both traditional and basic modern drugs. The lack of committed trained personnel in a remote region like Sanaag can be overcome by the training of village health workers selected by their own communities, and supervised, encouraged and supplied with basic drugs and materials by a small regional group of well-motivated doctors and nurses.³⁰

4.52 Community Aid Abroad initially conducted a survey, the results of which were as follows:

The initial survey carried out in Sanaag by the CAA health team demonstrated that the rural communities of the region were receptive to the idea of a health programme in which they would participate from the very beginning, in which their cultural values would be respected, and in which their own priorities would be those of the programme. Healthily sceptical of outside promises they were, nevertheless, enthusiastic about the prospect of being supported in their own efforts to improve their health and general well-being.³¹

4.53 Subject to the outcome of survey work CAA has been given the responsibility for the Sanaag region in the north. The program will, it is hoped, follow a similar pattern to the Primary Health Care Model developed by the World Health Organisation. An immunisation program for vaccine-preventable diseases, mother-child health clinics, sanitation/water supply systems, and health education will all be integrated in this Primary Health Care Program.

4.54 Like the programs in the camps the Primary Health Care (PHC) program aims to hand over to Somali personnel who hopefully will be supported completely by the community in which they live. This will depend on the development of improved means of livelihood in the region as well, such as agricultural programs, water supply, livestock programs, etc.³²

4.55 ADAB funds numerous CAA projects and has recently endorsed its proposal to assist the Somali Government and the people in Sanaag.³³ ADAB has recently given CAA \$600 000 to assist the program in Sanaag for 1983/84.

4.56 The Committee draws particular attention to Australia's support and participation in the self-help Primary Health Care Program in Somalia. The CAA program in the Sanaag region commenced in January 1983. The program aims to teach Somalis to take responsibility for their own basic health care and is modelled on a successful program which was applied to Somali refugee camps. The methods adopted in implementing the program and the success achieved are of world wide significance. The Committee recommends that the Australian Government should continue its support for CAA in this valuable work.

Austcare

4.57 ADAB provides funds for Austcare which gives educational assistance to Eritrean refugees in Sudan in two settlement villages and for extensions of a junior/secondary school in another village. The assistance is designed to assist refugees integrate into the local community.³⁴ In addition, Austcare assists the Save the Children Fund which operates a mother and child health care program in Somalia and Sudan. Austcare also supports an educational program implemented by the Australian Council of Churches for refugees in Djibouti.

Freedom from Hunger Campaign

4.58 An Australian Freedom From Hunger Campaign project in Ethiopia is also subsidized by Australia which aims to provide safe water from a reservoir to two villages in order to prevent disease and to relieve women of the physical hardships of having to carry water over long distances.

4.59 The Australian Freedom from Hunger Campaign has provided assistance to refugee camps in Eritrea through the ERA. Assistance is in the form of medical aid and an anti-tuberculosis program, market gardening and, more recently, food aid.

Save the Children Fund

4.60 Australia has assisted non-government organizations in Somalia. For example, in 1982 Australia contributed \$150 000 to the Save the Children Fund in support of its refugee relief program. The money was used to purchase supplies for initial medical and nutritional care for 142 000 refugees in two refugee camps where Save the Children Fund was providing medical, health and emergency relief teams.³⁵

4.61 Several international non-government organizations with Australian branches were brought to the attention of the Sub-Committee such as the Eritrean Relief Association and the International Red Cross Societies. The following is an analysis of their current programs in the region.

Eritrean Relief Committee (ERC)

4.62 The Eritrean Relief Committee in Australia is one of the seventeen branches of the Eritrean Relief Association, a world-wide relief organization established in 1975. Committees are based in Australia, Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Africa.³⁶ The committees liaise with the headquarters in Khartoum and supply food and other material assistance.

4.63 The Australian Council of Churches (ACC) has assisted in the formation of the Eritrean Relief Committee in Australia and has provided funds for humanitarian aid through the Eritrean Relief Association in Khartoum. For example, the ACC has provided grants totalling \$500 000 to ERA in Khartoum over past years, during which time ACC has also channelled over \$228 000 in grants from ADAB for the work of the Eritrean Relief Association.³⁷

4.64 Community Aid Abroad, Australian Freedom from Hunger Campaign, Australian Catholic Relief and Austcare have assisted ERA in relief and rehabilitation projects. They have also been able to obtain subsidies for some of their projects from ADAB. Other organizations have given money on a less frequent basis.

4.65 In Eritrea the ERA's major activities are in the distribution of relief/food aid. It also operates educational programs designed to improve the health and literacy of Eritreans.

4.66 In an address to an International Donors' Conference on Eritrea in Namur, 28-29 April 1983 a representative of the ERA outlined the ERA objectives:

What we try to do:

At present, 40% of humanity is suffering from the shortage of food. Somewhere between one and one and a half billion people are living in a state of absolute and abject poverty. These are the underfed, underemployed, illiterate, ill-housed and in ill-health. If this is the picture of the three-quarters of the population of the world, i.e. the third world, how much is it true of Eritrea, a member of the third world, who has been in continuous war for the last twenty one years and who is hit by severe drought from time to time?

Therefore food has become our primary concern at present.

Due to shortage or absence of food, the deficiency of proteins, vitamins and minerals, malnutrition has become rampant among the Eritrean population. Malnutrition is the single most serious problem at the heart of all the diseases that have made the lives of our people unbearable. Children, pregnant women, lactating mothers and old people have been the special victims of malnutrition. Therefore, we have to struggle hard against malnutrition by providing the population with adequate food both in quality and quantity, and also provide them with proper health service.

Education is expanding everywhere in Eritrea. The Zero School is opening junior and senior high schools. Elementary schools are sprouting everywhere. Above all, literacy education is in a very high demand. The printing of alphabetical books has assumed a very significant position at present.

However, we should also try to minimize and ultimately stop depending on relief aid. Thus we are trying to go into rehabilitation and development activities. This is, unfortunately, determined, to a great extent,

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However, we should also try to minimize and ultimately stop depending on relief aid. Thus we are trying to go into rehabilitation and development activities. This is, unfortunately, determined, to a great extent,

by the military situation. A military balance of forces in favour of Eritrea means an expansion in our activities both in relief and rehabilitation. At this time, Ethiopian troops are confined to the cities and major roads. The entire countryside is free from Ethiopian presence. Rehabilitation and development work is possible in vast areas of Eritrea. Thus we have entered a stage where we can help farmers produce food by providing them with seeds, tools, etc., caring for their animal health, drilling wells for human and animal consumption, and providing the handicapped with physical and vocational rehabilitation.³⁸

4.67 ERA has chosen to concentrate its efforts more on the displaced people inside Eritrea. This is intended to stop the flow of refugees to Sudan and improve the situation for those inside Eritrea as well as those who will eventually come back when the situation allows.

ICRC and LRCS

4.68 Australia also contributes to international non-government aid agencies in the Horn such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LRCS) through the Australian Red Cross Society. The policy and programs they operate are as follows:

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

4.69 The ICRC as distinct from LRCS is an independent Swiss body which targets its efforts towards relieving human distress and suffering caused by 'conflicts' which have affected nearly every region of Africa:

In the Horn of Africa, the efforts already realised in order to bring protection and assistance to all the victims of the conflictual situation in this region will be pursued and intensified.³⁹

4.70 The ICRC provides relief and medical assistance to those affected by 'man-made disasters' in Ethiopia's six administrative regions of Eritrea, Tigray, Gondar, Wollo, Hararghe, Bale and Sidamo, in co-operation with the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS). Food and blankets have been despatched to these regions as well as Eritrea (Asmara) by the Eritrean Regional Administration Special Commission and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission.

4.71 One of ICRC's major activities in Ethiopia has been carried out at the Debre Zeit Rehabilitation Centre for war amputees near Addis Ababa. At the end of 1981, ICRC achieved its aim - the completion of the gradual hand-over of responsibility to its Ethiopian counterparts who have been trained by an ICRC team.

4.72 The ICRC has also helped ERCS to improve its administration, system of control and logistics procedures. In June of 1982 the mobile medical teams in Bale, Hararghe, Tigray and Asmara financed by ICRC, were withdrawn.

4.73 In Sudan ICRC activities have been devoted primarily to Eritrean refugees in camps. ICRC operates a tracing service to locate missing persons and thus engineer family reunions and the transmission of family messages. In 1979 a program of medical assistance for paraplegic and hemiplegic victims of the Eritrean conflict was implemented by ICRC at the Port Sudan Rehabilitation Centre, which was completed in 1980.

4.74 ICRC has forwarded relief supplies to ERA and the Eritrean Red Cross and Crescent Society (ERCCS) for Ethiopian prisoners and has also provided drugs and medical services to victims of the conflict in Eritrea and Tigray, food, tents, and blankets and clothing to the displaced civilian population within Eritrea, through local relief organizations.⁴⁰

League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS)

4.75 The LRCS targets its assistance to victims of natural disasters, drought victims and refugees in Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan. LRCS provided food and medical care to Ethiopian refugees and drought victims but this was, however, discontinued in March 1982.

4.76 Food and medical assistance was also distributed to the drought and famine affected regions of Ethiopia's southern provinces - Sidamo, Bale and Gamo Gofa. This large League relief program was phased out in July 1981. The League has concentrated its efforts on a development program for the Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS) as well as assisting the ERCS relief activities by distributing food in provinces most affected by drought.

4.77 Between December 1981 and April 1982 the LRCS supported the ERCS current relief program of food distributions. Food supplied is being exchanged into locally produced food called faffa and distributed by ERCS to Sidamo, Bale, Gamo Gofa and Wollo.

4.78 Development programs are also being implemented in Ethiopia. The ERCS was proposing areas of participation for the League in its nationwide primary health care program and is in the process of developing and implementing specific projects and service programs.⁴¹

4.79 During 1981, the League was active in Somalia in co-operation with the Somali Red Crescent Society and other international relief organizations in refugee relief operations. The League provided food and health care in transit and permanent refugee camps as well as monitoring and logistics activities and other miscellaneous projects. The monitoring and logistics tasks were subsequently taken over by CARE in the latter half of 1981.

4.80 In 1982 the League took over responsibility for health, welfare and agricultural programs in the camps of Maganey and Dorianley in the southern Gedo region. Health teams have been provided by two national societies for at least a year, and are responsible for establishing preventive health measures in the camps and for training refugees as basic community health workers and midwives. They also include social workers to set up programs such as cloth and sandal-making and basic handicrafts with the aim of training the refugees in vocational and income-generating activities. The agricultural team, also assigned for a year, complements the health work by teaching the refugees simple agricultural techniques and enabling them to grow certain basic vegetables to supplement their diet.⁴²

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CHAPTER 5

SOME PROBLEMS WITH AID

5.1 During the course of the inquiry, a number of issues emerged with respect to aid. These issues relate to allegations received by the Sub-Committee that food aid is misused or misappropriated by the Ethiopian Government, that some of the current programs undertaken by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) are politically motivated and that relief assistance extended is often inappropriate to the needs of recipients. In view of such allegations, monitoring practices by Australian and other organizations in the Horn have been investigated. The danger of providing relief assistance without promoting effective developmental self-sufficiency or self-help programs as evidenced in Sudanese refugee camps has also been raised as an issue.

MISUSE AND MISAPPROPRIATION OF AID

5.2 Evidence was received by the Sub-Committee, in camera, which claimed that some humanitarian aid in the form of medical supplies was being diverted for use in the Ethiopian army. More specifically it was stated that 15 to 20 per cent of medical supplies are syphoned off.¹ The balance, however, is distributed to a large number of settlements. Allegations made in written and oral evidence received by the Sub-Committee and in successive international media reports concern the alleged misuse of humanitarian food aid by the Ethiopian Government. The allegations include claims that food aid is being diverted by the Ethiopian military regime to support its army and to finance

its arms bills and debts to the Soviet Union, estimated at \$US2 billion.² Reports of Australian food aid being sold on the black market have also been alleged.

5.3 Evidence to support the allegation that food aid is being used to support or feed the Ethiopian army is difficult to authenticate. The recurring evidence is that Ethiopian army supplies bearing EEC aid markings have been found and photographs have been published in the media. The most commonly cited source is that of Lord Avebury who addressed the House of Lords after a visit to the Horn of Africa region in early 1982 in which he stated in reference to aid:

It does not seem to be appreciated that this aid does not help to relieve the sufferings of poor peasants but it does help to nourish and sustain the Ethiopian war effort, sometimes even directly, by going straight to the troops in the front line. I have with me photographs taken by a distinguished Swedish journalist, Mr Goran Assbring whom I met in Eritrea, taken on the battlefield in 1980, showing the gifts of the EEC, and UNICEF which have come into the hands of military forces of Ethiopia and have been used to feed their own troops.³

5.4 Other independent claims reported in the press have been made in relation to aid packages found in army camps. For example Jon Bennett, a Durham University researcher who has recently written a report on the drought in Tigray province, found stockpiles of vegetable oil and flour labelled 'Gift of EEC' and 'World Food Program' in an army camp in the town of Ardit, after it was overrun and captured by guerrillas.⁴

5.5 James Firebrace of the Charity War on Want, has reported to the European Parliament the discovery of 5000 tins of butter-oil labelled 'Gift of the EEC to Ethiopia' in another army garrison at the village of Mai Tsabri, also overrun by Tigray guerrillas.⁵

5.6 The Eritrean Relief Association in its submission reported other independent sightings:

In Eritrea, there have been independent reports of the use of donated goods (milk powder and flour) for humanitarian use, captured in battlefields clearly marked 'Gift of EEC, Action of the International Committee of the Red Cross'.⁶

5.7 Various propositions have been made refuting such evidence including:

- That the Liberation groups operating in the regions where sightings have been made have stacked overrun camps with their own food supplies in an effort to undermine the credibility of the Ethiopian Government.
- That army lorries are often called into service guiding food supplies for militarily insecure areas or to inaccessible areas of Ethiopia. If captured, such supplies can then be shown as evidence of misappropriation by the army.⁷

5.8 A representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs gave evidence in support of this proposition:

May I simply comment on this particular problem because I was based in Nairobi and made a number of visits to Ethiopia during which time I attempted to monitor Australia's aid to Ethiopia. In the first place there have been allegations about food that has turned up or supposed to have turned up in army camps. In many parts of the countryside it is very difficult for the relief commission to distribute aid itself. It has to rely on the army to do that simply because of the security situation. Indeed this was pointed out to Mr Dobie on his recent visit to New York, by the former chief of the

Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, Ato Shimelis, when Mr Dobie asked him why supplies of aid had turned up in military camps.⁸

5.9 It has also been explained that bags bearing EEC markings used to carry food supplies are valuable in themselves. These bags are scarce and are therefore recycled.

5.10 Relief workers in the Tigray province of Ethiopia support this proposition. The Economist of 30 April 1983 reported:

The voluntary relief organisations deny the misuse of aid. Some of it may not be reaching its intended destination but much of it certainly is. They point to the confusion that can arise in a country where every food container or grain sack is used again and again. The marks on the container or sack are not necessarily an accurate guide to where the stuff inside came from.

5.11 This was later confirmed in evidence given to the Sub-Committee from representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

I would like to say that food aid containers are used many times over in Ethiopia. You see these containers on sale in markets and being used for carrying water and storing all kinds of foodstuffs. So that the container itself does not indicate that its contents are grant aid from Australia ...⁹

5.12 A report from the EEC, whose Addis Ababa delegation recently investigated such allegations, suggests detailed consideration should be given before any definitive judgement on the matter is made. The report states:

It has been reported that some tins of butteroil have been found in army camps in Tigray, when it was overrun by

anti-Government forces. Any definitive judgement on the matter must consider the following points:-

- . distribution of food aid has always taken place in areas suffering from drought and food shortages as well as armed conflicts;
- . the danger of food aid items falling into the hands of anti-Government groups has always been present. To restrict food aid to areas not threatened by anti-Government forces would be unacceptable for humanitarian reasons;
- . RRC operates a large number of stores and distribution centres in the province;
- . the amounts are always relatively modest.¹⁰

5.13 Reports that food aid is being sold on the black market at Mogadishu in order to finance the army have been made. Arguments explaining such claims are that the aid given is inappropriate, which causes a need to sell the goods in the market place to purchase more appropriate food.

5.14 In information received by the Sub-Committee it has been acknowledged that this is a normal and accepted procedure as regards wheat donations, involving donors such as the EEC and World Food Program. The EEC has asserted that exchanging wheat for locally grown cereals is advantageous to all parties. For example, high protein wheat is turned into flour for which it is far more suitable than locally grown wheat. Furthermore, recipients are able to receive locally grown cereals of familiar types.¹¹

5.15 A report alleging that foreign aid is used to finance Soviet arms bills was published in The Sunday Times, 27 March 1983, when an unnamed Ethiopian official awaiting asylum in England stated that:

Grain shipped by EEC countries to the Red Sea port of Assab is regularly relabelled and loaded on to Soviet vessels bound for Russian ports.

5.16 Information received by the EEC Delegation which recently carried out investigations in view of such allegations has concluded that allegations of re-exportation of wheat consignments are unfounded and states:

Persons familiar with the ports of Massawa, Assab and Djibouti claim that such an operation is practically impossible without becoming almost immediately publicly known. Discharge of say 26 000 MT of wheat, inclusive of bagging, takes between three and four weeks. Re-bagging and loading would take equally long. This can simply not take place in such small ports without being noticed by several foreign (Western) employees at the ports, surveyors and visitors. The military does not control the ports as is incorrectly mentioned in some news reports.¹²

5.17 The official mentioned above also accused the Ethiopian Government of exporting Ethiopian grain and locally milled flour to the Soviet Union in an effort to finance its present arms bill:

It is vitally important that the European governments who give aid - especially now - realise what is happening to it ... only the tiniest proportion of the aid reaches those who need it.¹³

5.18 Numerous investigatory teams representing multilateral organizations and government donors visited the Horn following these allegations. The consensus was that most food aid was directed to areas of need.

5.19 The EEC Report on food operations in Ethiopia summarized its findings as follows:

1. The Delegation is satisfied that all Community Food Aid has been discharged in port and transported inland for distribution. Allegations that food aid has been re-exported to third countries are unfounded.
2. So far, no conclusive evidence has been produced to show that food aid has been systematically diverted to the armed forces. Aid can be traced from the port of discharge to its final distribution. In the event that improper use of food aid has been made, we believe that it can only have been in very limited quantities, which would not justify any drastic reaction.
3. The procedures for acceptance, transport, storage and distribution of food aid are adequate and include a number of checks and cross-checks which make improper use rather difficult.
4. The allegation that only part of the aid reaches the intended beneficiaries must also be considered highly unlikely as this is contrary to the experience of the Delegation and to that of all other relief organisations operating in Ethiopia. It might partly be due, moreover, to misunderstandings with regard to the swap arrangement between food aid grain and locally produced grain.¹⁴

5.20 The Department of Foreign Affairs has supported these findings. ADAB reported to the Sub-Committee that:

On the question of corruption, ADAB has no evidence of any corruption or misuse of food aid. The recent claims of Ethiopian food aid provided by European donors being directed to the USSR have been refuted by the Ethiopian Government and they have been refuted after inspection visits by European donors and by the World Food Program.¹⁵

5.21 The Committee is of the opinion that, although there may have been examples of some misuse of humanitarian relief aid in Ethiopia in the past, there is not significant evidence of

misuse or misappropriation at present. Such charges as have been made do not justify the cessation of humanitarian aid to Ethiopia. The Committee is satisfied that investigations made by the EEC and other bodies justify this conclusion.

AID NOT REACHING THOSE IN NEED

5.22 The Sub-Committee also received evidence that aid is being misused indirectly. Firstly by the Government's inability to distribute aid to those in need due to 'war-zones' in Ethiopia or guerilla controlled areas. Secondly, that aid contributed to the Government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission is used in programs which are politically motivated.

5.23 The Sub-Committee received reports from the Eritrean Relief Committee concerning the inadequate distribution of aid in areas not under the control of the Ethiopian Government.

5.24 The northern provinces of Ethiopia: Eritrea, Tigray, Gondar and Wollo, have been the most severely affected by drought in Ethiopia in recent years. In Tigray and Eritrea substantial areas are not under Ethiopian control but guerilla control.¹⁶

It should be noted that of the nine provinces named in the Ethiopian Government's January 1980 appeal for famine relief, 7 were war zones.¹⁷

5.25 The inference drawn is that the Ethiopian Government cannot distribute aid effectively in these war zone areas.

5.26 Some relief agencies working in the area have denied reports that aid is misused but do claim that there is suffering in areas that are not accessible to them.

5.27 An official of the RRC, responsible for Gondar province, has been reported as admitting that emergency food aid will reach only 60 to 70 per cent of those in need:

We don't have the trucks and we can only supply those who come to the relief stations. Those people have to travel two to four days on foot and the weak cannot make it.¹⁸

5.28 Mark Bowden, from Save the Children Fund, reported the geographical inaccessibility of many of the drought affected regions:

What is more the drought affected areas are often the least accessible to medical relief ... They are usually high plateaux up to 12 000 feet above sea level, "a breeding ground for pneumonia, bronchitis and lice bred typhus".¹⁹

Logistical problems and geographical inaccessibility to such regions therefore exacerbate the difficulties in distributing aid effectively.

5.29 Non-government aid agency opinion on relief operations is regarded as of great value and in information received by the Sub-Committee it was maintained by the EEC that:

... almost all the representatives of the many NGOs which are working on the field have repeatedly stated that in their daily work they had ample proof of the correct functioning of the relief system. As these people are the closest to the field distribution operations, their opinion is of the greatest value and is not to be overlooked.²⁰

5.30 Persuasive evidence was received by the Sub-Committee, however, concerning the lack of international assistance to Eritrea. There are presently a large number of displaced persons in the area due to the war despite a vast number of refugees

leaving or fleeing into Sudan. The Eritrean Relief Committee claimed that there are approximately two million displaced persons within Eritrea and another two million within Ethiopia.²¹

5.31 Dr Mike Toole, in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Bill Hayden, MP, of 20 September 1983, illustrated the need for assistance in view of nutritional surveys he recently conducted within Eritrea. Dr Toole claimed that between 35 and 45% of children (200 000) under five were moderately or severely malnourished. Dr Toole stated that these figures are extremely high and compared adversely with figures released by OXFAM for affected populations inside Ethiopia. Although children were most severely at risk, vast numbers of persons were generally affected by the drought and resulting famine.

5.32 Eritrea also hosts an estimated 3500 prisoners of war whom the Ethiopian Government does not acknowledge and there has been no agreement between the ICRC and the Ethiopian Government for their repatriation. Although a large number have been set free they have not returned to Ethiopia and are looked after by the EPLF. The problem has not been resolved and in evidence the Sub-Committee was told that food aid from ICRC has been cut, which has exacerbated the food shortage problem.

5.33 The fact that little assistance and relief aid gets through to Eritrea is due mainly to the fact that donor governments are willing to deal directly with the EPLF or the ERA. Yet many NGOs regard the ERA as a satisfactory vehicle for getting aid through to those in great need in Eritrea. Direct international bilateral assistance to Eritrea has been meagre. Kuwait is reportedly the only government which has contributed directly.²²

5.34 The major international organization operating in the area is the indigenous Eritrean Relief Association, which is closely linked with the EPLF, and relies on contributions made through its committees located worldwide. (See Chapter 4 for a more detailed account of ERA's operations) All direct aid to the Eritrean Relief Association must be channelled through Sudan:

All supplies for Eritrea have to pass through Sudan and the Eritreans are dependent on the goodwill of the Sudanese authorities. The latter, especially now when they feel so threatened by the Aden Pact between Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen are apt to blow hot and cold at times and have even closed the border between Sudan and Eritrea to medical supplies on one occasion. However, they are normally co-operative about relief supplies.²³

5.35 In evidence received by the Sub-Committee it has been verified that the border is presently open:

As it stands now the border is open; and there is a good relationship between the Eritrean and the Sudanese people. Had it not been for the Sudanese people a lot of the materials sent from Australia, from humanitarian organisations in Australia, would not have gone through.²⁴

5.36 In evidence received by the Sub-Committee, the ERA's structure and operations have been praised in terms of its ability to receive and distribute aid within Eritrea which is facilitated by its association with the EPLF. Furthermore its health care system was referred to as 'far more efficient than those in many independent countries' by Dr Mike Toole, an Australian doctor who had visited the region.²⁵ In addition to the present health care services, the ERA recently commenced a primary health care program, the type of program which usually receives support through United Nations organizations, such as UNICEF, in independent countries. Technical assistance by UN organizations is necessary for such a program in areas such as

immunization, but is not forthcoming. Dr. Mike Toole has recommended that Australia support such a program or that Australia lobby for United Nations support of one.

5.37 In evidence to the Sub-Committee Dr Toole stated that requests for food aid made by ERA to donors is consistent with the need within Eritrea and that Australian aid to Eritrea would be best limited to the basic needs areas such as relief assistance, food and health care. Dr Toole reiterated the difficulties in distributing aid to Eritrea through Ethiopian organizations and verified the effectiveness of channelling aid in the form of relief assistance through NGOs such as the ERA.

5.38 In view of the difficulties the Ethiopian Government has in distributing aid to war zones such as Eritrea, the Committee is of the opinion that Australian aid channelled through Sudan to the Eritrean Relief Association is an effective way of ensuring that aid reaches those in pressing need in Eritrea. Such aid can be channelled through NGOs based in Australia which have a close association with the Australian Eritrean Relief Committee.

5.39 The Committee recommends that the Australian Government should, in consultation with other sympathetic nations, determine the best method of providing food and medical aid to Eritreans and Eritrean refugees through sources other than the Ethiopian Government where aid channelled through the Ethiopian Government cannot be provided to those in great need.

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION PROGRAMS IN ETHIOPIA

5.40 The third set of allegations relates to the present programs the Ethiopian Government is implementing through the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC). The RRC is presently implementing a 'Refugee Returnee Program' for refugees who have returned to Ethiopia from Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti. The

Commission is also implementing a program designed to resettle the victims of drought to less drought affected areas: from the northern provinces of Ethiopia to the southern and western provinces. LRCS and UNHCR are the major international organizations assisting the RRC in co-ordinating the 'returnee' program²⁶. (See also relevant paragraph of Chapter 3 - 'International assistance to the region' and Chapter 4 - 'Australian relief aid and development assistance to the Horn of Africa')

5.41 It was asserted in submissions and in evidence that aid should not be given arbitrarily in response to Ethiopian Government requests for assistance to such programs.

Returnee programs

5.42 It has been claimed that Ethiopia's recent appeals for assistance to finance a \$US 20 million program for refugee resettlement is not justified because hardly any refugees are returning to Ethiopia. It has been acknowledged that there are a great many in need of assistance in Ethiopia but aid generated under the false premise that refugees are returning results in a misplaced provision of aid through such programs.

5.43 The Sub-Committee received evidence to support these claims through the conflicting figures supplied about the number of returning refugees. The Ethiopian Government claims that a greater number have returned from the refugee camps in Sudan, Somalia and Djibouti, than do organizations working in the refugee camps or visiting the resettlement sites. The source said to discredit Ethiopia's estimates of refugees returning to Ethiopia from Sudan is a memorandum to the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the Sudanese Office of the Commission for Refugees:

The number of refugees Ethiopia claims to have returned from the Sudan is 150 000. This figure has been strongly contested by the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees of the Sudanese Government in a memorandum (dated 7 December 1981) to the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In 1980 Ethiopia presented the matter (the return of refugees) to the Economic & Social Council of the United Nations for the first time. It claimed that a large number of refugees had returned from the Sudan. However, the number of refugee returnees from the Sudan was only 300. This figure is confirmed by records of both the UNHCR in Khartoum and the Ethiopian Embassy in Khartoum. As the size of the returnees claimed by Ethiopia is huge (150 000) calling for massive preparation in terms of transportation and setting up of temporary settlement camps, the UNHCR office in the Sudan and a refugee committee made up of representatives of the two countries (Ethiopia and Sudan) should have known about the matter. But this was not the case.²⁷

5.44 With specific reference to refugees returning to Eritrea, Lord Avebury also cites the preceding source and highlights the difficulty in establishing such programs in war zone areas.

Although the Ethiopian Government has claimed that 70 000 Eritreans have returned to Eritrea and the UNHCR in Geneva and other agencies are funding rehabilitation programs for returnees there, the UNHCR in Sudan have categorically said that only 383 people have ever returned. There does not seem to be any prospect of their returning until there is a peaceful solution to the Eritrean question.²⁸

5.45 Lord Avebury also points to refugees originating from Tigray, another 'war zone', and estimates about 90 000 Tigreans have fled to refugee camps with little chance of returning until the situation improves in Tigray.

5.46 Recent information received by the Sub-Committee from the UNHCR detailed the program referred to by Lord Avebury. UNHCR assistance to Eritrea and the Hararghe regions is in the form of basic relief and material assistance to between 110 000 and 126 000 refugees who have returned to the regions. The UNHCR reports that a fact finding mission was conducted in February 1982 to areas where UNHCR was providing assistance. Their findings were that significant numbers of persons have returned from neighbouring countries to Ethiopia. Nevertheless, it was difficult to differentiate between returnees and internally displaced persons.²⁹

5.47 The Australian Council of Churches referred to a report written following a visit made to the Eritrean project site by the LRCS:

The Aliguidir Agricultural Settlement in Eritrea is situated on a 7000 hectare broad plane, one irrigated by Italian settlers by means of a 17km water canal from the Gash River and a 10 million litre artificial reservoir. The report states "the workers apparently all returnees from the Sudan, live in ten residential blocks at present". ... This program is clearly in occupied Eritrea and it is also clear that the team did not meet any returnees.³⁰

5.48 The Committee is not in a position to form an authoritative view on allegations made in evidence concerning the provision of humanitarian aid to the Ethiopian Government's present refugee returnee programs. Conflicting figures were reported including those from the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNHCR and the Ethiopian Government concerning the numbers of refugees who have returned to Ethiopia. Although a number of resettlement project sites are located in war zone areas, the actual composition of these resettlement camps (as to whether the people were returned refugees or resettled Ethiopians) was not able to be ascertained from the evidence.

The Committee is of the view that on the evidence available, humanitarian aid for such programs is directed to people in need of assistance and that humanitarian aid to Ethiopia should not be discontinued on the grounds that the Ethiopian Government has misled aid donors as to the purpose of the programs.

Resettling of drought victims

5.49 It was claimed in both submissions and in evidence presented to the Sub-Committee that the present Relief and Rehabilitation Resettlement program for drought victims is politically motivated and that aid contributed to these programs helps not so much the resettlement of refugees, but allows the Ethiopians to forcibly resettle various ethnic groups away from their native areas. The Amharic ethnic group, from which the Ethiopian Government largely derives, are alleged to be placed in the 'conflict regions' occupied by Oromo, and in Tigray and the Ogaden, replacing those national groups. Dispersal of opposition to the Government is another alleged reason for the resettlement program.

5.50 The Eritrean Relief Committee, in a written submission claimed that as well as 'uprooting' indigenous groups, those who are resettled are given army training near Addis Ababa and are armed when they resettle. The Eritrean Relief Committee claimed that groups in the northern regions are being resettled. Further claims heard by the Sub-Committee from witnesses working as relief workers in the Ogaden are that ethnic groups other than the Ogaden Somalis are settled in the Ogaden with similar motives.

5.51 Such claims are difficult to authenticate. Witnesses heard by the Sub-Committee have recounted stories told to them by refugees. The following passage extracted from evidence recounts the way in which the Ethiopian Government is alleged to be operating its resettlement program of non-Somali people in the Ogaden:

According to the stories which I get from people and which are not usually written evidence one of the examples they used was that around Harar and Jigjiga area, which was a relatively rich farming area before and in which there were opportunities, they brought people from the Ethiopian highlands, mainly from the Amharic ethnic group, as a co-operative. They brought them and gave them land and fed them as a community. They work them in a "kibbutz-like" working system. It is a sort of a government - only a co-operative. They allow in a few local people if they fulfil certain conditions ... They know what it would be if they have all Somalis out. To the international community they are not saying that they want to displace them. They just say: "We have these poor people in the Ethiopian highlands and we are settling them on this land, with the natives, or even without natives in an empty land, as a co-operative". It sounds beautiful and it produces more food. That is my own personal feeling about the idea - and I believe it is just displacement. It is more so in towns. It includes even buildings. People have not been able to use their houses. Their houses were given to one co-operative or to the Ethiopian army to settle in. This is a very common practice. In the towns of Harar and Jigjiga people will tell you of thousands of incidents. You are told one morning that your house has been given to a co-operative for farming people brought in and you move out - if not, you are killed.³¹

5.52 Similar stories were recounted to a relief worker in Sudan by a refugee from Oromo regions.³²

5.53 Lord Avebury estimated that a number of refugees in Sudan have been forced to flee from the southern regions of Ethiopia because of resettlement programs instigated by the Ethiopian Government:

There are over 10 000 refugees from Wollega and other provinces in the South in Sudan's Blue and Upper Nile provinces. These include

local people who were driven out since 1979 by the Ethiopian Government, which took their lands for resettlement projects in the south.³³

5.54 As with the evidence presented in support of allegations relating to the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission's current refugee returnee programs, the Committee cannot substantiate allegations that large numbers of people are being dispossessed by the drought resettlement program which, it is alleged, allows the Ethiopian Government to resettle forcibly various ethnic groups away from their native areas. The Committee is of the opinion that aid for such projects should not be discontinued on the basis of the allegations made to the Sub-Committee.

SOMALIA

5.55 During the course of the inquiry the Sub-Committee's attention was drawn to the refugee program in Somalia which in its initial stages received adverse publicity. Allegations had been made regarding the misuse or diversion of food aid and the inability to distribute aid effectively. In 1977-78 Somalia was not adequately equipped to cope with the large refugee influxes, Somalia itself already having been burdened by drought. In 1981 CARE, an American logistics contractor, was employed to carry out the management of the transport and logistics sector in distributing food and other relief items and the Sub-Committee received evidence that an efficient and effective food system now operates and the Committee is satisfied with the management of relief operations currently carried out in Somalia.

5.56 Although there have been allegations in the past concerning the maldistribution and mismanagement of food aid in Somalia, the situation now appears to be satisfactory due to the supervising role undertaken by CARE.

5.57 During the course of the inquiry, conflicting figures were received on Somalia's refugee population and questions arose regarding the basis for Somalia's requests for assistance. Somalia has estimated that its current refugee population in camps totals 700 000. This figure has been disputed, and in evidence presented to the Sub-Committee it was stated that this figure was slightly inflated and a more realistic figure would be 500 000. Dr Mike Toole, who has recently worked in Somalia, said in evidence before the Sub-Committee that it was not unreasonable to request assistance for 700 000 refugees in view of the large numbers of refugees living in the towns. He pointed to the town of Hargeisa in northern Somalia whose population has doubled since 1980 through refugee influxes which comprise 'almost the entire manual labour force in Hargeisa'.³⁴

5.58 Furthermore, a cut in food aid to refugees in 1983 has had adverse effects. Major donors of food aid to Somalia, such as the EEC and USAID, halved the amount of food provided to refugees in 1983, according to Dr Toole. This has resulted in an increase in the malnutrition rate according to surveys conducted by the Refugee Health Unit. Nutritional surveys carried out in 1981 revealed a malnutrition rate of eighteen per cent which gradually decreased over the next two years to five per cent. Surveys conducted in 1983 reflect an increase in malnutrition rates to the level of fifteen to seventeen per cent, approaching the levels experienced in 1981.

5.59 Recent cuts in food aid to Somalia by international donors have resulted in an increased malnutrition rate, something which indicates that Somalia's stated need for food aid is not exaggerated, as claimed by some western sources from time to time. Any decisions contemplated to modify Australia's food aid program to refugees in Somalia should be considered in the context of the recent rise in malnutrition rates.³⁵

MONITORING OF RELIEF AID

5.60 In view of the allegations relating to the misuse of aid and the questions raised with respect to the current practices of the RRC an appraisal of the current monitoring practices the Australian Government implements is necessary.

5.61 Food aid monitoring practices were being implemented efficiently in Ethiopia according to an appraisal in a report supplied by the EEC Delegation in Canberra. The Report states:

Criteria for monitoring procedures for food aid supplies are similar to the ones which apply to all other forms of Community activity ... Intervention takes place through the appropriate Government organisations and their administrative systems are utilized if found satisfactory. Very few countries have internal control mechanisms as detailed and as complex as those in Ethiopia. For example, any expenditure or release from store must be approved and signed by two to three people. Internal audits are made regularly.³⁶

Current monitoring practices: ADAB

5.62 ADAB provided the Sub-Committee with the following analysis of current monitoring practices in answer to questions relating to misuse of aid:

Project Aid: ADAB is not aware of corruption or misdirection in the use of project aid funds. Most project aid is provided in the form of technical assistance and/or equipment from Australia the costs of which are met directly from the aid vote by the Bureau as foreign exchange inputs. Monitoring of projects is a continuing process involving consultation between Branches of the Bureau and often with other departments. It also requires consultation between the Posts and the local implementing authority, overseas project staff as well as "in country" representatives of other donors. It is

reinforced by Bureau initiated investigative missions from Australia. Whilst more monitoring could be undertaken, further effort is dependent upon the availability of additional resources.

Food Aid: ADAB has no evidence of any corruption or misuse of food aid. The recent claims of Ethiopian food aid provided by European donors being directed to the USSR have been refuted by the Ethiopian Government and, after inspection visits, by the European donors. Our own 1981/82 food aid program to Ethiopia was supervised by UNHCR and the Red Cross. An effort is made to monitor and evaluate the use of food aid through officers at Australian Posts in or accredited to particular aid recipient countries, through monitoring and evaluation visits by Canberra based officers and through international organisations (such as the World Food Program) and NGOs involved in the distribution of our food aid.

It should be pointed out, however, that in some cases it is only possible to undertake sample checks of food aid delivery and distribution. With our Post in Nairobi responsible for monitoring food aid in Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, it is obvious that detailed on the ground supervision cannot be undertaken. As a result we have appointed agents to monitor food aid programs in most African countries. For example, in the Horn of Africa in the 1982/83 financial year our program in the Sudan will be supervised by the World Food Program, in Somalia by the UNHCR who have in turn appointed CARE (an American NGO) to supervise distribution and in Ethiopia partly by the World Food Program and partly by World Vision (an Australian NGO) ...

NGO Activities: Annual reviews are carried out of elements of the NGO program. These are supplemented by reporting from the individual organisations, mission reports and reports from international organisations. These reports indicate that the aid is being properly directed.

Multilateral Support: Multilateral agencies report to donors on the particular activities they have supported. In addition Bureau and mission staff have occasionally inspected their activities to the limit of resources available.³⁷

5.63 The procedure followed by representatives based in Nairobi to ensure that food aid is properly distributed by the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in Ethiopia appears on the surface to be an efficient procedure. The Committee was told by a representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs:

I might also outline as Mr Hodge did, but adding a couple more points, the way in which the post monitors the aid that goes to Ethiopia. In the first place we have fairly extensive discussions with the relief commission and we require a report from it as to where the aid is going to go and, when it has gone, where it has gone to. We also talk to the United Nations agencies which are in the field up there and have a number of staff scattered around the countryside, to ask them what has happened not only to our aid but also to the aid that other countries provide to Ethiopia. We make field visits which are really quite extensive. I went to quite a large part of Ethiopia over the two years that I was posted there. We have discussions with other major donors to ascertain whether they have had any problems with their aid to Ethiopia because that will give us some indication as to whether we are likely to have any, and with NGOs.³⁸

5.64 Scepticism is aroused, however, in reports received by the Sub-Committee from non-government agencies with Australian affiliations working in the area. These maintained that more efficient methods of monitoring could be carried out with respect to food aid.

5.65 Doubts were raised in evidence concerning the World Food Program's capacity to successfully monitor food distribution in Ethiopia. It was maintained that the World Food

Program, on which Australia relies for monitoring food aid is ill-equipped with the necessary skills or facilities to efficiently carry out this function.³⁹ It has been suggested that additional resources should be offered, by donor countries, to assist in facilitating efficient monitoring.

5.66 Doubts raised, however, seem inconsistent with recent reports received from the EEC which reflect confidence in present monitoring procedures from one of Ethiopia's largest food aid donors.

5.67 It would appear that the Australian Government relies heavily on international agencies to monitor aid and aid programs in the region. With respect to Ethiopia and the distribution of food aid, it is encouraging to see that the Department of Foreign Affairs has taken the initiative of appointing the World Food Program and an Australian NGO, World Vision, to undertake monitoring activities. However, there is a lack of Australian 'on the spot' scrutiny especially in Ethiopia. It was stated by ADAB in evidence that the reason is the limited resources available in terms of staffing at Nairobi and because of the resultant difficulties in carrying out detailed monitoring activities. Despite Australia's limited monitoring resources, a recent report from the EEC expressed confidence in present monitoring procedures from one of Ethiopia's largest food aid donors and the Committee was told by the Department of Foreign Affairs⁴⁰ that monitoring through the World Food Program has been satisfactory.

INAPPROPRIATE AID

5.68 The Sub-Committee received evidence that international aid sent to the region has been inappropriate in meeting the needs of recipients in providing relief. Dr Ali Osman Nur, a doctor with the Somali Ministry of Health recounted such instances in his experience in refugee camps in the early stages of their establishment. For example, cooking oil was provided but there was no food to cook and grain was supplied without amalgamate facilities to make it palatable, such as grinding machines. Furthermore, a majority of refugees in need in the camps were children, and aid in a form appropriate to their needs, such as milk powder, did not start arriving until 1981.

5.69 Dr Ali later indicated to the Sub-Committee that the food aid that should be provided to alleviate the apparent deficiency of protein and vitamin C was more powdered milk and vitamin C tablets as well as more equipment or facilities to process food such as grinding equipment for grain and corn.

5.70 Examples were cited by Ms Val Browning, of aid sent to Eritrean prisoners by the International Red Cross in the form of toothpaste and chocolate.⁴¹

5.71 Val Browning also cited examples of inappropriate and inefficient medical supplies supplied for refugees in Sudan:

I would ask the German organization I was working for for one medication in the camp and they would send me another and tell me to use it. For example, I asked for penicillin and they would say: "We haven't any penicillin in Germany; it is too expensive; use aspirin". I would say "One is an antibiotic and one is a pain killer. What am I supposed to do?" They would say: "Kill the pain; it does not matter".⁴²

5.72 In describing the problem of inappropriate food aid, it is necessary to refer to the cultural preferences and eating habits of food aid recipients. In Somalia, a majority of the 'displaced' persons and refugees are nomadic in lifestyle. The type of food nomadic people eat and the type of food that is consumed by urban dwellers is different. Maize and sorghum are nomads' staple foods, which are simple to cook and familiar to them. Food aid such as flour, cooking oil, etc. has to be exchanged for more appropriate foodstuffs in the marketplace. In Ethiopia EEC food aid in the form of grain has been exchanged for locally grown cereals. The recent report received from the EEC Delegation to Ethiopia on Food Aid Operations detailed the procedure followed:

When RRC receives the shipping documents it completes the customs documents and hands all documents over to the Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC). AMC in turn instructs the MTSC where the wheat should be dispatched, which in all cases, is directly to the flour mills.

At the same time the RRC and AMC agree upon the exchange details. It might either be on a bag-for-bag basis (i.e. 1.2 bags of maize for one bag of wheat) or on a monetary basis, if various locally grown cereals are involved. AMC issues a Credit Sales Order to RRC whose Purchase Department is then able to charge subsequent purchases of locally grown grain against the Credit Sales Order.

For the benefit of the donors the system functions in such a way as to allow the donor to identify the quantities and areas where the locally grown cereals have been distributed. The major objective must be that RRC, over a period, receives and distributes at least as much grain as it is entitled to, according to the exchange agreements.

Some NGOs exchange their allocation of food aid for "Faffa", a supplementary food product manufactured locally. This is an ideal product for feeding children, as it contains all the ingredients of a balanced diet.⁴³

5.73 In respect of food aid provided by international donors, it should be noted that often recipients' preferences cannot be accommodated and the accepted practice of exchanging goods in the market place provides a practical and satisfactory solution to the problem. Equipment for processing foods such as grinding machines for grain and more protein and/or vitamin enriched foods were put forward as suggestions in the context of future food aid efforts.

REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOMALIA AND SUDAN

5.74 The ineffectiveness of relief aid without proposals for long-term settlement, or self-sufficiency, or self-help was illustrated in the case of aid directed to refugee camps in Sudan. A distinction is drawn in this context between agricultural self-sufficiency and medical self-help in refugee camps.

5.75 The refugee situation in Sudan is a serious one. The economy itself is unstable with insufficient means to accommodate the influx of refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea since 1967. A substantial amount of aid extended is in the form of relief aid with an almost total lack of self-help initiatives in refugee programs. Because the majority of refugees fleeing from Ethiopia have left because of continuing wars and drought it is foreseen that a great number of the refugees will remain in Sudan, yet long-term settlement programs are not envisaged and nor do the camps have an adequate infrastructure or services in education, training, health or agriculture.

5.76 Some refugees have been in camps for thirteen years relying on emergency food aid. Ms Val Browning illustrated this point in evidence presented to the Sub-Committee based on her experience in the refugee camps:

They were still in a position where they were totally dependent on food hand-outs; they lined up at a tin shed once a month to be handed so much food per family; they were not free to seek employment; they were not free to find farming land; they were not free to carry on their normal lifestyle; their life was still interrupted; they were still treated as a refugee within a refugee camp, having to get even a paper to move from camp to camp. Even if they thought they had heard of a job in such and such a town, to get to that town was impossible because they had to get a pass from the government. The government was very unwilling to allow refugees to travel within the Sudan ... they are most definitely foreigners, most definitely people who have no voice and most definitely people whose actual needs, I am sure, are not well represented within the aid organization let alone world government.⁴⁴

5.77 The kind of situation described reflects a 'relief mentality' amongst refugees. Not only do refugees rely on food hand-outs, but they appear to be 'controlled' to the point of being excluded from any form of decision-making in terms of participating in determining their own welfare.

5.78 Development projects tried have apparently failed. For example, a wage earning settlement for refugees was established in a region called Es Suki. The settlement was surrounded by Sudanese groundnut and cotton farms where refugees could be employed. A self-sufficiency level could not be maintained in Es Suki. As the majority of refugees were women and children not every family had a working member. Seasonal cropping meant that there was only work for three months of the year and wages were below the average weekly wage for the area.

5.79 The refugee problem was sufficiently acute for the Government to decide to convene an international conference in Khartoum in June 1980 on the refugee problem and to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to send an interagency

mission to assess the needs of refugees. The mission saw a pressing need to strengthen infrastructure and services in education, training, health and agriculture:

The serious economic constraints, together with the Government's heavy external debt, make it difficult for the Government to provide normal social services to its own population, much less extend additional services to a large number of refugees. The burden in the eastern province is particularly onerous.

... While UNHCR and WFP have been active in supplementing the Government's efforts to assist the refugees and to seek, to a certain extent, more durable solutions, a substantial portion of the needs of the refugees, especially of those spontaneously settled in rural and urban areas, remains uncovered. There is, therefore, a need for more far-reaching and long-term solutions involving development-oriented programmes.⁴⁵

5.80 A Primary Health Care Program for the indigenous Sudanese community has been implemented by UNICEF to which Australia has contributed, but development programs for the refugee populations have not been as forthcoming. The state of refugee affairs in Somalia provides an example of the more successful management of refugee populations.

5.81 The Somali Refugee Health Unit in co-operation with international relief organizations, UNHCR and CARE have contained the 'food', health and logistical problems in providing relief aid to refugees in Somalia comprising those displaced through drought who have been resettled from the northern regions to the southern region of Somalia, and those 'war' refugees from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. The emergency situation is no longer applicable, with regular food supplies, accessible water, and better health care of the refugees as a result of self-help programs.⁴⁶

5.82 A feature of refugee camps comprising predominantly war refugees from the Ogaden has been the level of self-help attained in areas such as health care. A similar situation is seen in settlement camps for drought victims. However, in view of the stabilized circumstances at present, the UNHCR, in association with the Somali Ministry of Health, is placing emphasis on agricultural and income-generating self-sufficiency projects, whereas the previous emphasis was on health.

5.83 The UNHCR has in the past implemented some agricultural projects without success. High technology equipment in the form of irrigation pumps and irrigation channels were introduced. Somalis employed in these projects were not 'attuned' to the land (most Somali refugees are pastoral nomads) nor did they possess the technical skill and experience necessary.

5.84 UNHCR direction has changed recently and attention has been focussed on small scale cultivation of family plots using technology appropriate to expertise, for example fuel saving devices needing reduced and simple maintenance.

5.85 In comparison to Sudan, Somalia seems to be far more organized in terms of its policies towards the integration of refugees into useful and productive tasks as illustrated by self-help initiatives in refugee camps and agricultural projects, predominantly in those camps comprising drought victims. However, the Sudanese Government is less inclined than Somalia to view refugees as long-term guests. Refugees in Somalia are of similar ethnic background to the host population which allows greater acceptance. In Sudan refugees are of diverse ethnic origin, and within the host community, are considered an economic burden on the country, perpetuating alienation.

5.86 The situation in Sudanese refugee camps especially highlights the dangers of providing relief aid without constructive back-up developmental programs to provide, at least, some form of self-help programs or future self-sufficiency goal in terms of food production. This cannot be done until Government policy in Sudan towards refugee affairs is altered to allow refugees more say in decisions determining their welfare. There is a need for greater participation in the government policy-making processes which could be facilitated through an association with the UNHCR, which in turn could act as an advocate for refugees at a governmental level.

5.87 The Committee notes that although self-help programs for refugees in Somalia are viable and encouraged because there is less pressure on the people to return to their country of origin, the situation in Sudan is more difficult. In Sudan most refugees are hosted by the Government under duress, and it is the Sudanese Government's wish that they return ultimately to their countries of origin. It is therefore not in Sudan's interests to institute long-term programs which will encourage refugees to become permanent settlers. Development programs recommended by the United Nations and relief workers, including self-help projects, infrastructure development and refugee participation in decision-making are therefore not possible in Sudan at present. The Committee recognizes Australian Government support for a Primary Health Care Program undertaken by UNICEF in Sudan which aims to improve health care for the indigenous Sudanese population. With respect to the refugee populations the Committee recognizes the problems but notes the Sudanese Government's present policy on refugee affairs.

5.88 Australia's food aid contributions have increased significantly over the years. It is necessary on humanitarian grounds in view of the recent droughts and continuing refugee problem that relief aid be provided. Relief aid is justified where there is an urgent problem requiring attention, but its

usefulness is only short-term. There is a danger in the long-term provision of food aid only. Once established, unless there is potential or incentive for recipients of aid to produce their own food, aid becomes self-perpetuating and is very difficult to cut off. In addition to the 'relief mentality' that may build up by recipients, relief aid can be very damaging in terms of population growth on a cause-effect basis: increasing food aid causes an increase in population through a reduction in mortality rates creating an even further imbalance in food supplies unless food aid is escalated. Considering Australia's continued increase in food allocations to the Horn, it is necessary to re-evaluate to ensure that such a policy does not exacerbate the long-term food shortage problem.

5.89 In Kenya, Australia has attempted to integrate food aid with increased food production rather than aid acting as a deterrent to production. The Magarini Settlement Scheme has aimed to develop the agricultural potential of semi-arid lands by allocating a small percentage of Australia's gift of wheat to Kenya to produce cash and labour for the infrastructure to support settlement.⁴⁷

CHAPTER 5 - NOTES AND REFERENCES

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7. Andrew Lycett, 'Most relief aid is getting through', New African, June 1983, p. 25.
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24. T. Kahsai, Evidence, 7 June 1983, p. 12.
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31. Dr Ali Osman Nur, Evidence, 6 December 1982, p. 66.
32. Val Browning, Evidence, 6 December 1982, p. 92.
33. Lord Avebury, Submission No. 30, p. 3.
34. Evidence, 5 September 1983, p. 126.
35. Dr Mike Toole, Evidence, 5 September 1983, p. 119.
36. EEC, Community Food Aid Operation in Ethiopia, April 1983, p. 5.
37. Submissions and Incorporated Documents, 7 June 1983, p. 3.
38. Evidence, 7 June 1983, p. 70.
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40. Evidence, p. 56, 1982.
41. Evidence, 6 December 1982, p. 72.
42. Evidence, 6 December 1982, p. 76.
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46. Peter Collins Holdings Pty Ltd, Submission No. 34, p. 6.
47. Confidential Submission.

CHAPTER 6

PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY ON THE HORN

6.1 Submissions received by the Sub-Committee have provided some constructive proposals and prospects for Australian participation in developmental aid projects in both Somalia and in the region generally. Principally, Australia's experience in arid dry-land farming techniques would be valuable in establishing feasible small-scale agricultural development. Somalia's extensive coastline presents a valuable fishing industry resource that has not been fully exploited.

SUDAN

6.2 In submissions received from agricultural consultants who are familiar with the agricultural potential of Sudan, it was maintained that Australia can participate in worthwhile development assistance projects. A majority of Sudanese people possess basic agricultural experience and only require assistance in the implementation of projects.¹ Furthermore, the Sudanese are receptive to outside assistance. Parts of Sudan could be developed using Australian arid weather experience.

6.3 It was suggested in a submission that Sudan could benefit from Australian agricultural and developmental expertise as follows:

... in the diversion or laying out of irrigation systems, the technology used in dry-land farming in small consolidated groups, assistance in the eradication of diseases in livestock, the supply of drilling

equipment for water bores, windmills, etc which have been used for many tens of years in Australia.²

6.4 Small, basic projects using Australian practical experience has been advised. For example, the supply and installation of windmills and concrete tanks, medium range (cost) machinery for the tilling of land and the provision of seed stocks for growing crops.

SOMALIA AND ETHIOPIA

Agriculture

6.5 Aid to Somalia has been given primarily to refugees although Australia has been instrumental in co-ordinating a Primary Health Care Program in the Sanaag to encompass the local community.

6.6 Southern Somalia is the wealthiest in terms of agricultural potential due to the presence of the only two permanent rivers. The pastoral plains present in the north provide feed for the camels, goats and sheep herded by pastoral nomads. Demand for agricultural produce is low in the north due to the dietary preferences of the inhabitants. The main diet in the north comprises meat, rice and milk with very little vegetable content excepting maize.³

6.7 A number of factors have perpetuated the lack of assistance to the north: poor communication as roads are underdeveloped consisting of truck tracks only; the overall isolation of the north geographically; and the lack of communication in any substantial form. The lack of demand for agricultural products has led to the majority of food aid being deposited at Mogadishu for distribution to the southern regions

only. It has been suggested that the resulting neglect of the north could be overcome by 'earmarking' aid contributions for particular areas.

6.8 Australian and international aid could make a valuable contribution by helping to upgrade roads throughout the region thus alleviating the difficult access to those people in need in isolated areas. Attention was drawn to both Somalia and Ethiopia. The isolation of northern Somalia, in particular, is often exacerbated in the wet season. Assistance in the development of roads in the northwest close to Ethiopia's borders could provoke charges by Ethiopia that roads are being constructed for military purposes. Any decisions to build roads would have to be taken against this background.

6.9 Agricultural potential in the south and to a limited extent in the north could also be enhanced using Australian experience in arid dry-land farming. Already, an Australian consulting firm, John Bingle Pty Ltd, is running a World Bank funded dry-land farming project in Somalia at the Kurtun Whaarey and Sablaale project sites which at July 1982 was in experimental stages but expected yields of maize and sunflowers were foreseeable and when fully developed, it was envisaged that the region could make Somalia self-sufficient in food grain production.⁴

6.10 Consultants have recommended that Australia could assist in water improvement supplies to selected country areas. Peter Collins Holdings Pty Ltd told the Sub-Committee:

We have seen in the past many wells polluted through lack of knowledge, poor construction and poor upkeep. We feel Australian technology in this field should be easily passed on to the Somalis.⁵

6.11 Australia has participated in the Magarini Land Settlement Scheme in Kenya which has utilized Australia's expertise in water development using bores, surface storage and water tanks. Assistance from Australia for water development projects in both Somalia and in the Horn generally is a way in which Australia could assist in promoting self-sufficiency in the region.

6.12 The Committee is aware of the work being done in the Middle East and North Africa by SAGRIC International Pty Ltd, the overseas agricultural contracting and consulting group of the South Australian Government. SAGRIC has been involved in projects in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Algeria and Libya. With the increasing trend towards a more sedentary lifestyle of nomadic herdsmen in the Ogaden and in many areas of Somalia, further pressure is being put on the livestock carrying capacity of the rangelands. Overstocking and overgrazing exacerbate the problem in those areas where there is a low density of native vegetation. Pastoral zone native vegetation grazing management in regions where the options of introducing improved pastures and irrigation are not available is one area of expertise where an organization such as SAGRIC could play a valuable role in assisting improvement in local practices and in the overall increase in livestock production.

6.13 Australian expertise in dry-land farming techniques could make a valuable contribution to the increase in food, including livestock production, in the Horn of Africa.

6.14 Australia participates in livestock programs in Ethiopia and contributes to two centres located in Addis Ababa; the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA) and the International Laboratory for Research on Animal Diseases (ILRAD). The former is concerned with improved management activities with livestock production, the latter with research

into specific livestock diseases. The FAO, World Bank, and UNDP sponsor these organizations which have programs in Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Kenya and Botswana. Australian assistance in 1982/83 to ILRAD was \$275 000, and to ILCA \$330 000.

6.15 Dangers arise in extending aid to programs incompatible with recipients', skills and technological levels. Projects have failed for this reason and expensive and advanced equipment has been left redundant. Projects are best designed around those technologies currently appropriate to the country and the level of skill of recipient populations. Attention should also be drawn to the inherent traditional knowledge and practices of recipients in initiating training programs.

6.16 Large infrastructure development programs implemented by European countries in Somalia, including the building of a fertilizer factory producing four times the fertilizer needs for the country, and a pharmaceutical factory producing inappropriate medications, were doomed to failure according to Dr Toole. Dr Toole recommended that Australia participate in the 'basic needs' area where it has expertise in the techniques of grazing, soil protection, reafforestation, fishing, agricultural extension and basic health care.⁶

6.17 The Committee recommends that, because of Australia's expertise in dry-land farming and other agricultural techniques, and the growing problem of the lack of self-sufficiency in food production in the Horn of Africa, ADAB should continue to support the concept of self-sufficiency in its future aid program. The Committee is aware of the important work done in Somalia by an Australian consulting firm, John Bingle Pty Ltd, which is running a dry-land farming project at two project sites: Kurtun Whaarey and Sablaale. The project is run for the Somali Government and is funded through the World Bank. At July 1982 it was at the experimental stage, but it was hoped that

future crops would return high yields, and that when similar programs are fully developed, the region could make Somalia self-sufficient in grain production. Australia's participation in the Magarini Land Settlement Program in Kenya, which has utilized Australia's expertise in dry-land farming and water development, is noted. Australia's experience from supporting such projects in Kenya and Somalia will provide useful indicators of future possibilities in this field.

Fishing

6.18 Fishing as a provider of an alternative food supply, but more importantly as an income generating industry providing valuable export earnings, is a viable proposition considering the vast coastline of Somalia. Furthermore, recurring droughts and resulting famine highlight the dangers of dependence on land-based food producing schemes. The industry has never been fully exploited. Foreign exchange from the export of Somalia's more exotic seafoods, whilst making the cheaper lines available as a food source for the local population, is the rationale behind proposals to establish a fishing industry.

6.19 Cultural barriers exist as traditional Somali work has been pastoral or agricultural. Acceptance of fishing as an alternative is difficult as it is viewed by many Somalis as, in Western terms, 'lower class', and until 1972 it was mainly a subsistence activity for lower status groups. In 1974 the Government undertook a major resettlement of over 12 000 nomads to coastal villages where 21 co-operatives were set up employing some 4000 full-time and 10 000 part-time fishermen. The scheme was reasonably successful given the inherent nomadic skills of the workers and fish catches have doubled since 1975 and reached 10 000 tons in 1980. Discoveries of deep sea lobsters, mackerel, red snapper, sea bream and red emperor were made. Soviet foreign investment provided valuable financial and organizational support but, following Soviet support for Ethiopia in the Ogaden

war, the Somali Government expelled all Soviet enterprises in Somalia and the industry suffered a set-back when trawlers were withdrawn from the projects. Presently, all private investment in the commercial fishing industry has been nationalized although an agreement was reached in May 1980 on a joint fishing venture in which the Italians were to provide four trawlers as well as training and technology. The EEC and other Western aid sources are presently assisting in revitalizing the industry. Many projects have become redundant or have closed due to the inadequate on-shore storage facilities and/or insufficient trained or skilled Somali workers. For example, when the Somali Government took control from a North American syndicate of a rock lobster processing plant at Kismay in southern Somalia, the plant became redundant because of workers' lack of expertise in the technology required to operate the plant. A training program, assisted by the United Nations Development Program and the Food and Agricultural Organization was undertaken but also proved unsuccessful.

6.20 The major requirements to enable successful development of a fishing industry in Somalia relate firstly to continued training of Somalis in fishing related skills and educational programs to generate acceptance of fishing as an alternate food source and occupation; and secondly, to investment in on-shore facilities and equipment, the lack of which has in the past retarded fisheries development.

6.21 In a submission received from fisheries consultants familiar with Somalia's present potential, it was maintained that Somalia's coastline and fisheries resources were similar in many ways to the north tropical coast of Australia and parts of Western Australia. It was recommended that similar fishing methods to those used in Australia would succeed in harvesting both the fish and crustaceans of the ocean.⁷

6.22 The Committee is aware of the importance the Somali Government places on developing its fishing industry in an effort to gain valuable export earnings and provide an alternative food source. The Committee is of the view that assistance to the fishing industry in Somalia could be best facilitated through those countries with closer relations and larger markets. If requests are forthcoming for Australian assistance, however, Australia should consider them sympathetically. Australia may be able to contribute to training programs, or in other ways, in view of our experience in fishing methods employed in a fishing environment similar to that of Somalia.

COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE AUSTRALIAN OVERSEAS AID PROGRAM

6.23 The Committee considers that the issues raised in this Report in relation to relief aid and development assistance in the Horn of Africa, and their implications for Australia's overseas aid program generally, should be considered by the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program (Jackson Committee). The Committee will forward a copy of this Report to the Jackson Committee accordingly.

CHAPTER 6 - NOTES AND REFERENCES

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2. Peter Collins Holdings Pty Ltd, Submission No. 34, p. 3.
3. Peter Collins Holdings Pty Ltd, Submission No. 34, p. 7.
4. Report of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to Africa, July-August 1982, p. 10.
5. Peter Collins Holdings Pty Ltd, Submission No. 34, p. 9.
6. Dr Mike Toole, *Evidence*, 5 September 1983, p. 129.
7. N.A. Gallagher, Submission No. 18, p. 5.

CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The Committee draws particular attention to Australia's support and participation in the self-help Primary Health Care Program in Somalia. The CAA program in the Sanaag region commenced in January 1983. The program aims to teach Somalis to take responsibility for their own basic health care and is modelled on a successful program which was applied to Somali refugee camps. The methods adopted in implementing the program and the success achieved are of world wide significance. The Committee recommends that the Australian Government should continue its support for CAA in this valuable work. [Chapter 4, paragraph 4.56]

2. The Committee is of the opinion that, although there may have been examples of some misuse of humanitarian relief aid in Ethiopia in the past, there is not significant evidence of misuse or misappropriation at present. Such charges as have been made do not justify the cessation of humanitarian aid to Ethiopia. The Committee is satisfied that investigations made by the EEC and other bodies justify this conclusion. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.21]

3. In view of the difficulties the Ethiopian Government has in distributing aid to war zones such as Eritrea, the Committee is of the opinion that Australian aid channelled through budan to the Eritrean Relief Association is an effective way of ensuring that aid reaches those in pressing need in Eritrea. Such aid can be channelled through NGOs based in Australia which have a close association with the Australian Eritrean Relief Committee. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.38]

4. The Committee recommends that the Australian Government should, in consultation with other sympathetic nations, determine the best method of providing food and medical aid to Eritreans and Eritrean refugees through sources other than the Ethiopian Government where aid channelled through the Ethiopian Government cannot be provided to those in great need. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.39]

5. The Committee is not in a position to form an authoritative view on allegations made in evidence concerning the provision of humanitarian aid to the Ethiopian Government's present refugee returnee programs. Conflicting figures were reported including those from the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNHCR and the Ethiopian Government concerning the numbers of refugees who have returned to Ethiopia. Although a number of resettlement project sites are located in war zone areas, the actual composition of these resettlement camps (as to whether the people were returned refugees or resettled Ethiopians) was not able to be ascertained from the evidence. The Committee is of the view that on the evidence available, humanitarian aid for such programs is directed to people in need of assistance and that humanitarian aid to Ethiopia should not be discontinued on the grounds that the Ethiopian Government has misled aid donors as to the purpose of the programs. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.48]

6. As with the evidence presented in support of allegations relating to the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission's current refugee returnee programs, the Committee cannot substantiate allegations that large numbers of people are being dispossessed by the drought resettlement program which, it is alleged, allows the Ethiopian Government to resettle forcibly various ethnic groups away from their native areas. The Committee is of the opinion that aid for such projects should not be discontinued on the basis of the allegations made to the Sub-Committee. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.54]

7. Although there have been allegations in the past concerning the maldistribution and mismanagement of food aid in Somalia, the situation now appears to be satisfactory due to the supervising role undertaken by CARE. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.56]

8. Recent cuts in food aid to Somalia by international donors have resulted in an increased malnutrition rate, something which indicates that Somalia's stated need for food aid is not exaggerated, as claimed by some western sources from time to time. Any decisions contemplated to modify Australia's food aid program to refugees in Somalia should be considered in the context of the recent rise in malnutrition rates. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.59]

9. It would appear that the Australian Government relies heavily on international agencies to monitor aid and aid programs in the region. With respect to Ethiopia and the distribution of food aid, it is encouraging to see that the Department of Foreign Affairs has taken the initiative of appointing the World Food Program and an Australian NGO, World Vision, to undertake monitoring activities. However, there is a lack of Australian 'on the spot' scrutiny especially in Ethiopia. It was stated by ADAB in evidence that the reason is the limited resources available in terms of staffing at Nairobi and because of the resultant difficulties in carrying out detailed monitoring activities. Despite Australia's limited monitoring resources, a recent report from the EEC expressed confidence in present monitoring procedures from one of Ethiopia's largest food aid donors and the Sub-Committee was told by the Department of Foreign Affairs that monitoring through the World Food Program has been satisfactory. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.67]

10. In respect of food aid provided by international donors, it should be noted that often recipients' preferences cannot be accommodated and the accepted practice of exchanging goods in the

market-place provides a practical and satisfactory solution to the problem. Equipment for processing foods such as grinding machines for grain and more protein and/or vitamin enriched foods were put forward as suggestions in the context of future food aid efforts. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.73]

11. The Committee notes that although self-help programs for refugees in Somalia are viable and encouraged because there is less pressure on the people to return to their country of origin, the situation in Sudan is more difficult. In Sudan most refugees are hosted by the Government under duress, and it is the Sudanese Government's wish that they return ultimately to their countries of origin. It is therefore not in Sudan's interests to institute long-term programs which will encourage refugees to become permanent settlers. Development programs recommended by the United Nations and relief workers, including self-help projects, infrastructure development and refugee participation in decision-making, are therefore not possible in Sudan at present. The Committee recognizes Australian Government support for a Primary Health Care Program undertaken by UNICEF in Sudan which aims to improve health care for the indigenous Sudanese population. With respect to the refugee populations the Committee recognizes the problems but notes the Sudanese Government's present policy on refugee affairs. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.87]

12. Australia's food aid contributions have increased significantly over the years. It is necessary on humanitarian grounds in view of the recent droughts and continuing refugee problem that relief aid be provided. Relief aid is justified where there is an urgent problem requiring attention, but its usefulness is only short-term. There is a danger in the long-term provision of food aid only. Once established, unless there is potential or incentive for recipients of aid to produce their own food, aid becomes self-perpetuating and is very difficult to cut off. In addition to the 'relief mentality' that may build up by

recipients, relief aid can be very damaging in terms of population growth on a cause-effect basis: increasing food aid causes an increase in population through a reduction in mortality rates creating an even further imbalance in food supplies unless food aid is escalated. Considering Australia's continued increase in food allocations to the Horn, it is necessary to re-evaluate to ensure that such a policy does not exacerbate the long-term food shortage problem. [Chapter 5, paragraph 5.88]

13. Australian and international aid could make a valuable contribution by helping to upgrade roads throughout the region thus alleviating the difficult access to those people in need in isolated areas. Attention was drawn to both Somalia and Ethiopia. The isolation of northern Somalia, in particular, is often exacerbated in the wet season. Assistance in the development of roads in the northwest close to Ethiopia's borders could provoke charges by Ethiopia that roads are being constructed for military purposes. Any decisions to build roads would have to be taken against this background. [Chapter 6, paragraph 6.8]

14. The Committee is aware of the work being done in the Middle East and North Africa by SAGRIC International Pty Ltd, the overseas agricultural contracting and consulting group of the South Australian Government. SAGRIC has been involved in projects in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Algeria and Libya. With the increasing trend towards a more sedentary lifestyle of nomadic herdsmen in the Ogaden and in many areas of Somalia, further pressure is being put on the livestock carrying capacity of the rangelands. Overstocking and overgrazing exacerbate the problem in those areas where there is a low density of native vegetation. Pastoral zone native vegetation grazing management in regions where the options of introducing improved pastures and irrigation are not available is one area of expertise where an organization such as SAGRIC could play a valuable role in assisting improvement in local practices and in the overall increase in livestock production. [Chapter 6, paragraph 6.12]

15. Australian expertise in dry-land farming techniques could make a valuable contribution to the increase in food, including livestock, production in the Horn of Africa. [Chapter 6, paragraph 6.13]

16. The Committee recommends that, because of Australia's expertise in dry-land farming and other agricultural techniques, and the growing problem of the lack of self-sufficiency in food production in the Horn of Africa, ADAB should continue to support the concept of self-sufficiency in its future aid program. The Committee is aware of the important work done in Somalia by an Australian consulting firm, John Bingle Pty Ltd, which is running a dry-land farming project at two project sites: Kurtun Whaarey and Sablaale. The project is run for the Somali Government and is funded through the World Bank. At July 1982 it was at the experimental stages, but it was hoped that future crops would return high yields, and that when similar programs are fully developed, the region could make Somalia self-sufficient in grain production. Australia's participation in the Magarini Land Settlement Program in Kenya, which has utilized Australia's expertise in dry-land farming and water development, is noted. Australia's experience from supporting such projects in Kenya and Somalia will provide useful indicators of future possibilities in this field. [Chapter 6, paragraph 6.17]

17. The Committee is aware of the importance the Somali Government places on developing its fishing industry in an effort to gain valuable export earnings and provide an alternative food source. The Committee is of the view that assistance to the fishing industry in Somalia could be best facilitated through those countries with closer relations and larger markets. If requests are forthcoming for Australian assistance, however, Australia should consider them sympathetically. Australia may be able to contribute to training programs, or in other ways, in

view of our experience in fishing methods employed in a fishing environment similar to that of Somalia. [Chapter 6, paragraph 6.22]

18. The Committee considers that the issues raised in this Report in relation to relief aid and development assistance in the Horn of Africa, and their implications for Australia's overseas aid program generally, should be considered by the Committee to Review the Australian Overseas Aid Program (Jackson Committee). The Committee will forward a copy of this Report to the Jackson Committee accordingly. [Chapter 6, paragraph 6.23]

THE HON. W.L. MORRISON, M.P.
Chairman
December 1983

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A : THE COUNTRIES OF THE HORN : SOME FACTS AND FIGURES

REPUBLIC OF DJIBOUTI

Capital: Djibouti

Area: 21 783 sq km

Borders: Ethiopia to the west and north; Somalia to the south.

Population: 310 000 as at mid 1980 (UN estimate). Indigenous population evenly divided between Afars and Issas (the latter in a slight majority). Also Arabs (40 000), French (10 000), Somalis, Indians, Ethiopians, Greeks, Armenians, Italians, Sudanese and Chinese.

Religion: Predominantly Muslim.

Climate: Average annual rainfall less than 125 mm. High tropical temperatures and humidity during monsoon season.

Landscape and Vegetation: Volcanic desert - barren, arid terrain, consisting of volcanic rock strewn desert wastes, with occasional patches of arable land, salt lakes and pans. Continuous vegetation apparent in upper part of basaltic range of high altitude (1200 metres) only. Mangroves on the coast and date palms in inner plains are characteristics.

Government: Republic and one party state. A new Chamber of Deputies elected in 1982. President: Hassan Gouled Aptidon.

Armed Forces: 2400 (1981). French garrison at Djibouti of 4000. French naval presence.

Economy: Nomadic pastoralism at subsistence level (half population). Provides port through hinterland rail link for Addis Ababa. Hopes to become entrepot port. Free enterprise, including banking especially welcomed.

Diplomatic Relations with Australia: Australia does not have diplomatic relations with Djibouti. Australia's High Commission in Nairobi has visiting, reporting and consular responsibilities in respect of Djibouti.

SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

Capital: Addis Ababa - located within the Shoa Administrative Region, not far from the geographical centre of the country.

Area: 1 223 600 sq km (including Eritrea).

Borders: Ethiopia's western neighbour is Sudan; to the South it shares a border with Kenya; and to the east and south-east lie the Republic of Djibouti and Somalia. To the north-east Ethiopia has nearly 1000 km of coastline along the Red Sea and offshore from Massawa, the northern port, are the Dahlak Islands.

Population: Reliable information unavailable due to lack of population census. Figures based on estimates. Population projected to reach 35 million by 1985 (UN), but other sources estimate a current population of 42 million. Fifty per cent of population are aged 19 years and under. Seventy per cent of population are 29 years and under. Distribution: Seventy per cent settlements in highlands, thirty per cent on land below 2000 metres. Land over 2000 metres is free from malarial mosquito, a factor contributing to non-occupation of lowlands which are suitable for farming. Oromos are the largest individual ethnic group (approximately) 40 per cent, followed by Amhara and Tigreans.

Language and Culture: Seventy five distinct ethnic groups. Over 100 languages spoken. Migration of peoples from Arabia brought linguistic and cultural development in shape of Semitic languages; Nilotic people on Western borders; Bantu in the South. Highly dissected landscape, influenced the emergence of groups of people living in comparative isolation which contributed to development of a large number of dialects. Official languages Amharic/English.

Religion: Approximately 35 per cent Muslim. Approximately 10 million members of Ethiopian Orthodox Union Church, the official church of Ethiopia. Over 200 000 members of Roman Catholic Church and others. Also a number of animists in south west.

Climate: Ethiopia lies within the tropics but wide range of altitude produces considerable variations in temperature. Traditional zones: the Dega - the temperate plateaux, the Kolla - the hot lowlands, and the intermediate frost-free zone of the Woina Dega.

Rainfall: Rainy season over most of country during June, July and August. Generally, climatic conditions described as well-watered highlands: 1000 mm of rain per year (with the exception of Eritrean and Tigrean plateaux) and dry lowlands: less than 500 mm per annum (with the exception of Baro and Akobo River plains in the south-west).

Landscape: Highlands and plateaux of high average elevation with difficult access and sharply distinct from adjoining regions. Characteristics: steep scarps along the coasts and at irregular intervals inland; rift valleys. Structure often makes road and rail construction difficult with an almost total absence of navigable streams.

Soils: Formed from plateaux basalts young and rich; conditions superior to most African countries. Decomposition of volcanic rocks has produced reddish brown clay soils and black cotton soils on high plateaux suitable for crops. Crystalline rock areas less favourable. Alluvials from Nile, Awash and other rivers provide the finest soils, but cover a small area.

Vegetation: Natural vegetation of coniferous forest on plateaux and highlands largely disappeared. In south-west Ethiopia broad-leaved rainforest including coffee bush. Above the tree-lined plateaux are wide expanses of grassland. Grain crops grown on highlands. In the lowlands, dependent on rainfall there is a range of dry-zone vegetation, limited areas of desert through thorn scrub to savannah.

Natural Resources: Gold, iron ore, copper located in Eritrean Plateau. Potash deposits located awaiting exploitation. Exploration for petroleum unsuccessful but some oil seepages and strikes of natural gas offshore from Massawa have been recorded and more recently promising oil strikes in the Bale Administrative Region. Hydro-electricity power potential due to high rainfall and precipitous relief; a number of plants in operation south of the capital along the course of the Awash River.

Government: Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), known as the Dergue. Independence 'since antiquity'. Head of State: Lieutenant-Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.

Armed Forces: Regular army 75 000 (1981); navy 1500; airforce 3500 with over 100 combat aircraft. Paramilitary: 169 000 - mobile emergency police of 9000; People's Militia 150 000; People's Protection Brigades 10 000. Armed Forces augmented by Soviet bloc advisers and approximately 15 000 Cuban troops.

Economy: At least 80 per cent of Ethiopians are involved in agriculture, mostly at subsistence level. Main export: coffee. Animal products provide 5 to 7 per cent of total exports.

Diplomatic Relations with Australia: Australian Ambassador to Ethiopia resident in Nairobi. Ethiopian Ambassador to Australia resident in Tokyo.

SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Capital: Mogadishu

Area: 637 657 sq km

Borders: Ethiopia to the north-west, Djibouti in the far north, Kenya in the south-west.

Population: 4 637 000 (UN estimate 1980). Large nomad population and refugee influx make figures unreliable. An estimated influx of 1.3 million refugees arrived from the Ogaden after 1977. Somalis are overwhelmingly the principal ethnic group. Smaller ethnic groups comprise Bantu, Asians, Arabs, Indians and Pakistanis.

Religion: Islam is official state religion. Most Somalis are Sunni Muslims. With the long tradition of trading connexions with the Arabian Peninsula, the Somalis were converted to Islam.

Climate: Hot on high ground and along coast during June-September. Poor rainfall rarely exceeding 50mm in favourable regions. Rainy seasons are March to June and September to December followed by dry season. Temperature and rainfall are influenced by the south-west and north-west monsoons.

Landscape and Vegetation: Most of the terrain consists of dry savannah plains, with a high mountain escarpment in the north facing the coast. Juba and Shebelle are the only permanent rivers, irrigating the rich agricultural land between them. Sorghum, millet, maize and bananas and citrus fruits are grown. Vegetation predominantly shrub, bush and grass. Some regions have been denuded of trees. In the Haud region and extreme south, vegetation is thick. In most parts of the country grass and plains are plentiful. Overgrazing and erosion have damaged the fertility of the land and conservation measures are required.

Minerals: Some reserves of iron ore, gypsum, uranium and other minerals have been located. Petroleum exploration has proved disappointing.

Economy: Four hundred thousand hectares under cultivation - sugar cane (domestic use) and bananas (export), maize, sorghum, cotton, millet, sesame and peanuts. Pastoralists provide subsistence needs for seventy five per cent of the population and furnish export trade in livestock, hoof, skins and clarified butter. Cultivators provide subsistence quantity of maize, sorghum and millet grown in large expanse of territory between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers. Production of mutton, skins and hides, clarified butter and other livestock products is rising.

Industry: Is small in scale, based on agriculture. Meat and fish processing, textiles and leather goods.

Government: Somali Democratic Republic. Independence 1 July 1960. Political party: the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSF). Legislative body: the People's Assembly. President: Major-General Mohamed Siyad Barre.

Armed Forces: 62 550 in 1981 plus paramilitary border guards, 20 000, members of People's Militia and Police Force numbering 8000.

Diplomatic relations with Australia: Australia's High Commission in Nairobi has visiting, reporting, consular and trade responsibilities in respect of Somalia. Somalia's Ambassador to Australia is resident in Beijing.

APPENDIX B

LIST OF WITNESSES

ABRAHAM, Mr F. - Co-ordinator, Eritrean Relief Committee, (pp. 96-107) (1982)

ACTON, Mr J.A.H. - Foreign Affairs Officer Class 3, Department of Foreign Affairs, (pp. 2-22 and pp. 24-41) (1982)

BROWNING, Ms V. - Private capacity, (pp. 68-95) (1982)

COLLINSON, Ms P.A. - Projects Administrator, Community Aid Abroad, (pp. 150-163) (1982) (also in camera) (1982)

CONKEY, Mr H. - Member, Eritrean Relief Association, (pp. 3-24) (1983)

DALELLEW, Mr T. - Field Director, Ethiopia, World Vision, (in camera) (1982)

EDWARDS, Mr C.A. - Assistant Secretary, Africa and Middle East Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, (pp. 2-22 and pp. 24-41) (1982)

GREET, Mr R.J. - Acting First Assistant Secretary, International Organizations, Refugees, South Asia, Africa, Middle East Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, (pp. 45-90) (1983)

HODGE, Mr P.H. - Acting Assistant Secretary, Program Planning and Review Branch, Australian Development Assistance Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, (pp. 45-90) (1983)

JOHNSTONE, Ms D.K. - Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs on secondment to ESSO under the Public Service Board Interchange Program, (pp. 45-90) (1983)

KAHSAI, Mr. T. - Member, Eritrean Relief Association, (pp. 3-24) (1983)

LARKIN, Mr J.C. - Private capacity, (pp. 25-44) (1983)

MAKINDA, Dr S. - Private capacity, (pp. 92-113) (1983)

MAYNE-WILSON, Mr W. - Head, Policy and Plans Section, Defence Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, (pp. 24-41) (1982)

NEUHAUS, Mr M.E.K. - Foreign Affairs Officer, Central and Southern Africa Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, (pp. 45-90) (1983)

NUR, Dr A.O. - Private capacity, (pp. 44-67) (1982)

O'SULLIVAN, Mr N.P. - Projects Director, Community Aid Abroad, (pp. 150-163) (also in camera) (1982)

PATEMAN, Mr R.- Private capacity, (pp. 108-128) (1982)

ROSS, Mr N.R. - Head, Humanitarian Aid and Non-Government Organizations Section, Australian Development Assistance Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, (pp. 45-90) (1983)

SHEPPARD, Mr J.P. - Head, Central and Southern Africa Section, Department of Foreign Affairs, (pp. 45-90) (1983)

SNELL, Ms B.F. - Somali Refugee Health Unit, Ministry of Health, Somali Democratic Republic, (pp. 130-149) (1982)

TOOLE, Dr M. - Private Citizen, (pp. 114-137) (also in camera) (1983)

WALKER, Mr R. - Director, Research and Development Division, World Vision, (in camera) (1982)

APPENDIX C

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

	No.
AHMAD, Mr B.	32
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Australian Section)	33
AUSTRALIAN CATHOLIC RELIEF (Confidential)	35
AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL OF CHURCHES	29
AUSTRALIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY	36
AUSTRALIAN UNION OF JEWISH STUDENTS (Confidential)	28
AUSTRALIAN WHEAT BOARD	12
AUTON, Mr A.C.	1
LORD AVEBURY	30
AYAN, Mr A.H.	17
BRAGG, Mr T.W.	23
BROWNING, Ms V.	25
COMMUNITY AID ABROAD	27
CONKEY, Mrs N.	2
DICKSON, Ms H.A.	13
DWAN, Mr P.	22
ERITREAN RELIEF COMMITTEE, MELBOURNE	21
ERITREAN RELIEF COMMITTEE, SYDNEY	26
GALLAGHER, N.A.	18
GLEDHILL, Ms J.	9
GRAY, Rev. A.W.	3
LARKIN, Mr J. (Confidential)	20
LEWIS, Professor I.M.	37

MACONOCHE, Mr J.M.	31
MIDDLE EAST-NORTH AFRICA NEWS (George Wilson, Editor)	19
McGOWAN INTERNATIONAL PTY LTD (Confidential)	16
NEW AFRICA NEWS (Michael Little, Editor)	7
NUR, Dr A.O.	8
OHIS, Mr F.	14
PANTER, Ms M.	10
PARKER, Ms T.	24
PATEMAN, Mr R.	11
PETER COLLINS HOLDINGS PTY LTD	34
POMFRET, Captain R.	5
ROTHFIELD, Ms E.	4
SNELL, Ms B.	6
TEAKLE, Mr & Mrs L.C.	15
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Office for Australia and New Zealand)	38

OTHER PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS WHO ASSISTED THE SUB-COMMITTEE:

African Studies Association of Australia and the Pacific

Ambassador of the Somali Democratic Republic to Australia, H.E.
Professor Sharif Salah Mohamed Ali

Ambassador Designate of Socialist Ethiopia to Australia, H.E.
Brigadier General Afework Atlabachew

Professor Preston King, School of Political Science, The
University of New South Wales