The Australian Defence Force: its structure and capabilities

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence

THE PARLIAMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Joint Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Defence

THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE:

ITS STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITIES

October 1984

TERMS OF REFERENCE:

On 1 December 1983, the Committee requested the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters to inquire into and report upon the following terms of reference:

'The capability of the Australian Defence Force to fulfil its role, with particular reference to force structure and command and control arrangements.'

MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE

33rd Parliament
Main Committee

Chairman:	The Hon. W.L. Morrison, MP
Deputy Chairman:	The Hon. M.J.R. MacKellar, MP

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Mr S.A. Lusher, MP
Mr R.F. Shipton, MP

Secretary to the Committee:
      Mr P.F. Bergin

Sub-Committee on Defence Matters:

Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of the Resolution of
Appointment of the Committee, the Chairman, the
Hon. W.L. Morrison, MP, and the Deputy Chairman,
the Hon. M.J.R. MacKellar, MP, were ex-officio
members of the Sub-Committee.

Chairman:	Mr M.D. Cross, MP
Deputy Chairman:	The Hon. R.C. Katter, MP

Senator D.J. MacGibbon
Mr R.F. Edwards, MP
Mr J. Gayler, MP
Mr R.F. Shipton, MP

Secretary to the Sub-Committee:
      Mr P.N. Gibson, MC

Defence Adviser to the Sub-Committee:
      Dr G.L. Cheeseman

32nd Parliament
Main Committee

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Deputy Chairman: Senator K.W. Sibraa

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          Mr A.C. Holding, MP
          Senator J.R. Martyr

Consultant:

          Commodore K.D. Gray, DFC, RAN (Rtd)

          * Appointed to the Ministry 7 May 1982.

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> 'The capability of the Australian Defence Force to fulfil its role, with particuar reference to force structure and command and control arrangements'

2.   This reference developed from an earlier reference on force structure, from the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence in the previous Parliament. Before receiving the formal reference, the Sub-Committee had reviewed material on defence force structure prepared by the Sub-Committee in the Thirty Second Parliament. It then received a series of informal briefings on defence issues from, among others, the Minister for Defence, serving and retired senior Defence officials, senior officers from the three Services and representatives of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University.

3.   In mid-December 1983, advertisements were placed in major national and metropolitan newspapers inviting submissions. The Chairman wrote to appropriate Ministers inviting submissions, and invitations to submit were also sent to relevant non-Government agencies including the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, the Returned Services League of Australia and the Defence Representatives Association.

4.   As part of its inquiry, the Sub-Committee undertook a series of inspection visits to Defence installations around Australia. In the period 6-10 February 1984, the Sub-Committee inspected units of all three Services across northern Australia, including RAN facilities in Cairns and Darwin, the Army's Operational Deployment Force in Townsville and HQ North West Mobile Force (NORFORCE) in Darwin, and RAAF facilities in Townsville, Darwin and Tindal, near Katherine in the Northern Territory. This was followed by a visit to the Australian Defence Force Command Centre in Canberra in March 1984, and to operational headquarters of the Services in the Sydney area in April 1984. Finally, visits were made in June 1984 to Defence Force units in South Australia and Western Australia. Reports from these tours are included as Appendices 1-3 to this Report.

Any analysis of the structure of our armed forces should go beyond an examination of military organisations and capabilities to explore these higher order considerations.

9.   Ideally, the Defence Force structure should reflect, and be logically derived from, considerations of our national interests and our projected strategic and geo-political circumstances. Such a process would incorporate a wide spectrum of views and interests and would typically involve the following steps:

   a.   determination of Australia's national interests and objectives;

   b.   delineation of a strategic or national defence concept describing how the national interests and objectives are most effectively and efficiently promoted and defended in the light of the strategic assessment;

   c.   delineation of an appropriate military strategy and concept of operations, describing how the strategic concept is to be achieved;

   d.   development of an appropriate force structure - encompassing organisation, capabilities and doctrine - with which to carry out the military strategy; and

   e.   the procurement and maintenance of the forces and supporting infrastructure and their deployment in peace.

10.   In practice, the development of the Defence Force structure is more complex. Not all elements of the ideal planning process are present and others are poorly defined. Decisions are often constrained by external factors or by past choices. Moreover, the process itself is inhibited by strong interest groups which have a particular concern with advancing favoured roles and functions. In Australia's case, the planning and development of our force structure is complicated further by the absence of any clearly defined present threat to national security. The Defence Force must be structured, therefore, to meet a wide range of potential threats without knowing what form these threats will take or when they might occur.

11.   While these factors constrain the operation of the rational model of force structure development, they do not detract from its importance. Unless each of these steps is present and structured together in a clear and coherent manner, the structure of the Defence Force is likely to evolve more by accident than by design and the probability of achieving an optimum force posture will be reduced.

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5.   Written submissions were requested by mid-February 1984, and public hearings were held in March, May and June 1984. Evidence was taken in camera from senior officers of the Australian Defence Force on two occasions. The Assistant Chief of Defence Force Staff and the Service Chiefs of Operations gave evidence in camera in Canberra in May 1984. The Chief of Defence Force Staff appeared in camera in September 1984 in Canberra, and the Chiefs of Naval and Air Staff respectively gave in camera evidence in Brisbane, also in Septemer 1984. Appendix 4 lists the submissions received by the Sub-Committee in the course of this inquiry, and Appendix 5 lists the witnesses from whom public and in camera evidence was taken.

6.   The Sub-Committee met formally nine times in 1983 and thirty two times during the course of 1984. These included public and in camera hearings, private briefings, deliberative meetings and inspection visits.

The Scope of the Inquiry

7.   The inquiry was approached by initially considering the nature of defence force structure and determining the best method for its analysis and development. It was considered that, when reduced to fundamentals, military force structure could be considered to comprise the following elements:

>   a.   Organisation: comprising the basic building blocks of military establishment, their purpose, how they are identified, raised and trained;
>
>   b.   Capabilities: encompassing the nature and characteristics of the organisational elements and their integral weapons and support systems; and
>
>   c.   Doctrine: describing how the organisational elements relate to each other, how they are commanded and controlled and how they are employed in combat.

8.   Force structure, however, should not be viewed in these terms alone. Embodied within the military establishment are certain assumptions about the nature of the threat that is likely to be faced on the battlefield and the kind of operational environment in which military forces will operate. Moreover, armed forces are not maintained for their own sake but are part of the Government's overall strategy for meeting its national objectives. A nation's defence force structure is an end-product of a much wider system of national security management which links the overall, political aims of the state with the military and non-military actions that are required to achieve these aims.

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9.   Ideally, the Defence Force structure should reflect, and be logically derived from, considerations of our national interests and our projected strategic and geo-political circumstances. Such a process would incorporate a wide spectrum of views and interests and would typically involve the following steps:

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10.   In practice, the development of the Defence Force structure is more complex. Not all elements of the ideal planning process are present and others are poorly defined. Decisions are often constrained by external factors or by past choices. Moreover, the process itself is inhibited by strong interest groups which have a particular concern with advancing favoured roles and functions. In Australia's case, the planning and development of our force structure is complicated further by the absence of any clearly defined present threat to national security. The Defence Force must be structured, therefore, to meet a wide range of potential threats without knowing what form these threats will take or when they might occur.

11.   While these factors constrain the operation of the rational model of force structure development, they do not detract from its importance. Unless each of these steps is present and structured together in a clear and coherent manner, the structure of the Defence Force is likely to evolve more by accident than by design and the probability of achieving an optimum force posture will be reduced.

12.   In order to provide a systematic and comprehensive
review of Australia's Defence Force structure, this Report
follows the broad format of the rational model just
described, moving from a discussion of Australia's national
interests and objectives, through an examination of our
overall military strategy to a detailed consideration of the
functional capabilities required for the defence of
Australia and how these should be grouped together. At each
level in this process, the considerations were both
analytical - highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of
our present position - and prescriptive - examining
alternative approaches and options.

13.   The Report begins with a brief survey of the various
factors that influence the development and maintenance of
Defence Force structure. A complete understanding of our
present position and where and how we should move in the
future is not possible without being aware of past and
projected developments in our strategic environment. Any
future changes to our force structure will also be subject
to a range of basic constraints arising from such factors as
Australia's alliance relationships, the nature of our
physical environment, the resources that are available for
national security purposes and the nature of the defence
decision-making process.

14.   The external and internal factors influencing
Australia's defence force structure are described in
Chapters One and Two. This is followed by a brief
description of the current functions, roles and capabilities
of the Australian Defence Force. Together, these first three
chapters provide the necessary background to the primary
considerations contained in the remainder of the Report.

15.   The findings of the Committee's detailed examination
of the Australian Defence Force structure and capabilities
are contained in Chapters Four to Eight. Chapter Four
defines Australia's national interests and objectives, and,
from a consideration of our military role in global and
regional affairs, develops a national defence concept for
Australia and its offshore Territories. A key element in
this consideration is the definition of an Area of Principal
Defence Interest on which our military strategy should be
focussed and within which Australia's military forces would
be required to operate.

16.   Chapter Five examines Australia's overall military
strategy for achieving our national defence concept. It
concludes that our current approach is inadequate in a
number of important respects and recommends that we should
change the present emphasis of our military strategy from
one of reacting to threats as they emerge to controlling our
threat environment. This would be achieved by giving
priority in peacetime to deterring threats to our national
security and by providing a rapid response to those
low-level threats that may not be deterred.

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Basic Principles Underlying Australia's National Security Policies

1.   The Committee considers that Australia should maintain a defence capability not only adequate for deterring aggression and maintaining our treaty obligations, but also able to cope with any indirect or direct threat to our national security. Our basic defence posture should be defensively and not offensively oriented. Australia has no desire to engage in a technological arms race with other nations. The task of defending Australia would be made easier if tensions within our international community were reduced and both the global and regional balances of power were based on reduced levels of arms. This is not to say that Australia should not maintain a defence force, or that we should unilaterally disarm – clearly in an uncertain world it would be foolish to do either (paras 1.9 and 1.10).

Australia's Strategic Environment

2.   The Committee considers that:

a.   the most dangerous threat to Australia's national security and well-being would arise from war between the United States and the Soviet Union;

b.   Australia can provide no direct defence against nuclear war, nor can it directly change or influence the global balance of power;

c.   Australia should emphasise the common interests in achieving disarmament and arms control;

d.   While Australia's own region of interest is relatively stable, there are developments which could undermine the prospects for continuing stability in the longer term; and

e.   in seeking to ensure regional security Australia should be aware of the different perceptions and perspectives of our neighbours (para 1.88).

17.   Chapter Six examines the capabilities required for this revised strategy under the broad functional categories of intelligence, surveillance and early warning, strategic strike and interdiction, maritime defence, land warfare and air defence. A number of important functional deficiencies in our present inventory are identified and an order of priority for the acquisition and development of new capabilities is suggested.

18.   One important limitation of our existing Defence Force structure is its system of command and control. This is the subject of Chapter Seven which concludes that we should move away from the current single Service command structure towards a structure emphasising joint service roles and tasks, with a direct line of operational command from the Chief of Defence Force Staff.

19.   A principal finding of the Report, and one that is generally recognised, is that Australia's military capabilities will increasingly depend on a range of non-military factors and capabilities such as our industrial capacity and our ability to mobilise civilian resources and services. The integration of our military and non-military capabilities into an effective whole is examined in Chapter Eight which deals with national security policy-making and the development of Defence Force structure. Chapter Eight also highlights the absence of clear positive policy guidance at all levels within the force development process leading to the conclusion that our force structure is not being developed in a clear and logically coherent manner.

20.   The Committee appreciates the ready assistance given to the Sub-Committee throughout the inquiry by the Minister for Defence and his Department. The co-operation and assistance given by members of the Australian Defence Force with whom the Sub-Committee dealt in the course of the inquiry was particularly noteworthy. It has not been an easy task to analyse the range of issues relevant to a detailed consideration of the Terms of Reference, and the Committee is particularly grateful to those who have assisted, by making submissions and by giving evidence. The nation's defence is of fundamental importance, and the Committee trusts that this Report will contribute to public awareness and   discussion   of   the   issues   involved.

Threats to Australia's Security

3.   The Committee considers that the grouping of
threats into the broad categories of low-level
contingencies, intermediate-level threats and invasion of
Australia (or high-level threat) provides a reasonable
descriptive basis of Australia's threat environment and one
which broadly facilitates military strategic and force
structure planning (para 1.66).

4.   The Committee believes that only the United
States, and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union, have the
physical capacity to invade Australia with any real prospect
of success. The Committee considers that it is inconceivable
that the United States would invade Australia, and the USSR
is unlikely to do so except as a consequence of a preceding
serious deterioration in relations between the two
superpowers (para 1.89).

5.   Australia could still be subjected to a range of
low-level threats arising from within our region of interest
with little or no warning. The Committee concludes that
Australia's force-in-being should be structured and have the
capabilities to meet the more credible of these
contingencies. We could also, in time, be confronted by a
number of higher-level threats which we would need to
counter independently and which would require considerably
more defence resources than we presently have or are
prepared to invest in (para 1.90).

Australia's Defence Industrial Capacity

6.   The Committee supports the proposition that
Australia's defence industrial base is an integral part of
our force structure (para 2.22).

7.   The Committee believes that the compilation of the
National Infrastructural Directory and Australia's defence
industry profile are important tasks that should be
completed during the present period of 'no threat' (para
6.14).

8.   The Committee considers that a profitable and
constructive use of Australia's industrial infrastructure is
possible only if the basic concepts and strategies for the
defence of Australia and its interests are developed and
clearly articulated (para 2.22).

Budgetary Limits

9.   The Committee considers that, as Australia's expenditure on defence is likely to continue around the current level unless there is a major change in our external circumstances, it is particularly important that resources allocated to defence purposes are used wisely (para 2.34)

Australia's Alliance Relationships

10.   The Committee considers that it is in Australia's interests to maintain the ANZUS Treaty and other bilateral defence arrangements with the United States (para 2.61). The Committee recognises that Australia cannot rely on obtaining United States military support under all circumstances. Australia's defence planning therefore should proceed on the basis that American support, in whatever form, should be regarded as a bonus to, rather than an anticipated central element of, Australia's response capacity. The Australian Defence Force should maintain the capability to operate and integrate with allied forces (para 2.75 and para 4.29).

Australia's Global and Regional Military Roles

11.   The Committee:

   a.   considers that Australia should seek to reduce international tensions primarily through diplomatic and economic means rather than by the use of military force (para 4.35);

   b.   supports the view that Australia should focus on the defence of Australia and its essential interests and should not expand its current global or regional military commitments (para 4.34 and para 4.53); and

   c.   considers that the Government should evaluate the efficacy of Australia's present means of providing military forces for peacekeeping tasks, including whether the peacekeeping operations achieve their intended purpose and justify participation by countries such as Australia. Should Government decide to participate in future peacekeeping missions, then additional capacities to compensate for this participation must be built into the force structure of the day, so that ADF

capabilities are not reduced. The issue of financing peacekeeping contributions should also be reviewed, in particular whether the cost ought to be borne by the Department of Foreign Affairs through a special allocation or by direct Government grant (para 4.42).

Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest

12.   The Committee considers that there is value, especially from the point of view of planning and developing Australia's Defence Force structure, in identifying within Australia's broad region of strategic concern a more specific area in which we would expect to take a major defence interest and within which our military forces would be required to operate (para 4.65).

13.   The Committee defines this latter region as Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest. This area comprises Australia and its offshore Territories. The principal focus of our Defence Force operations would be on the maritime and air approaches to Australia and on any potential bases and staging areas from which opposing forces may be launched (para 4.65).

Australia's National Security Objectives and National Defence Concept

14.   The Committee considers that the basic objective of Australia's national security policy should be to provide the nation with security from armed attack and from constraints on independent national decisions imposed by the threat of such an attack (para 4.13).

15.   The Committee believes that Australia's national defence policy should have two broad aims, viz:

   a.   prevention of attack or threat of attack against Australia and its interests through

   •   development of a credible deterrent posture focussed on Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest;

   •   continuing commitment to the ANZUS alliance; and

   •   continuing defence cooperation with nations in Australia's region of interest.

b. Countering aggression

•   in the event of indirect aggression or
    aggression outside Australia's Area of
    Principal Defence Interest, by
    considering a range of non-military and
    military options designed to bring the
    situation under control as quickly as
    possible;

•   in the event of direct aggression within
    Australia's Area of Principal Defence
    Interest, by taking responsive action
    immediately to defeat or force back such
    aggression at the earliest possible
    stage. In the case of both low and
    intermediate level threats, Australia
    should be able to defeat aggression
    without outside help. In the case of
    high level threats Australia should be
    capable of delaying the enemy's progress
    in order to gain time to seek assistance
    from its major allies (para 4.66).

Australia's Defence Strategy

16.   The Committee considers that Australia's present
defence strategy - sometimes referred to as the core force
strategy - is inadequate in terms of its short term
deployment capacity and combat sustainability, its expansion
potential and its operational command structure (para 5.26).
Underlying these weaknesses is the fact that Australia's
military strategy is essentially a reactive one where the
principal focus is on responding to emergencies once they
arise. Because of the uncertainty associated with future
threats to Australia, the force-in-being is structured to
<u>defend</u> Australia and its interests against intermediate and
high-level threats with only a few force elements being
maintained at an advanced degree of readiness to meet
low-level contingencies. As a result, a prospective enemy is
likely to see Australia's force-in-being as thinly spread
and generally ill-prepared (para 5.27).

17.   The Committee is not satisfied that the Australian
Defence Force can meet low-level threats to Australia's
security in a timely and effective manner. Furthermore, its
capacity to deal with higher level threats crucially depends
on receiving sufficient warning and being able to expand in
time to react (para 5.26). The Committee considers that
these weaknesses detract from the credibility of Australia's
defence capacity and our ability to deter intermediate and
high-level threats (para 5.27).

18.   The   Committee   considers   that   an   alternative
approach or strategy is needed which:

    a. takes   account   of   the   fact   that   national
        security should not be responsive to factors
        which could not be perceived until a threat
        had developed but should be dynamic and
        positive so as to delay further or deny the
        emergency of a threat (para 5.2);

    b. adopts   specific   strategies   and   force
        structures for _deterring_ aggression and
        countering those threats that are not
        deterred (para 5.30 and 5.53); and

    c. gives priority to _deterring_ intermediate and
        high-level threats and _defending_ ourselves
        against likely low-level threats (para 5.54).

19.   The Committee considers that the basic planning
and selection criterion for Australia's deterrent strategy
should be the notion of disproportionate response, whereas
the capabilities required for defence against low-level
threats should be derived from detailed studies of likely
contingencies (para 5.55).

20.   The Committee recognises that, while afforded a
lower priority, _defence_ against possible intermediate and
high level threats cannot be ignored, and considers that at
least the organisational framework for this task should be
established and tested in peacetime (para 5.57).

      The Capabilities for the Australian Defence Force

Intelligence

21.   The   Committee   considers   that   Australia's
capabilities for the collection and development of strategic
intelligence must be further developed (para 6.7).

22.   The Committee considers the task of completely
mapping and charting Australia's Area of Principal Defence
Interest to be of vital importance to Australia's national
security and as such should be afforded more resources and a
much higher priority than at present (para 6.13).

Surveillance and Early Warning

23.   The Committee considers that:

a.   surveillance and early warning are continuing tasks that have similar application to both deterrence and defence;

b.   there is considerable correlation between defence and civil surveillance requirements in peacetime: the Australian Defence Force should be assigned overall responsibility for co-ordinating all forms of surveillance tasks;

c.   a comprehensive military surveillance and early warning system should be established in peacetime which would oversee both Australia's civil and defence surveillance requirements and prepare the Australian Defence Force for times of emergency or war (para 6.34).

24.   The Committee notes, but remains unconvinced by, the advice given by the Department of Defence that Australia's presently approved surveillance capability 'is broadly adequate for current needs', and 'that extension of our strategic surveillance using currently available technologies would be costly and of limited priority in our present strategic circumstances' (para 6.36). It considers that:

a.   while the basic components of Australia's strategic surveillance capacity may be 'adequate for current needs', there is currently no overall structure linking these component parts into a coherent and effective whole (para 6.37);

b.   the task of surveillance of Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest should be given to a single, joint force headquarters which would exert operational control over Australia's primary surveillance units and other units as needed (para 6.38); and

c.   Australia should acquire an airborne early warning and control capability to augment Australia's airspace surveillance capabilities (para 6.39).

Strategic Strike and Interdiction

25.   The Committee generally supports the view that,
with the introduction of the F/A-18, Australia's current
strategic strike and interdiction capacity is high in
regional terms and therefore is adequate. The Committee
considers that this capability should be augmented by
in-flight refuelling and that priority be given to adapting
our current Boeing 707 aircraft to this role (para 6.50).

26.   The Committee considers that Australia's deterrent
forces should be maintained at a credible state of
operational readiness. They must not be vulnerable to a
pre-emptive strike by a potential aggressor. They should be
continually exercised under a single operational command
headquarters (para 6.50).

Maritime Defence

27.   The Committee considers that Australia should
relate the size and scope of its maritime defence capacity
to assisting in securing Australia's Area of Principal
Defence Interest and being able to provide protection for a
select number of sea routes, vital choke points and maritime
facilities (para 6.55).

28.   The Committee considers that Australia's maritime
forces, however they are eventually structured, must be
given adequate protection against air and submarine attack.
The Committee believes that it is not appropriate at this
stage to provide our maritime forces with their own integral
combat air support, particularly in the form of an aircraft
carrier. The Committee acknowledges the problems associated
with the command and control of maritime forces consisting
of elements responsible to separate single-Service commands,
but believes that there is scope to integrate Australia's
maritime defence forces under a single operational command
(para 6.61).

29.   The Committee considers that Australia should
develop within its maritime defence forces a small but
highly capable mine countermeasures capacity utilising both
surface and airborne facilities and capable of providing
protection for at least our major ports and choke points
(para 6.65).

Land Warfare

30.   The Committee considers that Australia's land
warfare forces - comprising units from the Army and Air
Force - should have four broad roles:

- a. rapid and effective reaction against
     low-level military threats;

- b. ability to constrain an initial enemy
     lodgement on Australian soil. The Committee
     terms this role vanguard defence;

- c. defence of Australia's vital areas of
     interest. The Committee terms this role home
     defence: and

- d. exploitation of Australia's continental space
     (para 6.73).

31.   The Committee considers that a well equipped, air
mobile brigade group would act as a significant deterrent to
those low level military threats involving minor lodgements
or incursions onto Australia's land space. Given its
strategic mobility, it would also be able to be readily
deployed into other parts of Australia's Area of Principal
Defence Interest should the need arise. The Committee
considers however that such a force would neither deter, nor
could it be used effectively against, terrorist activities
or air and maritime incursions. Other force elements would
have to be maintained for these purposes (para 6.76).

32.   The Committee considers that Australia should
initially base its defence vanguard capacity around the 1st
Australian Division and a selected component or 'slice' of
Corps Troops (typically including armour, medium artillery,
engineering, close air support and air defence
capabilities). The force should be in a relatively advanced
state of readiness and should require only little prior
expansion. It should be largely operationally and
logistically self-sufficient or at least not dependent on
long lead-time items or overseas sources for vital supplies.
It should have sufficient reserves of ammunition and
materiel to conduct sustained defensive operations. Most
importantly, it should have, and be well practised in, the
operational and logistic doctrines required for the kinds of
tasks on which it would be deployed (paras 6.78 and 6.79).

33.   The Committee is concerned that the protection of
Australia's vital interests and the exploitation of
non-vital areas are major tasks which are beyond our present

capabilities and may never be wholly possible in light of
our limited resources. The Committee considers that this
provides all the more reason to seek to prevent an invasion
of Australia occurring in the first place. Priority should
therefore be given to providing strong and effective
reaction and vanguard forces (para 6.80).

34.   The Committee recognises that Australia requires
some form of home defence force in the event that deterrence
fails. One approach which is attractive to the Committee is
to assign the responsibility for defending Australia's vital
land areas to a mechanised conventional warfare force based
on both Regular and Reserve units and which is capable of
being expanded in times of emergency. The remainder of
Australia could be made the responsibility of a second,
territorial defence force (para 6.81).

35.   The Committee considers that it is vital to
determine Australia's civil support arrangements for the
defence of Australia's vital areas in advance of any
hostilities. An important first step in this process would
be the establishment of an appropriate high-level planning
body tasked with developing broad policy guidelines for the
defence of Australia as well as the appropriate
organisational framework for the task (para 6.84).

36.   In considering Australia's present land forces'
ready reaction capacity, the Committee considers that:

    a.   the Operational Deployment Force (ODF) should
         be expanded to a full brigade group and
         should contain a nucleus of higher-power
         combat capabilities;

    b.   Australia should possess sufficient air
         transport assets to be able to deploy, and
         support during operations, the major part of
         our ready reaction force; and

    c.   the ODF should have first call on Australia's
         military air transport assets and the
         operational capability of the ODF would be
         enhanced if the ODF or joint force commander
         had operational control of these assets (para
         6.96).

37.   The Committee identified a number of weaknesses
and shortfalls in Australia's land defence capabilities
(para 6.100). The Committee considers that these
deficiencies are serious and that they undermine the
credibility and effectiveness of Australia's land warfare
capability. The Committee considers that the present
weaknesses in Australia's land defence capacity may be
acceptable if we had a strong and credible

deterrent posture. At present however, there has been no
attempt by Army to distinguish between the strategies of
deterrence and defence. Australia's land warfare forces as a
whole are intended to serve both purposes, but, because of
the size and scope of the tasks involved, they do neither
satisfactorily (para 6.101).

38.   The   Committee   considers   that   a   clearer
articulation and analysis of deterrence and defence would
facilitate force structure planning and lessen the impact of
the serious deficiencies in our present structure. They
would not overcome them however. Serious thought needs to be
given to the defence of vital national areas in the unlikely
event of invasion. Again, a strong deterrent posture would
provide time and a measure of security for this task (para
6.102).

Air Defence

39.   In line with focusing on developing Australia's
deterrent posture and forces in peacetime, the Committee
considers that the use of the F/A-18 in a long-range
interdiction role within Australia's Area of Principal
Defence Interest is of prime importance (para 6.110).

40.   The Committee considers that Australia's national
air defence system is inadequate. It considers that at
least the basic framework of such a system should be
established now in order to develop effective procedures for
air defence and to practice them (para 6.111).

Priorities for Capabilities

41.   The Committee recognises that it would be
difficult to eliminate all the identified deficiencies in a
short period of time. There is a need therefore to assign a
higher priority to the development of some functional
capabilities over others, without undermining Australia's
overall defence capacity. The Committee considers that
preference should be given to Australia's deterrent posture
and strategy. This would mean concentrating on developing or
refining the following functional capabilities and forces:

    a.   finalising the mapping and charting of
          Australia's Area   of   Principal   Defence
          Interest and the collection of information
          required for the national infrastructure
          directory;

b. establishing a fully integrated surveillance
and early warning system which groups
together those assets required for the
surveillance of Australia's Area of Principal
Defence Interest. The system should include
our present P3 Orion and Patrol Boat forces;

c. establishing the organisational framework for
a national air defence system which links
into the surveillance and early warning
system;

d. grouping our present strategic strike and
long-range interdiction forces together as
part of a single functional command tasked
with the responsiblity of deterring
intermediate and high-level threats to
Australia's security. This force would
include Australia's present F-111 and Oberon
forces, and our projected Tactical Fighter
Force based on the F/A-18;

e. establishing a ready reaction force of
brigade group size based on the Operational
Deployment Force, with its own integral
tactical air transport and tasked with
meeting low level threats to Australia's
security; and

f. establishing a vanguard defence force based
on the 1st Australian Division and tasked
with containing and defeating an initial
enemy lodgement within Australia's Area of
Principal Defence Interest (para 6.114).

Command and Control of the Australian Defence Force

42.   The Committee found that there was general
agreement that any future military conflict involving
Australia's armed forces is likely to be based on joint
rather than single service operations and that the
Australian Defence Force needs to be well practised in joint
operations in order to facilitate the transition to this
wartime structure (para 7.55).

43.   The Committee considers that there are
deficiencies in the present Australian Defence Force command
structure to meet current peacetime tasks and roles. Of
particular concern to the Committee is the fact that the
command structure does not, as presently constituted in
doctrine and practice, provide a suitable basis for meeting
future operational requirements (para 7.57).

44.   The Committee believes that the command structure
of the Australian Defence Force should be restructured along
joint Service lines (para 7.62). The Committee considers
that the detailed composition of Australia's joint
operational command structure should be determined by the
CDFS and the Department of Defence and recommends that
studies be conducted into this matter. In addition to the
Army's Operational Deployment Force, early consideration
should be given to establishing joint forces and
headquarters tasked with surveillance and early warning, air
defence and coastal surveillance (para 7.86).

45.   The Committee considers that the present chain of
command linking the CDFS and his commanders in the field is
unduly complicated and subject to conflicts of interest at
all levels (para 7.88). It recommends that the chain of
command be simplified by removing the Service Chiefs of
Staff from the operational chain of command (para 7.89).

46.   The Committee considers that the present staff
support for the CDFS is inadequate and recommends that this
matter be investigated as part of the studies into an
appropriate joint Service command structure for the
Australian Defence Force, and that at least the nucleus of
an Australian Defence Force Headquarters be established to
exercise operational command over our armed forces in
peacetime (para 7.90).

National Security Policy-Making and the Development
of the Australian Defence Force Structure

47.   The Committee considers that both the current
structure for determining national security policies, and
the guidance itself, are inadequate. The Committee supports
the need to review the machinery and procedures for national
administration in the event of a defence emergency or war
(para 8.17).

48.   The Committee considers that the Department of
Defence should develop clearer policy guidance than
currently exists on Australia's military strategy and the
capabilities required for Australia's defence (para 8.35).

49.   The Committee recommends that a description of
Australia's overall defence posture and policies -
encompassing Australia's national interests and objectives,
our defence concept, our developing strategic environment,
military strategy and Defence Force capabilities - be
regularly published in a single comprehensive document or
White Paper (para 8.36).

CHAPTER ONE

EXTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE FORCE STRUCTURE

1.1   Australia's defence policies and the structure and detailed characteristics of our armed forces are shaped by, and directed towards, the environment in which we live. Changes in this environment can exert pressures on how we act and, in the extreme, they can threaten our existence or well-being. While we seek to use a range of diplomatic, political and economic strategies to overcome or accommodate change, in the last resort we need to rely on our armed forces to protect us from external actions or events which may adversely affect our national sovereignty and interests.

1.2   This chapter provides a brief description of Australia's current and developing strategic circumstances and examines the broad implications of these circumstances for our defence policies and postures. It begins with an overview of the global situation, in particular the current state of relations between the superpowers, and then examines the changes that have been occurring within our more immediate region of interest. The chapter concludes with an examination of the kinds of threats to Australia's security that could arise as a result of changes in our global and regional environment.

Australia's Global Outlook

The Global Outlook and Common Security

1.3   Australia's interests are affected both directly and indirectly by the pattern of global events and by developments in relations between other nations throughout the world. The present indications are that Australia's strategic environment of the 1980s and beyond will continue to be characterised by uncertainty and tension.

1.4   Globally, the outlook remains dominated by the continuing confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite recent US/USSR discussions, there is little indication that the existing tensions between the superpowers will reduce significantly within the foreseeable future.

1.5   Wars are currently in progress in the Middle East and Afghanistan. There are many tense confrontations elsewhere, particularly in Indo China and Central America. Such tensions stem from a variety of causes including conflicting territorial claims, historical animosities, religious and racial hatreds and battles for political influence and privilege. Most developing nations are also experiencing internal pressures stemming from economic underdevelopment and the maldistribution of resources and wealth. Many of these indigenous conflicts and tensions are complicated by the superimposition of East-West rivalry. There is an increased risk of superpower competition being transferred to the proving grounds of the Third World. Regional conflicts can themselves lead to wider escalation of tension involving the danger of great power confrontation.

1.6   Third World tensions and conflict are also being fuelled
by a burgeoning arms trade, in increasingly sophisticated
weapons, between industrialised and developing nations. The
greatest exporters of arms are the Soviet Union and the United
States, which together account for over 70 per cent of the
world's arms exports. The build-up of arms within the Third World
is part of a wider pattern of increasing expenditure on armaments
where altogether, the nations of the world now spend more than
US$700 billion on their armed forces each year.[1] Over three
quarters of this sum is accounted for by the industrialised
nations, but military expenditure by developing states is far
from trivial and is growing rapidly. More significantly,
expenditure on military research and development is increasing
even faster than overall military spending. Military research and
development contributes to increased military spending in two
ways; it increases the speed of weapon replacement and, more
importantly, it stimulates further research into effective
counter-measures and new weapons.

1.7   The continued growth in military expenditure is
decreasing rather than increasing international security as some
nations are confronted with a build-up of arms in their region.
The expenditure each year of over US$700 billion on armaments
also represents a significant diversion of resources - financial,
manpower, materiel and skills - away from areas of economic and
social need. The continuing failure to resolve problems of
malnutrition, inadequate health services and lack of public
education and welfare within developing nations contributes to the
growing disparities between North and South which can further
emphasise regional conflicts and tensions. Nor are industrialised
nations entirely free from the potentially adverse effects of the
spiralling arms race. Military expansion does not necessarily
increase employment. It may carry the risk of higher inflation
and it may reduce investment in productive capacity or facilities
such as hospitals and schools. While military research and

training can provide incidental or spin-off benefits for civil society, these may be less than would be achieved from direct investment in civilian research.[2]

1.8   Underlying these trends is the fact that we live in an increasingly interdependent world. Any future major conflict between the superpowers in particular is likely to have serious – some would argue catastrophic – consequences for all nations. It is in the interest of all nations therefore to seek to reduce political and economic tensions throughout the world and to re-examine the notion of stability based on armaments. Military confrontation should give way to a process of negotiation, rapprochement and normalisation, with the goal of removing mutual suspicion and fear. The key to reducing world tension and establishing greater national security lies in normalising the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

1.9   The Committee considers that Australia should maintain a defence capability not only adequate for deterring aggression and maintaining our treaty obligations but also able to cope with any indirect or direct threat to our national security. Our basic defence posture should be defensively and not offensively oriented. Australia's national security policies should take account of the principles of common security contained in the Palme Commission's report Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival.[3]These are that:

   a.   all nations have a legitimate right to security;

   b.   military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between nations (although it is recognised that all states must retain the right to use force in their own defence);

   c.   restraint is necessary in expressions of national policy. The urge to win advantage over others 'is the engine that drives the competitive acquisition of armaments and pushes the world towards nuclear war';

d.   security cannot be attained through military
     superiority or through threatening military
     postures. 'The basic aim must be to establish
     security at the lowest possible level of
     armaments';

e.   reductions and qualitative limitations of
     armaments are necessary for common security; and

f.   'linkages' between arms negotiations and
     political events should be avoided.

1.10   Australia has no desire to engage in a technological
arms race with other nations. The task of defending Australia
would be made easier if tensions within our international
community were reduced and both the global and regional balances
of power were based on reduced levels of arms. This is not to say
that Australia should not maintain a defence force or that we
should unilaterally disarm - clearly in an uncertain world it
would be foolish to do either.

Australia's Regional Outlook

1.11   The situation in Australia's immediate area of interest
- encompassing South-East Asia and the South West Pacific -
continues to be relatively stable. Beyond occasional skirmishes
between China and Vietnam, and intermittent fighting on the
Thai-Kampuchean border, there seems to be little likelihood of
major conflict within the region in the short term. This is due
partly to the delicate balance of forces operating within the
region and partly to the low strategic priority that has been
assigned to the area by both of the superpowers. In recent years
however, with the intensification and militarisation of the

East-West conflict, this situation has begun to change and the longer-term prospects for continued stability within the region are less certain. To the east, in the South West Pacific area, the Committee is conscious of the potential for change in one or more of the emergent island states with respect to superpower diplomacy.

1.12   The principal strategic change affecting the region has been the steady build-up of Soviet defence capacity in the Far East, and the Soviet Union's attempts to advance its interests in the region particularly through its alliance with Vietnam. Faced with the growing Soviet presence in the area, the United States has reaffirmed its determination to remain a Pacific power by building up its own forces, and it has pressed its regional allies to assume a greater role in regional defence.

1.13   Concern over Soviet intentions has also led a number of countries in the region to re-examine regional and local defence issues and to expand their defence forces. The Japanese Government, for example, under heavy pressure from the United States, is making a modest but noticeable increase in its defence expenditure thereby awakening fears of revived Japanese militarism among some of its neighbours. Most ASEAN states have also in recent years been steadily expanding and upgrading their defence forces and have shown increasing interest in various forms of bilateral defence cooperation. China has tended to reduce its defence spending over recent years in order to concentrate on improving its internal economic and social conditions. Faced with continuing strategic uncertainty however, China could begin to accelerate modernisation of both its nuclear and conventional forces.

Soviet Expansion[4]

1.14   Both East and South East Asia have become increasingly important to the Soviet Union in terms of its global priorities, particularly since the decline in Sino-Soviet relations in 1978 and the development over the past decade of a generally unfavourable diplomatic and political line-up within the region. From the Soviet Union's point of view, Siberia remains highly vulnerable to both the Chinese and the West. To this end Moscow has initiated a number of military and political moves aimed at extending its influence and military reach within the region, off-setting United States power, and discouraging closer ties between the United States, China and Japan. These moves include the invasion of Afghanistan, the conclusion of political and economic arrangements with Vietnam, attempts to soften relations with China and a range of diplomatic and military pressures on Japan including regular air and sea intrusions into Japanese air and sea space and stationing military forces on the disputed 'Northern Territories' in the Kurile Islands.

1.15   The continuing conflict in Indochina also provides the Soviet Union with the opportunity and the time to expand its military influence within South East Asia through its relationship with Vietnam. Vietnam remains dependent on the Soviet Union for military and economic aid in order to maintain its war efforts in Kampuchea and to maintain a stable economy at home. Moscow provides Vietnam with about US$1 billion worth of aid annually and has sent advisers and technicians to assist Hanoi. The longer the war in Kampuchea continues, the stronger the alliance between Moscow and Hanoi is likely to become. This is not to say that Vietnam will become a Soviet vassal. Hanoi continues to view relations with other regional powers from its own perspective and has given support to the zone of peace concept first proposed by Malaysia, in which all external powers would be required to withdraw their forces from South East Asia.

1.16   Over the past two decades, the Soviet Union has also steadily increased the size and quality of its strategic and theatre military forces in the Far East such that they now are second only to its forces confronting NATO. The USSR has also expanded its security infrastructure in the region. Where it once concentrated virtually all of its force at base complexes at Vladivostock and the nearby port of Nakhoda, the USSR now has substantial bases at Korsakov, Sovetskaya Gavan and Petropavlovsk in the Far East, with lesser facilities in Danang and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Dahlak in Ethiopia and Aden in South Yemen.

1.17   The USSR now has over fifty divisions deployed throughout its four eastern military districts — Central Asia, Siberia, Transbaikal and the Far East — compared with only 20 divisions in 1965. While most of the Soviet units are below strength, they are being progressively modernised. Soviet forces in the region are being equipped with the latest T-72 tanks, 152 mm howitzers which are capable of firing tactical nuclear weapons, and Mi-24 Hind ground attack helicopter gunships.

1.18   The Soviet air forces in the region comprise some 420 bombers, over 1500 fighters (including interceptors) and fighter-bombers and about 150 patrol aircraft. More than half of the fighters and fighter-bombers are MiG-23 Flogger B, MiG-27 Flogger D, Su-24 Fencer, and other third-generation aircraft with long-range, large payload and high-speed low-altitude penetration and electronic warfare capacity. The bombers deployed in the Far East now include some 60 Tu-22M Backfire medium-range supersonic bombers. The Backfire has a combat radius of 3400 miles, flies at Mach 2.5, and carries AS-4 missiles with a range of 150 miles.

1.19   The Soviet Pacific Fleet has also been steadily increasing in size and strength since the mid-1960s and currently comprises some 810 vessels, which is approximately one quarter of the total Soviet naval strength. The Pacific Fleet includes two aircraft carriers, 31 ballistic missile submarines and over 80

major surface combatants. The Fleet's air strength consists of about 330 combat aircraft. The Pacific Fleet also includes one division of naval infantry (about 5000 all ranks) which is equipped with T-54/55 medium tanks, PT-76 light tanks, BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers, M-1974 122mm self-propelled howitzers, BM-21 122mm multiple rocket-launchers and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles.

1.20   Part of the Pacific Fleet is normally detached to the Indian Ocean region and to the South China Sea. The Soviet Navy began regular deployments to the Indian Ocean in 1968 and Moscow has concluded cooperation agreements with a number of countries including Mozambique, Ethiopia and South Yemen to facilitate operations there. The USSR also has a treaty of friendship and cooperation with India. Following the Iranian revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet naval strength in the Indian Ocean was markedly increased (as was that of the US Navy). In 1980 there were around 20 naval vessels at various anchorages at Dahlak, Aden, Socotra, and in the South Indian Ocean. The Pacific Fleet seems also to have increased its activities in the Pacific region. Although no precise data on the extent of this activity are available, it is clear that Soviet SSBNs routinely patrol near the west coast of the United States and Soviet vessels conduct major exercises off the coast of Japan and South Korea.

1.21   In 1978 the Soviet Union concluded a friendship and cooperation treaty with Vietnam, immediately before Vietnam invaded Kampuchea, and has since provided large amounts of military and economic aid. In return it has acquired the right to use naval and air facilities in Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, from which Soviet naval vessels (between 20 and 26) normally operate and where facilities for nuclear submarines have reportedly been constructed. Tu-95D Bear long-range reconnaissance and other aircraft carry out regular patrols. The Vietnamese bases enable

the Pacific Fleet to support the operations in the Indian Ocean, and to carry out surveillance of US naval activities in the South China Sea.

1.22   Soviet intermediate nuclear weapons deployed in Asia have also been increased and are summarised in Table 1.1. They include some 108 mobile SS-20 IRBM, capable of reaching targets in much of Asia, long-range bombers and missile-carrying submarines. Around thirty percent of all Soviet SLBMs are on submarines based in the Pacific.

1.23   While the growth of Soviet forces and activities in the Far East has been substantial, it is largely focussed around the Soviet mainland and its principal bases and does not necessarily constitute a direct threat to Australia or its region of immediate interest. While Soviet ground and close air support forces in Asia are very large, the USSR would face severe problems in projecting its forces against another State in either South-East or even North-East Asia without both further increases in capability and substantial aid from a proxy nation in that area.

1.24   The Soviet Pacific Fleet is severely limited in its sea and airlift capacity. It is currently unable for example to move and sustain by sea much more than one of its lightly equipped naval divisions. Even then it would need to deploy this force under cover of either ground or sea-based air cover. In the latter case, while the Pacific Fleet includes an aircraft carrier capability, the current balance of naval power in the Pacific still clearly favours the United States with its much larger carrier forces and supporting bases located throughout the region.

1.25   The USSR also would probably be unable to deploy and support more than one airborne division without major air-lift

TABLE 1.1

SOVIET INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ASIA

Category and type	Number deployed (7/82)	First deployed	Max. range (km)	Warheads Max. yield	Weapons load	Notes
Sea-launched (SLBM)						
SS-N-5	24	1964	1400	1-2MT.		3 launchers each on 8 subs (2 Golf II-class and 6 HOTEL-CLASS)
Land-based (I/MRBM)						
SS-4	77	1959	2,000	1MT		Being replaced by SS-20
SS-20	108	1977	5,000-7,400	3x150K T		Model 3 has range of 7,400km
Land-based (SRBM)						
SS-1c Scud	177	1965	300(+)	100KT.)		
SS-12 Scaleboard	50	1969	850	1MT...)		Being replaced by SS-22
SS-22	33	1978	900(+)	N/A...)		
SS-23	N/A	1980	450	N/A		
Bombers*						
Medium range						
Tu-16 Badger	100	1954	2,400		20,000lb	Including AS-5, AS-6
Tu-22M/-26 Backfire	40	1974	4,000		17,500lb	Including AS-4, AS-6
Strike aircraft* land-based						
MiG-21 J/N Fishbed	30	1956	480-640		2,000lb	
MiG-27 Flogger D	180	1973	640-800		7,500lb	
Su-17 Fitter C/D	220	1972	480-640		11,000lb	
Su-19/24 Fencer	N/A	1974	800-960		8,000lb	

Figures extracted from The Military Balance 1983-84

redeployments. It would also again face the problem of trying to win local air supremacy during the initial drop and support phase of any airborne assault.

1.26   While these limitations currently mitigate against a major conventional deployment of Soviet forces into the region, Soviet long-range amphibious capabilities are steadily growing. In addition, the Soviet nuclear submarine and land-based missiles could pose a significant threat to allied bases, shipping and lines of communications.

The American Response

1.27   American policy towards the Asian-Pacific region is dominated by considerations of its own strategic interests and the threat that is posed to these interests by the Soviet Union. South-East Asia and the Pacific Basin area are seen as vital links in a strategic chain of American national interests that extend from the Arabian Gulf to America's western seaboard. Beside being a supplier of some vital raw materials, much of South-East Asia sits astride the waterways that are important to America and crucial to its most important Asian ally, Japan.

1.28   These strategic interests are supplemented by growing economic ties with Japan and ASEAN. Trading links between the countries of ASEAN and the United States for example, have significantly increased over the last few years. Grouped together, the countries of ASEAN constitute the fifth largest trading partner of the United States. The United States currently has over $US3.5 billion directly invested in the ASEAN states, which represents 21 per cent of all its direct investment in East Asia and 2.3 per cent of America's total world investment.

1.29   United States policy for the region, while not always clear, appears to aim to:[5]

a.   build up United States military power within
     the Pacific;

b.   reaffirm its defence commitments to South
     Korea in order to deter communist aggression
     there;

c.   share defence responsibility with supporting
     nations in the region, particularly with
     Japan;

d.   improve relations between the United States
     and the Peoples Republic of China; and

e.   support the continued political and economic
     viability of ASEAN primarily through
     bilateral assistance.

The United States has mutual cooperation and security treaties
with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, New Zealand
and Australia; and a military aid agreement with Thailand. The
United States also provides military aid on either a grant or
credit basis to Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and
Thailand.[6]. There are major American bases in Japan, South Korea
and the Philippines; a joint US/British base at Diego Garcia; and
air (B-52) and naval refuelling facilities in north and west
Australia respectively. A summary of major United States forces
in the region is given in Figure 1.1.

1.30   The United States therefore is attempting to contain
Soviet influence in the region by increasing its own presence and
by strengthening the quasi-alliance relationship which has
built-up over the past decade among the United States, China and
pro-Western nations in the region. Recent developments however,
have shown that there are major difficulties associated with
maintaining a pro-western grouping of such disparate and varying
interests, and that this power configuration may not be as
durable as might be expected or hoped. Otherwise sound

Figure 1.1 : US Military Deployment in the Western Pacific

Source: Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security 1983*, Tokyo, 1983, p. 53.

Sino-American relations have been marred by differences over the sale of arms to Taiwan and by continuing tensions over American trade restrictions. There has also been continuing tension and disagreement between the Japanese and American governments over trade and security matters and over economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Difference between Tokyo and Beijing have also arisen from China's postponement or cancellation of a number of large-scale economic cooperation projects and by China's fear of re-emerging Japanese militarism.

1.31   It is likely that the Soviet Union will continue to seek advantage from these tensions to woo China and Japan away from the United States which under President Reagan is seen by the Soviet Union to be pursuing policies increasingly hostile to it. Over the last few years, the USSR has made a number of overtures to China aimed at improving their relations, including an initial proposal to negotiate a new Sino-Soviet agreement based on principles of 'mutual respect for each others interests, no interference in each others internal affairs and mutual benefit.' While these initiatives have met with some success, it is unlikely that relations between the two nations will revert to the close relations of the 1950s. The establishment of close relations between China and the Soviet Union remains fundamentally constrained by the considerable Soviet forces in the region. They could also reduce China's chances of getting Western and Japanese assistance for its programs of economic and military modernisation.

1.32.   Moscow would also like better relations with Japan in order to discourage Tokyo from increasing the pace of its rearmament efforts and from cooperating more closely with the United States in defence of Western alliance interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Soviet-Japanese relations are unlikely to improve in the immediate future, however, because of the continuing build-up of Soviet forces in the Asia-Pacific region, and the long standing territorial dispute over the northern islands.

1.33   While these factors are unlikely to lead to a basic
realignment of the distribution of power in the region in the
short term, the longer term prospects will depend on a number of
factors including:

   a.   the extent of Moscow's willingness to make
        concessions to China and Japan;

   b.   the success or failure of China's economic
        modernisation efforts;

   c.   the willingness of American and Japanese
        officials to adopt policies to contain growing
        suspicions in their relations, and

   d.   the continuing build-up of arms within the
        region.

ASEAN Perspectives and Capabilities

1.34   For their part, ASEAN countries view the expansion of
Soviet influence in the region with considerable concern, not
least because of Soviet support for Vietnam and the Vietnamese
invasion and continued occupation of Kampuchea. Fear of Soviet
expansionism was a major consideration in the recent upgrading
and modernisation of the defence forces of most ASEAN nations.
ASEAN states also generally support the continued presence of the
United States Pacific Fleet facilities in the Philippines and the
use of certain port facilities in ASEAN waters by the fleet.

1.35   The support for a more direct American presence in the
region remains qualified however and most ASEAN countries are
reluctant to identify themselves publicly as allies of the United
States, particularly in the broad context of American global
policies. While a United States presence in the region is seen to
provide the balance of power necessary for the maintenance of

peace and security in South East Asia, it also poses potential problems for some ASEAN states. The US move towards a strategic alliance with China is viewed with anxiety by a number of ASEAN countries because, despite the present convergence of interests between ASEAN and China over Kampuchea, China is still viewed by the majority of ASEAN states as posing a potential long term threat. For Indonesia, in particular, a strong Vietnam figures in strategic calculations as a buffer to China, and some interests within Indonesia would probably be prepared to come to terms with a Vietnam-dominated Indochina.

1.36   There is also concern by Indonesia and the Philippines in particular over America's perceived role for Japan. The United States has called on Japan to assume greater responsibility for the defence of a large area of the north west Pacific at least 1000 miles out from the Japanese home islands thus awakening fears of a re-emergence of Japanese militarism. A further compounding factor in the strategic equation is Singapore's fear that the absence of superpower involvement in the region could lead to a local dominance either in the form of an Indonesian hegemony or in the shape of an Indonesian-Malaysian condominium.

1.37   The different strategic perceptions of the individual ASEAN states are also reflected in their relationships with extra-regional powers. Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines continue to cooperate with extra-regional states, while Malaysia and to a lesser extent Indonesia, view regional security more in terms of excluding the influence of external powers and promoting ASEAN as the appropriate vehicle for ordering intra-regional relations.

1.38   While there may be continuing differences in strategic perceptions between ASEAN neighbours, all countries have begun to build-up their military capabilities. In 1982, ASEAN spending on defence overall totalled some $US8.2 billion in 1978 prices. The greatest increases have occurred in Malaysia (a three-fold

increase since 1978), Singapore and Thailand, both of which have doubled their defence spending over the five years. The present military capabilities of the ASEAN states are summarised in Table 1.2. All ASEAN states have increased the size and capabilities of their armed forces in recent years, with increasing priority being given to the development of defence infrastructure and conventional warfare capabilities over those required for traditional counter-insurgency operations. Insurgent groups continue to pose problems in all countries other than Singapore. With the possible exception of the Philippines, however, these are unlikely to threaten seriously any ASEAN government in the foreseeable future. The growing concern over the ability to meet an external threat stems principally from the developments in Indochina since the early 1970s and the gradual build-up of Soviet forces and influence in the region. They are compounded by the finite nature of American military power and by Washington's limited commitments to help maintain regional security.

Defence Cooperation among ASEAN States

1.39   Over recent years, there has also been a marked increase in defence and security cooperation and collaboration among the individual ASEAN states. The major military agreements and arrangements among the states are summarised in Table 1.3. In addition to these formal and semi-formal arrangements, there is considerable intelligence liaison and exchange of information among ASEAN countries, exchanges of personnel, and cooperation in military training including training for counter insurgency and special forces operations. There have been moves to standardise command systems and combat procedures, and to produce and procure military supplies and small arms on a joint basis.

TABLE 1.2 SUMMARY OF ASEAN ARMED SERVICES

Service	Description	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand
Navy	Number of personnel	42 000	8700+	28 000	4500	32 200
	submarines	3				
	frigates	9	2(2)	7	6(1)	
	corvettes			10	(2)	
	large patrol craft	14		16	3	21(4)
	coastal patrol craft	8		59	12	27(3)
	fast attack craft (FAC)	6	16(4)	3(3)	15(3)	8(8)
	minesweepers/hunters	5	2(4)		2	
	landing ships	13	2	31	6	
	combat aircraft	8				9
	combat helicopters	10(26)			15	8
Marines }	Personnel	12 000		9600	13 000	
}		2 Inf Regts		3 Bdes		1 Bde
	light tanks	30				
	armoured cars	12(28)		55	40	
	personnel carriers	36(19)				
Reserves			1000	12 000		

TABLE 1.2 SUMMARY OF ASEAN ARMED SERVICES (Contd)

Service	Description	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand
Army	personnel	210 000	80 000	60 000	45 000	160 000
	infantry	13 Bdes (+)	9 Bdes	5 Divs	3 Bdes	2 Divs
	armour/cavalry	2 Bdes	4 Regts	1 Regt	1 Bde	1 Div
	airborne/spec forces	2 Bdes	1 Regt	2 Bdes		1 Div
	artillery	5 Regts(4)	4 Regts	4 Regts	6 Bns	
	anti-aircraft	1 Regt	2 Btys		1 Div	
	heavy/med tanks	134			55 (116)	
	light tanks	295	(51)	28	273	344
	armoured vehicles		400(640)	100	970	512(368)
	long-range artillery		12	36	80(34)	
	short-range artillery		92		200	
	aircraft	198(120)			230(51)	
Reserves		19 000+	60 000	20 000	150 000	500 000
Air Force	personnel	29 000	11 000	16 800	6000	43 100
	combat ac	68	32	92	106	188
	ground attack sqn	2			1	
	ac	31	18(34)	24	47	2
	intercepter/AD sqn	2		2	3	
	ac	15	2	32	49	
	counter-insurgency	1		3		
	ac	15	11(12)	36	10	94
	reconnaisance	1	1		1	
	ac	7(2)	3	6	15	
	transport sqn	3	4			3
	ac	41(32)	37	63	14	37(25)
	helicopter sqn	1	4	1 wing	2	2
	ac	41(7)	65	50(35)	45	47
Reserves				16 000		

TABLE 1.2 SUMMARY OF ASEAN ARMED SERVICES (Contd)

Service	Description	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore	Thailand
Para-Military	Police	12 000	19 000	44 000	7 500	22 200
	Militia	70 000	90 000		17 000	
	Coastguard					
	Civil Defence					
	Defence Corps		350 000+	65 000	30 000	33 000

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1983-84, London, 1983 Figures in brackets denotes equipments on order.

Table 1.3: Summary of Major Military Agreements and
Arrangements between ASEAN States

	Phillippines	Singapore	Malaysia	Thailand
Indonesia	Agreement on border cooperation Occasional joint naval exercises Cooperation on Celebes Sea area against piracy and smuggling.	Occasional naval exercises	Agreement on co-operation in counter insurgency operations in Sarawak/Kalimantan border area. Regular joint naval /air exercises. Planned cooperation in small arms production.	Agreement on bord cooperation. Occasional naval exercises
Thailand	Co-signatories of SEATO	Occasional military exercises	Agreements on joint operations against insurgents in border areas. Occasional military exercises.	
Malaysia		Co-signatories of Five Power Defence Arrangement.		
Singapore	Phillippines provide manoevre areas and artillery ranges for the training of Singapore's armed forces. Training exchanges			

Sources: Ron Buisken, Defence Resources of South East Asia and the
South West Pacific: A Compendium of Data, SDSC, Canberra, 1980.

Implications for Australia

1.42   The growing emphasis placed on defence and security
issues by the countries of ASEAN underlines their common concern
with containing potential conflicts within the region, minimising
the scope for increased involvement by extra-regional powers and
providing   a   climate   for   continuing   economic   growth   and
prosperity.

1.43   These interests are also shared by Australia. The broad
region encompassing the ASEAN nations is of vital strategic
significance to us since it is from or through these areas that
any major conventional assault upon Australia is likely to occur.
Any   significant   change   in   regional   stability   or   in   the
relationships between countries in the area could introduce or
expand uncertainties in Australia's strategic prospects. While
such changes may not directly threaten Australia, they could
promote developments that might not be in our longer term
interests. Military conflict or protracted high levels of tension
between regional adversaries for example, or the disintegration
of the domestic political situation within a country in the
region, could provide scope for increased involvement in the
region by extra-regional powers or require Australia to take
sides in a dispute.

1.44   In seeking to promote regional stability and security,
it is well to remember that Australia's past military posture -
deploying forces forward into the region in support of our major
allies - is no longer apposite. Despite a growing interest in the
Asia-Pacific area, the United States is unlikely to again commit
new ground forces into the region and will rely on its sizeable
air and naval power to offset the growing military presence of
the Soviet Union. By and large, this muted American presence is
desired by the countries of ASEAN and their Asian neighbours,
many of whom are inclined to the view that regional harmony is
best   promoted   through   forums   and   processes   which   exclude
non-Asian   states   -   including   Australia.

All ASEAN countries for example have selected the Northrop F5E fighter and the McDonnell-Douglas A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft as part of their expanding aircraft inventories.

1.40   While there has been increased bilateral collaboration and cooperation in defence and security affairs, there have been no moves to develop ASEAN into a formal joint military arrangement or pact, nor are there likely to be such moves in the near future. The reluctance of ASEAN governments to contemplate forming a military alliance stems from a number of factors. Despite their impressive individual arsenals, there is no combination of ASEAN forces which could match Vietnam's or China's military capabilities, and the planning and logistics problems associated with assembling a combined ASEAN force would be formidable. As has been argued in an article on ASEAN's force potential:

> '...it is difficult to imagine any way by which all of the far-flung ASEAN armies could be quickly and effectively concentrated in any likely battle area. Conflicting requirements for troops at home and difficulties in mobilisation and transportation of men and equipment would reduce the size of the force that each country could actually put into action on a foreign battlefield. Language differences would compound the operational problems of a combined ASEAN force and put it at a further disadvantage to the Vietnamese.'[7]

1.41   There is also the view within ASEAN that the establishment of a formal military alliance could be counter productive and provoke undesirable consequences within the region. Military cooperation between ASEAN states is also constrained by lingering suspicions and frictions between neighbouring countries which stem from the divergent historical and cultural backgrounds of the six nations and which continue to manifest themselves through territorial disputes, racial flare-ups and insurgency problems. These factors will continue to restrict the extent of multilateral cooperation within ASEAN and so it is likely that, barring the emergence of a major external threat to the region, future developments in security cooperation will occur principally on a bilateral basis.

1.45   While it is recognised that Australia has legitimate
interests in the region, we will tend to be seen by ASEAN as an
outsider or as being peripheral to the region or main interests
of the region. As the Foreign Minister, Mr Hayden, has recently
warned, we must also be aware of differing perceptions between
Australia and other nations over the security problems facing our
region and their potential solutions:

> 'Australia is geographically isolated, and from the
> perspective of other countries, 'safe'. This can tempt
> us to indulge in the luxury of preaching peace to
> countries which face much more complex security
> environments: a regional environment of danger and
> uncertainty on the Korean peninsular, in East Asia and
> in Indochina; a growing Soviet presence and military
> capability in the region; and in many cases the problem
> of internal subversion.'[8].

1.46   This does not mean that countries in the region do not
value continuing relations with Australia including the provision
of military assistance under the defence cooperation program. As
the Department of Foreign Affairs has observed:

> 'While relatively small, the programs afford tangible
> evidence of Australia's readiness to assist these
> countries in their efforts to maintain their own
> security and underline Australia's commitment to
> regional security. To the extent that the programs are
> successful, they serve as a disincentive to the
> intrusion into the region of outside powers with
> interests inimical to those of Australia.'[9]

1.47   Having said this, it should also be recognised that
Australia has only a limited capacity to provide unilateral
military aid or assistance to its neighbours, or to directly
influence a regional dispute through the provision of direct
military support. Moreover, we must be careful not to

over-emphasise regional security aspects at the expense of our
own national interests and objectives. A potential dilemma for
Australia in seeking increased military ties with other countries
in our region is that it provides them with the opportunity to
monitor and assess our own weaknesses and vulnerabilities and to
build-up capabilities that could eventually be used in ways that
do not serve Australia's interests.

1.48   The Committee considers therefore that Australia should
continue to promote regional security and stability primarily
through diplomatic, political and economic means. While we should
be prepared to provide military assistance to individual nations
of ASEAN and the Western Pacific we must be careful not to try to
impose our own perceptions and values on the region. In
considering requests for assistance we should also keep in mind
our own security interests. While the region is important
strategically to Australia, we should not let regional concerns
distract us from our own self-defence efforts and activities. In
particular, we should continue to monitor the military capacities
and intent of potential regional adversaries and maintain our own
relations with the United States.

Threats to Australia's Security

1.49   Australia's national security policy and its defence
force structure must ultimately provide protection against
threats to our national well-being and to the survival of our
national institutions. In a previous report to the Parliament,
Threats to Australia's Security, this Committee considered in
some detail the possible external threats to Australia. The
findings of that report provide the basis of our present
considerations, although we have taken into account additional

information and issues that have been raised since the
publication of that report

1.50   The threats to Australia's security are considered under
the general classifications used in the earlier report: low level
contingencies;   intermediate   level   threats   to   Australian
interests; invasion of Australia; and the potential for global
conflict and its implications for Australia. Within each of these
categories, we discuss, in general terms, the circumstances which
could lead to the emergence of the threat, the likelihood and
general nature of each threat, and its broad implications for
Australia's defence. We then draw some conclusions on the role of
the Defence Force in both deterring and countering these threats,
and some of the broad functional capabilities therefore required.

1.51   The Committee considers that the grouping of threats
into these categories provides a reasonable descriptive basis of
Australia's threat environment and one which broadly facilitates
military strategic and force structure planning. It orders
threats   roughly   in   terms   of   probability   and   potential
consequences (low level threats are the most likely but have
least consequences whereas the invasion of Australia is the least
likely threat but carries with it the most serious consequences).
We must be careful however not to consider each category of
threat in isolation. As one witness put it to the Committee, all
levels of threat are linked:

    '...you have to assume that even the lowest level of
    threat contains the seeds of escalation. The minute you
    enter a low level threat situation you should, will be
    forced to, automatically reach into your pocket for the
    second level of escalation. So the day we enter [a] low
    level threat we are already in the situation of
    mid-level threat.'[10]

Australia cannot afford therefore to predicate its military
strategy and defence force structure purely on the basis of
meeting low level threats to our security. Like the threats

themselves, our response capacity must contain at least the seeds
of escalation or expanion in order to handle the higher level
threats as they develop.

Low Level Contingencies

1.52   In its previous report, the Committee noted that
Australia could be confronted by one or several of the following
situations:[11]

a. sporadic attacks against key civil facilities
    and installations such as power stations,
    petroleum refineries, water supply, pumping
    stations and communications facilities;

b. attacks against isolated military facilities;

c. harassment   of   our   shipping,   fishing
    activities, and offshore exploration and
    exploitation;

d. sporadic intrusions into Australia's air
    space by military aircraft or smugglers;

e. military support for the illegal exploitation
    of our offshore resources;

f. the planned introduction of exotic diseases
    or the support of illegal migrants or
    drug-runners;

g. harassment of our nationals or a threat to
    their safety in overseas countries including
    seizure of overseas property and Australian
    embassies;

h. external support for dissident elements in,
    or military pressures against, a regional
    country the security of which is important to
    Australia;

i. covert or overt overseas support for
    Australian dissident or minority groups in
    Australia who might be encouraged to resort
    to terrorist action;

      j.   overseas based terrorist groups using violence or threats of violence in Australia *or on an Australian aircraft; and*

      k.   *large-scale but non-violent intrusions into Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone for the purpose of poaching scarce resources.*

1.53   Low level threats of this type could occur anywhere in Australia, in its offshore resources zone or our offshore *dependent territories. They could be perpetrated by any adversary* state, group or organisation. The threats could be carried out with only minimal resources. The level of force used would normally be capable of being countered by Australia's current peacetime resources.

1.54   The motive for perpetrating a low level threat of this kind could stem from a disagreement with some aspect of Australia's national policy. It could be used to influence or compel Australia to accept a particular military or political condition. The action could be used to draw attention to a domestic or international issue, or it could simply seek pecuniary gain. Low level threats could be part of a much broader and long-term strategy of persuasion against Australia which employs a range of political, economic and military presures (including a <u>fait accompli</u>) and is designed to influence or undermine Australian public opinion and so increase pressure on our national leaders to accept a negotiated settlement which favours the instigator. While some situations could occur without warning, most low level contingencies are likely to have antecedent causes and developments. In particular, threats involving covert action by foreign agents are unlikely to occur without some degree of tension between that country and Australia. The Committee continues to believe that such tension between Australia and any other country in our region does not exist now nor is it likely to in the foreseeable future.

1.55   Effective deterrents to low level threats include:

    a.   an effective civil and military surveillance
       capability which is integrated under a
       central control, which also has quick access
       to suitable reaction forces;

    b.   strong and efficient anti-terrorist
       capability;

    c.   continued provision for the lawful redress of
       grievances within Australian society;

    d.   foreign policy directed toward avoiding
       serious deterioration of Australia's
       relations with other countries;

    e.   provision for adequate protection of vital
       points in Australia's civil and military
       infrastructure which might prove attractive
       targets; and

    f.   an enhanced presence of 'territorial' type
       forces in Northern Australia which could
       report on or react to low level incursions.

Intermediate Level Threats

1.56   The Committee considered that intermediate level threats
included:

    a.   lodgements on Australian territory that are
       limited (including in time). The areas that
       appear to be more vulnerable as targets for
       limited lodgements would be offshore islands
       and territories as for example the Cocos
       Islands, or the Torres Strait Islands, or
       areas of northern and north-western
       Australia such as Cape York Peninsula, Arnhem
       Land, parts of the Kimberley or Pilbara
       regions and Australian territory in
       Antarctica;

    b.   major raids. Targets for this level of threat
       are more likely to be military bases, key
       civil installations and facilities and the

joint United States/Australian defence facilities. To be regarded as intermediate level threats, such raids would need to be on a continuing basis, or comprise seize-and-hold operations against major facilities or resource installations;

c. external aggression against a regional country, the security of which is highly important to Australia. This would apply particularly to states and territories in the Indonesian/Melanesian archipelago and to New Zealand;

d. the blockade of an Australian port or ports including the relatively economical device of laying mines; and

e. the disruption of our lines of shipping communications, or the closure of a strait. As Australian trade is important to other powers and is mostly carried in foreign ships, it is difficult to envisage such a contingency occurring except as part of a more general conflict.

1.57 To be regarded as an intermediate level threat, it would have to have limited objectives (against Australia) under policy limitations as to the extent of the destructive power that might be employed and the extent of the geographical areas that might be involved. A response to most intermediate level threats would require a substantial expansion of the Australian Defence Force. Allied support could be forthcoming, but would probably be in the form of logistic support rather than combat troops.

1.58 In order to pose an intermediate level threat involving a lodgement on the Australian mainland or one of its territories, the Committee considered that a notional enemy is likely to need the following capabilities:

a. naval and air forces required for at least local superiority to cover the lodgement;

b. strategic transport from embarkation points to the part or parts of Australian territory selected for attack; and

    c.   the ability to sustain and protect the force
        against inevitable countermeasures, for the
        duration of the operation.

1.59   Putting aside the question of motive, the Committee considered that currently only the superpowers and possibly some friendly European powers have the capability to pose an intermediate level threat to Australia. The possible motives for mounting such pressures against Australia include: a serious disagreement with some aspect of Australia's domestic or foreign policy; greater access to resources; at the invitation of internal dissident forces; or as a result of heightened tensions between the superpowers. As mentioned in the consideration of low level contingencies, Australia currently does not have serious disputes with any nation and is unlikely to do so into the foreseeable future.

1.60   The warning times associated with the development of an intermediate threat are likely to be considerable (years away rather than months). As the Committee's previous report noted:

> 'An intermediate level action against Australia
> could be expected to be preceded by a substantial
> period during which relations with the notional
> enemy state deteriorated. If the hostile state
> were other than one of the superpowers, it would
> in most cases take a considerable period to build
> up its capability to mount such an operation. If
> the hostile state were closely allied to a
> superpower, it could be assisted to build up its
> capability more quickly or be provided with
> technical and logistic support for warlike
> operations.'[12]

1.61   The principal deterrents to intermediate level threats include:

    a.   the ability of Australia's naval and air
        forces to attack and destroy an enemy's
        attacking forces, lines of communications and
        home bases;

b.   strong ground forces that can be readily
     deployed to meet and destroy attacking
     forces;

c.   the possession of an effective and integrated
     surveillance system;

d.   the employment of forces (both regular and
     territorial) within more vulnerable
     locations;

e.   continued defence co-operation with the
     United States and continued participation in
     ANZUS;

f.   strong commercial and diplomatic links with
     other countries which could be used to
     'internationalise' any potential conflict;
     and

g.   visible evidence of a national will to resist
     potential enemies.

Invasion of Australia

1.62   The third level of threat considered by the Committee
was the possibility of a major assault on the mainland using
conventional warfare, with the aim of seizing considerable
territory and resources, or the complete conquest of Australia. A
threat of such magnitude would threaten the survival of the
nation and would require full mobilisation and extensive national
commitment of resources to counter it.

1.63   The Committee considered that, on the basis of the high
level of capabilities needed to pose such a threat, only the
United States and the Soviet Union are presently capable of
invading Australia with any real prospect of success. Even then,
the capacity of the Soviet Union to invade Australia is presently
constrained by its limited capacity for long-range intervention

against a well-armed opponent and its requirement for an intermediate staging post in South East Asia in order to 'provide an attacking force with effective air cover and to keep its shipping operational'. The Committee judged that neither superpower currently has a motive for invading Australia, nor is one likely to develop except 'as a consequence of a preceding serious deterioration in relations between the two superpowers'.

1.64   Regional powers such as China, Japan, India, Vietnam and Indonesia do not have the capacity to invade Australia, and even if they wanted to, they would take considerable time and effort to develop such a capacity. As a result, Australia could expect considerable warning (estimated to be between five and ten years). The likely warning time for invasion by a superpower would be less but would be likely to be years rather than months.

1.65   The major deterrents to invasion are similar to those for meeting intermediate level threats, and they stem principally from Australia's unique geographic position which imposes the need for an enemy to acquire significant maritime capabilities to transport and support a large invasion force.

1.66   The Committee argued that the concept of deterrence 'should be central to Australia's defence planning', particularly in a period of no imminent or foreseeable threat. In view of Australia's small standing forces, an important objective of any deterrent strategy would be to gain time to expand the Australian Defence Force to meet the threat of invasion. The Committee noted that this may be achieved by the concept of disproportionate response.

> '... 'Disproportionate response' is a concept,
> within the context of strategic deterrence, which
> advocates progressively incorporating into the
> Australian Defence Force specific capabilities
> that would cause a potential aggressor to respond
> disproportionately in terms of cost in one or all

> of money, time, material and/or manpower in order
> to gain the advantage. For example, it is
> *conceivable that the purchase by Australia of some*
> extra submarines might force a potential enemy to
> need anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities
> costing many times as much as those extra
> submarines. In addition to this extra cost
> incurred, the potential aggressor would need to
> extend his force preparation time greatly, since
> these capabilities require complex command and
> control facilities and procedures, logistic
> support, trained crews, and so on. If, in this
> *example, the enemy is not deterred,* Australia
> would still have the option of raising its level
> of deterrence by adding more of the same
> capability or others specially chosen in the light
> of their ability to cause the potential aggressor
> to make a disproportionate response.[13]

The concepts of deterrence and disproportionate response, and
their application in the development of defence force structure,
are considered in more detail in Chapter Five.

1.67   The Committee acknowledged that deterrence essentially
involved establishing in the mind of a potential adversary a
perception of the military capacity of Australia and its will to
resist and so deterrence could fail for a number of reasons. It
was argued that:

> '...care should be taken to ensure that the
> concept of disproportionate response is not only
> applied in the context of deterrence but is also
> taken into account when considering the military
> requirements for the actual defence of Australia.
> To be cost effective, preparations should be
> suitable both for deterrence and for actual
> defence. Australia's force structure could well be
> tilted in favour of deterrence at the early stages
> when the likelihood of threat is low and potential
> enemies lack military capability to match their
> aggressive intentions. As threatening intentions
> are perceived to be reflected in the potential
> enemy's emerging force structure, then forces
> would have to be developed along more balanced
> lines to be credible in the context of Australia's
> actual defence.[14]

Implications of Global Conflict

1.68   The development of both the high and intermediate level threats to Australia or to Australia's area of primary interest is unlikely to occur without a corresponding decline in the relationship between the two superpowers. Global conflict could also result in Australia's being directly attacked with nuclear weapons or being exposed to the aftermath of a nuclear war. Australia therefore has an obvious interest in maintaining the central global balance of power between these two national rivals.

1.69   As mentioned earlier, the present prospects of direct nuclear or major conventional conflict between the superpowers appear to be small, although the potential for conflict may be increasing, particularly in view of the continuing qualitative developments in the superpowers' arsenals, continuing intransigence over disarmament and arms control negotiations and the proliferation of new weapons and technologies. There also remains the danger that peripheral disturbances could trigger a wider conflict.

1.70   In the event of general war occurring in the Northern Hemisphere, the Committee's earlier report argued that Australia's geographical situation is such that it is unlikely that we would be directly threatened with invasion, or that we would be automatically or immediately involved in a conventional conflict associated with general war. Similarly, it was considered that 'Australia would be unlikely to find its forces engaged during the initial stages of a war, except in limited activity in its immediate environment'. There was considered to be some risk that all of the joint Australian/United States facilities 'would be attacked during a Soviet/United States war that involved their nuclear forces'[15] The Committee still believes these conclusions are relevant.

1.71   The earlier report also considered that the initial
*effect of fallout from a nuclear conflict would be small and the
only short term damage that Australia would suffer 'would be*
large scale disruption to our economy because of the massive
destruction inflicted on some of our trading partners, and the
dislocation of world trade'[16]. The longer term implications for
Australia of large scale nuclear or conventional war were
considered to be more serious. Any major conflict would leave
millions of people homeless, large areas would be uninhabitable
due to high levels of radiation, medical supplies and supplies of
food and water would be inadequate, there would be a possibility
of widespread famine and many epidemic diseases could re-emerge.
A nuclear exchange therefore would impose severe and widespread
disruption to existing social, economic and security structures,
and it could have a significant impact on the central and
regional balances of power. In the ensuing chaos, medium and
small powers would need to be wholly self-reliant for their
security.

1.72   Since the publication of *Threats to Australia's
Security*, a number of scientific studies (the so-called 'Nuclear
Winter' studies) have been published describing the longer-term
climatic and biological effects of nuclear war.[17] While the
studies are incomplete and contain a number of assumptions, there
is the possibility that much of the Southern Hemisphere would
suffer severe long-term climatic and ecological effects as a
result of a nuclear war in the north. Australia would have no
defence against these effects. Even if the case for a 'nuclear
winter' has been overstated, the Committee believes that the
magnitude of the first-order effects is so large, and the
implications so grave, that we must take them seriously.

Summary

1.73   From this brief survey of Australia's strategic environment the Committee considers that:

  a. potentially the most dangerous threat to Australia's national security and well-being stems from the continuing poor relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and the prospects of armed conflict between them. Any major conflict is likely to escalate into nuclear war with incalculable consequences for Australia and the rest of the world;

  b. Australia can provide no direct defence against nuclear war, nor can it directly change or influence the global balance of power. We should continue to stress that it is in the security interests of all nations to seek to reduce political and economic tension throughout the world and to move away from the notion of stability based on armaments;

  c. Australia should also emphasise the common interests in achieving disarmament and arms control and we should avoid making national defence postures and policies that contribute to either global or regional competition and conflict. In this latter context, while Australia neeas to maintain a defence force for the protection of our national interests, our basic defence posture should be defensively rather than offensively oriented;

  d. While Australia's own region of interest is relatively stable, there are developments which could undermine the prospects for continuing stability in the longer term. These developments stem primarily from the growing superpower competiton within the region and the consequent build-up of armaments. It is in Australia's (and ASEAN's) longer-term interests to minimise tension and conflict within the region and maintain stability preferably without further encroachment by extra-regional powers and at a reduced level of armaments;

e. in seeking to ensure regional security
    Australia should be aware of its basic
    limitations and the different perceptions and
    perspectives of our neighbours. We cannot
    seek to impose our own values on the region;
    and

f. While Australia should continue to provide
    military assistance to other nations in the
    region, in terms of force structure planning,
    we should not let our regional concerns
    distract us from our own defence efforts and
    activities.

1.74   Despite these developments, the Committee believes that
only the United States, and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union,
have the physical capacity to invade Australia with any real
prospect of success. The Committee considers that it is
inconceivable that the United States would invade Australia, and
the USSR is unlikely to do so, except as a consequence of a
preceding serious deterioration in relationships between the two
superpowers.

1.75   Australia could still be subjected to a range of
low-level threats arising from within our region of interest with
little or no warning. The Committee concludes that Australia's
force-in-being should be structured and have the capabilities to
meet the more credible of these contingencies. We could also, in
time, be confronted by a number of higher-level threats which we
would need to counter independently and which would require
considerably more defence resources than we presently have or are
prepared to invest in. Methods of achieving an appropriate and
sensible balance between existing and future requirements and
utilising defence resources in the most effective way are central
dilemmas facing Australia's forces planners. These are addressed
in the remainder of this report.

CHAPTER TWO

OTHER FACTORS INFLUENCING AUSTRALIA'S

DEFENCE FORCE STRUCTURE

2.1   Australia's defence policies and the characteristics and
capabilities of the Australian Defence Force are influenced by,
and need to take account of, a number of internal and
institutional factors. These factors include the nature of
Australia's physical and geographical environment, the size and
distribution of our population, the nature and capacity of
Australia's industrial and civil infrastructure and the amount of
resources that can be spent on defence.

2.2   A second important area of influence stems from the
nature of the defence decision-making process itself. The making
of defence policy is not simply a matter of rationally developing
military capabilities from a consideration of Australia's
strategic environment. Like other areas of public policy, the
defence decision-making process is populated by strong interests
which seek to use bureaucratic and political power to influence
defence policy so that it reflects their own values and
preferences. These institutional influences are in operation all
the time. They also act independently of Australia's external
environment and so can serve to limit our ability to recognise
and cater for change.

2.3   Australia's defence policies and postures are also
influenced and constrained by past decisions and practices, in
particular by the various treaties and agreements to which we are
signatories. Of these, the most important is our current defence

relationship with the United States, for it is on this
relationship that Australia's ultimate security guarantee rests.

Australia's Physical Environment

2.4   In considering force structure options, force planners
should take into account the special and enduring features of our
physical environment. Australia will continue to enjoy the
advantages of being remote from the centres of world power and
strategic competition. It is also surrounded by a substantial sea
barrier. This strategic and physical isolation reduces the
motives for armed attack on Australia and requires that a
potential   aggressor   possess   quite   formidable   military
capabilities in order to carry out such an attack. As the
Committee noted in its report on Threats to Australia's Security
relevant factors in this respect are:[1]

> a. a notional enemy contemplating invasion of
>   Australia could be expected to consider a
>   ground force approximately three times as
>   large as the land forces Australia could
>   field against such an enemy;
>
> b. The transportation of such an invader's
>   considerable ground force would require a
>   large   concentration   of   troop   transport
>   vessels – a large target for maritime strike
>   forces – requiring a large escorting force of
>   warships and aircraft;
>
> c. A notional enemy would have to be capable,
>   perhaps   through   diplomatic   means,   of
>   obtaining and then securing against attack,
>   port and airfield facilities, probably in the
>   Indonesian/Melanesian island chain to our
>   north. He would also need to be capable of
>   commanding the maritime and air approaches to
>   Australia, which would require a large naval
>   force,   including   a   maritime   airpower
>   component, and large air forces based in the

adjacent islands. These same maritime bases would, of course, have to continue to secure the lines of supply of the invading force for the duration of the hostilities;

d. An invasion of Australia would involve a very difficult military operation - an amphibious landing - requiring an across shore capability, unless the enemy was able to seize and maintain an Australian port or airfield;

e. An invading power's air force would need to be capable of achieving local air superiority, and should include ground attack, reconnaissance, anti-submarine and transport elements. The invading ground force would have to be balanced and highly mobile, with armoured fighting vehicles and supported by troop carrying helicopters. Part of the force might require a paratroop capability;

f. Considerable logistic problems would need to be overcome after an invasion force had been landed. Unless the invasion force was to 'wither on the vine' it would require the continuous support of a large tonnage of ships and transport aircraft. Because of the long distances involved, its lines of communications would be vulnerable to interdiction; and

g. Finally, an invader, if he is to be successful, would require an occupation force sufficient to hold, control and presumably exploit the occupied area.

2.5   The need to possess these kinds of capabilities operates as a significant deterrence against a would be aggressor and it provides Australia with a degree of protection against major attack or invasion.

2.6   The natural advantages accruing from Australia's physical and geographical environment can be enhanced by developing a military capability that further increases the resources needed by an enemy to successfully invade Australia and so raise to the highest possible level the costs and associated risks of such an exercise.

2.7   While all force elements serve to increase the deterrent value of a defence force, some elements can require a disproportionately greater response on the part of the enemy than others. Decisions on the deterrent value of competing force structure elements would involve considerations of a number of factors including the existing capabilities of potential enemies, the likely cost to Australia of developing or expanding the capability and the time it would take a potential adversary to develop a counter force capability. The application to Australia's defence force structure of the concepts of deterrence and disproportionate response will be considered in more detail in Chapter Five. General areas in which the concepts could be applied however would include;

   a.   maritime and maritime air capabilities designed to prevent an enemy from gaining a lodgement on Australia's shores;

   b.   strategic strike capability against an enemy's lines of communications and forward bases; and

   c.   defensive and counter attack forces which could restrain an enemy's deployment and eventually defeat him.

2.8   While the enduring features of Australia's physical environment afford some measure of insurance against a major attack or invasion of Australia, they also represent potential vulnerabilities which could be exploited by an aggressor as well as pose significant problems for Australian forces seeking to counter such threats. In the case of low level contingencies in particular, the size and geographic features of our continent, the limited nature of our national infrastructure and the distribution of our population tend to favour the potential adversary and pose enormous problems for Australia's national security planners. Key considerations here include:

   a.   the length of our coastline, location of our island territories and the extent and nature of our offshore resource area;

b.   the size and geographic features of our
     continent;

c.   the small size and distribution of our
     population;

d.   the limited nature and relative concentration
     of our industrial infrastructure;

e.   the dispersion of our major natural
     resources; and

f.   the range and extremes in climate.

2.9   These problems are further compounded by the need to
protect extensive resources zones. These current and planned
zones comprise:

a.   Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ). This extends
     200 nautical miles out from Australia's
     shoreline;

b.   Continental Shelf. Australia currently
     exercises control over the exploitation of
     natural resources both living and non-living
     on its continental shelf. Under the
     prospective Law of the Sea Conventions,
     Australia will exercise sovereign rights for
     much larger areas than are presently covered
     by Australian legislation; and

c.   Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Australia will
     exercise sovereign rights over all natural
     resources within 200 nautical miles of its
     coastline.

2.10   All these factors emphasise the need for versatility,
mobility and endurance of our defence forces, for developing
operational and support concepts that are appropriate to the wide
range of circumstances under which our forces will operate and
establishing suitable infrastructure support.

Australia's Resources and Infrastructural Constraints

Australia's Defence Industrial Capacity

2.11   Australia's defence preparedness and our national security in any future conflict will be influenced by the capacity of our local defence industry to respond effectively to the requirements of the Australian Defence Force. The size and capabilities of Australia's industrial base, however, will always be limited by the economic constraints imposed by our small domestic economy. It is crucial therefore that this small base be structured to provide optimum benefit to Australia's present and future defence needs.

2.12   On the basis of evidence provided to the Committee, both in this inquiry and during earlier considerations, the indications are that our existing defence production facilities and capacities are not well adapted to our present and likely future strategic needs, and the ability of Australia's secondary industry to produce the quantity and quality of goods required within acceptable time and cost parameters continues to be limited.

2.13   In its submission to the Committee, the Department of Defence Support, which is responsible for providing support for the nation's defence efforts in peace and war, acknowledged that there has been a decline in the capability for local industrial support of the Australian Defence Force over the last decade. This decline has followed the general downturn in the manufacturing sector in Australia which has resulted from, among other things, inadequate capital investment and failure to compete with overseas industry. It is also partly a result of past policies and practices which have given priority to purchasing defence equipment from overseas sources, with

local industry simply providing back-up support for these equipments. As the Department of Defence Support put it, the consequence of these practices is that

> '...greater emphasis has been given to developing an industry which is necessary for limited support for the core Force than has been given to the systematic investment in a range of basic technologies and facilities which would allow an intensification and diversification of industry to match Force expansion should the need arise, and to developing the capacity to meet future equipment needs.'[2]

2.14   The Department also argued that Australia's continued (and growing) reliance on overseas equipments limits the options available to the Government in developing its force structure.

> '..such arrangements commit the Government to overseas production schedules which may or may not be in line with our own requirements and put undue pressure on other aspects of force structure development, particularly local industry programs.'[3]

2.15   The Department concluded that a more 'structured defence industry policy is required to be developed and enunciated to ensure that the objective of an appropriate level of industrial self reliance in defence is achieved.' Greater emphasis should be given to investing in selected technologies and facilities so that in the longer term, the defence force can 'look more to design, technological development and support from internationally competitive Australian sources.' For the immediate future, however, the Government should place 'greater emphasis on local industry involvement in overseas procurement' and seek to enhance Australia's general defence industrial base 'by selective investment in research and development, technology and facilities.'[4]

2.16   The state of Australian defence-related industries has been considered in detail in the Committee's earlier reports on

Industrial Support for Defence Needs and *Australian Defence Procurement.*[5] In those reports the Committee acknowledged the difficulties in fully supporting modern, highly technical armed forces, but concluded that given time, access to new technology and the provision of resources necessary for the production of high technologies, there is no reason why local industry could not, in due course, substantially satisfy Australian requirements for weapons platforms at the higher levels of technology. In particular, given the existence of a specialised industrial base in some areas, it should be possible to develop and support more advanced capabilities in shipbuilding, the aerospace and related industries and defence-electronics.

2.17   The Committee acknowledged that the relatively small Australian requirement for military equipments will always be a problem but that:

> 'It could be alleviated, to some degree, by the co-ordination, standardisation and rationalisation of requirements between the Services, other government authorities and, in some cases, the domestic market.'[6]

2.18   The Committee also noted that Australia is separated from its overseas suppliers of defence equipment by long lines of communications which are vulnerable and capable of being interdicted. Furthermore, in a deteriorating world situation, overseas suppliers may accord higher priority to their own needs than to Australia's, or, in a conflict with a regional country, they may be unwilling to provide Australia with its defence requirements.

2.19   From these kinds of considerations, the Committee considered that as a matter of principle:

> a.   Australia's indigenous defence-related industries should be developed to make us as free as possible from reliance on overseas

> sources of supply, should the strategic
> outlook deteriorate in circumstances when an
> overseas supplier would be unable – or
> unwilling – to provide us with the equipments
> vital to our survival as an independent
> nation; and

> b. changes in the size and shape of the Defence
> Force and improved self-reliance in local
> defence production should be implemented
> during the present period of assessed
> favourable strategic outlook.[7]

2.20 In spite of some progress in recent years towards
greater self reliance in our defence industrial capacities,
particularly through the Australian Industry Participation (AIP)
and the Offset Programs, the Committee believes that the state of
Australia's industries continues to be a matter of some concern.
The basic conclusions and recommendations contained in the
Committee's earlier reports dealing with defence industrial and
related matters, and the general thrust of the proposals put to
us by the Department of Defence Support are supported.

2.21 Australia should move towards establishing greater
defence industrial self sufficiency which takes better advantage
of the expertise and industrial infrastructure that is already
available. The Government should also continue to invest in
selected defence related technologies and facilities in order to
develop an industrial base that meets future defence
requirements. Areas in which such investment may be profitably
made are described in the later chapters dealing with defence
force capabilities, but generally involve the shipbuilding,
aerospace, electronics and selected armaments industries.

2.22 The Committee supports the proposition put by the
Department of Defence Support that Australia's defence industrial
base is an integral part of our force structure and that it makes
a significant contribution to our overall defence capacities and
the way these may be perceived by a potential aggressor. It is
important therefore that force structure planning and development

should take industry infrastructure matters into account. In this respect the Committee notes, and generally supports, the recommendations made by the report of the Utz Committee on The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia. The Committee considers however that a profitable and constructive use of Australia's industrial infrastructure is possible only if the basic concepts and strategies for the defence of Australia and its interests are developed and clearly articulated. Industrial policy, like other areas of defence policy, must flow from these broader considerations and not be developed in isolation.

Manpower Considerations

2.23   On 30 June, 1983, there were 97 544 permanent personnel and 36 685 part time personnel engaged in defence activities. The breakdown of these figures is shown in Table.2.1. The strength of the permanent Defence Force was 72 782. Of these, 31 245 or 43 per cent are located in either operational or logistic support forces. Losses from the Defence Force in 1982-83 totalled 7066 which represented a significant drop in wastage levels from recent years and was due in part to the downturn in the national economy. In spite of the improved retention rates of Service personnel, higher re-engagement rates and a reduction in earlier rank and trade imbalances, there continues to be shortages in skilled tradesmen within all three Services but within the RAN in particular.

2.24   In overall terms, the number and quality of potential recruits that can be made available for service in Australia's armed forces are limited by a number of demographic factors, such as the relatively small and stable size of our population and its changing age distribution, as well as other factors including the relatively high cost of manpower and the strenuous selection criteria for military service.

Table 2.1 : Defence Manpower

Category	Full Time	Part Time	Total
Civilian	24 762	1 076	25 838
Service			
RAN	17 198	1 204	18 402
Army	33 072	33 227	66 299
RAAF	22 512	1 178	23 690
Total	97 544	36 685	134 229

Source: Defence Report 1982-83, Appendix 3

2.25   These likely continuing restrictions on Australia's regular supply of manpower place limits on the strategic options that are available to us in both peace and war. Australia would not be able to maintain large, standing armies in peacetime for example, without the introduction of some form of conscription or national manpower mobilisation. Apart from the costs involved in such a scheme, it is unlikely under present circumstances to attract much public or political support. There are also those who argue that conscription poses a number of practical problems to our armed forces which could serve to decrease rather than increase their existing capabilities. In an earlier submission to the Committee for example, Colonel J.O. Langtry argued that:

> '...during the 1980s and 1990s a reasonably constant 130 000 to 140 000 young men will reach the age of 18 each year, and probably the same number of women. Even assuming that 30 to 40 per cent would be exempted, it would be beyond the Regular Army's capacity to cope with such an intake. It barely coped with the 20 000 or so who were recruited annually in the 1951-57 National Service Training Scheme. There would have to be a very significant increase in Regular Army manpower.[18]

2.26   Australia's manpower problems are complicated by the fact that modern armed forces are becoming technologically oriented with increasing emphasis on more sophisticated weapons and support sytems. The operation and maintenance of these new and developing technologies requires a highly specialised workforce, where many of the skills involved are more directly relevant to traditional civilian occupations than to the military. It is likely that this trend will increase rather than decrease in the future. Modern armed forces therefore are no longer repositories for unskilled or unwanted labour. More and more, the military needs to compete with other areas of Australian industry for a growing share of a relatively small segment of the labour force.

2.27   The convergence of military and civilian occupation structures, and its implications, are part of a broader debate that has taken place, principally in the United States, over the future role and organisational structure of the military.[9] A number of authors have suggested that the earlier clearly defined distinction between the military and the civilians is becoming increasingly blurred due to factors like:

   a.   the increasing emphasis on deterring violence rather than fighting wars which tends to civilianise military thought and organisation as military leaders concern themselves with a broad range of political, economic and social issues;

   b.   the complexity of the machinery of war and the increasing emphasis on research and development which weaken the boundary between the military and the non-military since both require a greater reliance on civilian-oriented techniques and skills;

   c.   the increasing cost and potential destructiveness of modern war which broaden the popular involvement in the consequences of war and increase pressure to improve civilian participation in the policy process and control over the military.

2.28   These pressures, so the argument goes, are tending to 'civilianise' the military by expanding both its value and skill base beyond traditional, largely combat oriented conceptions. Officers and soldiers alike are now required to be more aware of the potential social, economic and political consequences of their actions, and even the planning and conduct of war (or its prevention) increasingly require skills and orientations that are more common to civilian administrators. In the main, critics of these views tend to accept the changing nature of modern warfare and its broader range of requisite skills, but decry the apparent ascendency of management and engineering techniques over the more traditional areas of strategy and leadership.

2.29   Australia's limited manpower supply places a limit on the size and shape of its armed forces in both peace and war. While there may be some argument over what this limit could and

should be, the underlying message is clear. Australia should
avoid as far as possible strategic options that are manpower
intensive, and it should seek to make better use of its limited
skilled manpower resources.

Budgetary Limits

2.30   During the last three decades, the balance of social,
political, military and bureaucratic forces in Australia has
meant that the country has devoted a relatively stable proportion
of its resources to national security. During this period,
defence expenditure has remained around 3 per cent of gross
domestic product.

2.31   The divison of overall defence expenditure into the
major categories of capital equipment, capital facilities,
manpower and operating costs for the past decade is shown in
Table 2.2. From this table it can be seen that manpower costs
continue to represent a significant proportion (at least 50 per
cent) of total annual outlays and that expenditure on capital
equipment is tending to increase reflecting the growing
sophistication and complexity of modern weapons systems.

2.32   In its earlier report on Australian Defence Procurement,
the Committee noted that there has been much public debate on
what level of financial resources should be allocated to defence.
This debate has continued even though defence expenditure has
grown from around 2.6 per cent of GDP in 1979-80 to just on 3 per
cent in 1982-83. Advocates of a low defence posture have
maintained that this figure should be reduced while proponents of
a strong defence posture have pressed for further increases in
defence spending.

Table 2.2: Defence Expenditure — Major Categories as a Percentage
of Total Expenditure

	1972–73	73–74	74–75	75–76	76–77	77–78	78–79	79–80	80–81	81–82	82–83
Capital Equipment	12	7	6	8	13	13	15	16	16	13	17
		4	7	6						4	
Capital Facilities	5				6	5	4	3	4		4
Manpower	52	61	58	55	54	53	51	50	54	50	
Operating Costs	31	28	30	28	27	28	28	30	31	29	28

Note:
 • Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.
 • Defence co-operation is included in operating costs.
 • Category proportions are influenced by variations in other categories.
 • Historical data up to and including 1974–75 have not been adjusted in line with the re-
   classification of defence expenditure as defence function expenditure. See the 1973–74 budget
   speech.
 • Excludes expenditures on the acquisition of Special Purpose B707 aircraft.

Source: Department of Defence, *Defence Report 1982-83*, AGPS, Canberra, 1983, p. 31.

2.33   In its earlier report, the Committee concluded that
using percentages of GDP as a benchmark for determining either
overall defence expenditure or expenditures on capital equipment
is an arbitrary approach which has little meaning

> 'Clearly the only logical method is to determine
> the most cost-effective national strategy for
> defence, seeking a solution which would provide
> additional capabilities disproportionate to the
> investment, and then assess the costs of providing
> for that strategy, spreading the acquisition of
> major new equipments over a period of ten years,
> as proposed earlier. Should the financial burden
> prove to be too onerous over this period the
> electorate should be made aware of the consequence
> of failing to make provision for specific
> equipments.
>
> In the final analysis it should be the electorate,
> expressing its will through the Parliament, which
> determines the level of resources which should be
> allocated to achieve the national defence strategy
> and thus the effectiveness of that strategy.'10

2.34   The Committee continues to hold this view, but
recognises that in the present economic and strategic climate,
with no clear threat to Australia's national security either
existing or perceived, our defence expenditure is likely to
continue at around the present level unless there is a major
change in our external circumstances. Given these practical
limitations, it is very important that the resources allocated
for   defence   purposes   are   used   wisely.

The Nature of the Defence Decision-Making Process

2.35   The structure of Australia's defence forces and prospects for changing this structure are also vitally affected by the nature of the decision making process itself and the major interests and participants that are located within it.

2.36   While on the surface, defence policy-making constitutes a rational and ordered sequence of considerations linking Australia's strategic environment to requisite force structures and military capabilities, in practice, policy outcomes are often the product of the continuing interaction between individual bureaucrats or groups seeking, through various means, to advance their own interests and solutions. As Desmond Ball has argued:

> 'While necessary, neither organisational charts nor more detailed descriptions of formal processes are ever fully satisfactory explanatory tools. There are always, at the very least, some informal relationships and arrangements which impact substantively on decision-making outcomes, not to mention the inevitable political and bureaucratic-political factors.'[11]

2.37   As a result, policy outcomes may not be consistent, they may change as key participants or external circumstances change. They will often reflect compromises between the different interests involved and they could lead to the maintenance of force structures and military capabilities that do not have optimum relevance to the defence of Australia.

2.38   In Australia, national security and defence policy-making involves Cabinet, the Houses of Parliament and their Committees, various government departments and certain groups outside government such as the RSL, industrial and commercial associations, individual firms, and the media. In

spite of the number, and often high visibility, of some of these external interests, the consensus of opinion among academics and others seems to be that defence and national security policy-making in Australia is dominated by internal interests, particularly by those operating within the Department of Defence. Of these, the most important are the Minister for Defence, the Chief of Defence Force Staff, the Secretary of the Department of Defence and the three Services and their Chiefs of Staff.

2.39   Chief of the Defence Force Staff. The CDFS is the principal military adviser to the Minister for Defence and, subject to the control of the Minister, commands the Defence Force (it should be noted that the title of the CDFS is soon to be changed to Chief of the Defence Force or CDF). The CDFS is also responsible, jointly with the Secretary in most instances, for the administration of the Defence Force and he acts as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The CDFS is supported by an Assistant Chief of Defence Force Staff (ACDFS) and a Joint Military Operations and Plans (JMOP) Division. In accordance with an administrative directive issued by the Minister, the CDFS is responsible to the Minister for Defence for:[12]

> a.   the conduct of military operations by the Defence Force;
>
> b.   ensuring the effectiveness of military plans, training and organisation, the effectiveness of the Defence Force in the conduct of joint operations and the standard of discipline, morale and health of the Force;
>
> c.   tendering military advice on the size of the Defence Force and the balance within it in relation to the strategic requirements;
>
> d.   ensuring that the exercise of command within the Defence Force is within approved policies; and
>
> e.   recommending to the Minister Service promotions to one star (Brigadier or equivalent).

2.40   Underneath the CDFS are the three Services, which are made up of one or more operational and support commands. Each Service is headed by a Chief of Staff, who is supported by his respective Service Office.

2.41   **Service Chiefs of Staff.** The Service Chiefs of Staff are responsible to the Minister for Defence through the CDFS for:[13]

    a.   command of their respective Services under the authority of the CDFS and subject to the provisions of relevant Acts and Regulations, and to specific ministerial directions. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources, and for training, organising, directing, co-ordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned duties in accordance with stated policies, directions and programs;

    b.   the issue of single Service orders, and the planning for, and conduct of, single Service operations;

    c.   The provision of forces from the respective Service for assignment to joint operations; and

    d.   consultation with the CDFS on major matters relating to Service organisation, training and operational deployments and on anything which would significantly affect the operational efficiency or morale of the Service.

2.42   **Secretary of the Department of Defence.** The Secretary of the Department of Defence is responsible to the Minister for the administration of the Department and of the Defence Force. The Secretary is required to provide advice on the broad areas of 'policy, resources and organisation', and has both managerial and advisory duties in respect of financial planning, programming and

expenditure control. As the Permanent Head of the Department, the Secretary also has the wide ranging responsibilities prescribed by the Public Service Act as well as certain responsibilities under the Audit Act. The Secretary is supported by a number of functional and policy advisory units which together comprise the Defence Central Staff.

2.43   Each of these interests share a common concern for the country's national security, but because of different experiences and perspectives, they often manifest this concern in different ways. The Services, for example, tend to concentrate on military solutions which favour their traditional roles and equipments. As Morton Halperin and others have pointed out from American experience,[14] the Air Force is fundamentally concerned with combat flying, the Army seeks to develop a capacity to engage in ground combat operations employing traditional Army divisions and the Navy seeks to use surface naval ships to maintain control of the seas. These basic roles, and the hardware, expertise and knowledge needed to carry them out, are said to constitute the 'essence' of the respective organisations. The same applies to civilian groups dealing with defence matters, where those with experience in economic matters tend to see solutions primarily in economic or budgetary terms while those with foreign policy backgrounds often place emphasis on diplomatic rather than military initiatives.

2.44   According to Halperin and his colleagues, these major interests seek to maintain or increase their influence over the defence decision making process in order to promote their fundamental roles or to protect or enhance their favoured capabilities. Their ability to do this depends on their relative power which is in turn a function of both their formal and informal authority. The formal authority of an organisation or institutional interest group and its principal actors is determined by the level of the positions it occupies within the policy-making structure (here the structure can be a particular

service or the Defence establishment as a whole), by the range of functions and organisational values over which it is formally entitled to exercise power, and by the extent to which the interest group is unified with respect to other groups.

2.45   Informal authority or power involves being able to convince other power holders that it is in their own interest to carry out, or agree to, a particular course of action. The exercise of power in this way does not necessarily need formal authority but it does require a knowledge of the decision-making process and its principal interests. The execution of informal power is accomplished by a range of personal and bureaucratic skills. These include seeking alliances with other powerful groups, utilising personal prestige and popularity, exploiting technical expertise, manipulating information, coalition-building, precedent-setting and foreclosing alternative solutions. The successful pursuit or protection of vested interests can also be enhanced by exploiting broader environmental changes or uncertainties. Within defence in particular, the development of new technologies can be used by one group to gain advantages over another.

2.46   While both civilian and military groups are concerned with maintaining their fundamental roles and capabilities, a significant, and important, difference between the two lies in the ability of each group to assert authority over its individual members. As Richard A. Gabriel has argued[15], the relationship between the individual and the organisation within civilian bureaucracies is strongly tempered by material self interest. Within military organisations on the other hand, notions of individualism and self-interest are discouraged. The Services are able to use both their code of discipline and intense social pressures to align the values of the individual with those of the group (or its ruling elite). This process of normative control is enforced by defining rewards in terms of the individual's contribution to the organisation, through selective recruitment

(especially in peacetime), by emphasising training rather than
education and through the rotation of job assignments. All these
characteristics tend to strengthen the commitment and loyalty of
the individual towards the group, and encourage a general
acceptance of professional and organisational authority. Faced
with these kinds of pressures, career officers, including those
who serve in predominantly civilian or joint-Service
environments, come to view the national interest in terms of the
organisational interests of the Service to which they belong and
they often resist policy or budgetary changes which threaten the
'essence' of their organisation.

2.47   The continuing interaction of these divergent interests
is facilitated in Australia by the present structure of the
defence decision-making process where almost all policy decisions
and recommendations are made by committees. As noted in the
report of the Defence Review Committee, the Defence committee
system:

> '...provides a forum for exposing views on issues
> and options before advice on important matters is
> offered to government or executive decisions
> taken. It brings together the quite often
> differing perspectives, attitudes, views and
> judgements of the civilian and Service streams
> within the Defence Organisation. In this respect
> the committee system is integral to the support of
> the joint process by which Service and civilian
> interests and responsibilities are brought
> together to provide the necessary total
> perspective of defence issues required by
> government. It also allows the input to defence
> considerations of Departments such as Prime
> Minister and Cabinet, Foreign Affairs, Treasury
> and Finance, which have responsibilities that
> impact on the defence function'[16].

2.48   As mentioned earlier, the major implication of this
bureacratic model of defence decision-making is that decisions on
nearly all aspects of defence policy - including the development
of force structures and the selection and acquisition of major

weapons systems and equipments - can be influenced as much by the values and relative power of the different interests involved as by any external stimuli. The idea that internal considerations play a significant role in defence policy-making is gradually gaining acceptance within Australia although there remains a considerable difference of opinion over who wields the most power.

2.49   Following the 1973-76 reorganisation of the Department of Defence - in which the previously separate Service Departments were amalgamated under a single, integrated department - many Service officers have argued that the resulting organisation and formal distribution of power within the Department of Defence unduly favours the civilian elements at the expense of the military. The proponents of this view consider that insufficient weight is given to professional military views, particularly when the structure, equipment and capabilities of the Defence Force are being considered, and military contributions are limited more to the implementation of defence policy than its development. An issue of particular relevance to this inquiry is the further suggestion that these changes have undermined the ability of the CDFS to fully command the Australian Defence Force both in peace and war. It is argued that many of the administrative functions traditionally associated with the command of military forces now rest with the Secretary of the Department and, in order to fully exercise all elements of command, the CDFS has to depend on the cooperation of the Secretary and his staff. While informal collaboration and cooperation between the Secretary and the CDFS may be sufficient to overcome the conflicts of interests inherent in this arrangement in peacetime, this may not be the case under war-time conditions. A more streamlined organisational structure is said to be required in which the responsibilities of the major interests are clearly laid out and the CDFS and the Services have greater control over areas of administrative policy. The counter argument to this view is that defence decision-making embraces a much broader spectrum of issues and considerations than purely military ones and that the Minister, or more correctly in this

case the Minister's senior civilian adviser, should be able to
ensure that these issues are taken fully into account.

2.50   The   broad   issue   of   the   respective   command
responsibilities is taken up in Chapter Eight. It is instructive
to note at this stage, however, that similar arguments to these
were presented to the Defence Review Committee which found that,
in general terms, the higher defence machinery, including the
distribution of responsibilities between major participants, was
satisfactory, and that the criticisms of it related 'not so much
to defects of structure and formal organisation as to management
practices and working habits.' The Utz Committee further
concluded that it 'would be unwise to expand the general
jurisdiction of the CDFS (in respect of control over the Central
Staff divisions)' although it saw the need for the CDFS to be
given greater access to these divisions.[17]

2.51   On the question of the suitability of the higher Defence
machinery for a defence emergency or war, the Utz Committee noted
that both Defence and the ADF agreed that:

> '...given the uncertain strategic circumstances
> facing Australia at the present time and the need
> to strive for the efficient allocation of limited
> resources...that in peacetime it is neither
> practical nor cost-effective to structure the
> organisation to meet fully the requirements of a
> defence emergency or war. The ability of the
> organisation to adapt quickly and expand if
> necessary in response to a variety of possible
> contingencies is generally accepted as the
> essential requirement.'[18]

2.52   It was further argued that while there would be an
expansion of the tasks and activities of the CDFS in wartime,
with greater emphasis on operational aspects of defence policy,
'the fundamental responsibilities of the Secretary and the CDFS
would not change.' The Committee acknowledged however that there
was a need for forward planning particularly at the national
security level.

> 'Unless the broad framework for national
> administration in an emergency is planned in
> advance, and reviewed and updated regularly, we
> believe that it represents a serious omission in
> national defence preparations generally.'[19]

2.53   The Committee supports this latter view and generally
accepts that adaptability and flexibility are key considerations
in determining or assessing Australia's defence force structure
and its system of command and control. It does not follow however
that because the existing structure of the Australian Defence
Force is flexible that it is therefore the most appropriate for
Australia's circumstances. The following chapters expand on this
question and propose a number of alternative approaches for the
Australian Defence Force.

2.54   Others have argued that despite the changes following
the 1973-76 reorganisation, the Services continue to play a
predominant role in the defence decision-making process. Desmond
Ball, for example, has stated that the services are able to use
their formal and informal powers to control the equipment
procurement process.

> 'In addition to the Military's role as the
> initiator of particular equipment proposals, and
> its representation throughout the committee
> structure, the military also has unquestioned
> technical expertise which it brings to bear in
> support of its equipment preferences. There is no
> civilian group within the Australian Defence
> establishment which can challenge the Services in
> terms of knowledge of weapons system
> specifications or technical performance
> characteristics. It is difficult to over-estimate
> the 'authority' which accrues to the military from
> this; most civilians would prefer to allow Service
> claims to pass rather than to demonstrate their
> technical ignorance. Moreover, the Services
> naturally make great play of the fact that they
> are the users of the equipment; they are the ones
> that have to go into combat with the ships, tanks,
> guns, aircraft or whatever. The end result is
> often the acquisition of a piece of equipment
> which the military regard as 'technically sweet'
> and 'nice to have', but which has little relevance
> to the defence of Australia.'[20]

The Committee notes that Ball's thesis is supported by the Utz Committee's findings that the Services 'have the leading role in force development insofar as it is determined by capital equipment'. Unlike Ball however, the Utz Committee believed this to be appropriate although it did propose a more active role for the CDFS in both the development of force structure and the equipment procurement process, suggesting that existing procedures be amended to 'provide a total Defence Force perspective of capabilities requirements in place of the Services' individual assessments.'[21]

2.55   A further manifestation of the Services' acting to safeguard favoured roles and capabilities is the so called 'replacement syndrome' or 'follow-on imperative' which involves the replacement of an obsolete weapon system or platform with another of the same generic type when the requirement for that generic type no longer exists or there is a more cost effective alternative. This Committee considered this phenomenon in its earlier review of the Australian defence procurement process. While finding that the evidence put to it tended to overstate the case for the operation of the follow-on imperative in Australia, the Committee nevertheless acknowledged that:

> 'A temptation can exist for force planners, particularly if a vested interest of some type is involved, to assume that because a given requirement existed in the past it will continue to exist in the future. Not only does this simplify the decision-making process, it tends to protect the status quo within a large organisation.'[22]

2.56   The Committee acknowledges that bureaucratic competition and conflict may not necessarily be inimical to defence decision-making since it allows for the articulation of different and legitimate points of view. The existence of these competing interests should not be ignored, however, particularly when examining the existing defence force structure and how it should be changed.

2.57   One important consideration in examining the role of
interest groups in the policy-making proces is to determine the
basis on which competing equipments and major capabilities are
chosen. Does the bureaucratic politics of Defence take place
within some form of broad policy framework that provides overall
direction and meaning to policy outcomes? Or are decisions
determined completely by the relative power of the interests
involved?

2.58   A major criticism of the defence decision-making process
in Australia - both during this inquiry and in the past - is that
there is no clear guidance on Australia's national security
interests and objectives, no attempt to delineate a coherent
military strategy for the defence of Australia and very little
guidance on what kinds of military capabilities are most needed.
These issues are discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
On the basis of evidence presented to it, the Committee considers
that there is some justification in these criticisms.
Furthermore, the absence of such guidance severely constrains
effective decision-making since it makes choosing among
alternatives more difficult and facilitates bargaining and
compromise between the major interests concerned.

Australia's Alliance Relations

2.59   Australia's defence policies and posture are also
influenced by our formal defence relationships with other
countries. By far the most important of these is our relationship
with the United States which incorporates the ANZUS Treaty.
Australia is also party to a number of other agreements and
understandings, including:

a. **Five Power Arrangements.** In the aftermath of Indonesia's confrontation of Singapore and Malaysia and in light of the then imminent withdrawal of British forces from the region, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore andMalaysia signed a communique on 16 April, 1971 which declared that they 'would continue to cooperate in accordance with their respective policies, in the field of defence...[and] in relation to the external defence of Malaysia and Singapore, that in the event of any form of armed attack against Malaysia and Singapore, their governments would immediately consult together for the purpose of deciding what measure should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such an attack or threat;'

b. **Radford/Collins Agreement.** Under this agreement, Australia contributes to the implementation of Allied naval control and protection of shipping in allotted areas in the Pacific and Indian Oceans on an as required basis.

c. **Interoperability with Allies.** Australia has a number of interoperability agreements with its major allies which enable it to participate in combined operations, share information and technology, contribute to development of joint doctrine, procedures and operating standards, and so on. These agreements include membership of the Combined Communications Electronic Board (CCEB), ABCA Armies Quadripartite Working Groups, Air Standardisation Coordination Committee and the AUSCANUKUSNZ Navies Board.

ANZUS and Australia-United States Security Relations

2.60   The security relations between Australia and the United States cover a wide range of agreements and understandings of which the most important is the ANZUS Treaty. Both ANZUS and Australia/US relations in general have been considered in detail

in the Committee's earlier reports on Threats to Australia's Security and The ANZUS Alliance, and ANZUS itself was recently subjected to a wide ranging review by the Australian government.

2.61   All three studies concluded that it was in Australia's interests to maintain the ANZUS Treaty and other bilateral defence arrangements with the United States. They not only give a visible expression to Australia's membership of the Western strategic community, but also afford Australia a number of more tangible benefits. These have been described in the Committee's report on The ANZUS Alliance[23] and include:

a. the continuing membership of ANZUS provides Australia with a measure of deterrence against potential aggressors. 'ANZUS conveys to the Soviet bloc powers and to potential aggressors within the region a strong signal, both from the United States and the local powers concerned that this is not an area of low cost, low risk opportunities;'

b. ANZUS facilitates a strategic dialogue with the United States which 'gives Australia valuable access to US strategic thinking and allows closer assessment of global and regional developments which might also affect Australia's own strategic outlook;'

c. membership of ANZUS enhances Australia's diplomatic and military status within our local region;

d. ANZUS and other agreements with the United States give Australia access to a wide range of defence resources including advanced technology, supply and support for weapons systems and other defence equipment, and sophisticated intelligence; and

e. 'The Australian Defence Force derives considerable training benefit from the wide range of bilateral, ANZUS and other multilateral exercises in which Australia participates with the United States. Exercises cover the full range of maritime, amphibious, land and air warfare.'

2.62   These benefits notwithstanding, it is also clear that
ANZUS does not provide Australia with a security guarantee, nor
can Australia automatically expect to receive direct United
States military assistance under all circumstances.

2.63   As described in the Committee's report on Threats to
Australia's Security, the obligations assumed by the ANZUS
partners under the ANZUS Treaty are: self help to develop the
capacity to resist armed attack; cooperation to develop
individual and joint military capacity; consultation when any
party considers its own or another party's security to be
threatened in the Pacific; and action in accordance with
constitutional processes to meet an armed attack on any of the
partners in the Pacific area.

2.64   In assessing the implications for Australia of these
provisions, the Committe concluded that:

> 'Article IV of the Treaty patently does not of
> itself commit the United States to the use of
> military force were Australia subjected to armed
> attack. Neither does it define in precise terms
> what is meant by 'armed attack'. This leaves open
> the possibility that the United States would
> decide to act by means other than the application
> of military force. Assistance could be provided,
> for example, through the supply of military
> equipment to Australia, or by diplomatic pressure
> on the aggressor, or by economic and political
> sanctions against the aggressor, or by all these
> means.'[24]

The Committee further concluded that:

> '...Article IV clearly envisages the option of the
> use of military force by the United States.
> Moreover, the deterrence factor would increase to
> the extent that any aggressor would have to
> consider that the more effective an intended act
> of aggression against Australia, the more likely
> would become United States involvement in
> Australia's defence. It has been the judgement of

> successive Australian governments that the United
> States would see it in its own fundamental
> national interest to prevent Australia being
> overwhelmed by armed force and would act in
> whatever way was necessary to prevent this.'[25]

2.65   The Committee reached a similar conclusion following its
more recent and detailed examination of the ANZUS Alliance and
Australian/United States relations.

2.66   The deterrent value of the ANZUS Alliance
notwithstanding, the uncertain and conditional nature of the
United States security guarantee has been recognised by the
Australian government. In a recent speech to Parliament on the
governmental review of ANZUS, for example, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, reported that:

> '...we cannot assume military support from our
> Treaty partners in every contingency...we should
> therefore develop a self defence capability in
> case in a particular contingency we need to rely
> on our own resources. By definition, therefore, it
> would not be prudent to base the development of
> our Defence Force structure on the assumption that
> our force will necessarily be part of a superpower
> deployment in the event of any form of hostilities
> in which we are involved. It is more prudent and
> proper to elaborate these force structures on the
> basis of a self defence capability within our
> regional context.'[26]

2.67   In evidence to the Committee, the Department of Foreign
Affairs has also acknowledged that while the ANZUS Treaty:

> '...gives us the guarantee of a response in the
> event of attack or major threat to Australia, the
> provisions of the Treaty do not define precisely
> the nature of the response which our partners
> might provide, according to their constitutional
> processes. It may be that in certain circumstances
> our partners would adopt diplomatic action, or
> political or economic sanctions against the
> adversary, or supply us with equipment or
> logistical support, but stop short of direct
> military involvement. Thus, while the Treaty does

> provide guarantees of support we also have a clear
> obligation to develop and maintain our
> self-defence capability in case, in a particular
> contingency, we need to rely on our own military
> resources. Moreover, it was also explicitly agreed
> at the Council meeting that Australia's prime
> defence role was to build our self-defence
> capability within our regional context rather than
> simply as a potential part of some broader
> deployment.'[27]

2.68   The uncertainty associated with the American security
guarantee has been further emphasised by recent changes in United
States policies for the Asia/Pacific region. In the aftermath of
its Vietnam experience, the United States ran down its military
commitments in South East Asia and reoriented its national
security policy more directly towards those areas of the world
that are of central significance in its global competition with
the Soviet Union (principally continental United States, Europe,
the Middle East and North East Asia.) This new direction in
American strategic policy, first elaborated in 1969 in the Nixon
or Guam Doctrine, signalled a firm intention on the part of the
United States to avoid any new deployment of ground forces into
South East Asia. It also required America's regional allies to
take primary responsibility for their own security in relation to
regional threats, particularly those not directly involving the
Soviet Union.

2.69   The implications for Australia of the Guam Doctrine and
more recent elaborations of it have been described by Ross
Babbage in his book Rethinking Australia's Defence as follows:

> '... the Guam Doctrine indicates that the level of
> security assistance Australia can expect to
> receive from the United States will not be related
> necessarily to the seriousness of the threat that
> arises to Australia's security. Rather, it will
> tend to be related much more closely to current
> United States perceptions of the indirect threat
> to the United States itself of Australia being
> attacked by the country concerned. Thus if a major
> power mounts a heavy attack upon

> Australia, the United States response will not be
> conditioned primarily by the severity of the
> assault and its implications for Australian
> security and survival, but rather by United States
> perceptions of the impact that the conflict and
> the possible outcome will have upon United States
> regional and global interests. If the country
> attacking Australia happens to be a superpower
> rival of the United States, it can be concluded
> that the United States would almost certainly wish
> to respond vigorously. However, even in this
> relatively clear-cut situation, the desire to
> assist Australia may not be converted
> automatically into the physical provision of the
> level of aid the Australian government may
> request. Most particularly, if such an attack took
> place in the context of global superpower
> conflict, the United States may be distracted by
> higher priority commitments of a pressing nature
> elsewhere and be unable to render significant
> assistance.'[28]

2.70   Babbage also examined the likely United States responses
to a variety of threats to Australia's security as discerned from
a range of official United States government statements and
elaborations of these statements by United States
government-funded research bodies. The results of this
examination are summarised in Table 2.3, where it is clear that
full United States support would only be forthcoming in the event
of an attack on Australia by a superpower rival of the United
States.

2.71   In recent years, the United States has begun to focus
more attention on the Asia and Indo-Pacific areas, and to build
up its military capabilities there. These moves should be seen
primarily in terms of an extension of the global confrontation
between the two superpowers rather than any fundamental
reappraisal or abrogation of the basic tenets of the Guam
Doctrine. Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations have made it
clear that the friends and allies of the United States are still
required to share the burden of both local and regional defence.

Table 2.3 : United States : Expressed intentions
and capabilities to assist Australia in a
range of hypothetical situations

Type of Crisis	Expressed US intentions	Likely US capability to assist
1. Isolated attack by a super-power rival of the US	Full support would be provided	Likely that full support would be forthcoming
2. Attack by a super-power rival of the US in the context of a super-power conflict.	Full support would be provided within capabilities	Unlikely to be able to divert significant resources away from the major effort.
3. Heavy attack by a non-aligned major power	Unclear: may supply equipment, intelligence and diplomatic support	If this attack did not take place in the context of a major global conflict, the US could assist to the extent of its intentions
4. Heavy attack by a major power allied to the US	Unclear; may supply some equipment, intelligence and diplomatic support to both parties; may try to mediate; may favour Australia's opponent	As above
5. Heavy attack by a neighbouring power	Expects Australia be self-sufficient; may assist with heavy equipment supplies, particularly if attacking neighbour receives heavy support from a super power rival	As above
6. Other attacks by a neighbouring power	Australia expected to be self-sufficient	As above
7. Resource crises confronting Australia	As above	Australia might receive priority treatment if the US controlled scarce resource supplies.
8. The effects of foreign wars and resource conflicts	As above	As above

Source : Ross Babbage, Rethinking
Australia's Defence, p13

2.72   As noted in the Committee's report on The ANZUS
Alliance, the Reagan Administration is also pressuring its
friends and allies in the region to play a more active role in
assisting the United States maintain the global strategic
balance. In December 1983, for example, US Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger stated that the defence efforts of Japan, China
and Korea in particular 'have the potential to affect the global
balance of power more profoundly perhaps than those of any other
country in the world outside the United States and the Soviet
Union'. He then went on to elaborate the future mission roles of
the Japanese Self Defence Force as seen by the United States.
Under this revised role, Japan's naval and air forces would be
responsible for carrying out:

    a.   sea control - involving offensive and
        defensive capabilities against Soviet
        submarines, surface vessels and aircraft out
        to 1000 miles from Japan;

    b.   mining and blockading the Tsushima, Tsugaru
        and Soya Straits connecting the Sea of Japan
        with the open waters of the Pacific; and

    c.   establishment of an air defence screen
        against Soviet tactical fighters and long
        range bombers.

2.73   The Reagan Administration has also sought to encourage
greater participation by Australia, with some success. Australia
supported the United States in maintaining a presence in the
Indian Ocean and increasing surveillance activities in the
region. It now provides service facilities at Cockburn Sound to
US Navy ships engaged in patrolling the Indian Ocean. Staging and
transit facilities are provided at Darwin for US B52 bombers, and
Australia continues to contribute to the maintenance of strategic
deterrence through the joint facilities at Pine Gap, Nurrungar
and North West Cape. Australia has also contributed to RIMPAC
(standing for 'Rim of the Pacific') naval and air exercises which

involve forces from the United States, New Zealand, Canada and Japan. Not all United States requests have been agreed to however. When Washington asked Australia to consider a contribution to the Middle East Rapid Deployment Force, the Australian Government declined. It also declined to provide peace keeping forces for the Lebanon and has publicly refused to countenance the stationing of American ground troops in Australia.

2.74   The *continuing uncertainties and pressures in* the alliance relationship have important implications for the planning and development of Australia's defence force structure. As mentioned earlier, the conditional nature of the United States security guarantee under ANZUS suggests that it would not be prudent to expect direct US military support under any circumstances short of invasion of Australia. Even then, the United States may not be able to respond, or it may take some time to do so. While indirect support, in the form of military supplies, intelligence or diplomatic support may be forthcoming during lesser contingencies, the level and timing of the assistance provided by the United States will be influenced by calculations of its own national security interests at the time of the emergency. These interests and the American response are almost impossible to predict.

2.75   Thus, for national security and force structure planning purposes, United States assistance, in any form, should not be counted on but should be regarded as a bonus to Australia's own response capacity. Australia must plan to meet all levels of threat – including an initial attack by a superpower rival of the United States – on its own.

2.76   The requirement that Australia adopts a more self reliant defence posture has consequences that go well beyond obtaining United States military assistance. Whereas in the past,

Australian forces operated as part of much larger allied structures, we must now develop the capacity to conduct independent combat operations within our area of immediate defence interest. The ADF will also need to develop the necessary strategic and tactical doctrine to support its operational deployments as well as relevant logistic support capabilities embracing supply, repair, communications, transport and the like. More importantly, Australia will have to develop its own national security policies where the focus will need to be expanded beyond diplomatic and military means to include economic, civil and infrastructural considerations.

2.77   Both our national security and logistics considerations in particular, have tended in the past to be less advanced than Australia's combat capabilities because of the traditional practice of fighting alongside larger allied forces. The need to develop these kinds of capabilities has long been recognised within Defence and, as discussed in subsequent chapters, considerable progress has been made. It is also clear, however, that considerable progress is still to be made and that the development of a fully independent and self reliant defence posture is constrained by a number of factors including the uncertainty over the kinds of threats likely to confront Australia, our limited resources, the nature of the defence policy making process, and increasing pressures to contribute to global stability.

CHAPTER TWO

END NOTES

1.   Threats to Australia's Security, pp 31-2

2.   Department of Defence Support, Submission, pS56

3.   Department of Defence Support, Submission, pS56

4.   Department of Defence Support, Submission, ppS57-8

5.   See Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Industrial Support for Defence Needs and Allied Matters, Parliamentary Paper No.225/1977, October 1977; and Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian Defence Procurement, Parliamentary Paper No.260/1979, November 1979

6.   Australian Defence Procurement, p77

7.   Australian Defence Procurement, p70

8.   Colonel J.O. Langtry, Evidence, 23 April 1980, p114

9.   See for example Charles Moskos Jr, 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organisation', Armed Forces and Society, Volume 4, Fall 1977, pp44-50

10.   Australian Defence Procurement, p25

11.   Desmond Ball, 'The Role of the Military in Defence Hardware Procurement', in F.A. Mediansky (ed), The Military and Australia's Defence, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1979, p42

12.   See Department of Defence, Submission, pS32 and the Final Report of the Defence Review Committee, The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia, AGPS, Canberra, 1982, pp231-32

13.   See Department of Defence, Submission, pS33

14.   See Morton H. Halperin, National Security Policy-Making, Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1975 and Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla Clapp and Arnold Kanter, "Organisational Interests", in John E. Endicott and Roy W. Stafford (eds), American Defense Policy, Fourth Edition, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977, pp 207-223

15.   Richard A. Gabriel, 'Acquiring new values in military bureaucracies: a preliminary model', _Journal of Political and Military Sociology_, Volume 7, No.1, Spring 1979, pp89-103

16.   _The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia_, p137

17.   _The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia_, pxiii

18.   _The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia_, p188

19.   _The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia_, p192

20.   Desmond Ball, 'The Role of the Military in Defence Hardware Procurement', p52

21.   _The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia_, pp71 and 74 respectively

22.   _Australian Defence Procurement_, p35

23.   Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, _The ANZUS Alliance : Australian United States'Relations_, Parliamentary Paper No.318/1982, November 1982, pp51-2

24.   _Threats to Australia's Security_, pp23-4

25.   _Threats to Australia's Security_, p24

26.   Statement to the Parliament (on 15 September 1983,) by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Bill Hayden, quoted in _Australian Foreign Affairs Record_, September 1983, p516

27.   Department of Foreign Affairs, _Submission_, pS48

28.   Ross Babbage, _Rethinking Australia's Defence_, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1980, pp10-11

CHAPTER THREE

THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

3.1   This   chapter   summarises   the   current   roles,
organisational structures and major capabilities of the present
Australian Defence Force. It should also be noted that, in terms
of its existing manpower, equipment and facilities alone, the
Australian Defence Force already represents a major investment of
resources   and   interests   which   cannot   be   easily   altered,
particularly in view of the long lead times associated with the
selection and acquisition of new capabilities and the nature of
the   vested   interests   involved   in   determining   the   present
structure.

3.2   The Australian Defence Force is made up of three
separate armed Services - the Royal Australian Navy, the
Australian Army and the Royal Australian Air Force - all
operating under the command of the Chief of the Defence Force
Staff (CDFS). Each Service is headed by a Chief of Staff, who is
supported by military and civilian staff located in Navy, Army
and Air Force Offices respectively, and is further divided into a
number of functional commands and other units.

ADF Common Functions and Roles

3.3   While the detailed roles and capabilities of the ADF are
normally described in terms of the three single Services, the
Department of Defence has ascribed the following common functions
and roles to the ADF as a whole:

3.4   Common Functions: The common function of the Australian
Defence Force are, by acting as an independent national force or
in association with allied forces, to:

a. deter aggression;

b. ensure the security of Australia and its Territories;

c. uphold and protect Australia's national interests; and

d. contribute to United Nations supervisory or peacekeeping forces.

3.5   **Common Roles:** The common roles of the Defence Force are to:

a. prepare forces and maintain reserves of equipment and supplies for the effective discharge of the common functions;

b. organise, train and equip forces for joint operations and establish joint or combined headquarters as necessary;

c. develop and maintain reserve forces to supplement or expand the Regular Force;

d. assist each other in fulfilling their single Service roles;

e. develop the requirement, establish, manage and operate bases, facilities and installations;

f. provide joint and single Service communications;

g. provide intelligence for the national intelligence organisation and operational intelligence for the Services;

h. provide assistance and training for the military forces of designated nations;

i. provide aid to the civil power as directed;

j. provide assistance to civil authorities and organisations as authorised; and

k. conduct research, and develop tactics, techniques and organisation for the fulfilment of their roles.

3.6   In addition to, and expanding, these functions and roles common to all three Services, the Department of Defence has assigned more detailed functions and tasks for the individual Services. These are outlined in the following paragraphs.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN)

3.7   The basic function of the RAN is to conduct operations at sea for the defence of Australia and Australian interests.

3.8   The roles of the RAN are to:

a.   organize, train and equip naval forces, including naval aircraft, for timely and sustained operations at sea to:

(1)   detect and destroy enemy naval forces and sea commerce,

(2)   establish and maintain superiority in areas as necessary for naval operations including the protection of sea lines of communication,

(3)   conduct naval offensive operations against enemy forces and installations, and

(4)   conduct naval reconnaissance and surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, and the protection of shipping;

b.   provide naval support for land operations;

c.   provide military sea transport support for the Defence Force;

d.   provide seaward defence of ports and anchorages; and

e.   conduct hydrographic and oceanographic survey.

3.9   In order to carry out these roles, the RAN is organised
along functional lines into a Fleet Command, a Naval Support
Command, a number of Naval Area Commands and the Naval Reserves.
The outline organisation of the RAN is shown in Figure 3.1.

Fleet Command

3.10   The Fleet Command is made up of all Navy's operational
units, headquarters and bases. The Fleet Commander is responsible
to the CNS for, inter alia, command and administration of the
Fleet Command, the operational readiness of its units and
sub-units, development and promulgation of maritime tactics and
training. The Fleet Command comprises the following major
functional elements (summarised in Table 3.1):

    a. Australian Destroyer Squadrons comprising
        guided missile destroyers (DDGs), guided
        missile frigates (FFGs) and River-class
        destroyer escorts (DEs). The DDGs provide
        anti-air, anti-submarine, command and control
        and interdiction capabilities. They are
        currently armed with Ikara ASM but will be
        modernised later in the decade to incorporate
        the Harpoon SSM system. The FFGs provide
        anti-surface, anti-air and tactical
        surveillance capabilities. They are armed
        with the Harpoon SSM system and are to be
        fitted with the Phalanx close-in weapon
        system. Currently three FFGs are in service
        with HMAS Darwin expected to arrive in
        Australia in 1985. The River class destroyers
        are primarily anti-submarine escorts and are
        fitted with Seacat, SAM/SSM and Ikara ASM
        systems. They also have limited surface,
        interdiction and close range air defence
        facilities. The DEs are being progressively
        modernised to update their equipment and
        weapons systems and to extend their
        operational life into the 1990s. The
        destroyer squadrons are based in Sydney.

    b. Australian Submarine Squadron. The submarine
        squadron comprises six Oberon-class

Figure 3.1: RAN Outline Organisation

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                          ┌──────────────┐
                          │   Chief of   │
                          │     the      │
                          │ Naval Staff  │
                          └──────┬───────┘
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│ Fleet   │ │ Naval   │ │     Naval Area Commands      │ │ Naval    │
│ Command │ │ Support │ ├────┬─────┬─────┬────┬────┬────┤ │ Reserves │
│         │ │ Command │ │ WA │ Vic │ Qld │ NT │ SA │Tas │ │          │
└─────────┘ └─────────┘ └────┴─────┴─────┴────┴────┴────┘ └──────────┘
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
submarines which provide capabilities for offensive strike and strategic and tactical reconnaissance. The offensive strike capacity covers anti-submarine, anti-shipping, mining and special operations. The Oberon submarines are being progressively modernised to extend their operational life until their replacement by a new class of diesel-electric submarines in the 1990s. The squadron is based in Sydney.

c. **Australian Mine Warfare and Patrol Boat Force.** The mine warfare capability is based on one minehunter located in Sydney. Two inshore minehunter catarmarans are being built as proto-types. Known collectively as the Bay Class, these first two vessels are being built by a division of Carrington Slipways, and are due for completion in 1986. The patrol boat force is based on a combination of Attack-class and newer Fremantle-class boats both of which are armed with 40mm Bofors and 0.5in machine guns. The patrol boats are involved mainly in civil coastal surveillance and so are based at ports around Australia.

d. **Australian Amphibious Squadron.** The amphibious squadron comprises one amphibious heavy lift ship (HMAS Tobruk) and six heavy landing craft all based in Brisbane. HMAS Tobruk provides a military sea lift capability and can tactically insert troops and equipment by helicopters and landing craft. The heavy landing craft provide a ship to shore and limited sea movements capability. They are expected to be phased out in the late 1980s.

e. **Other Fleet Units.** Other Fleet Command Units include two training ships, a destroyer tender, a fleet oiler, two hydrographic survey ships, an oceanographic research ship and a trials and research ship.

f. **Fleet Air Arm.** The fixed wing elements of the Fleet Air Arm have been disbanded. Fixed wing support for the fleet is now provided by the RAAF. The principal roles of the remaining naval rotary wing aircraft are to conduct anti-submarine patrol operations and to provide anti-submarine protection of priority fleet units as well as to provide an airborne underwater surveillance facility.

TABLE 3.1 : FLEET COMMAND ORDER OF BATTLE[1]

TYPE OF VESSEL	ARMAMENT	NAME	LOCATION
Guided missile destroyers (DDG)	5 in guns Standard SAM Ikara ASM AS torpedoes	HMAS Perth HMAS Hobart HMAS Brisbane	First Australian Destroyer Squadron, Sydney, NSW
Guided missile frigates (FFG)	76 mm gun Standard SAM Harpoon SSM AS torpedoes	HMAS Adelaide HMAS Canberra HMAS Sydney HMAS Darwin	Second Australian Destroyer Squadron, Sydney, NSW
River-class destroyer escorts (DE)	4.5 in guns Seacat SAM/SSM Ikara ASM AS mortor (Torrens only)	HMAS Yarra HMAS Parramatta HMAS Stuart HMAS Derwent HMAS Swan HMAS Torrens	Third Australian Destroyer Squadron Sydney, NSW;
Oberon-class submarines	Anti-ship and Anti-submarine torpedoes	HMAS Oxley HMAS Otway HMAS Ovens HMAS Onslow HMAS Orion HMAS Otama	Australian Submarine Squadron Sydney, NSW
Minehunter	40 mm bofors	HMAS Curlew	Mine Counter-measures Force, Sydney, NSW
Amphibious heavy lift ship	40 mm bofors	HMAS Tobruk	Australian Amphibious Squadron Brisbane, Qld
Landing craft heavy	0.5 in machine guns	HMAS Balikpapan HMAS Brunei HMAS Wewak HMAS Tarakan HMAS Betano HMAS Labuan*	Australian Amphibious Squadron Brisbane, Qld

* crewed by Reserves

TYPE OF VESSEL	ARMAMENT	NAME	LOCATION
Attack-class patrol boats	40 mm bofors 0.5 in machine guns	HMAS *Advance** HMAS *Aware* * HMAS *Adroit** HMAS *Assail* HMAS *Buccaneer* HMAS *Attack* HMAS *Bayonet** HMAS *Ardent*	Sydney, NSW Adelaide, SA Cockburn Sound, WA Cockburn Sound, WA Sydney, NSW Westernport, Vic Westernport, Vic Hobart, Tas
Fremantle-class patrol boats	40 mm bofors 0.5 in machine guns	HMAS *Fremantle* HMAS *Wollongong* HMAS *Launceston* HMAS *Whyalla* HMAS *Geraldton* HMAS *Warrnambool* HMAS *Townsville* HMAS *Dubbo* HMAS *Ipswich* HMAS *Cessnock* HMAS *Bendigo* HMAS *Geelong* HMAS *Gawler*	Sydney, NSW Cockburn Sound, WA Cairns, Qld Darwin, NT Westernport, Vic Sydney, NSW
training ships	4.5 in guns 40 mm bofors Nil	HMAS *Vampire* HMAS *Jervis Bay*	Sydney, NSW
destroyer tender fleet oiler hydrographic survey ships oceanographic research trials and research ship	40 mm bofors 40 mm bofors	HMAS *Stalwart* HMAS *Supply* HMAS *Moresby* HMAS *Flinders* HMAS *Cook* HMAS *Kimbla*	Sydney, NSW Sydney, NSW Cockburn Sound WA Cairns, Qld Sydney, NSW Sydney, NSW

* crewed by Reserves.

FLEET AIR ARM

SQUADRON	AIRCRAFT	LOCATION
anti-submarine helicopter squadron	Sea King Mk 50/50A	Nowra, NSW
utility helicopter squadron	Wessex 31B	Nowra, NSW
helicopter training, EW and utility squadron	AS 350B Squirrel UH-1B Iroquois HS-748	Nowra, NSW

Notes: [1] Source : <u>Department of Defence Report 1983-84</u>, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984.

Naval Support Command

3.11   The Naval Support Command comprises a number of naval establishments in NSW and ACT which are not assigned to Fleet Command, all non-commissioned establishments throughout Australia except dockyards, all supply elements and a number of designated technical establishments. The Commander of Naval Support Command also serves as the Naval Area Commander of NSW and the ACT.

Naval Area Commands

3.12   The Naval Area Commands are generally defined by State or Territory boundaries and they extend seaward to the limit of Australia's national jurisdiction. The areas have no operational relevance and the area commanders have largely local administrative responsibilities: to CNS, to the Fleet Commander or to the Naval Support Commander in accordance with their own functional division of responsibilities.

The Australian Army.

3.13   The basic function of the Australian Army is to conduct operations on land for the defence of Australia and Australian interests.

3.14   The current roles of the Australian Army are:

    a.   to organise, train, equip and maintain forces for the conduct of timely and sustained combat operations on land;

    b.   to develop and maintain Reserve forces to supplement or expand the Regular Army;

    c.   to provide a sound base for expansion; and

    d.   to maintain reserves of equipment and supplies.

3.15 Supplementary to these roles are responsibilities concerning the provision of specified support to the other Services, the provision of general area ground defence of service installations, and low level air defence. It has responsibility also to conduct research and to develop tactics, techniques, organisations and equipments. Other roles, but ones which are particularly important in peacetime, involve aid to the civil authority, including counter-terrorism, providing assistance to the community, including natural disaster relief, and being prepared to participate in peace-keeping forces. In addition, the Army is required to provide assistance and training for military forces of other nations in accordance with Government policy.

Army Organisation and Major Capabilities

3.16 The current organisation of the Australian Army is shown in Figure 3.2. The Army is commanded by the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) who is assisted in the discharge of his responsibilities by the staff of the Department of Defence (Army Office). Under the CGS are Field Force Command and Training Command, both located in Sydney, Logistic Command located in Melbourne, seven military districts and a number of units not allotted to commands or military districts.

Field Force Command

3.17 Field Force Command (FF Command), with a current strength of some 12,500 all ranks, comprises those combat, combat support and logistic support formations and units needed to carry out the Army's operational functions. The General Officer Commanding Field Force Command is responsible to the CGS for, inter alia, operational training and command of all regular and reserve units within FF Command, contributing to the formulation of Army Office policy, plans and doctrine, development of Army

Figure 3.2: Army Outline Organisation

aspects of joint service plans, and maintenance of specified
operational readiness states for FF Command formations and units.
During wartime, FF Command will also be responsible for raising,
training and providing ground force units and formations for
operational forces, either single Service or joint forces. The
organisation of Field Force Command is shown in Figure 3.3. It
consists of one Regular and one Reserve Division, a Divisional
Field Force Group, a number of Corps Troops units and a range of
Regular and Reserve logistic and Communication Zone units.

Divisional Units

3.18   The Australian Army is currently based around the
infantry division which is considered to be a standard formation
designed to undertake operations in the field. The outline
organisation of the infantry division is given in Table 3.2. The
current war establishment of the division is just on 18,000 all
ranks. The division can operate as a single entity or in a
dispersed mode with the three brigades operating independently of
each other.

3.19   Augmented by corps troops, the infantry division can
provide the following capabilities:

        a.   sustained and intense direct and indirect fire;

        b.   movement of infantry in armoured personnel carriers;

        c.   anti-armour;

        d.   surveillance;

        e.   very low level air defence;

        f.   ground based logistic support; and

        g.   day and night operation irrespective of terrain.

3.14

Figure 3.3: Outline Organisation of
Field Force Command

Denotes A Res formations or units

Table 3.2: Outline Organisation of The Infantry Division

Type	Unit	No.	Principal Weapon
Headquarters	Divisional Headquarters	1	
	Brigade Headquarters	3	
Infantry	Infantry Battalion	9	GPMG, MRAW, MAW, 81 mm Mor
Armour	Tank Regiment	1	Leopard AS 1
	APC Squadron	1	M113A1
	Forward Delivery Troop	1	
Artillery	HQ Divisional Artillery	1	
	Field Regiment	3	105 mm Howitzer (being replaced by L118 105mm light gun in late 1980s-early 1990s)
	Medium Regiment	1	M198 155mm Howitzer
	Div. Locating Battery	1	
	Div. Air Defence Battery (Light)	1	Redeye SAM
Engineers	HQ Divisional Engineers	1	
	Field Engineer Regiment	3	
	Div. Eng. Support Sqn		
Communications	Div. Signal Regiment	1	
	Brigade Signal Squadron	3	
Aviation	Div. Aviation Regiment	1	Porter, Nomad, Bell 206B-1
Transport	HQ Divisional Transport	1	
	Transport Company HQ	3	
	Transport Platoon	12	
	Div. Air Transport Support Unit	1	
	Divisional Postal Unit	1	
	Div Transport Workshop	1	
Medical & Dental	HQ Div. Medical Service	1	
	Field Ambulance	3	
	Div. Dental Unit	1	
Supply	HQ Divisional Supply	1	
	Supply Companies	4	

Table 3.2: Outline Organisation of The Infantry Division
(Contd)

Type	Unit	No.	Principal Weapon
Electrical & Mechanical Engineers (EME)	HQ Divisional EME Field Workshop	1 3	
Miscellaneous	Topographic Survey Troop Div. Intelligence Unit Div. Cash Office Military Police Company	1 1 1 1	

3.20   The Australian 1st Division comprises a Headquarters, three Regular brigades, one Reserve brigade, a Field Force Group and a number of units not allotted to the brigades. While nominally structured as an infantry division, the three Regular brigades of 1st Division have been given specialised primary and secondary missions in order to cover the range of contingencies and operational requirements likely to be faced by Australia's armed forces.

3.21   The primary and secondary objectives of each brigade are as follows:

       a.   1st Brigade. The primary objectives of the 1st Brigade are:

          (1)   to develop and practise command and control techniques and procedures at formation level;

          (2)   to develop the techniques of mechanised and airborne operations; and

          (3)   to maintain the capability to operate as an infantry formation.

         Its secondary objectives are:

          (1)   to be capable of reinforcing 6th Brigade for operations in open country;

          (2)   to develop a capability for amphibious deployment; and

          (3)   to be prepared to undertake response force tasks in accordance with stated aid to the civil power contingencies.

       b.   3rd Brigade. The primary objectives of 3rd Brigade are:

          (1)   to develop and practise command and control techniques and procedures at formation level;

(2) to develop a capability for operations on light scales; and

(3) to be ready to deploy as the Brigade element of the ODF.

Its secondary objectives are:

(1) to develop a capability for operations in tropical areas including jungle warfare;

(2) to develop a capability for amphibious deployment; and

(3) to be prepared to undertake response force tasks in accordance with stated aid to the civil power contingencies.

c. **6th Brigade.** The primary objectives of 6th Brigade are:

(1) to develop and practise command and control techniques and procedures at formation level;

(2) to develop a capability for conventional operations as a predominantly infantry force with emphasis on warfare in open country; and

(3) to be capable of reinforcing 3rd Brigade.

Its secondary objectives are:

(1) to develop a capability for operating with ships of the Navy's Amphibious Squadron;

(2) to develop a capability for operating in built-up areas; and

(3) to be prepared to undertake response force tasks in accorance with stated aid to the civil power contingencies.

3.22   The 2nd Division, the 7th Brigade of the 1st Divison and the Army Reserve battalions of the Field Force Groups are presently structured as standard infantry formations and units. Their objectives are:

a.   to develop and maintain the capability for
     conventional warfare; and

b.   to provide the basis for future expansion.

The Operational Deployment Force (ODF)

3.23   The ODF, based on 3rd Brigade, is the operationally
ready element of the Army. It is prepared for rapid deployment in
low level contingency situations. It is basically air-portable in
tactical transport aircraft and medium lift helicopters, although
some heavier equipment will need to follow in strategic aircraft
or by sea. Its current deployment capabilities are to deploy a
company group within 7 days and the full brigade strength within
28 days of initial warning. Its development in the 1980s is aimed
at producing an even more lightly equipped force. Moreover, it
will develop expertise in tropical and jungle warfare.

Non-Divisional Units

3.24   The major non-Divisional units and their principal
equipments or weapons systems are shown in Table 3.3.

Logistic Command.

3.25   Logistic Command comprises the logistic formations and
units needed to provide rear area support to Field Force
elements.   The logistic functions encompass transport and
movement, supply, electrical and mechanical engineering, workshop
repair and quality assurance. Logistic Command is responsible for
the provision of logistic support to the Army, and will continue
to execute these functions during periods of conflict. These
functions will include:

a.   Letting of contracts for support from local
     infrastructure in an area of operations.

Table 3.3: Major Non-Divisional Units Located
in Field Force Command

Unit (1)	Principal Roles and Functions	Location (1)	Major Weapons Type
Armoured Regiment	Destroy enemy forces and provide close fire support to infantry	Puckapunyal VIC	Leopard AS1 Tank
Reconnaissance Regiment	Medium reconnaissance; flank, front and rear security; offensive or defensive delaying actions	Holsworthy NSW Parramatta NSW(R) Tamworth NSW(R) Wacol QLD (R) Fitzroy VIC (R)	Fire Support Vehicle M113A1 (To be replaced under Project Waler)
Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment	Transport an infantry brigade into battle; provide escort and administrative support	Enoggera QLD	M113A1 (To be replaced) under Project Waler))
Independent APC/ Reconnaissance Squadrons	Transport up to one infantry battalion into battle; provide escort and administrative support	Smithfield SA (R) Albury NSW (R) Karrakatta WA (R)	M113A1 (To be replaced) under Project Waler))
Medium Artillery Regiment	Supplement divisional artillery with longer-range offensive, defensive and counter-battery fire	Holsworthy NSW Geelong VIC (R)	5.5 in Medium Gun (To be replaced by 36 M198 155mm howitzers during 1984)
Air Defence Regiment	Route or point low level air defence	Woodside SA	RAPIER SAM
Air Defence Battery	Route or point very low level air defence	Woodside SA	Redeye SAM
Construction Regiment		Holsworthy NSW Haberfield NSW (R) East Melbourne VIC(R)	
Survey Regiment		Bendigo VIC	
Communication Zone Signal Regiment		Macleod VIC	
Special Air Service Regiment	Long range reconnaissance and surveillance; harassment; guerilla warfare; counter terrorist	Swanbourne WA	
Commando Regiment	Long range raids; specialised) reconnaissance; guerilla) warfare)	Randwick NSW (R) Mosman NSW (R) Williamstown VIC (R)	
Regional Force Unit		Darwin NT (R)	
Aviation Regiment	Air reconnaissance, surveillance; observation for artillery fire; command communications; liaison and long range anti-armour attack	Oakey, QLD	Pilatus Porter Aircraft Nomad Aircraft Bell 206B-1 Helicopter
Transport Regiment		Randwick NSW	
Terminal Regiment		Middle Head NSW	

NOTES: 1. Source Department of Defence Defence Report 1983-84, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984   (R) denotes Army Reserve unit.

    b.   Letting of contracts in the Support Area for a wide range of tasks in support of the area of operations. These include:

        (1)   Charter of civil transport vehicles, rail wagons, vessels, and aircraft;

        (2)   delivery to and from the area of operations, by appropriate transport mode, of material and personnel;

        (3)   procurement of materiel, in Australia or overseas, with the appropriate degree of urgency; and

        (4)   repair of materiel.

    c.   *The command, and effective management, of base logistic units, including their redeployment if necessary to meet the needs of the area of operations.*

Training Command

3.26   Training Command contains the training establishments needed to prepare the individual soldier for service in the Australian Army. It is responsible for initial recruit training and for the subsequent skill and specialist training carried out by Corps Schools, the Command and Staff College and the Land Warfare Centre.

Military Districts

3.27   Australia is divided into seven Military Districts whose boundaries generally accord with existing state and territory boundaries (excluding the ACT). The Military Districts provide a point of contact between the Army and each State or Territory and the commanders of the Military Districts exercise some command functions on behalf of the GOCs of the functional commands.

3.28   The seven Military Districts are currently responsible
for the provision of regionally oriented district support (for
example, medical, personnel services, facilities) in addition to
regional logistic support on behalf of Logistic Command. During
periods of conflict, Military Districts will be responsible for
the following functions

      a.   Military police control of military traffic
on lines of communication to the area of
operations, in conjunction with State Police.

      b.   If necessary, the establishment and command
of staging posts along the lines of
communication, for the use of military
traffic moving to and from the area of
operations. This will normally involve the
hiring of services and existing facilities
from local or state government bodies or
private agencies.

      c.   the administrative support of static
communication (signals) terminals
transmitting to and receiving from the area
of operations.

      d.   The receipt of medical evacuees and the
management of their treatment, convalescence
and rehabilitation.

      e.   Ensuring that adequate land lines of
communication to the area of operations are
maintained, and in some circumstances
constructed, by liaison with local or state
governments agencies as appropriate.

      f.   Processing of claims for damage by the
military to civil infrastructure, possibly
including that part of the Military District
which might be in the area of operations.

      g.   Public relations.

      h.   Processing of reinforcements to the area of
operations and returnees from the area of
operations, through personnel depots.

      i.   In accordance with normal procedural
processes, the provision of facilities
required to support operations (possibly
including some in the area of operations if
the area of operations encompasses parts of
the military district).

j.   The provision of a wide range of personnel
     services

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)

3.29   The function of the RAAF is to conduct operations in the
air for the defence of Australia and Australian interests.

3.30   The roles of the RAAF are to:

a.   organize, train, equip and maintain air
     forces for timely and sustained combat
     operations to:

     (1)   defend Australia, its territories
           and its armed forces against
           attack;

     (2)   undertake offensive air operations
           against enemy forces and
           installations;

     (3)   control vital areas and to
           establish and maintain local air
           superiority as and where required;

     (4)   carry out air reconnaissance
           throughout the areas of
           operational interest; and

     (5)   undertake maritime operations
           including air and sea surveillance

b.   provide offensive air support to, and
     tactical air transport for, the Defence
     Force; and

c.   operate strategic air transport aircraft and
     provide other air transport support for the
     Defence Force.

3.31   In order to carry out these roles, the RAAF is organised
into a separate Operational Command and Support Command, together
with a number of units not alloted to commands (Figure 3.4).

Figure 3.4:   RAAF Outline Organisation

Operational Command

3.32   Operational Command comprises all the units of the operational component of the RAAF. The Air Officer Commanding Operational Command (AOCOC) is responsible to the CAS for, inter alia, the supervision and co-ordination of the activities of Operational Command units, directing the operational activities of units during war, operational training, and maintaining units at acceptable states of preparedness.

3.33   At present, Operational Command is based on a number of functional formations located at different bases within Australia and overseas (figure 3.5). Each formation comprises one or more operational units and their direct support units which together can provide the following force capabilities:

a.   Strategic Strike and Reconnaissance Force. Based on the F111C aircraft, and currently organised into two squadrons (No.1 and No.6 Squadrons), located at RAAF Amberley in Queensland. Four of the aircraft are fitted for photographic reconnaissance work and are designated RF/F111C. All F111C can fly supersonically at sea level, operate above 60,000 feet, perform in all weathers, day and night, and carry a range of missiles, rockets and bombs. All aircraft are soon to be modified to use the Pave Tack target acquisition tracking and designation system, Harpoon anti-ship missiles and GBU-15 guided bombs, and their present radar homing and warning systems are presently being up-graded.

In addition to their strategic strike and reconnaissance role, the F111C aircraft can be used in anti-shipping and mining tasks, and in the direct support of ground forces although this last role would be unusual.

b.   Tactical Fighter Force. Currently based on the Mirage squadrons based at Williamtown (No.77 squadron), Darwin (No.75 Squadron) and Butterworth (No.3 Squadron). The Mirage is an

Figure 3.5: Location of RAAF Bases in Australia

Source: RAAF Handbook, January 1983, Annex A to Chapter 5.

all-weather interceptor used in the air
defence and ground support roles. It also
provides a tactical reconnaissance
capability. Its primary armaments are the
French Matra Magic and R530 air-to-air
missiles and it is also fitted with two 30mm
cannons. The Mirage squadrons are presently
being refurbished to sustain the aircraft as
an effective force until its replacement by
the F/A-18.

The 75 McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet
aircraft are to be delivered between 1985 and
1990. The F/A-18 is a multi-role aircraft
providing air combat, air intercept, fighter
escort, interdiction (including anti-shipping
strike) and close air support of ground
forces. It can attack targets by day or night
and in all-weather conditions at ranges in
excess of 1000 km. With aerial refuelling,
the F/A-18 could also supplement the
strategic strike capability provided by the
F111C. The F/A-18 will be able to be armed
with Aim-9 Sidewinder infra-red seeking
missiles, Aim-7 Sparrow radar guided, long
range missiles, 20mm cannon, Harpoon
anti-shipping missiles and both conventional
or laser-guided bombs.

c. Maritime Reconnaissance and Surveillance
Force. The maritime force is based on the P3B
and P3C Orion squadrons (No.10 and 11
Squadrons) located at Edinburgh in South
Australia. The Orion is fitted to deploy the
Barra sonobuoy and is armed with torpedoes
and the Harpoon anti-ship missile. It is able
to provide long range maritime reconnaissance
and patrol, anti-shipping, anti-submarine and
mining capabilities. The P3B Orion are being
progressively replaced with P3C aircraft, a
process which began in late 1984.

d. The Fixed Wing Transport Force. The RAAF
operates two squadrons of C130 Hercules
medium-range transport (based at RAAF
Richmond in NSW)and a flight of B-707 long
range transport (also at RAAF Richmond). A
mixed squadron of BAC 111, HS-748 and Mystere
20 aircraft forms the VIP transport force
(No.34 Squadron) located at RAAF Fairbairn in
Canberra. Tactical transport support is also
provided by a CC08 Caribou squadron at
Richmond and a mixed Caribou/UH-1H Iroquois
squadron at Townsville.

The C130 Hercules are well suited to Australia's transport support requirements. Primarily a tactical aircraft, their 3000-5000 nautical mile range capability also allows their use in the strategic role for urgent cargo, troops and aero-medevacuation. Improvements within the tactical role are planned, especially in the field of aerial delivery equipment and techniques, with the aim of reducing aircraft vulnerability. Most airfields in Australia are C-130 capable, and those too short could be lengthened at relatively short notice.

The Caribou aircraft can carry small loads into almost any airfield in Australia and are particularly suited to wet season operations in the north. However, the limited availability of AVGAS, and the apparently lessening requirement for an aircraft of Caribou's capability are major factors influencing decisions on the future of the element. In short, except for specialised circumstances, the C-130 has greater utility. Both the C-130E Hercules and the Caribou will demand replacement or major refurbishment before the end of the decade.

The RAAF B-707 is used for both defence and non-defence tasks. In military use, the aircraft is a long range strategic transport which can be operated between most established military and capital city airports. The RAAF B-707 can be used in the strategic cargo transport role, if necessary relieving the C-130 fleet or some of the workload. Missions undertaken include strategic transport support for the Army, scheduled courier services within Australia and overseas for use by all three services, VIP transport, search-and-rescue, medical evacuation and special air assistance tasks that have been requested by civil organisations and other government departments.

e. **The Rotary Wing Transport Force.** The RAAF currently operates three rotary wing squadrons equipped with Bell Iroquois Utility helicopters (divided between RAAF Townsville, Amberley and Fairbairn) and one squadron of Boeing Chinook medium-lift helicopters based at Amberley. The earlier model Iroquois

(UH-1B) are being replaced by French AS350
Ecureuil (Squirrel) light helicopters for use
by the Air Force and Navy.

The prime role of the RAAF helicopter force
is army support although significant support
has been provided in recent years as part of
aid for overseas countries or as part of UN
or Multinational observer forces in, for
example, the Sinai. Within Australia, rotary
wing transport assistance has been regularly
provided to civilian organisations, service
groups and other government departments and
agencies.

3.34   The majority of the Air Force's operational units are
currently located on the eastern seaboard. Australia's physical
environment and the concept of operations envisaged for the
defence of the mainland and Australia's immediate interests
requires that Air Force operational units should be able to
operate away from their current home bases for protracted
periods. They also require that advanced bases be developed in or
near the likely areas of operations in the north and north-west
of Australia.

3.35   To this end, the RAAF currently maintains airfields at
Learmonth in Western Australia and Tindal in the Northern
Territory. In August 1984 the Government announced that it would
proceed with the development of RAAF Tindal as the main base in
northern Australia for the F/A-18 tactical fighter force. It is
planned that 75 Squadron, now equipped with Mirage aircraft and
located at RAAF Darwin will be re-equipped with the F/A-18 and
relocated to RAAF Tindal in 1988. A further airfield is under
construction at Derby in Western Australia. Advanced bases have
only basic installations such as runway, limited accommodation,
fuel storage, water and power, and storage for ammunition and
explosives. Positioning of additional base facilities and
supplies would still be needed, however, before the bases could
be made fully operational.

3.30

3.36   The modular structure of the RAAF and its high degree of
mobility,   air   portability   and   self-sufficiency   enhances   its
flexible deployment capability. Units or sub-units from within
Operational Command, and their support elements, can be readily
deployed to other bases or as parts of a special tactical air
support force or maritime air force. In the former case, existing
operational bases contain additional facilities and reserve to be
able to support other units deployed from their parent bases.

Support Command

3.37   Support   Command   comprises   second   line   logistics,
training and administratives units which support the operational
component of the RAAF. The Air Officer Commanding Support Command
(AOCSC)   is   responsible   to   the   CAS   for,   inter   alia,   the
supervision and co-ordination of regular and reserve units under
command, personnel training and the provision of technical and
supply services in accordance with policy laid down by the
Department of Defence.

Joint Service Organisation and Capabilities

3.38   At   present,   the   only   standing   joint   Service
organisations within the ADF are the CDFS and his small central
staff plus a handful of joint service training establishments
(Australian Joint Warfare Establishment, the Joint Services Staff
College and the prospective Australian Defence Force Academy).
The command and control of joint forces is described in detail in
Chapter 7.

CHAPTER FOUR

DEFINING AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES AND

THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

4.1   Having described Australia's current and projected
defence force structure and the kinds of external and internal
factors that could influence or constrain developments in this
structure, we now turn to an examination of the structure itself;
how adequate is it in light of recent external developments, how
much should it be changed and in what direction?

4.2   In order to carry out this task, the Committee
considered that it was necessary to examine the specific roles
and capabilities of the Australian Defence Force within the
broader context of Australia's national security interests and
objectives. We need to consider both the detailed structure of
the defence force and the basic assumptions which underly this
structure. What are Australia's defence objectives? What are the
key characteristics of our present national military strategy and
concept of operations? What functional capabilities are required
to meet our military objectives?

4.3   The approach taken by the Committee was both analytical
- highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of our current
defence concepts and structures - and prescriptive - examining
alternative approaches to the defence of Australia and the
different structures that might be used. The Committee recognised
that such an examination can be neither fully exhaustive nor

conclusive since the number of options increase significantly as you work downwards from higher-order strategic considerations to detailed assessments of competing equipments and capabilities. The Committee believed however that the approach used provided a coherent and logical framework for examining both existing and alternative approaches to Australia's defence and that it could serve as a basic conceptual model for the future development of the Australian Defence Force.

4.4   The Committee found that there was general agreement that the detailed organisational structure, roles and capabilities of the Australian Defence Force should be derived from broader considerations of Australia's strategic environment and an assessment of our national interests and objectives. Such a process could involve the following steps:

    a.   determination of Australia's national interests and objectives;

    b.   delineation of a strategic or national defence concept describing how the national interests and objectives are most effectively and efficiently promoted and defended in the light of the strategic assessment. The national defence concept would cover both military and non-military strategies and would include the broad functions and roles of the Australian Defence Force;

    c.   delineation of an appropriate military strategy and concept of operations describing how the strategic concept is to be achieved;

    d.   development of an appropriate force structure encompassing organisation, capabilities and doctrine — with which to carry out the military strategy; and

    e.   the procurement and maintenance of the forces and supporting infrastructure and their deployment in peace.

4.5   The first steps in this process are very important
because they establish the basic framework within which
Australia's force structure is determined. As Rear Admiral G.R.
Griffiths argued to the Committee:

> 'Unless the higher defence policy and objectives
> are clearly defined it is not possible to consider
> the detailed aspects of the defence forces
> necessary to meet those objectives...there should
> be what could be considered a national corporate
> plan in which national objectives are stated, and
> various policies, such as those covering foreign,
> external trade, national security, and internal
> industrial and development policies, are
> coordinated to achieve those objectives.'[1]

Admiral Griffiths further argued that to be effective, the
national security policies should be so structured that they

> '...set the basis for defence policy which in turn
> should provide guidelines for the intended use of
> military forces, and thus the size and shape of
> the Defence establishment which is required to
> support the national security policy.'[2]

4.6   There was also general agreement that the delineation of
national interests and strategies is a broad responsibility of
Government rather than a responsibility of the Department of
Defence. It was considered that the Government should provide
defence planners with sufficient guidance to enable them to
develop an overall military strategy and a defence force
structure appropriate to Australia's needs.

4.7   A major and widespread criticism of Australia's defence
has been the lack of such high-level guidance and the appropriate
machinery for its development and oversight. In its submission to
the Committee, the Australia Defence Association stated that:

> 'It is the Association's impression that very
> little policy direction is given by Australian
> governments. This impression is gathered from the
> experience of individuals and from the lack of
> statements by the Government that a broad defence
> policy does exist...

In this context, the Association does not regard
policy as being a question of the acquisiton of
particular types of equipment for the Defence
Force. These are outcomes of policy and should be
judged against broad policy decisions. The
questions of policy on which the Association would
expect a directive to be given by the Government
to the Department include:

-    the   foreign   policy   objectives   of   the
     Government;

-    the economic objectives of the Government,
     especially in respect of trade, and foreign
     access to energy and other resources;

-    the circumstances in which the Government may
     be prepared to use the Defence Force,
     including mobiliseable reserves, at home and
     abroad;

-    the circumstances in which the Defence Force
     would NOT be used;

-    the weight that should be given to the
     purchase of equipment from overseas or from
     Australian industry;

-    the   resource   level   beyond   which   the
     Government   is   NOT   prepared   to   make
     commitments to defence in peace or war (this
     to include questions of money, manpower and
     diversion of other resources);

-    the integration of military and non-military
     resources and infrastructure;

-    the political, bureaucratic and military
     organisation for war, or circumstances short
     of war; and

-    readiness   -   at   what   notice   forces   of
     specified levels   must   be   capable   of
     deployment.'3'

4.8   A similar point has been made by Paul Dibb when he
recently stated:

     'Isn't it about time Cabinet tasked the Defence
     Committee to establish what are Australia's vital
     interests, and what they are in order or
     priorities, whatever they might be. Is it the

> defence of the Australian continent and if so what
> parts? Is it the offshore deposits of oil, natural
> gas, our territorial seas, our lines of
> communications? What is the policy? Does it have
> nothing to do with our neighbouring friendly
> countries?[4]

4.9 This view was partially confirmed by a senior
Departmental officer appearing before the Committee when he
stated that:

> 'I know of no document that contains national
> tasks. One of the concerns, I think, in the
> planners' minds over many years has been not only
> the lack of national tasks but the lack of
> national objectives and I think the identification
> of national tasks would be facilitated if we could
> have a clearer definition of what our national
> objectives are. But we see that as something that
> comes from Government rather than from the
> Department, if I could just put that bid in. We
> must start, I think, by asking what are our
> national objectives.'[5]

4.10 The Committee supports the contention that both the
current structure for determining national security policies, and
the guidance itself, are inadequate. The remainder of this
chapter attempts to set out the kind of broad policy guidance
that should be provided to force planners. It then translates
this basic guidance into an appropriate defence concept for
Australia and lists the overall roles and functions of the
Australian Defence Force. The appropriate machinery for the
development and implementation of national security policy and
defence force structure is discussed in Chapter Eight.

Defining Australia's National Interests and Objectives

4.11   Like all nations, Australia is basically concerned with
the maintenance of the economic, social and cultural well-being
of its people and institutions, and the protection of the nation
from actions that may adversely affect national sovereignty, the
exercise of fundamental rights or continuing individual or
national prosperity. As described in Chapter One, we also need to
recognise that we live in an increasingly interdependent world
and so our national interests cannot be entirely separated from
those of other nations or from the continued well-being of the
international political system as a whole.

4.12   We must also recognise from the outset that resources
required for national security could also be used to fulfil our
economic and social goals. It is easy enough to suggest that no
price is too high for the preservation of our national
independence, but in reality while Governments are concerned with
independence they are also concerned with social stability and
political survival. This is particularly the case in countries
like Australia in which military conflict remains only a remote
possibility. In these countries, defence expenditure has to be
fitted into a general framework of political and economic
policies which accords the highest priority to economic
development and social welfare.

4.13   Bearing in mind these broader considerations and
contraints, the basic objectives of Australia's national security
policy would be to provide the nation with security from armed
attack and from constraints on independent national decisions
imposed by the threat of such an attack. This is the present
objective of Australia's defence policy and the Committee
considers it to be a clear and unambiguous expression of the
ultimate objective of our national security policy.

4.14   This objective is broadly achieved through non-military and military strategies including:

a.   *support for international and regional* arrangements concerned with the resolution of conflict and realisation of world peace;

b.   promotion of international and regional *prosperity, and well-being;*

c.   development of effective capabilities for the defence of Australia and its territories, with due regard to the nation's resources and *the prevailing domestic situation.*

4.15   More specifically, as noted in the Committee's earlier report on Australian Defence Procurement, it may require the Australian Defence Force to perform a variety of tasks including:

a.   to deter a potential aggressor from mounting a major military attack against Australia or its vital interests by having the demonstrable capability to provide, at the time it may be required, a military response which would deny the enemy from achieving its objectives or would increase the cost and *risk of that activity to an unacceptable* degree;

b.   should deterrence fail, the provision of a successful defence against major attack and *raising the cost and risk of that attack to a* degree which the enemy would find unacceptable;

c.   to provide an appropriate military response *to any of the lesser contingencies;*

d.   to further Australia's diplomatic influence;

e.   to contribute to world and regional *stability, and to contribute to the security* of Australia's allies, neighbours and friends;

f.   to contribute to Australia's self-confidence and national will; and

g.   to support the civil authorities.[6]

4.16   These   tasks.   encompass   three   broad.   perspectives:
Australia's. global military role, our security relationships with
our   regional   neighbours. and   the   defence. of   Australia   and   its
immediate interests.

4.17   As Australia has limited resources to devote to defence
purposes, and considering the present difficulties of identifying
threats to Australa's security, the Committee believes that it is
important that clear guidance be given on the relative importance
of these different. perspectives. and the identification of the
priority of tasks to be undertaken.

Australia's Role in Global Affairs

4.18   From the discussion in Chapter One, it is clear that the
continuing proliferation of armaments, the advent of new military
technologies and the heightening tensions between the superpowers
are increasing fears of conflict eventually occurring between the
Soviet Union and the United States.

4.19   As the Committee noted in its report on Threats to
Australia's Security, while Australia may not be directly
involved in such a conflict, it would nonetheless be seriously
affected.

4.20   The damage that Australia would suffer in the first
instance in a general war, aside from that associated with a
possible nuclear attack, would be large scale disruption to our
economy because of the massive destruction inflicted on some of
our trading partners, and the dislocation of world trade. The
longer-term effects on the world of a large scale nuclear war,

including potential climatic, ecological and genetic damage, are likely to be even more serious than the short term effects. The enormity of destruction is indicated for example, in the Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations which describes some of the effects from a large scale nuclear exchange in the following terms:

> '...There is very little reason to believe that the political and social situation in any country would be unchanged after a large nuclear war. Many nations among those we know today would probably disappear. Others might be virtually depopulated by famine and mass migration. The system of international security would have been destroyed, and so would to a large extent the traditional pattern of those states, nations and societies which might survive.'[7]

4.21   Australia would have no defence against direct nuclear attack, or the longer-term climatic and ecological consequences of nuclear war. Australia therefore has a vital and continuing interest in reducing tensions between the superpowers and re-establishing a more stable relationship between them. In the interests of common security we should also seek to induce all nations of the world to act in concert to reduce the overall level of armaments to a more manageable and less dangerous level.

4.22   Australia's present contributions towards maintaining the global strategic balance centre on our continuing defence relationship with the United States, principally through the location of joint facilities in Australia and our obligations under the ANZUS Treaty.

Joint Facilities

4.23   Australia is currently host to a number of joint United States-Australian facilities including the North West Cape Naval Communications Station in Western Australia, the Joint Defence

Space Research Facility at Pine Gap near Alice Springs and the Joint Defence Space Communications Station at Nurrungar in Woomera.

4.24   The nature and role of these joint facilities have been considered at length by the Committee in the preparation of its reports on Threats to Australia's Security and the ANZUS Alliance. On both occasions, the Committee found that while the presence of the joint facilities adds to the risk of Australia's being attacked by Soviet nuclear strategic weapons, this risk is outweighed by the important role the facilities play in preventing nuclear conflict between the superpowers. In the latter report, for example, the Committee concluded that:

> '...the part played by the joint facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar in monitoring and gathering intelligence on Soviet forces and weapon movements, their verification capabilities in regard to arms limitations agreements, as well as the important contribution made by the facility at North West Cape to United States defences, make a vital contribution to the defences of the whole Western Alliance. Therefore, on balance, the Committee agrees with the assessment made by this, and former Australian governments, that the benefits to Western defences and hence Australia's ultimate security outweigh any risks the presence of these facilities entails.'[8]

4.25   This view is also held to by the present Government. In a statement to the Parliament on 15 September 1983, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Bill Hayden, stated that

> '...the contribution made by the joint defence facilities to deterrence of nuclear war fully justifies any risks that might be seen as arising from our having those facilities in Australia. In addition, the operation of the joint defence facilities gives us some moral standing in the position we intend to take more actively in the United Nations and other international fora in support of arms control and arms reduction.[9]'

The ANZUS Alliance

4.26   In addition to the direct benefits to Australia's defence, which are described in Chapter Two, ANZUS has a wider significance as part of the system of alliances and treaty arrangements which constitute the Western Alliance and which contribute to global deterrence. In the geopolitical context, ANZUS conveys to the Soviet bloc powers a strong signal, both from the United States and the local powers concerned, that our region is not an area of low-cost, low risk opportunities.

4.27   ANZUS also provides a framework within which Australia can directly contribute to the strategic capabilities of the West through such existing activities as the provision of service facilities at Cockburn Sound for US Navy ships engaged in patrolling the Indian Ocean, and the provision of transit facilities at Darwin for US B-52 aircraft.

4.28   This does not mean however that Australia's defence and strategic interests are subsumed within those of its major ally. In its recent review of the ANZUS alliance, both the Australian and the United States governments agreed that the Treaty provisions do not derogate from Australia's right to take an independent view in both foreign and defence policy matters. Moreover, as Mr Hayden observed in his 15 September speech,

> '...agreement was specifically reached as to Australia's prime defence role, namely, as one of building our self-defence capability within our regional context, rather than as a presumed global role as some sort of appendix of a superpower.'[10]

4.29   As pointed out in Chapter Two, it must also be recognised that neither the Australian-United States defence relationship in general nor the ANZUS Alliance in particular provides Australia with a guarantee of obtaining direct military support from the United States under all circumstances.

Australia's defence planning therefore should proceed on the basis that American support, in whatever form, should be regarded as a bonus to, rather than an anticipated central element of, Australia's response capacity. This notwithstanding, the Committee considers that the Australian Defence Force should maintain the capability to operate and integrate with allied forces.

Should Australia's Global Role be Increased?

4.30   A number of submissions to the Committee argued that at present, the major threat to Australia's security stems from the continuing military build-up by the Soviet Union and the ensuing possibility of a potential breakdown in superpower relations. At a general level, they suggest that regional and even local concerns should be viewed as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, Australia's broader role in the Western Alliance, and that Australia has an important part to play in limiting the global aspirations of the Soviet Union. It was further argued that any major deterioration in American-Soviet relations could result in Australia's sea lanes being directly threatened by expanding Soviet naval power. The centre of gravity of Australian maritime defence should therefore be shifted to the North and North-West, and Australia's naval forces - in concert with those of its western allies - should operate as far North as the China Sea and as far West (or East) as the South Atlantic.

4.31   The Department of Defence on the other hand argued that although Australia's security would be vitally affected by major conventional or nuclear war between the super powers, 'there is little we could do directly to influence the likelihood or course of the conflict'. The responsiblity for providing a global response to Soviet intentions should be born by those Western nations 'whose interests were more at stake [and which] would be able to contribute more effectively than ourselves.'[11]

4.32   Moreover, as noted in the 1976 White Paper, Australia's defence resources are limited, and the dissipation of these resources into far flung regions throughout the world would do little to sustain our own defence capabilities.

> 'Our military resources are limited and the first
> call upon them must always be in respect of our
> own national security tasks. We could not sustain
> significant   operations   in   two   theatres
> concurrently. We cannot contribute military forces
> that would be significant to the strategic balance
> in Europe or North East Asia, nor to the western
> nuclear deterrent. Events in distant areas such as
> Africa, the Middle East and North East Asia
> (assuming there were international sanction for
> Australia's involvement) are beyond the reach of
> effective defence activity by Australia.'[12]

4.33   The consequence of this position for defence planning is that the 'contingency of global war...has not been accepted as a determinant of the development of the ADF. [Rather,] we would expect to defend the security of our immediate environment with military forces shaped by other considerations.'[13] The Department does point out, however, that the ADF developed for Australia's own security would still 'allow the Government of the day options' although it does not spell out what it means by these options.

4.34   The view of the Department of Defence, and a large number of defence commentators then, is that Australia should focus on the defence of Australia and its essential interests and that it should not expand its global military commitment beyond its current role.

4.35   This basic position is supported by the Committee. While it is recognised that it is in Australia's own interests to contribute in any way it can to maintaining the current balance of power between the superpowers, our ability to do so militarily is limited. Australia does not have, nor is it likely to have,

sufficient defence resources for deployment in support of the
Western Alliance in the Northern hemisphere. Australia should
continue to support its Western allies in our area of strategic
interest through existing defence cooperation programs and
alliance arrangements such as ANZUS, but we should seek to reduce
existing international tensions primarily through diplomatic and
economic means rather than by the use of military force. This
last point has been recognised by the Government. As stated by
the Department of Foreign Affairs:

> 'inter-connection between the role of the ADF and
> the conduct of Australian foreign policy must,...
> be seen clearly in the context of the Government's
> overall approach to external policy – an approach
> which rests wherever possible on a non-military
> appraisal of power politics, is averse to options
> of military intervention, and conversely, actively
> seeks and emphasises the preferred alternatives of
> political contact and diplomatic dialogue.'[14]

Peacekeeping

4.36   A related issue involves the use of Australia's forces
in peacekeeping missions. The Department of Foreign Affairs has
argued that:

> 'The ADF's participation in a range of United
> Nations peacekeeping operations since World War II
> has served our national interests by helping to
> prevent or to stabilise some conflicts in areas of
> strategic importance, by demonstrating our
> commitment to the maintenance of international
> peace and security, and by strengthening our
> credentials as a responsible middle power.'[15]

4.37   The Department further stated that Australia is 'likely
to remain a country asked from time to time to contribute to
United Nations peacekeeping operations.' While acknowledging that
such approaches would have to be decided by the Government or the

day, the Department argued that the Australian Defence Force
should 'maintain the capacity to allow the Government to respond
as needed to U.N. and other requests for peacekeeping
assistance.'[16] The Department of Defence, however, has placed a
different emphasis on peace-keeping. In an information paper
published in 1979, Defence observed that:

> 'A possible requirement to participate in UN
> peacekeeping is not...a factor specifically
> shaping the capabilities that should be possessed
> by the Defence Force. Rather, planning and
> preparedness in the Defence Force takes account of
> the possibility of Australia from time to time
> contributing forces to UN peacekeeping activities
> from the capabilities existing within the
> force-in-being.'[17]

4.38   In the same paper, the Department of Defence also
cautioned that the implications for ADF force structure should be
carefully considered when assessing requests for peace-keeping
contributions:

> '...A contribution which would result in a serious
> imbalance in residual capability - or even
> complete denial of a particular capability - might
> be judged unacceptable having regard to the effect
> on the ability to react to other contingent
> situations, on training, or on, for example, the
> planned introduction of new skills or
> equipment.'[18]

4.39   Australia currently has 140 defence personnel located
overseas on various peacekeeping missions. These missions
include:

> a.   Sinai Peacekeeping Force. Since March 1982,
>   Australia has maintained a contingent of 99
>   RAAF personnel with the Multinational Force
>   and Observers (MFO) at El Gorah in the Sinai.
>   Australia also provides seven officers on the
>   Force Headquarters staff as well as eight of
>   the ten Iroquois helicopters in the MFO's
>   Rotary Wing Aviation Unit.

b.   United Nations Observers. Australian Defence
     Force personnel currently serve with the
     United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation
     (UNTSO) in the Middle East and with the UN
     observer force in Kashmir (overall total of
     19 officers). In addition, since February
     1979, an Australian Army force, comprising a
     Headquarters   Australian   Contingent,   United
     Nations Transition Assistance Group and 17
     Construction   Squadron   (Royal   Australian
     Engineers), has been placed on a degree of
     readiness to deploy to Namibia as part of a
     proposed   United   Nations   peace-keeping
     operation. The advance party of this Force is
     on thirty-two days notice to move and the
     main body on sixty days.

4.40   The Committee has reservations over the efficacy of
Australia's peace-keeping role and is concerned at its potential
effect on our own force structure and capabilities. In this last
context, the Committee notes the earlier advice from the
Department of Defence, that:

     'Requests for Australia to contribute forces for
     UN peace-keeping tasks can arise with little
     warning and may make calls upon a range of
     capabilities   from   within   the   Defence
     Force...Specific units are not earmarked for
     peace-keeping tasks, nor do these tasks dictate
     capabilities or training. It could be expected
     that a wide range of possible UN requirements
     could be met from within the force-in-being,
     depending on the extent to which the Government
     was prepared to allow this to detract from their
     availability for their fundamental roles in the
     defence of Australia.'[19]

4.41   The Committee further notes that the deployment of
Iroquois helicopters to the Sinai effectively restricts the
Army's Operational Deployment Force in carrying out either its
major training or operational roles. The Committee recommends
therefore that as a matter of urgency, sufficient additional
helicopters be acquired to restore this capability to Australia's
current force-in-being.

4.42   The issue of helicopter support for the Sinai commitment and its impact on the Army's short term deployment capabilities highlights the potentially open-ended nature of Australia's peace-keeping tasks and the significant constraints and limitations these commitments can impose on the ADF. The Committee considers that the Government should evaluate the efficacy of Australia's present means of providing military forces for peacekeeping tasks, including whether the peacekeeping operations achieve their intended purpose and justify participation by countries such as Australia. Should Government decide to participate in future peacekeeping missions, then additional capacities to compensate for this participation must be built into the force structure of the day, so that ADF capabilities are not reduced. The issue of financing peacekeeping contributions should also be reviewed, in particular whether the cost ought to be borne by the Department of Foreign Affairs through a special allocation or by direct Government grant.

Australia's Military Role in Regional Affairs

4.43   As described in Chapter One, the broad region encompassing South East Asia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and the South West Pacific is of vital strategic significance to Australia. Any significant change in the regional balance of power or in the relationships between or within countries in this region could introduce or expand uncertainties in Australia's strategic prospects. It is in Australia's interests therefore to seek to promote regional stability and security through a range of diplomatic, economic, political and defence initiatives.

4.44 Australia's present approach to the region, in terms of defence cooperation and involvement was summarised, in the 1976 White Paper as follows:

> 'Our policy will be to support as best we may the present relatively favourable prospect in South East Asia. We cannot succeed to Britain's earlier role, nor would this be acceptable either to us or to the regional states to-day. However, most of the regional countries appear to value some association with Australia in defence matters. We intend therefore to continue our defence connections with them, by such means as defence co-operation programs, occasional military exercising, consultations and visits. We shall continue to co-operate under the Five Power arrangement, which embraces Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore.'[20]

4.45 These elements of our defence policy are discussed below.

Five Power Defence Arrangements

4.46 In 1971, the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Malaysia and Singapore entered into the Five Power Defence Arrangements. These provide a cooperative framework for the Australian presence at the Royal Malaysian Air Force Base at Butterworth, the Integrated Air Defence System linking Malaysia and Singapore, Malaysian and Singaporean participation in multilateral and bilateral exercises, and the provision of some training facilities in Australia.

4.47 The Australian presence at Butterworth currently comprises one Mirage fighter squadron, two P3 Orion long range maritime patrol aircraft which conduct surveillance operations in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, some ancilliary units and one infantry company. The Minister for Defence, Mr Gordon

Scholes, recently announced that this commitment would continue
into the foreseeable future. While the existing Mirage Squadron
is to be phased out of Butterworth between 1986 and 1988,
Australia will continue to maintain its fighter presence by
rotating the new F/A-18 fighters through Butterworth for a
minimum of 16 weeks a year from mid-1988. In a recent trip to
Singapore, Mr Scholes also announced that Australia would
continue to deploy its fighter aircraft to Singapore, noting that
'changes in the Air Force capabilities of Singapore and Malaysia
and the introduction of the F/A-18 fighter into the Royal
Australian Air Force would strengthen the overall effectiveness
of the Five Power Defence Arrangements.'[21]

Defence Cooperation Programs

4.48   Australia   presently   conducts   defence   cooperation
programs with Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand, the Philippines and the small emerging states of the
South West Pacific.

4.49   The programs are conducted on a bilateral basis and are
tailored to respond to the needs and priorities of the regional
countries concerned. The programs are oriented towards developing
practical   working   relationships   between   Australia   and   the
recipient countries. In so doing, they are seen to

> '...afford   tangible   evidence   of   Australia's
> readiness   to   assist   these   countries   in   their
> efforts   to   maintain   their   own   security   and
> underline   Australia's   commitment   to   regional
> security. To the extent that the programs are
> successful, they serve as a disincentive to the
> intrusion into the region of outside powers with
> interests inimical to those of Australia.   The
> contribution made in this way to a peaceful and
> stable Australian strategic environment makes them

directly relevant to efforts in other fields to
advance Australian foreign policy objectives in
their region.'22

4.50   The cooperative activities consist primarily of Defence
Force assistance to facilitate training both locally and in
Australia, the provision of specialist advice and skills, and
joint equipment projects. The Australian Defence Report 1982-83
states that

'[i]n recent years, the defence co-operation
program has given particular emphasis to
activities with a technical bias that also aid
national economic development and, where possible,
supplement Australian economic aid.'23

4.51   Australia agreed to a Singapore request in 1980 for the
use by the Singapore Armed Forces of Australian training
facilities. As a result, since February 1982 eight Republic of
Singapore Air Force fighter aircraft have been deployed to RAAF
Williamtown on a long term basis, with rotations of six months
for aircrew training. Singapore has also conducted its own Army
exercises (involving a battalion group) in the Shoalwater Bay
training area.

4.52   The total defence cooperation expenditure in 1982-83 was
$44.2m compared with $39.7m in the previous financial year and
$24.6m in 1978-79. Despite this increase, money spent on defence
cooperation continues to remain at around one per cent of
Australia's total defence expenditure. The breakdown of the
1982-83 expenditure was as follows:

                                          $million

        Papua New Guinea   17.3
        Indonesia   10.2
        Malaysia   4.9
        Thailand   3.8
        The South West Pacific   3.4
        Singapore   1.6
        Philippines   1.5

4.53   The Committee considers that the current nature and
level of Australia's defence commitments to its region of
interest are satisfactory given the nature of our security
interests and our limited capacity to influence militarily events
or expectations anyway. Our present, relatively low key approach
to regional defence cooperation adequately demonstrates our
interest in the region without attempting to impose on it our own
solutions or values. It also serves both our own interests and
those of ASEAN nations.

Defining Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest

4.54   The Committee believes that it is important, especially
from the point of view of planning and developing Australia's
defence force structure, that clear guidance is given on what
constitutes Australia's required area of military operations as
distinct from our more general area of primary strategic concern.

4.55   While the recent changes in Australia's strategic
environment have led us to revoke our earlier posture of 'forward
defence' in favour of one that is primarily concerned with the
defence of Australia and its immediate interests, there remains
uncertainty over exactly what this latter posture means
particularly in regard to Australia's regional military role.
Should the focus of Australia's future military activities be
restricted to our mainland and maritime surrounds - as implied in
the oft-used terms 'Fortress Australia' and 'Continental Defence'
- or should we seek to project our military capabilities further
into our immediate region?

4.56   Current guidance on this issue remains confused and
ambiguous. The most recent official statement on Australia's area
of operations is contained in the 1976 White Paper which states
that, in light of the recent developments in Australia's
strategic circumstances;

> '...the requirements and scope for Australian
> defence activity are limited essentially to the
> areas closer to home – areas in which the
> deployment of military capabilities by a power
> potentially unfriendly to Australia could permit
> that power to attack or harass Australia and its
> territories, maritime resources zone and near
> lines of communication. These are our adjacent
> maritime areas; the South West Pacific countries
> and territories; Papua New Guinea; Indonesia; and
> the South East Asian region.'24

The area described by the White Paper however is very broad, and
it is not clear whether or what kind of military forces are
required to be able to operate into all these areas.

4.57   In evidence to the Committee in an earlier inquiry, a
former CDFS Admiral Sir Anthony Synnot provided a further view on
what could constitute Australia's area of operations when he
stated that:

> '...the primary purpose of our Defence Force...is
> the defence of Australia and its interests. It is
> very much a government policy matter whether they
> would consider that those interests went further
> afield than perhaps the 200-mile nautical zone. I
> do not think from a Defence Force point of view we
> would have our forces so narrowly structured that
> they were incapable of going elsewhere.'25

4.58   Yet another view was put by the Department of Foreign
Affairs which argued that the Australian Defence Force should be
able to 'demonstrate a capacity to protect Australian offshore
territories such as Cocos, Christmas, and Cartier Islands, and
Ashmore Reef.'26 The Department also suggested that it would also
be in Australia's interests for the Australian Defence Force to
maintain:

4.23

> '...the capability to respond effectively to
> emergencies in the South Pacific region. The
> extent and effectiveness of our responses (along
> with those of New Zealand) will condition the
> Island Governments' perceptions of the reliance
> and trust they can place on us to support their
> security and well-being.'[27]

4.59   A number of commentators outside the defence
establishment have suggested that Australia should play an even
more active regional military role. In a submission to this
inquiry, for example, Brigadier R.A. Sunderland argued that:

> 'There is a need to reinforce the defence links
> between Australia and the regional states both to
> enhance Australia's security and the security of
> the region as a whole. While much is being done by
> way of providing economic and military assistance,
> Australia's defence planning is presently too
> introspective. Planners are rightly concerned
> about the defence of Australia, but insufficient
> planning is being done about the more immediate
> problems of regional defence.'[28]

4.60   This theme was repeated by the RSL which suggested that
Australia should be able to deter any future threats to its
security from within our region by expanding Australia's first
line of defence beyond our immediate coastal surrounds to include
an area embracing Indonesia, New Guinea and the near Pacific
islands to the east of Australia (defined as Australia's
'Neighbourhood').

4.61   The RSL further argued that the Australian Defence Force
should be capable of:[29]

        a.   making a major contribution to the stability
              of our Neighbourhood;

        b.   preventing an unfriendly external power from
              gaining positions of influence or
              establishing a presence in the Neighbourhood;

        c.   providing a deterrent to any local power
              which seeks to gain a position of dominance
              in the Neighbourhood;

d. encouraging local states to resist pressure
    by unfriendly external powers; and

e. providing an option for Australia to
    contribute to situations beyond our
    Neighbourhood which could have long-term
    implications or potential benefits for
    Australian security.

In order to meet these tasks, it saw the Australian Defence Force
being able to:

a. monitor the movement of potentially hostile
    forces and to have a demonstrable capability
    to inflict an unacceptably high degree of
    damage on that force;

b. respond to any intrusion into the area which
    is assessed to have a hostile intent; and

c. strike at the bases or facilities of an
    aggressor local to the area or of an external
    power which has established or gained access
    to bases in the area.

4.62   The RSL also argued that Australia 'can and should play
a useful role in ensuring that the USSR does not gain further
strategic advantage in the Indian and Pacific Oceans' and that
Australia should look to developing an 'independent capability
for securing, relieving and maintaining our Antarctic bases.'

4.63   If implemented, these latter changes in particular would
require substantial additions to Australia's present force
structure, not least the addition of long-range air and sea
transportable ground forces and naval surface and maritime strike
forces. Such changes would be an expensive and potentially
open-ended exercise that may be beyond Australia's capacity to
achieve. Furthermore, in light of the current threat assessment,
the Committee cannot see the need for such a capability at this
stage. There is also the danger that the adoption by Australia of
a more assertive regional military role may actually decrease our

national security by raising fears within the region over Australia's longer-term intentions, inviting an arms race between Australia and other regional powers and inviting superpower involvement to maintain a regional balance of power.

4.64   Even if Australia were to achieve these kinds of capabilities, there are severe doubts whether any unilateral response by Australia would be decisive in any regional conflict.

4.65   These problems notwithstanding, the Committee considers that there is value in identifying within Australia's broad region of strategic concern a more specific area in which we would expect to take a major defence interest and within which our military forces would be required to operate. The Committee defines this latter region as Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest. In determining the most appropriate area for this purpose, we must not only take into account the views and perceptions of our neighbours, but also seek to provide for defence in depth. As the Australia Defence Association has put it:

> '...it is surely prudent for an Australian defence strategy not to surrender positions which are held or can be held at a distance from the Australian heartland. It is a basic principle of strategy that a defender must trade space for time, positions held in return for time to properly organise a defence.'[30]

Taking all these factors into account, the Committee considers that Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest should comprise Australia and its offshore Territories (see Figure 4.1). The principal focus of our defence force operations would be on the maritime and air approaches to Australia and on any potential bases and staging areas from which opposing forces may be launched. The area would need to be reviewed at regular intervals in line with assessments of change in Australia's wider strategic and operational environment.

Figure 4.1: Australia's Off-shore Territories

Source: Adapted from BMR Research Newsletter, September 1984, p7.

Australia's National Defence Concept

4.66   The Committee believes that Australia's national defence policy should have two broad aims, viz:

    a.   prevention of attack or threat of attack against Australia and its interests through:

        (1)   development of a credible deterrent posture focussed on Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest and aimed at all levels of potential threats.

        (2)   continuing commitment to the ANZUS alliance; and

        (3)   continuing defence cooperation with nations in Australia's region of interest.

    b.   Countering aggression

        (1)   in the event of indirect aggression or aggression outside Australia's area of principal defence interest, by considering a range of non-military and military options designed to bring the situation under control as quickly as possible; and

        (2)   in the event of direct aggression within Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest, by taking responsive action immediately to defeat or force back such aggression at the earliest possible stage.

        In the case of both low and intermediate level threats, Australia should be able to defeat aggression without outside help. In the case of high level threats Australia should be capable of delaying the enemy's progress in order to gain time to seek assistance from its major allies.

The Roles and Functions of the Australian Defence Force

4.67   The Committee considers that the broad functions of the Australian Defence Force should be, by acting as an independent national force, to:

   a.   prevent an attack or threat of attack against Australia and its interests;

   b.   counter all forms of military aggression against Australia and its interests and ensure the security of Australia and its territories; and

   c.   contribute, either by itself or in concert with other nations, to both global and regional security and stability.

4.68   In carrying out these functions, the principal roles of the Australian Defence Force would be:

   a.   to organise, train and equip forces required to prevent attack or threat of attack against Australia and its interests;

   b.   to provide the basis for the combat and support forces required for the defence of Australia and its interests against higher level threats;

   c.   to provide assistance and training for the military forces of designated nations;

   d.   to provide aid to the civil power as directed; and

   e.   to provide assistance to civil authorities and organisations as authorised.

END NOTES

CHAPTER FOUR

1.   Rear Admiral G.R. Griffiths, Submission, pp S73-4.

2.   Rear Admiral G.R. Griffiths, Submission, pS74.

3.   Australia Defence Association, Submission, pS211.

4.   Paul Dibb, Canberra Times, 20 October 1983. Cited
        in Brigadier R.A. Sunderland, Submission, pS160.

5.   Evidence, 24 May 1984, p88.

6.   Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence
        Australian Defence Procurement, p15.

7.   United Nations General Assembly, Comprehensive
        Study on Nuclear Weapons: Report of the Secretary
        General, 12 July 1980, (A/35/393; E.81.I.11), p84;
        quoted in Threats to Australia's Security, p14.

8.   The ANZUS Alliance, p58.

9.   Statement to the Parliament (on 15 September 1983)
        by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Bill
        Hayden, quoted in Australian Foreign Affairs
        Record, September 1983, p516.

10.   Australian Foreign Affairs Record, p516.

11.   Department of Defence, Submission, pS6.

12.   Hon. D.J. Killen, Australian Defence, November
        1976, p6.

13.   Department of Defence, Submission, pS6.

14.   Department of Foreign Affairs, Submission, pS44.

15.   Department of Foreign Affairs, Submission, pS50-1.

16.   Department of Foreign Affairs, Submission, pS51.

17.   Department of Defence, Information Paper on the
        Capacity of the Australian Defence Force to
        Contribute to United Nations Peacekeeping, 19
        March 1979, paragraph 12.

18.   Department of Defence, Information Paper,
        paragraph 15.

19.   Evidence, 18 March 1981, p1661.

20.   Australian Defence, p7.

21.   Defence News Release No.74/84 dated 26 April 1984.

22.   Department of Foreign Affairs, Submission to the Sub-Committee on Australia and ASEAN, p111.

23.   Defence Report 1982-83, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1983, p4.

24.   Australian Defence, p6.

25.   Evidence, 18 March 1981, p1686.

26.   Department of Foreign Affairs, Submission, pS45.

27.   Department of Foreign Affairs, Submission, pS50.

28.   Brigadier R.A. Sunderland, Submission, pS190.

29.   The Returned Services League of Australia, Submission, pp22-3.

30.   Australia Defence Association, Submission, pS197.

CHAPTER FIVE

AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE STRATEGY

5.1   Having defined a basic defence concept for Australia and
the broad roles and functions required of the Australian Defence
Force, it is necessary to look at ways in which these may best be
achieved. What should be our overall approach to deterring
threats to Australia's security and of dealing with those threats
that actually arise? Given the likely nature of our strategic and
domestic circumstances into the 1980s and 1990s, what should be
the basic parameters of our military strategy and the key
determinants of the structure and operational concepts of the
Australian Defence Force? These questions are the central focus
of this Chapter.

5.2   It begins by examining Australia's current military
strategy for the defence of Australia and how well our present
force-in-being satisfies the defence concept that was proposed in
Chapter Four. The current approach, sometimes described as the
core force strategy, is a largely reactive posture which seeks to
provide defence against a range of threats as they emerge. The
Committee considers that this strategy is inadequate. Our
security should not be responsive to factors which could not be
perceived until a threat had developed, but should be dynamic and
positive so as to delay further or deny the emergence of a
threat.

5.3   It is argued that a change in emphasis in our present
military strategy is required in which priority is given to
deterrence rather than defence. We should seek to deter the
emergence of all levels of threat to Australia's security. An
important part of this strategy is the ability to deal

effectively with those low-level threats that may arise with little or no warning. This overall approach would give greater credibility to Australia's defence posture and would facilitate force structure planning and development. It would also ensure that we had time to re-examine our current limited capacity to defend ourselves against intermediate and high level threats to our security.

Australia's Current Approach to Defence

5.4   As noted in Chapter Three, the common functions of the Australian Defence Force are to:

      a.   deter aggression;

      b.   ensure the security of Australia and its Territories;

      c.   uphold and protect Australia's national interests; and

      d.   contribute to United Nations supervisory or peace-keeping forces.

5.5   Apart from peacekeeping, these functions are similar to those recommended by the Committee in Chapter Four.

5.6   The current approach of the Department of Defence for carrying out these broad functions was outlined in the Committee's earlier report on Australian Defence Procurement. In that report, it was noted that the imperatives of an absence of any definable threat and the need to insure against a range of possible contingencies led the Department to adopt a reactive

military strategy encompassing the concept of a core force. As the Committee noted, this 'is a simple notion of a force that is able to be fleshed out when indicators are perceived of the specific direction that any change in strategic circumstances might take, noting that these indicators will occur well ahead of any major eventuality. Expansion and change in direction would take place gradually, at least in the first instance, in response to any perceptions of a developing threat.'[1]

5.7   On the basis of evidence presented to it, the Committee notes that *while the term 'core force' no longer is used* officially to describe Australia's overall military strategy, the basic principles underlying the concept are still considered to be adequate. Australia's present and future military response capacity will continue to react to, rather than pre-empt or attempt to dictate or control perceived changes in our strategic and operational environment. Force structure planning and development therefore will occur incrementally as developments in our external circumstances and their implications for Australia are continually monitored and assessed. This evolutionary process *takes place within the context of the Department's Five Year* Defence Program (FYDP) which provides a financial planning basis for defence procurement over rolling five year periods.

5.8   The basic ingredients of Australia's present military strategy were described by the Department of Defence in the following terms:

> '.   We need intelligence collection and assessment, and regular review processes able promptly to detect deterioration in our strategic circumstances.

> .   The force-in-being needs to be able to deal effectively with peacetime tasks and credible contingencies of national defence which could arise in the shorter term, and to deter realistic escalation from that level.

- We need also to be able to expand the force in a timely way to respond to perceived strategic changes which could weaken Australia's security. Thus we seek to maintain a core of military skills, equipment and infrastructure to insure against the risks of the future. In selecting capabilities for inclusion in this basis for expansion, we give priority to those most fundamental to the direct defence of Australia.

- We need a planning machinery which regularly tests the consequences for our defence posture of credible shorter term and more remote contingencies.

- Calls on defence resources such as national tasks, exercising with friendly forces, and contributing to peace-keeping operations, are not determinants of our force structure, but are taken into account in planning development of the Defence Force.'[2]

5.9   Within this overall strategy, the Department gives emphasis to developing and maintaining

'...capabilities that are appropriate to shorter-term contingencies. At the same time, in maintaining a selective basis for expansion to meet more serious but remote threats should they arise, we concentrate on those capabilities that take a long time to acquire and develop, and which seem most fundamental to any future major military conflict in Australia's enduring geo-strategic circumstances.'[3]

The Department further argued that in light of Australia's remoteness and relatively benign strategic circumstances, only a few elements of the defence force need to be kept at a state of high readiness. These force elements include counter terrorist forces based on the SAS Regiment, the Operational Deployment Force and our maritime surveillance forces.

5.10   All other force elements, particularly those 'which are established to sustain long lead capabilities and to form the expansion base' are currently held at a lower level of

operational readiness. This lower state of readiness is 'manifest
in constrained training activities, flying hours and steaming
times, and consequently in lower expenditure on ammunition and
maintenance spares.' The Department acknowledged that these lower
states of readiness together with existing low levels of reserve
stocks of ammunition, weapons and spare parts mean that we could
'not support any sustained combat involvement of our forces
beyond low level operations'. It argued however that such an
approach is reasonable in terms of Australia's current
circumstances.

> 'We have found it necessary to hold down these
> stock levels to meet only our more important
> training needs together with a modest operational
> commitment. Only in this way, within the resources
> available, can the investment in major capital
> equipment and infrastructure be held at the levels
> necessary to maintain our force structure and to
> introduce key new capabilities from time to time.
> This judgement is accepted for the present on the
> basis that training intensity and stock levels can
> be lifted more rapidly than the more substantial
> investment items can be introduced, and that our
> strategic assessment makes the associated
> shorter-term risks acceptable. However the
> consequential reduction in overall operational
> efficiency must be carefully monitored to ensure
> long term detriment does not occur.'[4]

5.11   That Australia's present military strategy is largely a
reactive one is also seen by the nature of the command and
control arrangements that would apply in the transition from
peace to war. These are detailed in Chapter Seven, but they
essentially involve the grouping of appropriate force elements
from the three Services under a Joint Force Headquarters only
after there is a fairly clear indication of an emerging threat to
Australia. The operation of both the joint force and its
headquarters would occur in accordance with guidelines issued at
the time by the CDFS, and standard operational doctrine and
procedures that are published in various Joint Service
publications.

5.12   As noted in its earlier report, the Committee recognises
that Australia's present military strategy has much to commend
it. It seeks to ensure that selected capabilities are relevant to
any emerging crises and to Australia's particular environment and
that resources are not spent too soon or on the wrong equipments.
It provides some degree of deterrence against a range of possible
threats to Australia's security, and sufficient capabilities to
be able to respond to most low-level threats should they arise.
Departmental witnesses assert that it also provides an adequate
base for expansion to the size and shape necessary, within the
available time of warning, should an intermediate or high level
threat emerge.

5.13   The Committee continues to believe however that the
present approach suffers a number of shortfalls and that the
implications and potential consequences of these shortfalls are
becoming more acute.

5.14   In particular, the Committee is still not satisfied that
the core force, as presently constituted, could expand to its
required level within a realistic period of warning should the
threat of major direct attack emerge in the future. As noted in
the Committee's report on Australian Defence Procurement:

> 'Given the long-lead times required to acquire
> major, advanced technology naval and air
> capabilities, to introduce them into effective
> service, and to train personnel to operate and
> maintain these, the capacity to expand the Navy
> and Air Force within a period of five years (the
> least time in which a realistic threat would be
> likely) would be limited, although they could,
> perhaps, be provided with relatively large numbers
> of lesser technology equipments, where these can
> be shown to be suitable substitutes or
> complementary capabilities to the more advanced
> equipments with their greater acquisition lead-
> times. The present level of equipments in service
> or authorised for acquisition in these Services

> would provide only a limited defensive capability
> against the threat of major attack. This limited
> capability requires either that the naval and air
> elements of the core force should be expanded in
> the period before the threat of major attack
> emerged, or the development of a strategy based
> around a major Army response. Independent
> assessments conclude, however, that it would take
> between two and a half and five years defence
> preparation to provide a trained ground force of
> 150,000 troops or between four and eight years to
> provide an Army of 250,000.[15]

5.15   The Committee believes that these problems are being compounded by factors which are increasing the difference between what Australia currently has in terms of military capabilities and what it is likely to require in order to meet either an intermediate or a high level threat.

5.16   These factors include on the one hand, recent advances in military capabilities generally within our region of interest and continuing developments in technology which are increasing the size and composition of the terminal force to which Australia's force-in-being must expand. On the other hand, it is also clear that the present expansion baseline of the ADF has remained static. Successive governments have failed to provide the resources necessary to acquire the kinds of equipments that have been identified by the Department of Defence to make good existing shortcomings and deficiencies. The capabilities of the ADF for example still fall short of those that were identified in the 1976 White Paper as being required to be purchased or in sight by 1981. Partly as a result of this, much of the current and projected investment in capital equipment is now being directed towards keeping in time with technological developments rather than increasing the capabilities of the ADF. Furthermore, the present approach of the Department in purchasing relatively high-cost, high-technology replacement equipments and capabilities provides little scope for introducing subtantive additional capabilities.

5.17   This problem is compounded by the fact that implicit in
the core force concept is the capacity to receive and recognise
the necessary threat indicators and then decide to respond to
them. The warning time between Government awareness of a
perceived threat and the required response can be divided into
two parts: an initial period in which one or more potential
threats are assessed, perhaps in terms of the aggressors' ability
to, say, invade Australia, and a secondary stage in which one of
the potential threats begins to emerge as a more specific threat
which may be measured in terms of a particular nation's political
resolve to invade Australia. It is unlikely that any significant
adjustment or expansion of our capabilities would take place in ,
the first period. The effective warning time therefore becomes
the period from the acceptance of the existence of a specific
threat to the time a significant operational response is
required. It is likely that political considerations alone would
result in Government's delaying for as long as possible any
decision to divert significant national resources into defence
and so the actual time available to increase existing force
capabilities could be quite small.

5.18   Australia's national military strategy therefore needs
to be adjusted to either increase the expansion potential of its
force-in-being or to give us more time to expand. There are a
number of ways in which these objectives could be achieved,
including:

         a.   devoting more resources to defence, thereby
               gradually   increasing   the   size   and
               capabilities of the expansion baseline;

         b.   utilising   lower   technology   and   shorter
               lead-time options in areas where it is both
               feasible and cost-effective to do so;

         c.   introducing structural and other changes
               (such as building up certain reserve stocks
               and increasing the training component of the
               ADF) which allows for more rapid expansion;

    d.   controlling   the   threat   environment   by
        deterring potential adversaries; and

    e.   incorporating   into   the   ADF   response
        capacities that will delay an enemy and so
        provide more time for expansion once the
        threat has materialised.

5.19   The Committee recognises that all of these approaches
are to varing degrees either incorporated or taken into account
by the Department in its considerations on military strategy and
force structure but believes that such considerations are not
made in any coherent or systematic way. This is due primarily to
the lack of broad policy guidelines on Australia's interests and
objectives which would provide the basic framework within which
these kinds of considerations would take place.

5.20   The Committee also believes that the key to the
development and effectiveness of the ADF lies in changing the
focus of our national military strategy from one of reacting to
*perceived changes in our environment to controlling that
environment.* As will be argued shortly, a more dynamic and
positive outlook will not only overcome the problems of
expandability, if structured properly, it will be able to provide
a better basis for determining the requisite force structure with
its appropriate capabilities and command systems.

5.21   A second weakness in the present force structure is its
limited short-term operational deployment capacity. This has been
argued by a number of submissions to the inquiry. The Australia
Defence Association, for example, stated that the ADF has

       '...very   little   capability   for   sustained
       operations of any kind, even at a very low level.
       With the exception of some parts of the RAN and
       the Operational Deployment Force, very little of
       the ADF could be said to be combat ready. To a
       large extent, the ADF exists to maintain an
       infrastructure which would require large scale
       expansion before it could engage in sustained

> operations in Australia or overseas. To that
> extent, it has very little capacity to deter
> attack and virtually none to deter the development
> of threats.'6

The Committee notes that in spite of an annual defence budget of
over $5 billion and combined forces totalling some 72 000 service
personnel, Australia can only quickly field in an emergency:

- a small number of tactical aircraft;

- a smaller number of naval combat vessels;

- a counter-terrorist force based on two
  squadrons of the Special Air Service
  Regiment; and

- up to a brigade - approximately 3000 soldiers
  - mainly from the Operational Deployment
  Force (ODF) located at Townsville, supported
  by other units.

5.22   The response times for the ODF are currently to be ready
for operational deployment within seven days notice for a company
group, 14 days for a battalion group and 28 days for the whole
brigade (it should be noted that only two of the three battalions
of the brigade are presently raised). This means that the units
would be ready for deployment within these times. Their actual
deployment times is another matter. Air Force has insufficient
helicopters available on line to deploy a company group in one
lift. At present only three Iroquois helicopters are in direct
support of the Operational Deployment Force, and the deployment
of significant elements of the ODF also requires medium lift air
transport support (estimated to be some 150 C130 loads for a
battalion group) as well as some land or sea transport support.

5.23   While there could be some concurrent movement of forces,
it is clear that Australia could not deploy much more than one
rifle company in a rapid response to a low-level threat and even
this only after seven days notice. Furthermore, in order to

provide this level of strategic mobility, the ODF has been developed as a light-scaled infantry formation and so has low tactical mobility and low firepower. Its combat sustainability is also limited to approximately 180 days after which it would require additional support in order to continue operations. These factors limit the ability of the ODF to respond to a range of low level threats, and they impose important tactical and operational constraints on the commanders in the field.

5.24   As noted earlier, the Department of Defence believes that the Australian Defence Force is presently capable of meeting most 'credible' low-level threats to Australia and argues that our current low-level of operational readiness is acceptable given Australia's relatively benign strategic circumstances and the need to invest in the major capital equipment and infrastructure required for higher level contingencies. While the Committee can understand how this has come about, it does not support this view and believes that Australia's current poor response capacity is a major weakness and that it needs to be improved. The Committee further notes the Department's advice that its current efforts are directed primarily towards maintaining the existing force structure and only introducing key new capabilities 'from time to time'. What this suggests, is that the Australian Defence Force will continue to exhibit an inadequate response capacity into the foreseeable future. We would leave ourselves vulnerable therefore to a range of medium level, lesser contingencies which are more likely than major direct attack against Australia and which could arise within a relatively short period of time.

5.25   Finally, while the proposed command and control arrangements for the transition from peace to war provide for a degree of flexibility in establishing the most appropriate force mix for the task at hand, the Committee believes that it suffers from a number of disadvantages. The establishment of a joint

force will take valuable time and there is likely to be uncertainty and conflict over the detailed distribution of responsibilities during the transition from a single Service to a joint Service structure. The major weakness however is that neither the joint force headquarters nor the force itself will be fully ready for operations, and it is likely that considerable time will need to be spent establishing in practice those procedures that have been either overlooked or not fully developed during peacetime. The Committee believes that Australia would not have the time to sort these problems out once the threat had materialised. It is imperative therefore that at least the nucleus of the command structure that may be required during operations be established and tested in peacetime.

5.26   *The Committee considers that on balance, Australia's* current approach to defence is inadequate in terms of its limited short term operational deployment capacity and combat sustainability, its limited expansion potential and its inadequately defined operational command structure. The Committee is not satisfied that the Australian Defence Force can quickly deploy sufficient men and materiel to meet low-level threats, nor can it sustain them for long enough in operations. Its capacity to deal with higher-level threats crucially depends on receiving sufficient warning of the threat and being able to expand in time to meet it.

5.27   The Committee considers that these fundamental weaknesses detract from the credibility of Australia's defence capacity, in particular our ability to deter intermediate and high-level threats. Underlying these weaknesses is the fact that Australia's military strategy is essentially a reactive one, being driven by changes in our strategic and operational environment rather than seeking to control or make better use of this environment. The principal focus of Australia's current *approach to defence therefore is on responding to emergencies*

once they arise. Because of the uncertainty associated with future threats to Australia, the force-in-being is essentially structured to defend Australia and its interests against intermediate and high-level threats with a few force elements being maintained at an advanced degree of readiness to meet low-level contingencies. As a result, a prospective enemy is likely to see Australia's force-in-being as being thinly spread and generally ill-prepared.

5.28   A further contributing factor to this situation is that the force-in-being as a whole is intended to both deter aggression and defeat it once it occurs. There appears to be no separately or clearly defined strategies for deterrence and defence even though these concepts are quite different and they can require different forces. Furthermore, the tasks of deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression are not defined in a way that directly relates to either our strategic environment or our likely future operations. There is no delineation of the responsibilties for deterrence, and the defence of Australia and its interests are divided along single-Service rather than functional lines: the conduct of operations at sea, in the air and on land. All these factors make it difficult to assign priorities to different strategies or tasks, or to choose between competing capabilities or force structures.

5.29   The Committee considers that an alternative approach or strategy is needed which overcomes or minimises these weaknesses and more directly relates to the defence concept described in Chapter Four.

5.30   In particular, the present focus of Australia's response strategy should be changed from one of reacting to perceived changes in our environment to controlling that environment. In addition, specific strategies and force structures need to be adopted both for deterring aggression and for countering those threats that are not deterred. Because Australia cannot afford to

develop completely a force structure that will satisfy all these broad requirements, some guidance is also required on the relative importance of our deterrent and defensive roles and on their associated military capabilities.

Alternative Strategies for Australia's Defence

5.31   In examining alternative military strategies for Australia, the Committee recognises that a large number of options, many of them interlocking, can be considered and that such a review cannot be exhaustive. In the remainder of this Chapter, the Committee considers a number of strategic options for Australia, some of which have been examined previously in the report on Australian Defence Procurement. The options are considered in the context of the defence concept that was proposed in Chapter Four. They are divided into two groups; strategies for the prevention of attack or threat of attack against Australia and strategies for countering aggression if it should occur.

Military Strategies to Deter Attack or Threat of Attack

5.32   The notion of deterrence is based on the threat or use of force to prevent someone from carrying out his intentions. A potential adversary must be convinced that it has nothing to gain by using force or threatening to use it, and that it runs the risk of having to accept serious setbacks in the event of a conflict, setbacks that would decisively weaken its position of

power. Deterrence can take the form of either a threat to inflict 'unacceptable damage' in the event a certain act is carried out (deterrence by punishment), or a threat to prevent by force the actual implementation of the act (deterrence by denial).

5.33   Two alternative strategies for deterring potential adversaries are considered; major deterrence and high cost of entry or disproportionate response. A further sub-option considered is the use of nuclear weapons as the basis of Australia's deterrence. Both approaches essentially relate to the composition and actions of our own military forces in order to satisfy Australia's national security objectives. As such they would complement other non-military initiatives. In this context, it is important to keep in mind the additional deterrent value of maintaining our present defence relationships with the United States and with our neighbours in the region. The Committee sees the former relationship in particular as providing an ultimate deterrent against a major threat to Australia's security. As the Committee concluded in its report on Threats to Australia's Security:

> 'The ANZUS Alliance is likely to act as a deterrent against those potentially hostile actions against Australia that would be beyond Australia's own capabilities. [Moreover] Any policy of non-alignment would need a much higher defence expenditure by Australia.'7

5.34   In looking at deterrence, it is also important to remember that the concept is psychologically based, involving mutual perceptions and assessments of intent, risks and costs. In order for deterrence to be effective, a potential adversary needs to be clearly aware of actions likely to be unacceptable to Australia and our probable reaction. The clearer, more salient the line a potential aggressor must not cross and the less ambiguous Australia's response, the better the prospects for successful deterrence. The implications of this for Australia's defence posture are two-fold. First, we must clearly signal our

capabilities and intent. This can be achieved by publicly expressing our defence objectives and intentions, particularly those conditions which we have established for the use of our armed forces. It also requires that a large part of our deterrent force be in existence and be seen to be capable of responding in the way we have stated. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we should choose a deterrent strategy that provides us with least problems in defining and controlling our response. An important element of this, in peacetime in particular, is that our military actions be accepted and supported by both the Australian public and the international community.

Major Deterrence

5.35   The major deterrence approach is essentially deterrence by punishment. It requires that Australia maintain the demonstrated capacity to inflict upon a potential aggressor an unacceptably high degree of damage should it resort to the use of military means to gain its objectives. Its principal purpose would be to discourage a potential enemy from engaging in any form of military action or pressure against Australia, and to discourage the emergence of any military threat.

5.36   As noted in the Committee's earlier report on Australian Defence Procurement, the capabilities acquired under this strategy would relate more to the vulnerabilities of Australia's potential adversaries than our own defence needs. It would be an offensive strategy utilising power-projection capabilities to threaten the war-fighting and economic potential of a prospective enemy. It would need to be an advanced technology approach with emphasis placed on acquiring a selection of high-technology equipments which the enemy would have serious problems in combatting. It would include long-range maritime and air strike

capabilities with maximum penetration and survivability in a hostile environment, and the ability to inflict high degrees of damage.

5.37   The Committee's views on this strategy remain those contained in the earlier report where it was considered:

> '...that there are some major problems inherent in this option. It could be misrepresented as a belligerent approach causing our neighbours to believe that Australia was developing a hostile intent, and possibly provoking them into higher levels of defence preparedness and to seek major power supporters, to the detriment of regional stability. It would be likely to be an expensive solution. The success of this concept depends, to a large degree, on the potential aggressor's perception of Australia's national will and willingness to use a considerable degree of force. If that will is lacking at the appropriate time - or if the potential enemy miscalculates the extent of it - there is a risk that the deterrent could fail to be effective. The potential enemy could, moreover, resort to a low level activity which it perceived as being unlikely to cause Australia to escalate its response to a high level and flout world or regional opinion. Finally, it would be necessary to provide second tier forces in any case to handle peacetime tasks and situations requiring a military response at low level.'[8]

Like its nuclear counterpart, this form of conventional deterrence is also vulnerable to advances in defensive or counterforce techniques and capabilities. It could therefore promote a degree of instability, as nations constantly reassess the appropriate balance of forces and attempt to protect themselves against technological breakthroughs.

5.38   Major deterrence also complicates Australia's response options and gives our national command authority only limited flexibility. Faced with an aggressive action, we would need to decide whether to strike at the aggressor's home facilities - thereby risking escalation to a higher order of threat - or doing nothing. At the early stages of a conflict, where each side is uncertain of the actions and motivations of the other, it is

likely that our political leaders would decide to defer a military response in favour of diplomatic initiatives . In reality therefore, a strategic strike capability of the type envisaged under the major deterrence strategy would apply only to high order and relatively unambiguous threats to Australia's security.

High Cost of Entry or Disproportionate Response

5.39   A less aggressive, but nonetheless effective, means of deterring a potential enemy from taking military action against Australia would be to adopt the high cost of entry or disproportionate response approach. As noted in the Committee's earlier report on defence procurement, the basis of this concept would be to develop and maintain a military capability which would raise the cost and risk of any military activity which a potential enemy might contemplate to a degree unacceptable to that enemy.

5.40   The principal difference between this and the major deterrence approach is one of focus. Whereas major deterrence is an offensive strategy, designed to exploit the vulnerabilities of our potential adversaries, the high cost of entry approach seeks to make an enemy's task more difficult by exploiting the unique features of our own physical and strategic environment. It has a more limited geographical focus than major deterrence and so can be used as a defensive strategy.

5.41   Given the nature of Australia's physical environment, the concept based upon a strategy of disproportionate response would seek to have:

> '... *denied an enemy unopposed access to ports and*
> *airfields; forced it to use disproportionately*
> *large ground forces to seize an objective (and so*
> *increased the required size of the vulnerable*
> *transport force); enabled a rapid concentration of*
> *defensive forces at any threatened target area;*
> *caused it to provide protection of its maritime*
> *transport forced against surface, submarine and*
> *air attack and its air transport force against air*
> *attack; and...forced it to use long lines of*
> *communication. Should a potential enemy engage in*
> *lower levels of military activity, it should be*
> *faced with the certainty that its activities will*
> *be monitored at an early stage and responses*
> *effected which would force it to cease its*
> *activities or to escalate them to a degree not*
> *commensurate with its objectives.*'[9]

5.42   It would utilise a mixture of low and high technologies,
selected to maximise the capabilities required by an adversary in
order to achieve its objectives. Such a strategy would require
Australia to concentrate on developing its surveillance and
interdiction capabilities as well as exploit the force multiplier
effect of being able to quickly and effectively respond to a
range of threats.

5.43   The approach has a number of advantages. It can be used
to deter both low and higher level threats (although it is
principally a strategy for preventing or delaying the emergence
of significant military threats to Australia). It is potentially
less expensive than major deterrence, partly because of its more
limited focus but also because relatively fewer high technology
items would be required. The most appropriate mix of 'hi-lo'
equipments however would need to be determined by detailed
force-on-force calculations of a type that have not been widely
done so far in Australia. Because it is based on selected items,
it can be more easily supported by local industry and so has the
potential for greater self-reliance. The most significant
advantage of the concept of disproportionate response is that it
would allow Australia to control its threat environment by
imposing upon a potential aggressor lengthy lead times for the
acquisition and development of essential capabilities. It

therefore provides Australia with greater flexibility and
initiative than more reactive postures. It also provides a basis
for more realistic (and therefore more credible) response options
by narrowing the area of operations of the ADF.

5.44   It remains a difficult concept to apply to low level
threats and, at this level in particular, there is always the
chance that deterrence may fail. Australia's military strategy
needs to take into account the actual defence of the country and
its interests as well as deterring future threats. The strategy
depends on maintaining a technological edge in some areas and so
is susceptible to advances in technology. It is also open-ended
and potentially destabilising particularly if it is perceived to
be an assertive or aggressive strategy by Australia's neighbours.

Nuclear Deterrence

5.45   It has been suggested from time to time that Australia
could use nuclear weapons in either a global strategic deterrence
capacity similar to that of France or Great Britain, or as the
basis of a regional strategic deterrent. The major perceived
advantages of using nuclear weapons are that they would simplify
Australia's defence problems and would be less expensive than an
equivalent conventional capability. It has been further argued
that the acquisition of nuclear weapons could also provide
Australia with increased prestige and bargaining power within
both international and regional forums.

5.46   While Australia has the technical and industrial
capacity to produce its own nuclear warheads in time, the
Committee considers that the development of an indigenous nuclear
weapons capacity would pose a number of serious problems and
disadvantages. First, the development of either a global or

regional nuclear deterrent requires complex delivery and support systems that would have to be purchased from the United States or developed locally. Either way, the acquisition of such a capability would be an expensive exercise, requiring the investment of substantial additional national resources on defence over an extended period. Secondly, such a policy would be a repudiation of our present commitment to the Nuclear *Non-Proliferation Treaty and other disarmament and arms control* initiatives, and so could seriously undermine them. Thirdly, it would generate a considerable international reaction and could convert Australia's relatively benign strategic situation into a less benign one. If Australia had nuclear arms, or expressed its intention to develop them, our regional neighbours would be forced to consider acquiring their own. An ensuing arms race would not only be expensive, it is likely to reduce Australia's overall security because of our high level of population concentration and its consequential vulnerability to nuclear attack. Fourthly, nuclear weapons would not serve as a credible deterrent against low level threats. Nor would they be effective against an attack by a major power. In this latter case, the possession of nuclear weapons could even invite a preemptive strike against Australia. Finally, a decision to base Australia's defence posture on nuclear weapons is likely to be unacceptable to a significant proportion of Australia's population.

5.47   The Committee accepts that the acquisiton of a nuclear weapons capacity by another country in Australia's region would *significantly alter our strategic and security circumstances and* public perceptions of these matters. It would be prudent to continue to monitor the nuclear capability of our potential adversaries. The Committee believes, however, that nuclear proliferation is detrimental to the common interests of the region and that Australia should continue to give a lead against the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Military Strategies for Countering Aggression

5.48   Australia cannot rely on deterrence alone to prevent the emergence of threats to our national security. There is always the chance that deterrence will fail through irrationality, misunderstanding, miscalculation or acceptance by an adversary of the military costs involved. We need to have a military strategy for the defence of Australia and its interests in the event that deterrence does fail. The Committee considers that there are two broad approaches to defending Australia; structuring our forces primarily on the basis of meeting low-level threats to Australia's security, or providing a basis for defence against all threat levels.

5.49   In the first case, it can be argued that, given our presently assessed strategic outlook and the relatively low level of forces indigenous to our area of strategic interest, we need only sufficient defence forces to meet likely low-level threats to Australia's security. If this approach were adopted, our defensive capabilities would be related directly to the characteristics of likely lesser contingencies and to the essential features of Australia's environs - vast distances and low-level military capabilities indigenous to the area. The type of capabilities required would be those necessary for surveillance and monitoring of the environment, sea and air transport, a predominantly coastal defence Navy equipped with large numbers of small craft, and with air defences related only to the likely low-level of threat which would obtain. A small, highly mobile ground force would be required to counter the threat and the fact of any small-scale raids or lodgments. Advanced technology could be employed in selected fields relevant to our environment, but it would be simple rather than complex advanced technology (as used, for instance, in patrol boats rather than destroyers). Should the longer-term strategic outlook

show signs of fundamental change, indicative of the potential for
a major threat to Australia arising, capabilities relevant to the
specific threat and based on the improved infrastructure could
then be developed.

5.50   A principal advantage of the low-level approach is that
it would enable a stronger and more effective force to be
established than is presently the case, since resources could be
concentrated on low-level defence roles and on improving our
defence infrastructure in order to provide a higher degree of
self reliance. As noted in the Committee's earlier report on
Australian Defence Procurement,the low-level approach also has a
number of disadvantages.[10] First, the concept by itself would not
deter the prospect of an intermediate or high-level threat to
Australia arising, indeed it could encourage it. This problem
could at least partly be overcome if Australia were to adopt a
separate deterrent posture (and appropriate forces) aimed at
preventing these higher level threats from emerging. Secondly,
Australia's defence forces would not be practised in many of the
military   skills   and   procedures   needed   for   higher-level
operations. Thirdly, given the lengthy lead-times for acquiring
high technology items such as ships and combat aircraft, there
may not be time to develop the capability to defend ourselves
against a major threat in the time available.

5.51   In the high-level approach, Australia would structure
its forces for defence against higher levels of threat, and
provide from within this structure a capability to meet likely
low level contingencies. As we have seen from the analysis of the
present force-in-being, this approach suffers from not being able
to identify a specific threat to Australia's security. The
strategy   requires   considerable resources   including   high-cost,
advanced-technology equipments and weapons systems which cannot
be justified by our current strategic environment.

Discussion

5.52   The Committee considers that Australia's present military strategy - maintaining an outline force structure that can be fleshed out and expanded as the need arises - is inadequate in terms of its operational deployment capacity, combat sustainability, expansion potential and operational command structure. To overcome these weaknesses, the present focus of our defence strategy should be changed from reacting to changes in our strategic and operational environment to controlling that environment.

5.53   The Committee considers that Australia should adopt an approach to defence which gives priority to deterring intermediate and high level threats and defending ourselves against likely low-level threats. The Australian Defence Force should have within it a range of capabilities that would maximise the cost to a potential aggressor of an incursion into, or lodgement on land within Australia's Principal Area of Defence Interest. We should also have the capability to deal quickly with such incursions where, at present, these are likely to reflect low rather than higher level contingencies.

5.54   The functional capabilities and force structures required for these tasks are considered in detail in the following Chapters. The basic planning and selection criterion for Australia's deterrent strategy would be the notion of disproportionate response, whereas the capabilities required for defence against low-level threats would be derived from detailed studies of likely contingencies. The Committee notes that the Department of Defence is presently conducting such studies in the context of examining their implications for Joint Service operations.

5.55   The adoption of this revised approach would increase
Australia's defence capacity and improve our credibility within
our region of interest. It would give greater meaning and
direction to our defence policies and would enable us to develop
and maintain more effectively our force structure and military
capabilities. As will be argued shortly, it can probably be met
from within existing resources although there will be a need to
re-assess the combat readiness of Australia's forces. Because
deterrence is largely a continuing task in peacetime, the forces
assigned to this role need to be in existence and clearly capable
of carrying out their tasks.

5.56   Finally, it should be noted that while the defence of
Australia and its interests against possible intermediate and
high level threats to our security would be afforded a lower
priority under this approach, the Committee recognises that it
cannot be ignored. The Committee considers that at least the
organisational framework for this task should be established and
tested in peacetime. The lower priority at this stage simply
reflects a realistic assessment of the nature of our strategic
environment and the resources that are both required and
currently available for the defence of Australia and its
interests.

Technological Change and its Implications

for Australia's Defence

5.57   Whichever strategies are chosen for Australia's defence,
an important consideration is the role and implications of
technology. Technological change is occurring in all areas of
science and engineering, from micro-electronics, through material

sciences, to information processing. Developments in these fields are revolutionising conventional warfare by providing a host of new and improved military capabilities which can escalate the level of threats posed by a potential adversary and which have significant implications for existing doctrine and force structure.

5.58   While technological change has always been an important consideration in military affairs, it is the breadth and pace of change that makes it a critical factor today. Spurred on by intensive research and development, all areas of science and technology are undergoing rapid change. Moreover, it is likely that the rate of change of technology will increase rather than decrease. In the not too distant future we can expect further advances that will produce new generations of weapons systems and military hardware with significantly greater capabilities.

5.59   The application of technological change to the defence of Australia has been the subject of considerable debate over recent times. There are those who suggest that advanced technologies provide Australia with an opportunity to overcome the inherent problems posed by geographical isolation, a small population and a large, penetrable coastline. Others argue that new technologies should not be seen as a panacea to all Australia's defence needs and that there are hidden dangers associated with developing force structures around advanced technology weapons.

5.60   In this section, we survey recent developments in military technologies and discuss their general implications for future conventional warfare. We then examine how the new technologies could be employed in the defence of Australia and the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach.

Developments in Technology

5.61   The more recent major advances in technology have been
surveyed by Ross Babbage in his book Rethinking Australia's
Defence. Babbage argues that the principal technical developments
that are having a major impact on warfare include:[11]

a.   the emergence of highly accurate precision
      guidance capacities which make it possible to
      deliver all types of military ordinance onto
      small mobile or stationary targets under all
      types of weather and operational conditions;

b.   more efficient propulsion systems which can
      more efficiently and more effectively deliver
      warheads or weapons systems over increasing
      ranges and at higher speeds with less chance
      of detection or interception;

c.   more effective conventional warheads such as
      minelets, bomblets, fuel air explosives and
      multi-stage hard structure munitions. These
      new warheads provide for much greater
      destructive power for a given volume or
      weight than has been the case in the past;

d.   short- and long-range surveillance and target
      acquisition technologies. Ground, sea, air
      and space sensors, radars and sonar systems
      are making it easier to detect and track
      targets with greater certainty over longer
      and longer ranges and within all kinds of
      environments. These developments are also
      stimulating intensive counter efforts to
      reduce the optical, acoustic, infra-red and
      other signatures of a wide range of targets;

e.   increasingly sophisticated command, control
      and communications (C^3) systems which enable
      complex surveillance and weapons systems to
      be tied together electronically and
      integrated into increasingly automated
      systems of command and control. New
      information processing technologies also
      enable more information to be collected and
      analysed in shorter times thereby providing
      for 'real time' control at higher levels
      within the chains of command; and

f. new weapons concepts and platforms and new
    technologies which have produced an array of
    new weapons and their platforms including
    vertical, short take off and landing (VSTOL)
    aircraft, remotely piloted aircraft and
    modular glide bombs. Other advances which
    could occur in the near future include
    particle beam weapons, mini-submarines and
    underwater radar.

5.62   These technical developments, used in concert, have
resulted in military hardware with capabilities unheard of in the
recent past. Moreover, the developments are continuing and there
is no evidence to suggest that major advances in military
capability will not continue.

Implications of Technological Change on Modern Conventional
Warfare

5.63   The implications of these developments in technology
include:[12]

a. the increasing vulnerability of large and
    obvious weapons platforms. The continuing
    developments in target acquisition
    techniques, combined with the greater
    efficiency and destructiveness of modern
    weapons, means that there is an increasing
    probability that a target will be detected
    and that, once detected, it will be
    destroyed. As a result, major weapons
    platforms such as aircraft, surface ships and
    ground vehicles are becoming increasingly
    vulnerable to a range of new weapons systems
    which are relatively cheap and easy to use.
    The principal response to these developments
    has been to adopt expensive defensive
    equipment fits and elaborate operational
    tactics designed to improve survivability on
    the battlefield. These in turn can either
    limit the operational effectivenss of the
    weapons platform or dramatically increase its
    cost to the extent that it is no longer cost
    effective;

b. **the increasing utility of small units.**
    Because of the greater vulnerability of large
    operational formations and weapons platforms
    to attack, it is becoming increasingly
    desirable to disperse military capacities and
    force an enemy to find and destroy many
    relatively inexpensive platforms rather than
    a few high-value ones. Because future force
    units will be required to operate within a
    more dispersed mode, they will need to be
    more self sufficient and to be able to carry
    out a wider range of tasks than before. The
    dispersal of force units will also make it
    necessary to modify current deployment and
    operational procedures and will increase the
    reliance of forces on secure and survivable
    C^3 systems;

c. **the increasing importance of remaining
    untargeted.** The likelihood that once a target
    is detected it will be hit and destroyed
    means that the capacity to remain un-targeted
    will be an increasingly important factor in
    any future war. The requirement to remain
    un-targeted places an increased emphasis on
    the development and employment of a range of
    stealth technologies and tactics including
    camouflage, electromagnetic suppression,
    subterfuge, force dispersal and coordinated
    movement under the cover of darkness, poor
    weather or natural vegetation. These means
    would need to be applied to both operational
    forces and to Australia's own surveillance
    and sensor systems;

d. **the increasing vulnerability of permanent
    facilities and support areas.** Developments in
    long-range precision guided munitions and
    conventional explosives are increasing the
    vulnerability of permanent bases, logistic
    support areas and *key facilities such as*
    factories, power stations and dams. The
    vulnerability of both military and non-
    military support facilities can be decreased
    by the employment of ground-to-air missile
    systems, by dispersing and hardening
    facilities or by developing duplicated
    facilities for use in wartime. The
    proliferation and dispersal of force units,
    the vulnerability of large logistic support
    areas to attack and the *non-stop nature of*
    modern war will necessitate the development
    of new logistic support concepts;

e.   the changing nature of modern warfare. Under the impact of advanced technology, modern conventional wars are likely to be weapon oriented, highly destructive, sudden in character and of relatively short duration. The new technologies will have both a strategic and tactical impact on future conventional warfare. At the strategic level, the long range target acquisition and weapons delivery capabilities will enable an aggressor to strike at almost all areas of the Australian mainland from remote locations either as a preliminary to, or during hostilities. Indeed, it is likely that an enemy intent on invading Australia will concentrate on destroying much of our economic, industrial and military infrastructure before invasion in order to limit our capacity to wage war. Future major conventional warfare on Australian soil therefore is likely to threaten the existence of all elements of Australian society and will not be constrained to its armed forces. Future combat at the tactical level is likely to involve the rapid deployment of highly mobile and dispersed forces over a broad front with air and ground strikes being conducted against rear echelon and support targets. The initial conduct of the battle is likely to be intense, involving almost non-stop, around-the-clock operations. Equipment and weapons attrition rates will be high and both military and civilian casualties are likely to be significant. These in turn could lead to the physical and mental exhaustion of one or both sides and intense public pressure to negotiate a political settlement; and

f.   the rising costs of many military systems. Because of the need to develop counter-measures to the new technologies, the unit costs of conventional weapons sytems such as aircraft carriers, main battle tanks and attack aircraft are increasing dramatically. This is especially so for complex, multi-purpose systems that need to utilise numerous offensive and defensive technologies. The increasing unit costs of major equipments and weapons systems have important financial and budgetary consequence and increase the pressure for seeking numerical/cost/performance trade-offs in the selection of appropriate technological options. An important factor in these considerations is that many new weapons technologies such as precision guided munitions and fuel air explosives appear to

provide a similar level of capability as more
conventional systems but at a much lower
cost. They offer the prospect therefore of
stabilising or even reducing the costs of
national security and, at the same time, of
providing for increased survivability through
the deployment of more force units. It must
be remembered however that the effectiveness
of these new weapons systems depends to a
large degree on the efficiency of supporting
communications, command and control systems.
Cost comparisons therefore should also take
these wider system's needs into account.

Consequences of the New Technologies for Australia's Defence

5.64   A number of authors have suggested that the utilisation
of new technologies could help overcome some of the problems
faced by our defence planners and be used to give Australia a
decided edge over any likely regional opponents. The deployment
of modern, sophisticated weapons systems for example, could
counter the disadvantages accruing from our relatively small
industrial base and our relatively small standing forces. The
recent developments in long-range surveillance and weapons
systems could simplify Australia's task of defending its large
land mass and maritime surrounds. Technological superiority could
be used to offset our numerical inferiority and provide an
enhanced military capability at lower cost. It could also provide
a sound basis for a deterrent posture which requires a potential
aggressor to allocate a disproportionate amount of his resources
to gain or regain the initiative.

5.65   Technological change should not be automatically seen as
a panacea to all Australian defence needs, however. As Ross
Babbage has argued, new technolgies cannot be fully exploited
unless our defence planners are able:

> '...to recognise the potential of new
> developments, to choose selectively from the
> greatly expanded range of technological options,
> to operate effectively those systems that are
> procured, to service and maintain them efficiently
> and to derive strategies, tactics, structures,
> doctrines and operational procedures that exploit
> fully the potential of the new systems.'[13]

5.66   Furthermore, technical awareness is of no military value
if the new systems are not deployed, and if there is no coherent
strategy for their procurement and usage. Superior technology may
not deter irrational behaviour, and it may not prevail under all
circumstances particularly if an opponent is unaware of the
advantages that Australia gains from them or if Australia does
not exhibit a strong national will to use them. Advanced weapons
systems may not be successful against low level threats such as
trade embargos, terrorist attacks or attacks against merchant
shipping. 'Technical superiority could be readily undermined by
increased superpower involvement, and, as aptly demonstrated by
the arms race, advances in technology do not always guarantee
consequent improvements in national security.[14]

5.67   The ability to sustain technological superiority is also
ultimately dependent on a number of non-technical factors such as
the state of the economy, Australia's industrial capacity and our
competitiveness with other countries in the region. At present,
Australia continues to rely heavily on overseas sources of supply
for much of our specialist technology. We have neither the
indigenous production capacity nor the requisite skills to
support the highly specialised technologies associated with
modern armaments. Even if it were feasible to develop such a
base, it may be counterproductive as there is some evidence to
suggest that this kind of industrial specialisation may serve to
limit our long term economic and social development.

5.68   Potential adversaries are also able to utilise advances
in technology to develop successful counter-measures or to pose
completely new levels of threat to Australia. The possibility

that adversaries will ultimately develop counter-measures means
that Australia would have to continue to review and update its
weapons and equipment arsenals. The cost of staying in front is
increasing, particularly as most weapons systems require
increasingly complex support and maintenance arrangements.

5.69   Despite these limitations and potential problems, it
would seem that Australia could significantly enhance its defence
capacity in some areas through the selective exploitation of new
and developing technologies. Such a process is not a simple
matter and would involve a series of cost effectiveness
considerations between various alternatives and options. There
will always be the dilemma, for example, over the relative merits
of high performance weapons systems that are so costly that only
a few may be acquired versus moderate performance, moderate cost
weapons systems which may be acquired in greater numbers.
Although the high perfomance systems may be capable of
discharging a greater range of tasks with greater effectiveness
than the moderate performance systems, their greater performance
characteristics may be required in only a limited range of tasks.
Furthermore, their necessarily limited availability - because of
cost - could prejudice the ability to discharge particular tasks
because they could not be in enough places at the same time. In
making these kinds of decisions it will be important to consider
the total system costs as well as the time needed to develop and
acquire either the new or replacement system.

5.70   The full exploitation of technology involves more than
choosing the best kinds of weapons systems. As Ross Babbage has
argued:

> '...the task confronting Australia is not only to
> decide the most appropriate mix of new technology
> systems to buy: it is of comparable importance
> that a major effort be made to devise tactics,
> doctrines and structures that fully exploit the
> potential of the new technologies in satisfying

> Australia's priority security requirements. This
> will not be easy...[especially as] the lessons
> that might be available from the experience of
> others can be expected to provide only a general
> guide to local requirments.'[15]

5.71   It is equally clear however that if Australia does not
master its future technological environment then it will become
increasingly   vulnerable   to   those   nations   that   have.

END NOTES

CHAPTER FIVE

1.   Australian Defence Procurement, p16

2.   Department of Defence, Submission, ppS8-9

3.   Department of Defence, Submission, pS9

4.   Department of Defence, Submission, pS11

5.   Australian Defence Procurement, p17

6.   Australia Defence Association, Submission, pS202

7.   Threats to Australia's Security, p29

8.   Australian Defence Procurement, p19

9.   Australian Defence Procurement, p19

10.   Australian Defence Procurement, pp21-22

11.   See Ross Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence,
        University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia, 1980, pp23-26

12.   Ross Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, pp26-45

13.   Ross Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, p26

14.   See Donald Ross Jender, "Advanced Technology
        Conventional Weapons: new capabilities, old and new
        problems", Defence Force Journal, November/December
        1980, pp15-22

15.   Ross Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, p45

CHAPTER SIX

THE CAPABILITIES OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

6.1   In the previous chapters, it was recommended that Australia's national defence posture should be based on the dual concepts of:

    a.   the prevention of attack or threat of attack against Australia and its interests; and

    b.   countering aggression in the event that it is not deterred.

Given Australia's present and projected strategic circumstances and the nature and probability of the threats that are likely to confront us, the Committee further recommended that at this stage we should give preference to deterring all levels of threat and, defending ourselves against low level attacks or threat of attack against Australia and its interests. It was also recognised that we cannot ignore defence against higher-level threats and so at least the framework of this response capacity needs to be developed and maintained.

6.2   In examining the strategies for meeting these requirements, the Committee identified an Area of Principal Defence Interest within which the Australian Defence Force should operate. It also recommended that our deterrent posture should be based on a strategy of 'disproportionate response' or 'high cost of entry' which would focus on the maritime areas within Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest and seek to impose on a potential aggressor unacceptable costs should he decide either to invade Australia or to attempt a lodgement.

6.3   This chapter examines the functional capabilities needed to carry out these broad tasks, under the headings of intelligence, surveillance and early warning, strategic strike and interdiction, maritime defence, land warfare and air defence. Within each of these categories, some general observations are made on the required capabilities and these are compared with the existing and projected capabilities of the Australian Defence Force. The chapter finishes with a brief overview of Australia's force capability requirements, their relative priority and how they may be structured. This in turn leads into the discussion of command and control arrangements contained in Chapter Seven.

Intelligence

6.4   The collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence forms an important component of both deterrence and defence. In the former case, a knowledge of the existing and prospective military capabilities of our potential enemies – particularly those capabilities concerned with power projection or strategic interdiction and harassment – enables us to fine tune our deterrent posture and capacities in order to maintain the initiative. The focus here would be on discerning broad trends and tendencies in Australia's regional military environment and identifying ways in which the concept of disproportionate response could be best used to control this environment.

6.5   In addition to monitoring the military capability of our neighbours, we must also be aware of their intentions. This involves a broader assessment of economic, social and political considerations and would include attempts to identify at an early stage whether a potential aggressor is likely to pose a threat to

Australia's security regardless of the costs involved. Because our defence strategy is likely to require time to become effective, the earlier we receive this warning and act on it the better. In both cases, there would be a very close relationship between intelligence operations and surveillance and early warning which are discussed in detail shortly.

6.6   The Department of Defence has stated to the Committee that Australia's capabilities for the collection and development of strategic intelligence 'are generally adequate, and developing satisfactorily, although the technological demands of this activity are costly and require constant attention.'[1]

6.7   The Committee considers that this capability must be further developed and it is not certain that the links between intelligence assessment and force structure planning are adequate. This latter aspect is considered in more detail in Chapter Eight which describes how the Australian Defence Force structure is developed.

6.8   Timely intelligence is particularly important in respect of low level threats. These may arise with little or no warning and would require a rapid response by Australian forces. Our response capacity can be further enhanced by a prior knowledge of the aggressor's intentions and capabilities, his order of battle, weapons numbers and characteristics, modes of deployment and logistic support, battlefield tactics, and so on.

6.9   An important element of Australia's intelligence requirements involves the development of a detailed knowledge of the physical environment in which Australian forces would need to operate. This would enable us to make best use of our local terrain, climatic conditions and so on, in both the deterrent and defence phases. In this respect, the Department of Defence has

advised that our existing store of knowledge of Australia is
deficient, especially in charting, mapping and infrastructure,
although:

> 'Action is in hand to ameliorate these deficiencies
> through the development of an airborne laser depth
> sounder to enter service in the later 80s, the
> enhancement of mapping by the computer-based AUTOMAP
> system, and the leasing and possible later acquisition
> of aircraft for the photo-survey tasks carried out by
> the Canberra aircraft before they were withdrawn.'[2]

6.10   In further evidence to the Committee, the Department
stated that maps, charts and terrain data are required at the
following scales to facilitate training for, and the conduct of
military operations:[3]

Type/Purpose	Scale
Planning and tactical maps of built up areas	1:5000 to 1:100000
Training area maps for gunnery and other various range requirements	1:25000
Army Aviation and mobile operations	1:100000
Joint Operations Graphic Ground and Air	1:250000
Tactical Pilotage Charts	1:500000
Operational Navigational Charts	1:1000000

The Department further noted that:

> 'The accuracy provided by the larger scale maps is
> necessary for the employment and capabilities of
> modern weapon systems. This degree of accuracy is not
> normally achieved by non-military survey sources. In
> addition, to meet specific military applications
> associated with new technology systems, there is a
> requirement for terrain data to be reduced to digital
> format.'[4]

6.11   At present, 20 per cent of the 1:50,000 and 57 per cent
of the 1:100,000 topographic maps coverage has been obtained
(although only 3 per cent and 6 per cent respectively have
digital data bases). Furthermore, full modern surveys still need
to be carried out over 64 per cent of Australia's continental
shelf and a further 16 per cent requires some further attention
to bring the surveys to standards suitable for modern shipping.
The Department estimates that:

> 'The extent of the overall Defence requirement for
> topographic   mapping,   air   charts,   hydrographic
> surveying and nautical charting, coupled with the
> capacity of present resources indicates a gross lead
> time of some 46 years to overcome all the shortfalls
> identified. Non-military output is included in this
> assessment. Taking account of the increased production
> capacity forecast for planned equipment acquisitions,
> all the higher priority new topographic mapping
> requirements of the combined mapping and air charting
> programme could be achieved in about 28 years.'[5]

6.12   Under current strategic guidance, priority is being
given to mapping and charting the areas of northern and
north-western Australia as this 'is the most likely area of
operations in lesser contingencies and hence the area in which
there is the greatest need for Defence Force familiarity'[6]. No
estimate has been provided of the existing and required coverage
for this area although it is recognised that there has been
considerable work carried out in these areas of late. According
to Defence, the most serious difficulties confronting the
Department at the moment, 'in the context of mapping and
charting, are those arising from the non-availability of the
Canberra replacement aircraft.'

6.13   While the Committee recognises the enormity of the task
of completely mapping and charting Australia's area of principal
defence interest, particularly in view of the equipment and
financial limitations involved, it considers the task to be of

6.6

vital importance to Australia's national security and as such
should be afforded more resources and a much higher priority than
at present. The Committee agrees that first priority should be
given to those areas of north and north-western Australia. It
believes that maximum use of commercial and other government
departmental facilities should be used, and that in the initial
stages, consideration should be given to diverting other defence
resources (particularly air resources) to the task.

6.14   A second important element of operational intelligence
relates to Australia's civil and industrial infrastructure. Both
the planning and conduct of operations are facilitated by a
detailed knowledge of Australia's internal lines of
communications and vital interests: roads, railways, airfields,
harbours and so on. The Committee is aware that the Department of
Defence is compiling a National Infrastructure Directory which
will provide this kind of detail, but that the task is nowhere
near complete. In addition, the Industry Strategy Branch of the
Department of Defence Support is presently compiling a defence
industry profile which describes the capacity of Australia's
local industries to support both defence oriented and
offsets-oriented requirements as they arise. The Committee
believes that these tasks are important and that they should be
completed during the present period of 'no threat'.

Surveillance and Early Warning

6.15   The physical environment of Australia emphasises the
importance of surveillance of our maritime, air and land space.
The ability to detect, monitor and respond to intrusions into
Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest acts as an

important deterrent to all levels of threat to our sovereignty or
security. If a potential intruder knows that he will be detected
and in all probability apprehended, he is likely to consider more
carefully before an attempted intrusion.

6.16   Surveillance and early warning are also important for
the defence of Australia and its interests. Reconnaissance and
surveillance provides force commanders with current information
on enemy activity levels, his installations and possibly his
intended operations. A knowledge of the enemy's movements and
dispositions enables commanders to concentrate and deploy their
own forces to maximum effect, either in order to defend
themselves against an enemy attack or to attack and destroy the
enemy forces. Effective surveillance and early warning therefore
are instrumental in preventing Australia from making a
disproportionate response to the enemy's initial moves.

6.17   The Committee believes that Australia should provide
for surveillance in depth. This would involve a range of passive
and active surveillance and reconnaissance techniques concerned
with airspace, surface and sub-surface movements. Our
surveillance system should be multi-layered and provide a
comprehensive coverage of Australia's Area of Principal Defence
Interest. The surveillance system would encompass:

    a.   long-range or strategic surveillance of
          Australia's maritime and air surrounds and
          approaches with a capacity to monitor the exit
          points from the adversary's territory;

    b.   coastal maritime and air surveillance;

    c.   continental air and land surveillance; and

    d.   local or sector airspace surveillance.

To be fully effective, the different surveillance and early
warning capabilities should form part of an integrated command,
control and communications (C^3) system which incorporates the
forces that would be needed to respond to a particular threat or

emergency. They should also link into other, non-military surveillance systems, such as Coastwatch, and be able to utilise information obtained from other allied or non-military sources (including sightings by merchant ships, airline pilots, the Australian fishing fleet and so on).

Australia's Current Surveillance Assets and Capabilities

6.18   At present, Australia's long-range surface and sub-surface surveillance capability is provided by the two squadrons of P3 Orion aircraft located at Edinburgh in South Australia. The Orion aircraft has a radius of detection of about 2800km (1500nm). It can, in a single sortie, sweep an ocean area of some 300,000 square miles, detecting all surface targets of about 2000 tonnes or greater. The Orion uses the Australian-produced Barra sonobuoy for its anti-submarine role and it is to be fitted with the Harpoon anti-ship missile. The Orion has virtually no capacity to detect or track other aircraft. Fourteen of an overall total of 20 aircraft are maintained at a state of operational readiness. At present, the major limitation to increasing this level of operational readiness is the lack of fully trained aircrew.

6.19   The long-range maritime surveillance capabilities of the P3 Orion force can be augmented by other aircraft - principally the RF-111C and the F/A-18 - and by Australia's submarine force which could provide sustained covert maritime surveillance. Shorter-range and coastal surveillance is provided by Australia's patrol boat force presently comprising both Attack Class and the newer Fremantle Class patrol craft distributed around Australia's coastline. The Fremantle Class boat has a single-engine range of 2500 nm and a patrol endurance capability of up to 20 days. The patrol craft can be used in conjunction with aircraft to shadow and apprehend intruders.

6.20   Australia's   maritime   surface   and   sub-surface
surveillance capacity will be improved with the introduction
during the late 1980s of underwater acoustic arrays. Defence is
presently investigating the use of hydrophone arrays that might
be towed below the surface behind either a submarine or surface
vessel. Acoustic arrays can also be permanently located in deep
water in areas of importance, such as straits or choke points.
Both the towed and fixed acoustic surveillance systems offer
potential for detecting surface ships and submarines at long
ranges and identifying the nature of the target by its noise
signature.

6.21   The military surveillance of Australia's surrounding
and continental airspace is presently limited to two radar-based,
airspace control systems, one located at Darwin and the other at
Williamtown (the Williamtown unit is portable and can be
relocated to another airfield if the need arose). The airspace
control and associated tactical air defence systems involve radar
surveillance, the detection and identification of all radar
tracks and, where appropriate, controlling the fighters
dispatched to intercept intruders. Because they utilise
ground-based radars, the systems can only provide detection and
surveillance facilities over limited distances - up to about 400
km at medium to high altitudes but to less than 40 km at low
altitudes.

6.22   Australia's airspace surveillance capabilities will be
improved to an extent by the introduction of the over-the-horizon
radar system being developed under Project Jindalee. The
over-the-horizon radar would provide for the detection and
tracking of incoming aircraft or missiles over both land and sea
at any altitude out to around 3000 km (but within a limited
area). The system is still being tested but the Department of
Defence has advised that:

> 'On present planning, an initial operational system
> covering part of our northern approaches could be in
> service from early 1988, given successful trials. The
> command and control arrangements, and other
> operational aspects of the use of this system will be
> assessed during these trials.'[7]

Jindalee also has some potential to detect surface vessels but
the operational utility of this capability has yet to be
established.

6.23   The Department has also stated that airborne early
warning and control (AEW & C) aircraft are important elements in
providing comprehensive surveillance coverage. They can detect
and direct the interception by fighters of medium to high
altitude aircraft to some 450 to 550 km and low altitude aircraft
to about 400 km. This type of aircraft can also detect ships and
it has the capability to detect and plot the course and behaviour
of stand-off missiles. The importance of the AEW & C aircraft
goes beyond the surveillance function however. As the name of the
aircraft suggests, it can also serve as the focus of a wide range
of strategic and tactical command and control functions and
activities. As Air Force has previously pointed out to the
Committee, these activities include:[8]

   a.   early warning and threat definition using
         passive and active sensor systems to provide low
         level detection well beyond the range of static
         microwave radars, thereby substantially
         improving warning times;

   b.   monitoring the nature of an air threat by
         analysing disposition and strength and exposing
         feints and decoys;

   c.   co-ordinating and controlling air combat action
         at maximum ranges, thus affording a defence
         cover not previously possible;

   d.   minimising the effects of electronic jamming in
         aerial combat operations; and

   e.   providing airspace and recovery control as
         necessary.

The AEW&C aircraft can also, either in conjunction with other airspace control systems or by itself, provide for the:

  a.   coordination for long-range strike operations;

  b.   *air defence for maritime surface units; and*

  c.   support of ground operations.

6.24   While recognising the potential role of AEW&C, the Department of Defence has stated that:

  'Present defence planning places a low priority on the acquisition of AEW&C aircraft in peacetime but *acknowledges that at a time of deteriorating strategic circumstances their acquisition could command priority.'9*

The principal reason at this stage for rejecting the acquisition of an AEW&C capability is cost.

6.25   Australia's future airspace surveillance capabilities may also be augmented by aerostat (balloon-borne) radars which are being reviewed for their application to Australian defence needs. Overseas experience has shown that these devices could provide a capability for detection of low flying aircraft and of surface craft.

6.26   Land surveillance is carried out principally by the Special Air Service Regiment supplemented by regional Army Reserve units such as NORFORCE in the Northern Territory and other units which may be raised. Army intends to pursue throughout the 1980s, and beyond, the development of a comprehensive ground surveillance screen in the North and North-West by utilising local forces which have a thorough knowledge of their locality and environment. Australia's regular land forces also contain their own integral reconnaissance and

surveillance capabilities which would be used during the conflict
stage. These include Army aviation, cavalry and light infantry
reconnaissance units.

Australia's Peacetime Surveillance Activities

6.27   The major defence surveillance tasks undertaken by the
Australian Defence Force at present are:

a.   RAAF P3 operations from Butterworth, Malaysia,
      into the northern Indian Oean and the South
      China Sea, mounted by a permanent detachment of
      two aircraft;

b.   RAAF P3 operations into the South East Indian
      Oean and the South West Pacific from Australian
      bases;

c.   general military patrol duties by RAN surface
      ships; and

d.   surveillance patrols by submarines.

6.28   In addition to these routine surveillance activities,
all ADF units in transit conduct surveillance operations and the
P3 Orions are often required to monitor the activities of vessels
of intelligence interest operating in the area of Australian
maritime surveillance activity.

6.29   Units of the ADF also play a major part in civil
coastal surveillance and seach and rescue operations. The recent
**Review of Australia's Peacetime Coastal Surveillance and
Protection Arrangements** reported that the costs of Defence
resources allotted to the civil coastal surveillance program in
1982-83 was $7.91 million[10]. These Defence resources comprised:

a.   aerial patrols of the 200 nautical mile AFZ by
      RAAF P3 long range maritime patrol craft (1502
      hours);

b.   surface response and enforcement and, if
     available, programmed surveillance patrols by
     RAN patrol boats (1772 patrol boat days); and

c.   support by defence units engaged on defence
     tasks.

It should be noted however that many of the tasks performed would
occur as part of defence surveillance training and so they do not
represent a significant misallocation or misuse of resources.

6.30   The Defence Report 1982-83 also noted that numerous
search and rescue missions were mounted by service aircraft and
ships for missing boats, aircraft and bush walkers, and there was
a continuing demand for service aircraft and ships to participate
in medical evacuation and cliff rescues, and to respond to
distress calls.[11] These latter kinds of activities largely
involved the use of service helicopters and the Committee noted
during its tours of defence facilities that service helicopters
were often placed on exclusive standby for search and rescue
operations. The Committee acknowledges that such tasks are an
important and necessary role for the ADF but considers that its
impact on the operational effectiveness of the ADF and its
*ability to meet its peacetime military roles needs to be closely
monitored.*

Surveillance Operations in Military Contingencies

6.31   The Committee believes that the basic functions and
activities of Australia's current surveillance forces would not
significantly change with the advent of military hostilities,
particularly those involving low-level contingencies (the Air
Force has advised the Committee for example, that some 60 per
cent of its current P3 tasks would continue in wartime). What is
likely to change as Australia moves from one level of conflict to

another is the focus and intensity of our surveillance and interception operations and the consequent resources required for these tasks.

6.32   During peacetime it is expected that priority would be accorded primarily to wide area maritime and air surveillance, perhaps concentrated to the north and north-west of Australia, and restricted to Australia's Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). Intelligence assessments might indicate that certain areas or vital interests should be subject to intensive surveillance but otherwise the required probability of detection and interception of military targets would be quite low. Under these conditions, Australia's defence resources could continue to be used to carry out non-military surveillance tasks.

6.33   With an escalation of hostilities or the advent of a specific threat to Australia's security, there would be an increased need to detect and intercept military targets on land, sea or air, during day and night and under all kinds of weather conditions. It is also likely that the kind of targets to be tracked, and the skills and resources needed to carry out this higher level of surveillance, would be an order of magnitude greater than those required for peace-time surveillance. In particular, Australia may be confronted by a range of sophisticated, EW-capable, aircraft, missiles and surface vessels, dispersed across the breadth of the continent and perhaps intent on destroying in a single, pre-emptive strike most of our capacity for war-fighting.

Committee Views

6.34   From the foregoing, the Committee considers that:

a.   surveillance and early warning are continuing
tasks that have similar application to both
deterrence and defence; and

b.   there is considerable correlation between
defence and civil surveillance requirements in
peacetime; the Australian Defence Force should
be assigned overall responsibility for
coordinating all forms of surveillance tasks.

The Committee believes therefore that a comprehensive military
surveillance and early warning system should be established in
peacetime which would oversee both Australia's civil and defence
surveillance requirements and prepare the Australian Defence
Force for times of emergency or war.

6.35   In line with developing such a system, the ADF needs to
possess and be practised in the operation of all levels of
surveillance and early warning, strategic, maritime, airspace and
land. Initially this capability could focus on wide area maritime
and air surveillance forward of Australia's mainland, but it
should be carried out within the overall command, control and
communications structure that would be used during higher-order
contingencies. This broad structure and its associated doctrine,
procedures and key equipments should be part of Australia's
force-in-being.

6.36   The Committee notes, but remains unconvinced by, the
advice given by the Department of Defence that Australia's
presently approved surveillance capability 'is broadly adequate
for current needs', and 'that extension of our strategic
surveillance using currently available technologies would be
costly and of limited priority in our present strategic
circumstances.'[12]

6.37   The Committee accepts the difficulties involved in
providing for comprehensive surveillance of Australia's Area of
Principal Defence Interest, and it recognises that the cost of
developing such a system with existing technologies and

capabilities could be disproportionately high. It believes
however that adequate and timely surveillance and early warning
are key elements in both our deterrent and defence strategies,
and that the importance of these functions is likely to increase
rather than decrease with time. The Committee further believes
that while the basic components of Australia's strategic
surveillance capacity may be 'adequate for current needs', there
is currently no overall structure linking these component parts
into a coherent and effective whole. The failure to provide a
systematic and national approach to surveillance is due in part
to the existing division (and in some areas confusion) of
responsibilities between Government Departments at both the
Federal and State level. It is also a product of current
arrangements within Defence where command and control of routine
surveillance activities is normally exercised by single Service
operational headquarters (Fleet Command and Operational Command).

6.38   The Committee believes that the tasks of surveillance
of Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest, strategic
reconnaissance and provision of early warning, (to serve both as
a deterrence against threats arising to Australia's security and
in the defence of national interests), represent important
peace-time roles, and that they should be controlled by a single,
joint-force headquarters. The headquarters should be given
operational control of Australia's primary surveillance units;
and other units could be assigned as needed.

6.39   The Committee recommends that Australia should acquire
an airborne early warning and control capability that can be used
to augment Australia's airspace surveillance capabilities and to
duplicate the command and control of these capabilities. Mindful
of the long lead-times associated with developing such a
capability (it has been suggested that it would take some four
years to perfect AEW & C) and the costs of acquiring dedicated
AEW&C aircraft, the Committee sees advantage in initially

providing this capability by seeking to lease one or more US E2C
AWAC aircraft, while the Lockheed P3C (AWAC version) is evaluated
for purchase by the Australian Defence Force.

Strategic Strike and Interdiction

6.40   Medium and high level threats to Australia's security
can be deterred by incorporating into our force structure
selected strategic strike and long-range interdiction
capabilities. As mentioned in the previous chapter, these
capabilities should seek to exploit the unique nature of
Australia's physical environment and simultaneously require a
potential adversary to devote disproportionate resources to carry
out its threat. The Committee also believes that the capabilities
acquired should be seen by our neighbours as being
defensively-oriented rather than offensive.

6.41   The broad purposes of our strategic strike and
interdiction forces would be to demonstrate clearly a capacity to
apply significant military force against an adversary during its
approaches to Australia, and against the lines of communications
between the enemy's forward bases and its deployed forces. The
principal geographic focus of these capabilities would be to the
north and north-west, in the area between the Australian mainland
and the outer limits of our Area of Principal Defence Interest.
The requirements for strategic strike and long-range interdiction
would be met by a range of anti-air and anti-shipping weapons
carried in various airborne, surface and sub-surface platforms.
Such force elements may typically include aircraft carriers,
long-range strike aircraft or missiles, submarines, destroyers,
and missile-carrying patrol boats.

6.42   The specific types and numbers of weapons systems and
their principal characteristics would be determined by detailed
force-on-force and cost-effectiveness calculations which would
use the concept of disproportionate response as a basic planning
guideline. The Committee believes that the selection process
should also ensure that:

   a.   Australia's strategic strike and interdiction
        capacity is based on a range of equipments and
        weapons systems that have some overlapping
        capabilities. This would complicate the enemy's
        defence of his own forces and reduce the
        vulnerability of Australia's forces to a
        pre-emptive strike; and

   b.   the individual force elements must be survivable
        within their operational environment.
        Australia's forces must be seen to be effective
        by potential aggressors. This suggests that the
        forces should be largely in-being and that they
        would act in concert with Australia's strategic
        surveillance and early warning system, and
        operate under a single, integrated system of
        command and control.

Australia's   Current   Strategic   Strike   and   Interdiction
Capabilities

6.43   Australia's current and forecast strategic strike and
interdiction capabilities are based on

   a.   24 F111C medium-range strike aircraft;

   b.   75 F/A-18 Hornet multi-role fighter aircraft;
        and

   c.   6 Oberon submarines.

The Navy's surface maritime forces - principally the FFG guided missile frigates and the guided missile destroyers - and the Air Force's P3 Orion forces can also provide some limited capacity for long-range interdiction of enemy naval forces.

6.44   The F111C remains one of the world's most advanced aircraft. Equipped with advanced navigation aids, including a terrain-following radar system, the F111 is capable of both land and sea attack with rockets, bombs or precision-guided stand-off weapons. It has the ability to approach a target fast and low, strike with great accuracy and get out again before missile emplacements can react. The F/A-18 Hornet is also a very advanced, high-capability aircraft that can be used in the roles of air combat, air intercept, fighter escort, interdiction (including anti-shipping strike) and close air support of ground forces. It can attack targets by day or night and in all weather conditions at ranges greater than 500 km.

6.45   The Department of Defence is modifying the F111 to use the Pave Tack target acquisition tracking and designation system, as well as Harpoon anti-ship missiles and GBU-15 guided bombs. Its integral radar homing and warning system is also being modernised. The F/A-18 will be able to use the Sidewinder short-range and the Sparrow radar guided medium-range air-to-air missiles, Harpoon anti-shipping missiles and either conventional or laser-guided bombs. The Department also plans to extend the operational range of both aircraft by adapting our present Boeing 707 aircraft for in-flight re-fuelling.

6.46   Australia's maritime interdiction capacity can be augmented by our current surface naval forces, in particular by the guided missile destroyers and frigates both of which provide anti-shipping capabilities. As will be described later, the effectiveness of these forces, particularly in areas remote from Australia's mainland, is reduced by their limited anti-submarine and air defence capabilities.

6.47   The Department of Defence acknowledges that the
development of Australia's strategic strike and interdiction
capabilities 'is relevant principally to deterrence of the remote
contingencies of major attack on Australia, for which we could
presently expect many years of warning.' It further states that
current defence policy distinguishes between strikes against land
and maritime targets where the latter is given a 'higher
strategic priority.' Australia's existing and planned strategic
strike and interdiction capabilities are seen to be 'high in
regional terms and are being steadily upgraded', although the
Department states that in view of the costs involved and the low
probability of high-level threats to Australia's security 'we
need to be discriminating in the usage and level of training of
these forces in peacetime.'[13]

6.48   A number of submissions to the inquiry argued that
Australia's present strategic strike and interdiction (and
maritime defence) capabilities continue to suffer from a lack of
maritime air capability. A carrier-based task force would provide
Australia with a considerable capacity to destroy an aggressor's
naval and civil shipping, of attacking his forward bases and
interrupting his sea lines of communications. Such a force would
also enable Australia to operate independently within our local
neighbourhood and provide us with greater initiative in dealing
with a range of threats.

6.49   The potential roles, and the arguments for and against
an aircraft carrier, were considered by the Committee in its
earlier report on An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence
Force. In that report, the Committee acknowledged that an
aircraft carrier can provide many of the functions which would be
valuable in the defence of Australia, including strategic strike
and interdiction. It was concluded however that the total project
cost of a fully operational aircraft carrier would be prohibitive

and that it would result in other desirable defence acquisitions being curtailed or delayed unacceptably. Moreover, it was considered that many of the functions performed by an aircraft carrier can be performed as effectively, or at least acceptably, by other elements of our air and maritime forces. The Committee stated however that if 'future Defence expenditure of a much higher order were to be contemplated, a carrier could be included in the capital expenditure program without necessarily distorting the shape and balance of the Defence Force.'[14]

6.50   The Committee continues to support these conclusions and considers that, under present circumstances, a maritime air capability based on one or more aircraft carriers is not required, particularly for our strategic strike and interdiction role. The Committee generally supports the view of the Department of Defence that, with the introduction of the F/A-18, Australia's current strategic strike and interdiction capacity is high in regional terms and therefore is adequate. The Committee considers that this capability should be augmented by in-flight refuelling and that priority be given to adapting our current Boeing 707 aircraft to this role. Unlike the Department, the Committee sees that deterrence and its component roles and functions represents an immediate and on-going task at least up to the commencement of hostilities. In order to fully deter a potential aggressor, Australia's deterrent forces must exist and they must clearly demonstrate the capacity to perform their roles. The Committee considers that this is best achieved if the forces are maintained at a credible state of operational readiness. They must not be vulnerable to a pre-emptive strike by a potential aggressor. They should be continually exercised under a single operational Command headquarters.

Maritime Defence

6.51   As a maritime nation, Australia needs to control vital
sea lanes and protect coastal shipping and points of entry.
Control of the sea may be achieved defensively by denying the
enemy the use of the sea or offensively by using the sea for our
own purposes: convoys, maritime assertion, power projection and
so on.

6.52   Sea control requires forces which collectively are
capable of providing anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine
capabilities, where the nature and extent of each capability will
depend on the level of threat to be encountered. Such a capacity
can be provided either by autonomous naval forces or by a
combination of naval and land-based forces. The exact composition
of our maritime defence force would need to be determined from
detailed force calculations which are beyond the competence and
expertise of this Committee, although a number of general points
can be made.

6.53   First, most of the basic force elements needed for
maritime defence are high-technology items which require
considerable time to develop and acquire. I.M. Speedy has
recently examined the lead-times for the peacetime acquisiton of
major equipments by the Department of Defence. Speedy found that
the average time between the initial Cabinet submission and
financial approval was 44 months. Major acquisitions would also
involve some planning time for project definition and preparation
of specifications. Even if the purchases were to be made
off-the-shelf, this prior planning and approval time is likely to
be months rather than weeks. Finally, as Speedy points out:

> 'Major equipment construction time, especially for
> ships, is lengthy, varying only by the complexity of
> the construction. The Oberon-class submarines took 75

> months, the Australian designed destroyer (DDL) was
> planned to take four years, while the last two
> River-class frigates (Swan and Torrens) took five
> years each.'[15]

Given the increasing complexity of modern weapons and command and
control systems, it would seem that neither the project planning
times nor the construction times for major naval vessels could be
significantly decreased. Australia could have difficulty
therefore in expanding its maritime defence forces either in the
lead-up to hostilities or during a conflict. Unless we can extend
this warning time or substantially alter the basis of our
maritime defence force, we will need to conduct our maritime
defence with the forces that are in-being at the commencement of
conflict.

6.54   Secondly, the size and character of Australia's
maritime defence forces should be based on a detailed assessment
of such factors as the nature of the maritime threat, Australia's
reliance on seaborne trade and the likely actions of our major
allies and trading partners. The Committee considers for example,
that while seaborne trade is important to Australia, it does not
necessarily follow that all routes should be protected for all
levels of conflict. Australia's strategic isolation means that it
can readily diversify its trade routes. Any aggressor intent on
cutting off supply therefore, and not just harassment, would need
to mount extensive naval operations concentrated on either the
supply or delivery ports. His task would be compounded in
peacetime by the fact that much of Australia's maritime trade is
carried in overseas-owned shipping. Any attack on this shipping
would carry with it the risk of involving extra countries in the
dispute or of attracting international disapprobation. Finally,
Australia has a high degree of self-sufficiency in many basic
resources and capital goods which could be augmented by
stockpiling in peacetime and rationing in wartime. This would
reduce further the number of sea routes and cargoes that would
need protection.

6.55   These considerations suggest that Australia should
relate the size and scope of its maritime defence capacity to
assisting in securing Australia's Area of Principal Defence
Interest and being able to provide protection for a select number
of sea routes, vital choke points and maritime facilities. The
Committee considers that even in the face of an intermediate or
higher level threat, such a capacity could be provided by a
relatively small number of naval combat surface vessels supported
by ground-based air power. Moreover, it is considered that such a
force should be able to be developed and maintained from within
our existing level of defence resources. Because of its limited
size, the force would need to be survivable and so would require
considerable self-defence capabilities. It should also be able to
utilise fully force-multiplier effects in order to provide the
maximum maritime defence capacity.

Australia's Current Maritime Defence Capability

6.56   Australia's present maritime defence force is centred
on our destroyer force of three guided missile destroyers, four
guided missile frigates and six destroyer escorts. Two more
guided missile frigates are to be constructed at the Williamtown
Naval Dockyard. The destroyer escorts are planned to be paid-off
by the mid-1990s and the guided missile destroyers by around the
end of the century.

6.57   These surface forces carry a range of anti-submarine,
anti-shipping and surface-to-air missiles including Ikara,
Standard, Harpoon and Seacat. All vessels are eventually to be
fitted with the Phalanx close-in weapon system and the FFGs will
carry two helicopters. The Government is giving high priority to
acquiring helicopters with advanced anti-submarine sensors and

attack systems as well as anti-ship and surveillance
capabilities. The Department has taken delivery of the first
batch of Ecureuill (Squirrel) A5350B helicopters which are
replacing the light helicopters currently in service with the RAN
and RAAF. Some of these are being trialled with the FFGs. Navy
considers that, given its present tasks, the operational
capabilities of its surface units are reasonable although there
is difficulty in supporting them at sea for protracted periods
particularly at long distances and in view of the need to
effectively sustain a two-ocean Navy. In view of the fact that
most of Australia's destroyer force will reach the end of its
service life by the late 1990s, the Department of Defence is
beginning to conduct studies 'aimed at assessing our needs for
surface combatant ships beyond the turn of the century.'[16] The
key consideration in these studies is balancing the increasing
cost of providing traditional naval surface platforms with their
increasing vulnerability to small, and relatively cheap
precision-guided weapons.

6.58   A number of submissions to the inquiry have argued that
Australia's present maritime defence forces are too thinly spread
and that they suffer from a number of serious shortfalls. The
major perceived weaknesses are that Australia's fleet units can
no longer be guaranteed air cover nor do they have adequate
protection against submarines.

6.59   At present, the air defence capabilities of Australia's
fleet are provided by the short-range weapons systems located
on-board ships and ground-based fighter aircraft that belong to
the Air Force. Navy has advised that at present, RAAF air cover
can only be provided out to 500 miles from shore and only for
limited periods. While this will improve with the introduction of
the F/A-18, Navy has argued that the need to provide air defence
support to the Fleet poses a major increase in flying hours for
the RAAF, particularly in view of the long transit times

involved, and there is some doubt whether RAAF could provide the amount of support required. As a matter of principle, Navy believes that the naval task force commander should have operational control of all forces assigned to maritime operations. For its part, the Air Force believes that it can meet the additional requirement to provide close air support to the Fleet, although this may mean reducing some existing operational capabilities elsewhere because of current crew shortages.

6.59   The more serious weakness is seen to be the lack of an effective, medium-range anti-submarine capacity. Since HMAS Melbourne was de-commissioned, Australia's naval forces are unable to use their Sea King helicopters which can operate up to 200 miles from their parent ship and use sensors and MK 46 torpedoes to locate and destroy either nuclear-powered or diesel electric submarines before they can get within missile or torpedo range of Australian ships. The Sea Kings also have the capability to assume control of the Ikara anti-submarine missile that is carried on Australia's guided missile destroyers and destroyer escorts, thereby extending their range. While Australia is to provide its guided missile frigates with an integral helicopter-based anti-submarine capability, this will not completely replace the previous capability provided by the Sea Kings.

6.60   Naval units are provided with a degree of long-range anti-submarine air cover by the RAAF's P3 Orion force. It is argued however, that this support has only limited effectiveness because naval commanders have no control over the tasking and deployment of these assets. At present Navy's Fleet Command places its requests for P3 support to the RAAF's Headquarters Operational Command, and assets are allocated on the basis of Air Force needs. While there has been no real problem in obtaining this support in peacetime, this may not be the case during periods of conflict when there will be a need for more extensive surveillance of Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest.

In addition, it has been further argued that because RAAF
planning personnel are generally unfamiliar with maritime warfare
they are not able to contribute effectively to these kinds of
operations.

6.61   The Committee considers that Australia's maritime
forces, however they are eventually structured, must be given
adequate protection against air and submarine attack. For the
reasons already stated, the Committee believes that it is not
appropriate at this stage to provide our maritime forces with
their own integral combat air support particularly in the form of
an aircraft carrier. The Committee considers that for the kinds
of maritime defence tasks envisaged, adequate close air support
should be able to be provided by medium and long-range combat
aircraft based on the Australian mainland together with
short-range air defence weapons systems located on-board the
ships. The Committee acknowledges the problems associated with
the command and control of maritime forces consisting of elements
responsible to separate single-Service commands, but believes
that there is scope to integrate Australia's maritime defence
forces under a single operational command. This question is taken
up later in the Report.

6.62   An important, and until recent times, neglected element
of maritime defence is mine warfare which comprises both mining
and mine countermeasures. Mining is the placing of sea mines in
waters to deter the transit of enemy ships and, if necessary, to
sink them. Depending on who controls the waters being mined,
mining can be offensive, defensive or protective. Offensive
mining involves laying mines in enemy territorial waters or
waters under the control of the enemy. Defensive mining is the
mining of international waters or choke points not controlled by
either side. Protective mining is the mining of friendly
territorial waters in order to protect vital assets such as
ports, harbours, anchorages, landing sites and coastal shipping
routes. It is clear that mining can be used in both the

deterrence and defence roles. Furthermore, modern mining operations could be used to some effect against Australia and so we need to develop our own mine countermeasure capacities.

6.63   The Department of Defence has acknowledged that Australia's present capabilities for mining and mine countermeasures ' have fallen back in recent years in the face of the growing complexity of mine technology and the rising cost of vessels able to deal with them.'[17] Our current mine warfare capabilities are vested in one ageing minesweeper and one minehunter, both located in Sydney. In view of the potential effectiveness of mining, the Department is giving priority to the development of mine countermeasures, and contracts have been let for the construction of two Australian-designed inshore minehunting catamarans, which, when proven, would be followed by further orders.

6.64   The Committee agrees that recent developments in mine warfare have important consequences for Australia's maritime defence, both in terms of our ability to deter a potential *aggressor and in ensuring that our own defence effort is not* unduly vulnerable to a mine attack. It also recognises that mine warfare may not be able to be given the same priority as other defence capabilities, and that we could not afford to develop and maintain the countermeasures needed to protect all of our sea and coastal assets against mines.

6.65   The Committee considers that Australia should develop within its maritime defence forces a small but highly capable mine countermeasures capacity utilising both surface and airborne *facilities and capable of providing protection for at least our* major ports and choke points. We should aim to augment these forces in time of conflict with a range of civilian craft that have been predesignated and trained in the minesweeping and minehunting roles. The Committee also believes that the effective planning   and   operation   of   mine

countermeasures requires detailed knowledge of the ocean and
seabed environment of our key coastal shipping routes and access
points. This kind of information should be stored in a
centralised data bank which should form part of a fully automated
mine countermeasures information centre that would receive, plot
and evaluate all mine information.

Land Warfare

6.66   While Australia's ground forces would be used primarily
in the defence of Australia and its interests, they can also make
an important contribution to deterrence. This occurs in two ways.
First, a potential aggressor may be deterred if he believes that
Australia can provide an immediate and effective response to his
actions. Secondly, in the case of higher level threats, the value
of Australia's ground forces as a deterrent lies in making a
potential adversary's task of amassing adequate invasion or
lodgement forces prohibitively expensive in terms of both men and
materiel.

6.67   An effective and rapid response to a threat is
predicated firstly on an awareness of the enemy's location and
intentions. This requires an efficient intelligence and
surveillance capability which is backed up by a flexible and
responsive C^3 system which enables the Australian Command
authority to assess quickly the situation and then deploy and
monitor its forces. Secondly, it requires that Australia's ground
forces be either already present in or near the chosen area of
operations or that they can be rapidly deployed there. Given the
size of the task and Australia's limited resources, it is likely
that we would have to concentrate on the latter approach,
although the Committee considers that regional forces similar to

NORFORCE should be established throughout the northern areas of
Australia in order to provide a ground surveillance and possibly
a limited initial reaction capacity.

6.68   The ready reaction forces would need to have a high
level of strategic mobility in order to be able to be quickly
deployed and redeployed over long distances and into the more
remote areas of Australia. The Committee believes that in view of
the nature of the task, Australia's ready reaction capability
should utilise regular, conventional forces, and it should be
based on an air-mobile concept with only limited reliance on
ground and sea transport. For higher level contingencies in
particular, the force would need to have its own protection
against air attack. There would also be a need to develop a
sufficient nation-wide infrastructure of airfields and other
facilities required for the deployment and support of the forces.

6.69   The Committee recognises that the requirement for a
high degree of strategic mobility can impose limits on the
tactical mobility and firepower of a force. This is not seen as a
problem for low-level threats but it may become important as the
threat level rises. Under these conditions, highly mobile and
lightly armed forces may be less effective as a deterrent. They
are also increasingly susceptible to rapid tactical defeat by
superior enemy forces. Greater combat power can be achieved
initially through the selective use of advanced technology
weapons and associated operational tactics and doctrine.
Ultimately, however, the force would need to incorporate some of
the more conventional elements of combat power: tanks, armoured
personnel carriers, medium or heavy artillery, ground attack
aircraft and so on.

6.70   As already mentioned, a potential aggressor can be
deterred from invading Australia if the cost of amassing adequate
invasion or lodgement forces is disproportionately high. Faced
with the prospect of being confronted by a relatively large, well

armed and motivated ground force, the enemy will need to structure the size and capability of his force accordingly in order to ensure victory. This will in turn make the force more vulnerable to Australia's strategic strike and interdiction forces, and so the enemy will be deterred on two counts – the likely cost of raising the invasion force in the first place and the high cost of carrying out his threat.

6.71   A notional enemy contemplating invasion of Australia could be expected to require a ground force which is at least three times as large as the land forces Australia could field against such an enemy. Thus if Australia were seen by a potential attacker as capable of deploying one division against his initial lodgement and sustain it in defensive operations, the enemy high command would have to plan on mounting an invasion with at least three and probably more divisions of comparable combat power. The build up of such a force, together with its required transportation and protection elements, would be a large undertaking for any nation, requiring considerable time to implement and so should be readily discernable.

6.72   In the defence phase, the principal role of Australia's land forces would be to hold the key areas essential to the defence of the country – that is the main population centres, the chief industrial areas, and a substantial area of food and industrial resource producing territory. The land forces would have to be able to defeat enemy ground assaults on Australia's vital areas and hold them so that the national defence effort could continue. The forces would therefore need to be proficient in all phases of modern warfare – advance, attack, withdrawal and defence – they would need to be able to operate throughout most areas of the continent, have a high level of tactical mobility and combat power and be both operationally and logistically self-sufficient. The force would have to be sizeable – probably at least five divisions – and contain significant amounts of armour, anti-armour, long-range artillery and air defence assets.

It would need to have adequate stocks of equipment and materiel, and facilities would need to be prepared in advance for fortifications, logistic storages, transportation, communications and training camps. A secondary task of Australia's main land forces would be to operate within non-vital areas in order to inflict enemy casualties and to keep him off-balance. This should require long-range, air and ground mobile, strike forces.

6.73   From an analysis of these factors, the Committee considers that Australia's land warfare forces - comprising units from the Army and Air Force - should have four broad roles:

   a.   rapid and effective reaction against low-level military threats. This would be the principal role of Australia's land forces in peacetime. The rapid reaction force should be in-being, it should be largely self-sufficient and would be lightly scaled and air mobile. It should also have a nucleus of higher-level combat capabilities in order to cater for any escalation in the threat;

   b.   ability to constrain an initial enemy lodgement on Australian soil. The basic purpose of this role is to prevent an intermediate or higher level threat to Australia from arising. Because it relates to deterrence, the capability should be relatively well advanced. The force required for this role would need to be able to deploy into the required area of operations and conduct a sustained defence against the enemy. It would have both strategic and tactical mobility and would need to be operationally and logistically self-sufficient. The Committee terms this role vanguard defence;

   c.   defence of Australia's vital areas of interest. This would be the primary role of Australia's land forces in the event that deterrence fails and Australia is

invaded. It would require relatively large scale
conventional forces well versed in all phases of
war. The Committee terms this role home defence;
and

d. **exploitation of Australia's continental space.**
This would be a secondary role of Australia's land
forces during the defence phase and would be aimed
at removing the initiative from the enemy in
non-vital areas.

6.74   The Committee considers that the size, detailed
composition and structure of the land forces required to meet
these broad roles is a matter for professional judgement, based
on an assessment of the nature of the task, the resources that
are available and the time available for expansion and training.
There are, however, a number of general observations and
propositions that can be made. First, the structure and
operational readiness of Australia's Defence Force should broadly
relate to our threat environment and our chosen approach to deal
with this environment. As noted earlier, the Committee considers
that during peacetime, Australia's defence posture should be
principally concerned with preventing the emergence of threats to
our security and with dealing with those threats which do arise.
At present, these are most likely to be low-level threats
stemming from within our own region of interest, but they could
involve certain intermediate level contingencies which may arise
at relatively short notice. Priority should be given therefore to
developing Australia's ready reaction capacity and our ability to
constrain or defeat an initial enemy lodgement. In saying this,
the Committee recognises that we cannot ignore the possibility
that deterrence might fail and so we also need to have, at least
in outline, the capacity to defend Australia's vital land areas
if the need arises.

6.75   In examining the most appropriate land force to counter
low-level threats, the Committee notes that in submissions placed
before it, there has been fairly wide agreement that this task
could be adequately handled by a force of about brigade strength.
A former Army Chief of Logistics Major General J.D. Stevenson for
example, has stated that the likely low-level military threats to
Australia's security could be countered by a well equipped
brigade group on light scales, where some of the required
capabilities and characteristics of this force are:

> 'a.   Three infantry battalions on light scale with
>   combat support. The supporting arms must also be
>   airportable and would include field artillery,
>   engineers and some light armoured vehicles. One
>   battalion should be parachute trained.
>
> b.   A very strong reconnaissance and surveillance
>   capability is required. Two SAS squadrons are
>   needed as well as local force Army Reserve
>   reconnaissance elements, such as NORFORCE.
>
> c.   The force must be capable of rapid redeployment
>   in the combat zone. This will usually be by air,
>   either by helicopter or short range transport
>   aircraft. The use of helicopters, whether
>   employed tactically or logistically is integral
>   to land operations.
>
> d.   Logistic resupply will essentially be by air,
>   but this has its limitations and is
>   uneconomical. Some local logistic support
>   capability is desirable.
>
> e.   Key points in the command and control and
>   logistic deployment of the force will tend to be
>   exposed and vulnerable to air attack. Low level
>   air defence is required.
>
> f.   Command and control will have to be exercised
>   over long distances. Headquarters of units and
>   sub-units may have to move frequently.'[18]

6.76   The Committee considers that a force of this size and
capabilities would act as a significant deterrent to those low
level military threats involving minor lodgements or incursions

onto Australia's land space. Given its strategic mobility, it would also be able to be fairly readily deployed into other parts of Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest should the need arise. The Committee considers however that such a force would neither deter, nor could it be used effectively against, *terrorist activities or air and maritime incursions. Other force elements* would have to be maintained for these purposes.

6.77   In looking at our abiity to deter or constrain an enemy lodgement on Australian soil, it is important to keep in mind our other deterrent forces and capabilities, and to strike a balance between what is desirable and what is practicable. On the one hand we need to convince a potential adversary that he will be confronted by a large and well armed force which is well trained, capable and prepared for a protracted operational campaign. On the other, we must not set ourselves goals which we clearly cannot meet *nor should we pursue options that would undermine our* strategic strike and interdiction capabilities.

6.78   Taking these kinds of factors into account, the Committee considers that Australia should initially base its defence vanguard capacity around the 1st Australian Division and a selected component or 'slice' of Corps Troops (typically including armour, medium artillery, engineering, close airsupport and air defence capabilities). This force is largely in-being and if it were structured and trained to meet and defeat a major enemy lodgement on Australia's shores, it would provide a large measure of deterrence against intermediate and even high level threats to Australia. As Major General Stevenson has pointed out,

> 'The proven ability to deploy a well trained force
> of divisional strength, even modestly equipped, to
> possible lodgement areas prior to attempted
> landings would be a strong deterrent. If we also
> had a highly trained, very well equipped force of
> about brigade strength possessing considerable
> combat power and battlefield mobility available to
> strike   at   the   already   opposed

> landing our deterrent would be really worthwhile.
> Better still if we could get at least one regiment
> of tanks to the battlefield as well. Of course, if
> the enemy could force a landing in one place, the
> possibility of an alternate lodgement area would
> also have to be considered. Therefore there is
> probably a need for another "deterrent" division,
> but the low level reaction force, which would
> almost certainly be deployed already, may be able
> to undertake a "containment" task.'[19]

6.79   In view of the uncertainty over warning times for intermediate-level threats, the Committee further considers that Australia's vanguard force should be in a relatively advanced state of readiness and that it should require only little prior expansion. It should be largely operationally and logistically self-sufficient or at least not dependent on long lead-time items or overseas sources for vital supplies. It should have sufficient reserves of ammunition and material to conduct sustained defensive operations. Most importantly, it should have, and be well practised in, the operational and logistic doctrines required for the kinds of tasks on which it would be deployed. The Committee notes that there is some commonality between the roles and functions of the ready reaction and vanguard forces and considers that there may be scope to combine them as part of a single operational force.

6.80   The protection of Australia's vital interests and the exploitation of non-vital areas are major tasks which are beyond our present capabilities and may never be wholly possible in light of our relatively limited resources. As Robert O'Neill has noted,

> 'Even after national mobilisation, Australia would be
> hard pressed to support a well equipped Army of four
> or five divisions. A force of that size is slender by
> comparison with Australia's surface area.'[20]

The Committee shares this concern and considers that it provides all the more reason to seek to prevent an invasion of Australia occurring in the first place. Priority should therefore be given to developing and refining Australia's deterrent role, and as part of this, of providing strong and effective reaction and vanguard forces. Having said this, the Committee recognises that Australia requires some form of home defence force in the event that deterrence fails. It is clear however that we may not be able to afford conventional forces of the type that we now have to both defend Australia's vital land areas and to exploit the whole of our continental land space. New approaches are needed which make use of advances in technology and which capitalise on, and take account of, Australia's unique environment.

6.81   One approach which is attractive to the Committee is to assign the responsibility for defending Australia's vital land areas to a mechanised conventional warfare force based on both Regular and Reserve units and which is capable of being expanded in times of emergency. The remainder of Australia could be made the responsibility of a second, territorial defence force. As Robert O'Neill has suggested, this latter force

> '...should be based on both the Regular Army and the Army Reserve and be capable of substantial expansion in an emergency. Such a force would compel any enemy constantly to protect his movements in order to avoid the risk of substantial casualties. It would not always be able to stop an enemy from doing what he wanted but, every time he concentrated a force to take an initiative, he would run the risk of being struck hard by a small force which could then disappear while he reorganised and tried to counter it. This concept would offer a durable means of making enemy operations in the remote areas of Australia unattractively expensive.'[21]

6.82   An important issue is the relationship between the vanguard and home defence forces. The Committee recognises that again there will be a considerable degree of commonality between the functions and characteristics of the two forces. However,

because the enemy's initial lodgement could be well removed from
Australia's areas of vital interest, the Committee considers that
the forces used to contain this lodgement and restrict the
enemy's subsequent advance should not form a critical part of the
larger home defence force. Having said that, it is recognised
that there will obviously be circumstances in which Australia's
vanguard force could either operate as part of, or in conjunction
with, our home defence force, and the ability to do this should
be maintained.

6.83   The defence of Australia's vital areas involves more
than selecting the most appropriate military forces. As Colonel
J.O. Langtry has suggested to the Committee[22], it must also take
into account such considerations as:

   a.   the   use   of   civil   resources   (industry,
        construction, transport, communications, etc) to
        supplement   and   support   Australia's   uniformed
        forces and so provide depth to our national
        defence posture;

   b.   the establishment and utilisation of para-military
        forces to be used to protect local facilities and
        other tasks.   These could be similar to the
        Volunteer Defence Corps which was formed during
        the Second World War. The VDC eventually had over
        50,000 members and its operational role included
        providing warning of enemy movements, immediate
        defence of home localities and guerilla warfare;

   c.   the use of non-uniformed forces as partisans,
        saboteurs   or   guerillas,   particularly   within
        locations outside Australia's vital areas;

   d.   civil defence which involves the 'protection of
        the civilian populations against dangers arising
        from hostilities, assistance in its recovery from
        the   immediate   effects   of   hostilities   and   the
        provision of conditions necessary for the survival
        of the civilian population.'

   e.   the planning and implementation of internal
        security and civilian defence.

6.84   The Committee notes that many of these considerations apply for all levels of threat. It also recognises that the task of planning and developing these kinds of capabilities is not easy. As Colonel Langtry has stated:

> 'Solutions to these problems will not be found easily. There will be competing demands for resources. There will be problems in legislation and compensation. There will be conflicts of interest over matters of command and control. There will be areas of dispute in areas of federal and state responsibilities. Moreover, there will be ambiguities in the context of both planning for and the conduct of operations.'[23]

The Committee considers that it is vital to determine Australia's civil support arrangements in advance of any hostilities. Unless such arrangements can be brought into action quickly, the scope and endurance of the nation's military efforts will be severely constrained. The Committee accepts that the task is a long-term one, made more difficult by the absence of any clearly defined high-level threat and the federal structure of our polity. An important first step in this process could be the establishment of an appropriate high-level planning body tasked with developing *broad policy guidelines for the defence of Australia as well as* the appropriate organisational framework for the task.

6.85   While noting that some work is being done in this area by the Department of Defence and the Department of Defence Support, the Committee considers that the responsibility for planning and coordinating these tasks should go beyond these Departments. There is a need to establish some form of high-level machinery to ensure that all civil and military aspects of national defence and mobilisation occur in harmony. The planning and conduct of Australia's national security policies are considered in detail in Chapter Eight.

6.86   The Committee concludes therefore that Australia's land forces should comprise in conceptual terms three basic elements, viz:

a. a ready reaction force tasked with meeting low level threats as they emerge within Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest. This force should be an air-mobile, lightly-scaled, brigade group with a nucleus of higher level combat capabilities;

b. a vanguard defence force which would be tasked with meeting, constraining and defeating an initial enemy lodgement on the Australian mainland. This force should comprise a 'deterrent' division, and an appropriate 'slice' of Corps Troops; and

c. a home defence force tasked with defending Australia's vital areas and exploiting other, non-vital areas within the Australian mainland. This force should be made up of a mechanised conventional warfare force, and a territorial defence force.

Because of the different tasks and likely areas of operation of the three forces, the Committee considers that they should operate under separate commands but that there may be scope to group some or all of these commands under a single higher command charged with the defence of Australia. These arrangements are considered in more detail in the following chapter.

Australia's Current Land Warfare Capability

6.87   Army accepts that Australia's present strategic outlook does not support the need to maintain a large standing army. Its approach is to maintain a core of manpower and capabilities which would serve as the expansion base to meet higher level contingencies as they arise. Within this expansion base, a component is manned, equipped and trained to handle those operational tasks that might arise at short notice. All other units are manned to levels which are judged the minimum necessary

to conduct viable unit and formation training. While the
expansion base is based on an army corps of three divisions, only
two skeletal divisions are raised and there is no Corps
Headquarters. The senior operational headquarters is HQ 1st
Australian Division. Headquarters Field Force Command is not an
operational headquarters, nor will it be in wartime.

6.88   *Australia's present land warfare capability is centred*
on one regular Army infantry division and one Army Reserve
division together with the combat support, logistic support and
administrative elements needed to sustain them in both peace and
war. The structure and capabilities of the Army were described in
detail in Chapter Three. In addition to the Army, there are
certain elements of the RAAF which are used to supplement
Australia's land warfare capabilities. These are:

    a.   strategic strike and tactical fighter forces which
          provide long-range reconnaissance and close air
          support to ground forces; and

    b.   the fixed and rotary wing transport forces which
          provide both a strategic and tactical air lift
          capacity for the transport of troops, war
          material, supplies and cargo.

6.89   These Army and Air forces would be expected to provide
the capability for the conduct of timely and sustained combat
operations on land against all levels of threat. As mentioned,
the Army is presently not able to carry out all these tasks at
short notice. In the event of an intermediate or high level
threat arising, the Army would need time to expand both its
present size and operational capacity.

6.90   Army considers that the present size and
characteristics of its expansion base will not change
significantly over the next decade or so, although it is hoped
                                                ies will be added,

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6.90   Army considers that the present size and characteristics of its expansion base will not change significantly over the next decade or so, although it is hoped that some improvements or extra capabilities will be added,

particularly in the areas of battlefield surveillance, rocketry and self-propelled artillery, tactical command and control, aerial fire support and mechanised warfare.

Australia's Ready Reaction Capability

6.91   Australia's ready reaction response capacity is based on the Operational Deployment Force (ODF) which presently consists of the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Australian Division. The ODF is directly supported by No.35 Squadron of the RAAF which presently maintains 4 Iroquois helicopters and 3 Caribou short-range tactical aircraft. The 3rd Brigade specialises in light scale air mobile operations and jungle warfare and is kept at a high degree of readiness in order to 'provide the initial reaction to those lesser contingencies that might require a military response.' The present response times for the ODF are for a company group of the ODF to be ready for operational deployment within seven days notice to move. In the case of a battalion group, the response time is 14 days and it is 28 days for the whole brigade.

6.92   While there has been general support for the concept of the ODF, its composition and deployment capabilities have been criticised in a number of submissions to the inquiry. Major General Stevenson argued, for example, that while most of the requirements of such a ready reaction force can be met from within Australia's force-in-being, there remains a number of areas of concern, including:

> 'a.   Reconnaissance and surveillance capability. The Counter-terrorist commitment has seriously restricted the SAS regiment's availability for its primary role. Local force Army Reserve units are inadequate and need backing from elsewhere.

b.   A parachute trained battalion is not yet available.

c.   Helicopter support, particularly for fire support, is inadequate, and needs closer integration into the Army operational organization.

d.   The importance of SRT aircraft in the area of operations is being "played down" by the RAAF, and replacement of the Caribou by a similar aircraft is in some doubt.

e.   Capability for sustained logistic support is in doubt in a number of fields - local logistic capability, availability of aircraft and shipping, and specialist logistic units.'[24]

6.93   Others have pointed to the ODF's limited combat power, its limited sustainability, and poor manoeuvrability on the battlefield. The training of the ODF is said to be hampered - some have suggested seriously so - by the unavailability of certain specialised ammunition, by restricted flying and training hours and by limited air support assets. These basic constraints are said to be undermining morale, they are leading to a decline in certain specialist skills and are eroding the operational capability of the ODF. A further, major criticism has been that the operational response times of the ODF are unrealistic in view of the limited numbers and availability of air transport assets and the potential conflict between the RAAF and Army over the control of these resources.

6.94   In examining these issues, the Committee noted that while the ODF is based on a brigade group its present size falls well short of this capacity. Although all units of the 3rd Brigade are manned at higher levels than other units in the Army only two of the three battalions are raised. This must restrict the operational capability of the ODF particularly in the broad 'search and detect' missions that it may be engaged in in the north and north-west of Australia. Furthermore, in order to be fully air-mobile, the ODF is equipped to light scales only and

has no organic capabilities in armour, medium artillery or air
defence. It would have difficulty therefore in providing a
response to an intermediate-level threat. The ODF also lacks an
integral surveillance and long-range reconnaissance capability,
in particular night-vision devices, radars, sensor devices and
surveillance aircraft. While the ODF is capable of conducting
independent operations, this requires considerable administrative
resources to be deployed with the force, much of which cannot be
air lifted. The ODF has sufficient stocks to be able to be
maintained in the field on low-level operations for 180 days. It
could be sustained beyond this period but not without some
detriment to the remainder of the Army at least in terms of
replacement manpower, specialist ammunition and some maintenance
items. The load on the rest of the Army would increase if there
were any significant escalation in the threat.

6.95   In terms of the operational response times of the ODF,
the Committee notes that the brigade has yet to be deployed as a
whole on operations. Moreover, Exercise Kangaroo 83 has shown
that the deployment of a company group on its own may not be the
most suitable response for all contingencies. While studies into
the nature of low level conflicts are still being conducted by
the Department of Defence it seems that the minimum viable
response capacity may need to be based on an initial deployment
of a battalion group. These constraints are compounded by our
current limited capacity to deploy the ODF into its required area
of operations once it is ready, and to redeploy it during
operations. On the basis of evidence presented to the Committee,
there seems to be general agreement that our present air
transport assets are inadequate for these tasks. The fact that
Australia's air assets are inadequate should not be surprising.
The deployment of all or a significant portion of the ODF by air
would be a monumental task. Some idea of the magnitude of this
task can be gained by considering the air assets required to lift
just one field artillery battery (a field battery would normally

be deployed with a battalion group). It has been suggested to the Committee that a battery and its ammunition and supplies would require either 9 C130 sorties, 10 medium lift helicopter sorties, 23 utility lift helicopter sorties or 20 Caribou sorties. There are three field batteries in a brigade together with a headquarters battery, a repair element and a detachment of the Divisional Locating Battery, all of which would need to be deployed with the ODF on operations.

6.96   The size of the task notwithstanding, the Committee considers that Australia should possess sufficient air transport assets to be able to deploy, and support during operations, the major part of our land-based ready reaction force. The ability to quickly and efficiently deploy this force and sustain it in operations is vital if we are to deter low-level threats to Australia's security and defeat those military threats that are not deterred. The Committee also considers that the ODF should have first call on Australia's military air transport assets and that the operational capability of the ODF would be enhanced if the ODF or joint force commander had operational control of these assets. Finally, the Committee considers that the ODF should be expanded to a full brigade group and should contain a nucleus of higher power combat capabilities.

Australia's Vanguard and Home Defence Capabilities

6.97   The Australian Army, together with selected elements of the RAAF, would be responsible for containing initial enemy lodgements, providing for the defence of Australia's vital areas and seeking to exploit non-vital areas within our continental space. As mentioned earlier these tasks are beyond the present capacity of our land forces and a substantial increase in both its size and capabilities would be required prior to the

commencement of hostilities. Faced with this prospect, Army has
sought to provide a balanced force which retains - at least in a
'state-of-the-art' form - those capabilities that are likely to
be required in the defence of Australia and its interests and
which can be readily expanded to an appropriate terminal size in
the time required.

6.98   *The resulting force structure however is skeletal* and
thinly spread. The three regular brigades within the 1st
Australian Division have been tasked to develop certain
specialist as well as general skills in recognition that
Australia's terminal land force could require sizeable
capabilities in one or all of airborne, mechanised, amphibious or
conventional infantry operations. One of these brigades provides
Australia's ready reaction capability and so it may not be
available as part of the vanguard force. The expansion base for a
nominal target force of one Army corps has been achieved by
integrating regular and reserve units and formations into a
'total force'. *In order to maintain the full spectrum of*
capabilities required in the expansion base, most units are
under-manned and under-equipped. Finally, in order to provide
sufficient funds to purchase high-cost capial equipment items for
other areas in the Australian Defence Force, army's reserve
stocks of ammunition, weapons and spare parts have been allowed
to be run down and, apart from the ODF, its operational readiness
is very low.

6.99   All of these limitations are accepted by the Department
of Defence as a necessary price for updating and modernising
Australia's overall defence capacity in line with recent
developments in our strategic environment. They are further
justified in terms of the high costs and long lead-times
associated with major defence equipments and the likely extensive
warning times for intermediate and high level threats.

6.100   As described in Chapter Five, the Committee considers
that Australia cannot afford to rely on receiving and acting upon
the kinds of warning times that have been suggested by the
Department   as   being   typical   for   all   possible   threats.
Furthermore, there are serious doubts whether the present force
could be expanded sufficiently even within these times. Apart
from the problems of expandability, the core force approach has
directly and indirectly undermined our present land warfare
capacity. On the basis of evidence put to the Committee,
Australia's land forces continue to suffer a number of serious
weaknesses and shortfalls. Some of these have already been
alluded to, but they include:

    a.   while   the   framework   for   a   corps   of   three
           divisions exists, the divisions are in skeletal
           form and are significantly deficient in logistic
           and   supporting   elements.   Most   units   are   well
           below strength, inadequately equipped and poorly
           prepared.   Even   if   all   our   resources   were
           concentrated in one division, 'it would still be
           inadequately   equipped,   lacking   in   logistic
           capability and at a low level of training' [25].

    b.   the   close   air   support   and   local   air   defence
           capabilities of Australia's land force are very
           limited and are not all subject to the control
           of   the   commander   of   the   land   forces.   As   one
           witness put it:

           'Army tactical aviation in the land battle is a
           composite of Army light observation helicopters,
           Pilatus   Porters   and   Nomads,   with   the   major
           combat element of ground attack, air defence and
           battlefield   transport   (Caribous,   Chinooks   and
           Iroquois) provided by the RAAF. Apart from the
           age of many of these aircraft the command
           arrangement for Army tactical aviation needs...
           requires   a   separate   command   overlay   of   RAAF
           personnel   together   with   their   own
           communications. While it has been said that Army
           -    RAAF   differences   over   the   control   of
           battlefield airspace have been finally resolved
           after   a   protracted   wrangle,   the   RAAF   still
           insists that RAAF ground attack aircraft must be
           under the direction of RAAF personnel, whether
           on the

> ground or airborne. Army Forward Observation Officers are restricted to controlling army weapons and Naval Gunfire Support.'[25]

c.   Army's armoured and artillery assets are limited, in some cases obsolete and geographically dispersed. The Army's Leopard tanks for example are based at Puckapunyal and are well removed from the three brigades. Furthermore, they are difficult to deploy in numbers in reasonable time. There is only one readily available heavy lift ship capable of unloading them without extensive port facilities.

d.   While the modernisation of Army's field communications systems is in hand, it will not be completely replaced until the 1990s. Army's existing systems are outmoded and inadequate.

e.   Army's war reserves are insufficient to sustain major combat operations for any protracted period.

f.   the community's role in terms of defence infrastructure and civilian support in Australia's defence posture is ill-defined and greatly neglected.

6.101   The Committee considers that these deficiencies are serious and that they undermine the credibility and effectiveness of Australia's land warfare capability. In saying this, the Committee recognises the problems facing Australia's defence planners, in particular how to develop the most appropriate balance between our deterrent and defence postures from within Australia's limited resources. The Committee considers that the present weaknesses in Australia's land defence capacity may be acceptable if we had a strong and credible deterrent posture. At present however, there has been no attempt by Army to distinguish between the strategies of deterrence and defence. Australia's land warfare forces as a whole are intended to serve both purposes, but, because of the size and scope of the tasks involved, they do neither satisfactorily.

6.102   The Committee considers that a clearer articulation and
analysis of deterrence and defence along the lines suggested
earlier in this section would facilitate force structure planning
and lessen the impact of the serious deficiencies in our present
structure. They would not overcome them however. Serious thought
needs to be given to the defence of vital national areas in the
unlikely event of invasion. Again, a strong deterrent posture
would provide time and a measure of security for this task.

Air Defence

6.103   Air   defence   is   an   important   component   of   both
Australia's deterrent and defence posture. The credibility of our
deterrent capability is heavily dependent on the survivability
and security from enemy air attack of our strategic strike and
interdiction forces, and their home bases. Similarly, Australia's
defence facilities and other high value military and civilian
strategic targets need to be protected from air attack during a
defence emergency or war.

6.104   An air defence system involves more than missiles and
aircraft. As one author put it to the Committee:

> 'To be effective a national air defence system needs
> much more than fighters. An essential command and
> control requirement is an adequate, co-ordinated chain
> of sensors (ground and possibly airborne radars,
> passive electronic warfare) and operations centres for
> controlling the fighters. In addition the fighters
> need a series of suitably located military airfields
> with   hardened   runways,   airfield   defences,
> comprehensive   communications,   maintenance   support
> facilities, magazines, hardened fuel tanks, and
> domestic facilities. An adequate logistic support
> system to sustain them in combat is also necessary.'27

6.105   The size and capability of our air defence should be determined by both the nature and probability of the threat and the *vulnerability of our national defence infrastructure to* attack from the air. While the air threat may be low, a well coordinated strike against key targets in Australia could cripple our defence capacity. This suggests that Australia's air defences, particularly those protecting our deterrent forces, should be well established in peacetime. The provision of this kind of capability across the whole of Australia however represents a large and expensive task which we may not be able to afford. These contra-pressures have been recognised by the Department of Defence which acknowledged that

'Any use of air power against Australia is likely to be confined primarily to the north and, in lesser contingencies, to be limited, sporadic and dispersed. Nevertheless, dispersed air intrusions would be extremely difficult to counter and the task of providing a credible air defence system for the continent is formidable. In the ultimate, an enemy prepared to use air power against Australia, and prepared to risk escalatory consequences, could place heavy demands upon us.'[28]

Australia's Current Air Defence Capabilities

6.106   The surveillance and early warning elements of Australia's air defence capabilities were described earlier in this chapter. They are presently limited to two air transportable point air defence systems. The inadequacy of these systems to meet the national air defence need is generally recognised, and the RAAF is continuing to develop new concepts based on wide area surveillance and integrated command and control systems. These activities include the development of over-the-horizon radar, the

examination of the use of airborne early warning and control aircraft and the exercising of joint air defence operation centres in the defence of major airfields.

6.107   The primary responsibility for air defence rests with the Tactical Fighter Force, presently equipped with the Mirage, but shortly to begin replacement with the F/A-18 Hornet. The Department of Defence pointed out in its submission that the F/A-18 currently represents the world's highest technology and capability in its field. It further asserted that the substantial investment made on the F/A-18

> '...is justified for Australia essentially on the basis of the fundamental nature of the air defence need, and of the aircraft's expected operational life of more than 20 years.'[29].

6.108   The basic air defence capability is supplemented by Army's low-level and very low-level surface-to-air missile systems (based on Rapier and Redeye missiles) which can contribute to point defence. A replacement for the Redeye missile is being evaluated where potential contenders include Stinger, Mistral, Blowpipe, Javelin and the Swedish RBS-70 missile.

6.109   The Department acknowledges that Australia's capabilities for airspace security and defence 'are currently very limited but are developing such that, by the late 1980s, they should provide a sound defence posture for our perceived strategic circumstances.'[30]

6.110   The Committee notes that in addition to its air defence role, the Tactical Fighter Force is also required to contribute to Australia's strategic strike and interdiction capability,

to maritime defence and to provide close air support to our ground forces. This raises the question of whether all these roles can be adequately performed with a relatively small number of, albeit high-performance, aircraft. In line with focusing on developing Australia's deterrent posture and forces in peacetime, the Committee considers that the use of the F/A-18 in a long-range interdiction role within Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest, is of prime importance.

6.111   The Committee considers that Australia's national air defence system is inadequate; our radar and sensor systems are extremely limited, there is no overall system for controlling and coordinating our current fighter assets, our advanced airfields are presently located primarily on the east coast and our surface-to-air missile capabilities are restricted to two sub-units capable of providing only limited point defence. While recognising that the cost of developing a complete and fully integrated national air defence system in peacetime is presently beyond our means, the Committee considers that at least the basic framework of such a system should be established now in order to develop effective procedures for air defence and to practice them. The system should be based on the surveillance and early warning system described earlier but should also incorporate a series of air defence control centres which are linked together via a data communications network. Consideration should also be given at this stage to identifying special purpose fighters or interceptors and/or surface-to-air missile systems, which could be integrated into the overall air defence system as the strategic circumstances dictated.

Discussion

6.112   From the foregoing, it is clear that all of the broad functional capabilities described - intelligence, surveillance,

strategic strike and interdiction, maritime defence, land warfare and air defence – are relevant to the defence of Australia and they all could be required either now or at some stage in the future. It is also clear that Australia's present force structure suffers from a number of serious deficiencies in these functional areas. The principal weaknesses found by the Committee were:

    a.   the lack of a long-range integrated surveillance and early warning capability;

    b.   the absence of a national air defence system; and

    c.   an inadequate strategic command and control system.

6.113   Other important deficiencies in Australia's present force structure were:

    a.   Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest is inadequately mapped and charted;

    b.   the information on Australia's national infrastructure is incomplete;

    c.   Australia's maritime defence forces are thinly spread and they have inadequate protection against air and submarine attack;

    d.   the Operational Deployment Force is inadequately manned and equipped and has insufficient air transport support to meet all of its deployment response times;

    e.   Australia's land forces lack a close air support or aerial fire support capability, and have inadequate battlefield surveillance facilities. As a general rule, they are thinly spread, undermanned and under-equipped;

    f.   Army's reserve stocks of ammunition, weapons and spare parts are inadequate, and, apart from elements of the Special Air Services Regiment and the Operational Deployment Force, its operational readiness is very low; and

    g.   Australia's preparations for civil defence and civilian support of our defence posture are ill-defined and greatly neglected.

6.114   The Committee recognises that it would be difficult to
eliminate all these deficiencies in a short period of time. There
is a need therefore to assign a higher priority to the
development of some functional capabilities over others, without
undermining Australia's overall defence capacity. For the reasons
that have been stated earlier in this Report, the Committee
considers that preference should be given to Australia's
deterrent posture and strategy. This would mean concentrating on
developing or refining the following functional capabilities and
forces:

    a.   finalising the mapping and charting of
Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest
and the collection of information required for
the national infrastructure directory;

    b.   establishing a fully integrated surveillance and
early warning system which groups together those
assets required for the surveillance of
Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest.
The system should include our present P3 Orion
and Patrol Boat forces;

    c.   establishing the organisational framework for a
national air defence system which links into the
surveillance and early warning system;

    d.   grouping our present strategic strike and
long-range interdiction forces together as part
of a single functional command tasked with the
responsibility of deterring intermediate- and
high-level threats to Australia's security. This
force would include Australia's present F-111
and Oberon forces, and our projected Tactical
Fighter Force based on the F/A-18;

    e.   establishing a ready reaction force of brigade
group size based on the Operational Deployment
Force, with its own integral tactical air
transport and tasked with meeting low level
threats to Australia's security; and

    f.   establishing a vanguard defence force based on
the 1st Australian Division and tasked with
containing and defeating an initial enemy
lodgement within Australia's Area of Principal
Defence Interest.

6.115   All these capabilities already exist to some degree and apart from surveillance and early warning they would not require significant additional resources to be developed to a relatively advanced stage. The principal changes from Australia's current approach to defence are that:

   a.   as mentioned, the primary emphasis would be on developing our deterrent *forces with lesser* priority being given to defence, other than defence against low level threats; and

   b.   the capabilities would generally be developed and grouped along broad functional rather than single-Service lines and the functional elements would generally be linked within an overall, strategic C^3 structure;

6.116   The functional arrangement that would apply is shown in figure 6.1. The initial concentration on the development of forces for Australia's deterrent role would improve, and give greater credibility to, Australia's defence posture. It would also provide time for Australia's defence planners to analyse and establish an appropriate framework for its maritime, air and land defence strategies and forces which are presently seriously deficient. The most appropriate command structure to support this breakup is discussed in the following chapter.

Figure 6.1 : Proposed Functional Breakup of
Operational Capabilities within
the Australian Defence Force

END NOTES

CHAPTER SIX

1.   Department of Defence, _Submission_, pS12

2.   Department of Defence, _Submission_, ppS12-13

3.   Department of Defence, _Additional Evidence_, letter
        dated 10 May 1984 (PC 83/9716), para 8

4.   Department of Defence, _Additional Evidence_, letter
        dated 10 May 1984 (PC 83/9716), para 9

5.   Department of Defence, _Additional Evidence_, letter
        dated 10 May 1984 (PC 83/9716), para 16

6.   Department of Defence, _Additional Evidence_, letter
        dated 10 May 1984 (PC 83/9716), para 3

7.   Department of Defence, _Submission_, pS14

8.   _Evidence_, 2 May 1980, pp267-8

9.   Department of Defence, _Submission_, pS14

10.   Kim C. Beazley, _A Review of Australia's Peacetime
        Coastal Surveillance and Protection Arrangements_, 19
        December 1983, p4.5

11.   _Defence Report 1982-83_, p19

12.   Department of Defence, _Submission_, pS15

13.   Department of Defence, _Submission_, pS16

14.   _An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force_,
        p51

15.   I.M. Speedy, 'Mobilisation of the Navy', in Desmond
        Ball and J.O. Langtry (eds), _Problems of Mobilisation
        in Defence of Australia_, Phoenix Defence Publications,
        1980, p74

16.   Department of Defence, _Submission_, pS17

17.   Department of Defence, _Submission_, pS18

18.   Major General J.D. Stevenson, _Submission_, ppS108-9

19.   Major General J.D. Stevenson, _Submission_, pS112

20.   Robert O'Neill, 'Australia's Strategic Options for the 1980s', SDSC Working Paper No.30, Australian National University, Canberra, 12 November 1980, p22

21.   Robert O'Neill, 'Australia's Strategic Options for the 1980s', p23

22.   See Colonel J.O. Langtry, Submission, ppS62-66

23.   Colonel J.O. Langtry, Submission, pS62

24.   Major General J.D. Stevenson, Submission, pS110

25.   Major General J.D. Stevenson, Submission, pS113

26.   Commander J.A. Robertson, Submission, pS286

27.   Commander J.A. Robertson, Submission, pS288

28.   Department of Defence, Submission, pS21

29.   Department of Defence, Submission, p21

30.   Department of Defence, Submission, pS22

CHAPTER SEVEN

COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

7.1   In its submission to the inquiry, the Department of Defence defines several key terms. 'Command' is defined as:

> 'The authority which a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over his subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organising, directing, co-ordinating, and <u>controlling</u> military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.'<u>(emphasis added)</u>

7.2   The phrase 'command and control' is not defined in the submission, but two aspects of control, administrative and operational, are described, in the following terms. 'Administrative control' is:

> 'Direction or exercise of authority over subordinates or other organisations in respect of administrative matters such as personnel management, supply, services, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organisations.'

'Operational control' is defined as:

> 'The authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by

function, time, or location, to deploy units
concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of
those units. It does not include authority to assign
separate employment of components of the units
concerned, neither does it, of itself, include
administrative or logistic control.'[1]

7.3   The lack of clarity in these definitions, and the
absence of a definition of 'command and control' (despite the
repeated use of the phrase in the submission itself), did not
assist the Committee's examination of the effectiveness of the
Australian Defence Force's arrangements for command and control.
For the purposes of avoiding ambiguity, therefore, this chapter
proceeds from the precision of the Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary (on Historical Principles). From this, to command is
'to order, enjoin, bid with authority or influence', and to
control is 'to check or verify, and hence to regulate'.[2]

7.4   The command and control arrangements for the Australian
Defence Force, therefore, are those arrangements through which
authority over the ADF and its elements is ordered and exercised,
and the manner and method by which that authority is checked and
regulated.

7.5   Authority over the exercise of military forces will by
definition vary in its span of application, from the direction of
strategic defence at national level, to the direction and
management of tactical manoeuvre units at sea, on land or in the
air. This chapter deals with the system of command and control
within the Australian Defence Force. It begins with a brief
historical review of higher command arrangements as they evolved
during the war in the Pacific, principally as they affected the
Australian Army, and which highlights a number of principles
relevant to an examination of the present command and control
arrangements for the Australian Defence Force. It goes on to
examine the current ADF system of command and the merits of a
joint service command system, and examines the systems of

command and control adopted by Canada and the United States. The machinery for the development and implementation of national security policy is discussed in Chapter Eight.

**Australia in the Pacific War: Some Observations on the
Higher Command Structure**

7.6   Australia's lack of defence preparedness for World War Two has been well documented. But it was not simply the lack of preparedness in the Services which was evident. The necessary machinery for higher direction of national defence, despite official pronouncements to the contrary, was barely adequate two years after Australia had entered the war. By the time Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and Australia faced a direct threat to its security, many Australians were disturbed at the manner in which national defence was being co-ordinated and directed. Echoing these views, in a debate on international affairs in the House of Representatives on 16 December 1941, Mr Archie Cameron attacked the higher defence management structure:

> '... some time after the outbreak of war, we heard a great deal about that blessed word 'co-ordination' ... Every minute spent by Ministers conferring in the Advisory War Council with ex-Ministers is a minute wasted. At this time, we want, not discussion, but decisions, and it is impossible to get quick and effective decisions from committees. From them we only get postponements and compromises. No country can fight a war successfully by compromise. Wars are conducted by commanders, not committees.'[3]

7.7   By March 1942, the situation in the Pacific theatre had changed considerably. The first enemy attack ever on the Australian mainland had occurred with the bombing of Darwin on 19 February 1942 - this was followed by a further six raids on

Darwin and raids on Katherine, Derby, Broome and Wyndham. The
Japanese had occupied Rabaul and Lae, and were pressing on
towards Port Moresby, with pressure also heavily applied to
Kupang and Dilli on the island of Timor.

7.8   Referring to these events, Prime Minister John Curtin
greeted 'with pride and intense satisfaction' the appointment of
General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander of a new, unified
Allied Command in the Pacific. Curtin informed the House on 25
March 1942 that the Australian 'service advisory machinery' would
continue to be the Chiefs of Staff Committee, acting as 'the
general advisers to War Cabinet, except where, on the highest
strategical questions, the supreme or the local commanders may be
consulted.' Under the Supreme Commander there were to be local
commanders for RAN and Australian Army elements - RAAF elements
were already under command of General Brett, an officer of the
United States Air Force. Curtin went on to assert his
Government's view that the proposed command structure should be
uncomplicated, and act to help, not hinder, a quick decision.[4]

7.9   Events of 1942 were to show that, in terms of
international strategy, the appointment of MacArthur as Supreme
Commander was instrumental in turning back the southern Japanese
thrust through New Guinea. But Curtin never disguised the fact
that the Australian Government had effectively surrendered an
element of national sovereignty in assigning its forces to a
foreign, albeit an Allied, commander. In December 1942, after
reviewing recent progress in the Pacific war, the Prime Minister
acknowledged recent public discussion on 'the machinery for
operational control in the Pacific', among other aspects. He
conceded that the war's grand strategy, vis-a-vis the British
Empire and the United States, was determined by the Combined
British and American Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He also
agreed that his Government, acting with War Council concurrence,
had approved MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander,

'responsible for operational strategy to the Chief of Staff of the United States of America Army', and had assigned to MacArthur's command the 'combat forces of the Australian Navy, Army and Air Force.' In a key section of his address to the House, Curtin referred to both the unusual nature of the command arrangements and also his Government's view that these arrangements best facilitated the Australian contribution to the defeat of Japan:

> 'When the Australian Government agreed to this unique set-up under which it surrendered a part of its sovereignty and placed its defence forces under the control of a commander of an allied nation, it did so, of course, on the clear understanding that its action would facilitate the achievement of two results – first, there would be unified direction of the operations in the South-West Pacific Area under an American commander; and, secondly, the Australian Government, having placed its military resources under this commander, would have made the maximum contribution of which it was capable towards the achievement of the objectives laid down in the directive for the South-West Pacific Area. Having done so, it would have every right to expect that any additional strength required would be furnished from other sources.'[5]

7.10   These, then, were the high level command arrangements with which Australia confronted the prospect of invasion. The bulk of the Australian Army was nominally under national command, in the form of General Blamey when acting as Commander, Allied Land Forces South-West Pacific Area or in his other role as Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces (AMF). But MacArthur exercised his authority directly over Australian subordinate commanders, and rarely through either of Blamey's headquarters. He communicated directly to the Prime Minister, as he saw fit, on matters concerning the deployment of Australian forces. As the Minister for Supply and Shipping informed the House in mid 1943: 'What has been achieved has been due to the close co-operation, goodwill, mutual understanding and high regard which exist between the Prime Minister and General Douglas MacArthur.'[6]

7.11   The price of the closeness of this relationship was, in national terms, high. One observer has pointed to the stultifying effect on Australia's capacity for independent strategic assessment of the Government's, and particularly Curtin's, reliance on MacArthur.[7] Moreover, the various and sometimes conflicting responsibilities placed on General Blamey - Chief Military Adviser (in theory) to the Government, Commander-in-Chief of the AMF, and Commander, Allied Land Forces, with headquarters moving progressively from Brisbane to Port Moresby to Hollandia - were made more onerous by the power and influence of the Supreme Commander as the war progressed.

7.12   General Blamey had in fact been progressively isolated from command as the war entered its final stages. By early 1945, with uncertainty increasing over the AIF's role and particularly the intentions for the 1st Australian Corps in projected operations in the Netherlands East Indies, Curtin at last wrote to MacArthur, at Blamey's instigation. He stressed his Government's position that it was 'a matter of vital importance to the future of Australia ... that her military effort should be concentrated as far as possible in the Pacific and that it should be on a scale to guarantee her an effective voice in the peace settlement.'[20]

7.13   This strategic concern of the Australian Government was being expressed at the same time that the Government's Chief Military Adviser was reaching his limit in attempting to overcome the major difficulties imposed by the structure for high command. Clearly exasperated by MacArthur's intention to continue to disregard his command and operational control of the AIF, Blamey wrote a letter on 19 February 1945, for Curtin's attention. For the light it throws on the command and control arrangements of Australia's defence forces, after nearly four and a half years of war, it deserves close scrutiny:

'You will recall that, on the establishment of the
South-West Pacific Area, General MacArthur was
appointed Commander-in-Chief and I was appointed
Commander, Allied Land Forces. I understand my
appointment was made as part of the general agreement
for the acceptance of the set-up of the SWPA. Except
during the offensive campaign in the field in New
Guinea up to the end of 1943, I have never operated as
such ...

... The set-up of command in New Guinea is completely
unsatisfactory. It is impossible to secure reasonable
attention even to maintenance requirements ...

... It is my view that, unless the authority of the
Australian command over Australian national forces is
effectively asserted, an undesirable positon will
arise as far as the Australian troops are concerned,
by which they will be distributed under American
control and Australian national control of its forces
will be greatly weakened.

The insinuation of American control and the
elimination of Australian control has been gradual,
but I think the time has come when the matter should
be faced quite squarely, if the Australian government
and the Australian Higher Command are not to become
ciphers in the control of the Australian Military
Forces.'[9]

7.14   It has been argued by some observers that such telling
criticism by Blamey would have had greater strength and validity
if expressed two years earlier, when difficulties first became
apparent. Irrespective of the merits of this argument, it remains
a fact that, following receipt of Blamey's letter, the Australian
Prime Minister felt it necessary to seek clarification of the
command arrangements from the Supreme Commander. He wrote:

'... General Blamey was appointed Commander of the
Allied Land Forces which provided for the observance
of the principle [of national command of Australian
forces] in respect of the command of the Australian
Army. I shall be glad, therefore, if you could inform
me of the arrangement that is contemplated in regard
to the operational control and command of the First
Australian Corps in particular, and of the Australian
Land Forces in New Guinea and adjacent islands, and of

the manner in which it is proposed to ensure the
observance of the basic principle I have mentioned.'[10]

7.15   MacArthur's dominance over Curtin, and his near
contempt for Blamey's dual positions, were evident in the
frankness and crispness of his reply. He referred to his own
personal and direct command of the assault forces, and his own
co-ordinating role over his subordinate commanders. He cited the
Commanders of Allied Naval and Air Forces, but made no mention at
all of Blamey's role as Commander, Allied Land Forces. He
referred, rather, to ground forces being organised as Task
Forces, varying in organisation with the types of operation. He
condescended to advise Curtin that the appointment of the
Australian commander was for Australian determination, but then
vigorously qualified this position.

> '... [it] is considered to be impossible, however,
> from an operational viewpoint, for the officer so
> designated to be concerned with command of Australian
> troops in New Guinea and Australia. It is essential
> that the Task Force Commander remain in the field with
> his troops and that he have no other duties of any
> kind. Any other course of action would unquestionably
> jeopardise the success of the operation and impose a
> risk that could not be accepted.'[11]

7.16   As an immediate consequence, the 1st Australian Corps
came under the direct command and operational control of
MacArthur's Headquarters, leaving Blamey with only its
administrative control. As Blamey's biographer has observed: 'So
the overshadowing of the Australian Army and the humbling of
Blamey were pretty well complete.'[12]

7.17   The frustrations and seeming futility of subsequent
operations by the AIF until the end of the war have been well
documented. They are illustrated by the Balikpapan operation,
which began on 1 July 1945. MacArthur's planning envisaged the
use of the 7th and 9th Australian Divisons for phased landings at

Tarakan Island, Brunei Bay and Balikpapan. Blamey, supported by his principal commanders, recommended the withdrawal of the 7th Division from the operation, for sound tactical reasons as well as to meet the Government's increasing pressure to begin scaling down military manpower. When queried on this issue by the Australian Government, MacArthur's response stretched credibility:

> '... withdrawal would disorganise completely not only the immediate campaign but also the strategic plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.'[13]

He peremptorily requested immediate confirmation if the Australian Government wished to withdraw the 7th Divison, so that he could take the issue to Washington and London.

7.18   The operation proceeded, at a cost of 229 Australians dead and 634 wounded. Blamey's biographer summarises the situation well: 'Balikpapan's capture could do nothing to bring the end of the war closer; its chief value would be to give the 7th Division something apparently but not actually useful to do ... As always when MacArthur spoke in stern tones, the Australian Government came to heel.'[26]

7.19   This brief and selective review of aspects of the high command of Australian forces in one theatre of World War Two highlights a number of principles relevant to an examination of the current command and control arrangments for the Australian Defence Force. The requirement for co-ordinated direction at the highest central level speaks for itself. The machinery for this existed in World War Two, but its influence was overshadowed by the effects of MacArthur's personality and influence. The inherent difficulties which confronted General Blamey in attempting to be both the chief military adviser to the Government and exercising his function as Commander-in-Chief, irrespective of the additional problems generated by General

MacArthur's role, raise questions about the possible delegation
of command and control. They also highlight the requirement, in
high command, for the provision of a balanced and effective staff
through which that command may be exercised. As one observer has
noted:

> 'it is clear that the work load required for the
> effective and efficient performance of both the
> 'administrative' and 'operational' roles was too
> great, not just for Blamey but also for his staff -
> and Blamey commanded only the land forces, not the air
> and naval forces as well.'[15]

7.20   Clearly, the circumstances under which Australian
forces would now be deployed are fundamentally different from
those which prevailed before and during World War Two. It is safe
to assume that a MacArthuresque figure would never again so
dominate an Australian Government, or exercise such influence on
its strategic policy-making. Nonetheless, if the national command
structure established for World War Two was unsatisfactory in
some respects, it is relevant to ask whether the projected
structure for modern warfare has reflected lessons learnt from
past errors. It is also relevant to question the validity, in the
Australian context, of Liddell Hart's observation that:

> 'The way that decisions are reached on questions of
> strategy, tactics, organization etc. is lamentably
> unscientific ... there are no means for the
> *comprehensive analysis of past experience, and thus no*
> synthesis of adequately established data to serve as a
> guide in framing policy.'[16]

The Current System of Command of the Australian Defence Force

7.21   The formal   command   responsibilities within the
Australian Defence Force are detailed in a series of Ministerial

Directives issued under the authority of the Defence Act by the Minister for Defence. The Ministerial Directive issued to the CDFS, in the relation to the command of operations, states, inter alia, that:

> '1. ... subject to the control of the Minister, you are to command the Defence Force.
>
> 2. Under normal circumstances you are to exercise your command through the Chiefs of Staff, using appropriate staff channels or through the appointed commander of a joint force or joint Service unit.
>
> 3. You are to be responsible to the Minister for Defence for:
>
> > a. the conduct of military operations by the Defence Force;
> >
> > b. ensuring the effectiveness of military plans, training and organisation, the effectiveness of the Defence Force in the conduct of joint operations and the standard of discipline, morale and health of the Force;
> >
> > ...
> >
> > d. ensuring that the exercise of command within the Defence Force is within approved policies;...'[17]

7.22   The Department of Defence has also stated that under the Defence Act, the CDFS and the Secretary of the Defence Department are jointly given the responsibility for 'the administration of the Defence Force except with respect to matters falling within the command of the Defence Force by the CDFS or the command of an arm of the Defence Force by the Chief of Staff of that arm of the Defence Force, or any other matter specified by the Minister.'[18]

7.23   Administration is defined as 'the management and execution of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy: primarily in the fields of logistics and personnel management'[19]. The definition of 'Command' also includes these

broad functions. It is clear therefore that there is an overlap in the defined responsibilities of the CDFS and the Secretary which stem from ambiguities in the terms 'command' and 'administration'. This overlap provides for a potential conflict of interest between the two parties and could undermine the ability of the CDFS to 'command' the Australian Defence Force.

7.24   The Minister for Defence has also assigned certain command responsibilities to the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services. These are also detailed in a Ministerial Directive which states, inter alia, that:

> '1.   You are the professional head of the (relevant Service).
>
> 2.   You are responsible to the Minister for Defence through the Chief of Defence Force Staff for:
>
>> a.   command of the (relevant Service) under the authority of the Chief of Defence Force Staff and subject to the provisions of the relevant Acts and Regulations, and to specific Ministerial directions. Your command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for training, organising, directing, co-ordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned duties in accordance with stated policies, directions and programmes ...;
>>
>> ...
>>
>> d.   the issue of single Service orders and the planning for, and conduct of, single Service operations;
>>
>> e.   the provision of forces from your Service for assignment to joint operations;
>>
>> f.   consultation with the Chief of Defence Force Staff on major matters relating to Service organisation, training, and operational deployments and on anything

> with international aspects or matters
> which would significantly affect the
> operational efficiency or morale of your
> Service; ...'[20]

7.25   The ability of the CDFS to command the Australian
Defence Force is thus, in certain circumstances, subject to the
co-operation and collaboration of the Service Chiefs of Staff. As
will be argued shortly, this introduces further potential
conflicts of interest which complicate the chain of command and
again could restrict the CDFS in the exercise of his command
responsibilities.

7.26   Under the present command arrangements, the CDFS is
given appropriate high-level guidance by the Government. This
guidance may 'range from broad statements of longer-term strategy
and associated national defence objectives, to the close control
of the application of military force, through the use of Rules of
Engagement, in periods short of hostilities.'[21] The execution of
command would in turn be delegated as far as practicable to
subordinate commanders where 'the principle of centralised
command (direction) and decentralised control (execution) would
be followed.' The CDFS would still be required to keep the
Government continuously informed of the progress of operations,
however, as well as details of future military plans and the
resources needed to achieve the ADF objectives.

7.27   In practice, these principles of command lead to the
command and control arrangements shown in figure 7.1. Under these
arrangements, operational command of Australian forces will
normally be as follows:

> 'a.   Command of a single Service force operating
>   virtually in isolation from the other Services
>   would remain with the single Service Chief of
>   Staff concerned, who would be responsible to
>   CDFS for conduct of the operation.

Figure 7.1: Current Arrangements for ADF Command

Note: Command Directives would limit the level of command of
assigned forces — ie, operational command, operational control,
or "in support" — thus providing great flexibility to CDFS.

Source: Department of Defence, Submission, p 539

b.   Command   of   a   joint   operation   where
        circumstances or reasons existed for the CDFS
        to exercise command direct to the commander,
        would be effected by the appointment of a Joint
        Force Commander.

c.   Other joint operations would be commanded by a
        commander responsible to the CDFS through a
        designated Chief of Staff.'22

7.28   It can be seen therefore that while overall command of
the Defence Force is vested in the CDFS, in peacetime this
authority is exercised via the Service Chiefs of Staff through
the single-Service chains of command (these were described in
Chapter Three).

7.29   During operations, the overall command arrangements can
take two forms. In the case where the operational force comes
from one Service or is predominantly single Service-oriented
(so-called 'joint operations'), command continues to be exercised
via the appropriate Service Chief of Staff. Where significant
elements of two or more Services are required (so-called 'joint
force operations'), the CDFS can group them under a designated
Joint Force Headquarters. In this case the Joint Force Commander
would be responsible only to the CDFS and would have no command
links to the Service Chiefs of Staff.

7.30   The   establishment   of   a   Joint   Force,   and   the
implementation of the command and control arrangements to apply,
would follow a directive issued by the CDFS. The normal practice
would be to assign units from the Services to the Joint Force
Headquarters either to carry out specific tasks or for the
duration of the operations. The level of the command
responsibilities and the appropriate delegation of authority
would be expressed in terms of a number of standard definitions
that have been adopted by Australia and its major allies. These
various   delegations   of   authority   include   'command'

'administrative control' and 'operational control', which were defined at the start of this chapter, as well as:

a.   **Full Command** . The military authority and responsiblity of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense.

b.   **Operational Command.** The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include administrative command or logistical responsiblity.

c.   **Technical Control.** The term 'technical control' is defined as: 'the specialized or professional guidance and direction exercised by an authority in technical matters.'

7.31   The Joint Force itself will often be made up of discrete Service components, each headed by a 'component commander' who would act as the senior Service adviser to the Joint Force Commander. While component commanders may be subject to the operational control of the Joint Force Commander, they will often have administrative and logistic responsibilties to their own Service Chiefs of Staff.

7.32   As mentioned in Chapter Three, Australia has no standing joint forces or joint force headquarters, although there is the nucleus of a Maritime Headquarters located in Garden Island, Sydney. The Maritime Headquarters is activated during

major operations and provides a facility for the control of RAN
and RAAF forces in joint exercises or other joint operations.
Navy is planning to construct a new Maritime Command Centre at
HMAS Kuttabul. The Centre will combine the functions of the Fleet
Headquarters, Fleet Communications Centre, Fleet Operations
Centre and the Maritime Headquarters.

Australian Defence Force C^3 System

7.33   The system of command and control within the Australian
Defence Force is based on a number of discrete command centres
which are linked together via a communications network. They
include the interim ADF Command Centre (Canberra), CNS' War Room
(Canberra), small operations rooms for the CGS and CAS
(Canberra), the Fleet Operations Centre (Sydney), Maritime
Headquarters (dormant at Garden Island, Sydney), and Headquarters
of the Air Officer Commanding Operational Command (Penrith, NSW,
which is also the back-up ADF Command Centre).

7.34   The Department of Defence in its submission stated that
the support systems provided within these command centres are
'generally based on the practices developed during World War II',
but 'embryonic computer-based systems have been introduced as
test beds with which to gain the experience necessary for the
more extensive introduction of modern technology for command
support.' The submission further noted that:

        'Strategic analysis has pointed to a longer term
        objective to develop an Australian command system
        which is capable of providing centralised command of
        all Defence Force operations in our neighbourhood. The
        current higher level command arrangements for the ADF
        are being developed to identify the framework of a

command and control system, including interoperability
standards, which would meet the needs of the ADF and
within which the Services could further develop their
own single Service systems.'[23]

7.35   An outline of the overall communications linking the
CDFS with his subordinate commanders in both peace and during an
operational deployment is given in Figure 7.2. The Services each
have responsibility for tactical communications in support of
their own operations and for the provision of strategic
communications between formation headquarters and the Department
of Defence. Where there is an overlap in responsibilities, the
Services share responsibilities in accordance with agreed joint
Service doctrine.

7.36   At present, Australia's strategic communications are
provided by the Defence Communications Network (DEFCOMMNET) which
provides low speed telegraph and record traffic only. The
DEFCOMMNET is to be replaced in the mid 1980s by the Defence
Integrated Secure Communications Network (DISCON) which is a high
speed, multi-mode network linking operational commanders and
single service and Defence officials and planners, via secure
voice, telegraph, data and facsimile.

7.37   A number of submissions to the inquiry have suggested
that the present command arrangements for the Australian Defence
Force are unduly complex and they do not adequately relate to our
current and likely future operational environment. The Australia
Defence Association argued for example that:

'If a project had been mounted to devise the most
complex, inappropriate and wasteful command
organisation for the ADF, it could hardly have come up
with anything much different from what is in
existence. It bears no relation to the demands of
modern war, the strategic environment or efficiency.
It defers far too much to the traditional ethos of
independent and often mutually hostile forces.'[24]

Figure 7.2 : Outline of Current Strategic and Tactical Communications Arrangements

7.38   The Association supported the notion that the ADF
should have a single commander, who is answerable to the
Government of the day through the Minister for Defence. It
argued, however, that:

> '... the sharing of important elements of command with
> the Secretary, Department of Defence through the
> shared responsibility for administration hinders the
> proper exercise of the command function by the CDFS.
> Similarly, the vesting of command of each of the
> Services in a Chief of Staff who has direct access to
> the Minister is contrary to the basic principles of
> command. As long as the Chiefs of Staff can exercise
> the reality of independent command, there can be no
> Australian Defence Force, merely a group of three
> Services which can and do trade with each other for
> resources and influence.'25

7.39   The Association further argued that the trend in modern
warfare has been towards joint rather than single-Service
operations and that under such circumstances 'the concept of a
single Service commander has no justification.' The Association
did not support the unification of the Defence Force but
suggested that the single Service commands be replaced by joint
commands. Two joint Service commands were suggested: a Maritime
Command and a Home Command. Units would be allocated to these
commands on the basis of Government policy, and 'allowing the
switch of most types of units between commands according to the
dictates of the strategic situation.'26

7.40   Under these revised command arrangements, the
individual Services would continue to be responsible for
recruitment, training and equipment definition. While the Chief
of Staff would remain the professional head of his Service, he
would have no command responsibilities in operations. The
Department of Defence would generally retain its present role but
would lose the shared responsibility (with the CDFS) for
administration.

7.41   A further argument in favour of establishing a functional command system is that it would preclude the need to restructure Australia's force structure either at the commencement of, or during, hostilities, with all the potential problems that that would entail. As Robert O'Neill has observed:

> 'Each Service can ... readily make contributions to a joint force if required to do so. However, the joint force structure into which such contributions would have to be fitted does not exist, and so if the Australian services are to be used jointly to defend Australia, there would be appreciable delays until the framework was set up.'[27]

7.42   The need to establish at the outset new command structures and to practice these joint forces prior to committing them to operations could undermine the credibility of our defence posture. As Robert O'Neill warned, while Australia could expect some warning time for both intermediate and higher-level threats,

> '... given a determined enemy, Australia would have no time to waste in this situation. Furthermore, since the outcome of such a conflict could well determine the continued existence of Australia as an independent and free nation, it would be inadvisable to enter a race for defence preparedness with the handicap of a non-existent force structure when one can be created for quite small financial costs. [Moreover], ... the deterrent value of a well organized and proficient Defence Force must also be given special emphasis.'[28]

7.43   O'Neill suggested that an appropriate functional command structure can be determined directly from the nature of Australia's security problems. In essence, these problems can be grouped into three categories: first, those accompanying the maintenance of sovereignty over Australian territories, coastal waters and adjoining economic zone; second, those of defending Australia and Australian interests against low level contingencies, and third, those of repelling major raids,

incursions or invasion. These in turn suggest that Australia's overall operational command structure could be subdivided into at least the following:

   a.   **Continental Defence Command,** consisting of ground, air and light naval elements, and responsible for the defence of Australia's continental land and air space and its coastal surrounds; and

   b.   **Maritime Defence Command,** consisting of long-range sea and air forces and which would have responsibilities covering the Indian, Pacific and Southern oceans, together with the seas around the archipelagoes to the north of Australia.

7.44   These two major commands could be further subdivided into smaller commands having responsibilities for specific geographical areas. O'Neill also suggested that Australia could have separate Coastal and Retaliatory Strike Commands. The operational commands would be supported by a supporting element made up of a Logistics Command, a Training Command and a Reserve Forces Command. O'Neill did not rule out the possibility that these supporting commands could be largely single-Service.

> 'The operational Commands would be unlikely to have to meet a requirement for furnishing a purely single service force. However the support commands would include not only the backing for the tri-service operational Commands but also that necessary for each individual service to maintain its skills, personnel and equipment.'29

7.45   The proponents of a system of functional commands have generally acknowledged that there would be some difficulties associated with implementing such a proposal. These difficulties stem from the inevitable loss of some single Service independence and a weakening of the authority of the individual Service Chiefs of Staff. But there is also general agreement that the benefits of such a change would outweigh any disadvantages. Robert

O'Neill, for example, argued that in view of the nature of
Australia's defence problems and the steps already taken to
integrate the Services into the Department of Defence, a transfer
of authority from the Service Chiefs to both the CDFS and to the
heads of the proposed functional commands 'seems wholly
appropriate'. Moreover:

> 'The individual service Chiefs of Staff would still
> have important functions to perform - they would be
> the professional heads of their services and would be
> responsible for their training and administration in
> all of the many and vital single service aspects which
> would remain as the foundation of the Defence Force.
> However they would not be the commanders of their
> services and would have to function within the scope
> of Defence Force policy, much as the head of a corps
> has to function within the framework of Army
> policy.'30

7.46   A second difficulty with establishing a functional
command system along the lines suggested by O'Neill and others is
that it could lead to the demise or downgrading of the Air Force.
While the bulk of the RAN would be in the Maritime Defence
Command and all of the Army would be in the Continental or Home
Defence Command, the RAAF would be divided between the two.
O'Neill himself recognised this problem, suggesting that:

> "While this division of the RAAF may be founded on
> logical, functional arguments, there would undoubtedly
> be others which are relevant. It may prove necessary,
> and not just for purposes of placating service pride,
> to add a separate Air Defence Command which would
> overlap the other two operational commands. It is
> difficult to see how this could be done without
> seriously weakening the functional ability of the
> other two commands to meet their responsibilities but
> it may yet prove possible.'31

7.47   A further, related, problem would be the overall effect
that a major re-organisation could have on the morale of the
Services,   particularly in view of the earlier upheavals
associated with the involvement in Vietnam and the implementation

of the Tange reforms. On this last question, the Committee notes the finding of the Utz Committee that the revised structure of the Department of Defence is now generally accepted within the defence community, and so considers that it is appropriate and consistent with the earlier Tange reforms to examine these questions.

7.48   For its part, while acknowledging that elements of the 'ADF command, control and communications systems and facilities are not sufficient for the operational needs of a modern defence force,'[32] the Department of Defence generally considers that both the existing joint force doctrine and the command arrangements that would apply in both peace and war are adequate and should not be changed.

7.49   While recognising that a functional command system has a number of attractions, departmental officers have argued that it also has a number of serious weaknesses. First, in view of the uncertainty over the threats to Australia's security, it would be both difficult and foolish to adopt an organisational structure which sought to counter a particular threat or threat scenario. There would always be the chance that the revised arrangements would be wrong and that Australia would have to adjust its force structure at the beginning of hostilities anyway. This argument has also been put by the RSL, which stated that:

> 'The command structure for forces in the field depends on the nature of the threat. A major difficulty facing Australian defence planners is that the potential threats to Australia are not specific: they are diffuse and, accordingly, the way in which command arrangements for future operations are structured cannot be specific. Current Australian Defence Force policy is that, as a threat develops, forces will be structured and deployed in reaction. The command structure best suited for those forces will be determined at the time and implemented using, to the greatest extent, existing subordinate headquarters of the three Services as required.'[33]

7.50   According to this view the primary features of
Australia's command arrangements should be flexibility and
adaptability, and it is suggested that these are best provided by
Australia's present approach to joint force operations and
command and control.

7.51   A second argument against a functional command system
is that it would be expensive, requiring manpower and resources
that the three Services can ill afford. Furthermore, the
allocation of resources in this way would reduce the flexibility
of the Services. As the Assistant CDFS put it to the Committee:

> 'If our total resources of naval and air assets were
> larger, I could see some advantage in having a
> permanent maritime command established. The
> disadvantage in our present circumstances in so doing
> is that if, for example Air Force were to allocate
> assets to a maritime commander on a permanent basis, I
> believe it would lose some flexibility in how it could
> train the residual assets it has to prepare it for a
> maritime commander. By retaining the assets under one
> control, as at present under the Air Force control,
> it has flexibility in how it can train the total
> assets and allocate them to the maritime defence
> commander when required.'34

7.52   It was further argued that the allocation of
substantial assets to a functional commander could overload him
and so reduce his ability to efficiently and effectively carry
out his tasks.

7.53   Others have suggested that while the present command
system meets our peacetime requirements very effectively, it is
not adequately structured to ensure that the officers and
operational forces of all Services are trained and
administratively prepared to undertake tasks of a joint service
nature. The dilemma over how best to structure to meet both
existing and future operational tasks has been described by Major
General Stevenson in the following terms:

> 'We cannot afford to upset a command system
> which is working effectively now for the task
> it has to meet. On the other hand we cannot
> ignore the need to prepare for the possible
> operational tasks which may arise at short
> notice which would be undertaken by joint
> forces. There is need not only to train for
> joint service operations but also to develop
> the proper attitude of mind amongst Service
> officers towards the joint service
> environment.'[35]

7.54   Major General Stevenson asserted that in order to
achieve this last objective, Australia must go beyond relying on
raising 'ad hoc' headquarters for Kangaroo series exercises every
two or three years, and establish a number of permanent joint
force headquarters. He further argued, however, that it is
important that such joint forces be established for realistic
purposes:

> 'If the ADF is to be practised continually in
> the functioning of joint HQs, even on a limited
> scale, there is a need to identify possible
> operational areas or tasks, the control of
> which would warrant the raising of a joint HQ
> to exercise command. The obvious possibilities
> are those related to operational commitments
> which may arise at short notice and to the
> regions of Australia which could be threatened
> at a low level at short notice.'[36]

Discussion

7.55   In considering the arguments for and against the
establishment of a joint service or functional command structure,
the Committee notes that there is general agreement that any
future military conflict involving Australia's armed forces is
likely to be based on joint rather than single Service
operations. There is further agreement that a joint service
command structure would be established in war and that the
Australian Defence Force needs to be well practised in joint

operations in order to facilitate the transition to this wartime structure.

7.56   The primary issue at stake therefore is whether we should move towards establishing some form of joint service command system now, or whether we can afford to wait until specific threats to Australia's security, or at least strong indications of such a threat, begin to emerge. The proponents of the latter position argue that any substantive move away from the present system of command would be costly, precipitative and unwarranted. In their view, the present system satisfies existing requirements and provides adequate flexibility and adaptability to meet any foreseeable contingency. Those who argue for the establishment of a joint service or functional command system assert that the existing single Service command structure is no longer relevant to Australia's strategic and operational circumstance. A joint service or functional structure would not be difficult or costly to implement and it would improve Australia's defence posture and state of preparedness. They acknowledge that there would be some problems in changing the present command structure, but suggest that these stem from single Service interests and they are outweighed by the benefits of such change.

7.57   On balance, the Committee considers that there are deficiencies in the present ADF command structure to meet Australia's current peacetime roles and tasks. Of particular concern to the Committee is that the command structure does not provide, in doctrine or practice, a suitable basis for meeting future operational requirements. In the case of low level threats, and probably a number of the more likely intermediate-level ones, the Committee doubts whether we would have time to establish an appropriate force and prepare it for operations. This tends to limit our ready reaction capability and so undermines our deterrent posture. This weakness was revealed in the recent Kangaroo 83 exercise where it was found that it would take about four weeks to establish a joint force

headquarters. This lead-time was considered by the Department of Defence to be unsatisfactory. The Committee notes that the Department is examining ways of maintaining at least the nucleus of a standing joint force headquarters in peacetime.[37]

7.58   The Committee further considers that the present system of developing and exercising joint service doctrine and procedures does not adequately prepare service officers for either wartime command or future staff appointments on joint force headquarters. There are presently no permanent joint operational headquarters in existence and for major exercises, the requisite joint staff are simply drawn from wherever they can be spared within other areas of the Defence Force. In the case of Kangaroo 83 for example:

> 'We took personnel from all three services ... from all round Australia, and quite obviously that is a major probem if you look at it in the larger context of handling or coping with any sort of emergency that arises with the level of manpower we have at the moment.'[38]

In addition to the problem of finding personnel to staff the headquarters, it is clear that many of these officers may be unsuitable for, or may not be fully familiar with, or practised in, joint planning procedures or the running of an operational headquarters. Such an approach is hardly conducive to establishing and maintaining a permanent capability that can be effectively utilised at short notice. The Committee considers that the best way to develop such expertise is to establish permanent headquarters and continually test them in peacetime.

7.59   The question of tasking these joint service headquarters is not seen as a major problem. They would take over many of the tasks that · are currently allotted to

the Services. Some of these tasks, such as coastal surveillance and defence against low level threats, involve more than one Service anyway. Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter Six, deterrence is an on-going peacetime task which involves elements of all three Services and can be given to a specific operational headquarters to plan for and carry out.

7.60   The Committee does not accept the argument that the organisational structure and command arrangements of our forces should be determined by the nature of the threat. Both the Canadian and United States experience shows that there is ample scope to define an operational command system in terms of the broad functional or geographical requirements of defence. These two systems are described briefly later in this chapter. Both systems utilise standing joint service commands, which reflect the broad tasks and likely wartime arrangements of the two forces, both exhibit the principles of centralised command and decentralised control, both can be readily adapted to a changing threat scenario and both provide similar flexibility to the Australian model since operational units can be re-allocated between commands.

7.61   Finally the Committee is not satisfied that a joint service command structure would require substantially more resources or that it would necessarily be any less flexible than the present structure. Because of the nature of the tasks and functions likely to be performed, the joint service headquarters would probably be of similar size and composition to the current single service operational headquarters. The Committee considers that the joint service commands would replace, rather than co-exist with, the existing single service operational commands. If required, additional staff could be drawn from the operational and logistics staff located in the Service Offices in Canberra. Each joint service command would have a number of units allocated to it in accordance with the task at hand and in line with the standard delegations of authority

described earlier in this chapter. These units could be re-allocated between commands as strategic circumstances dictated or as the tasks changed. In this respect, at least, a joint service command structure would be more flexible than the present system.

7.62   For all these reasons, the Committee believes that the command structure of the Australian Defence Force should be re-structured along joint service lines. Such a structure would be in line with the recent changes in Australia's operational environment and it would allow the Defence Force to carry out both its short and longer-term responsibilities in a more effective way. A joint service command system would bring the Services together just as they would be in war. It would facilitate the development of a unified and cohesive strategic doctrine, a joint administrative system and training policies for the defence of Australia. It would allow for the attainment of higher operational proficiency by the Services by encouraging specialisation in both regional and functional senses.

7.63   As Robert O'Neill has argued, a joint service command system would also facilitate the articulation of military strategies and the planning and development of our Defence Force structure. Such a system

> '... would assign all major parts of the services to a
> functional role in Australia's defence, simplifying
> many of the usual problems of training, identification
> of operational goals and priorities, and morale in a
> protracted period of peace. The structure...would also
> provide for constant training and exercising of
> intermediate headquarters. It would encourage greater
> standardisation of operational methods, administrative
> procedures, organisations and equipment across the
> three services. Most importantly of all, it would
> heighten the deterrent capability of the Australian
> Defence Force, raising the stakes for an enemy attack
> through minimising unpreparedness in some sectors
> which could offer some easy loopholes for a cheap
> attack.'39

An Appropriate Functional Command for the Australian Defence Force

7.64 There are clear advantages in moving towards some form of joint service command structure for the Australian Defence Force in peacetime, but it is not a simple matter to determine exactly what this structure should be. One approach was described briefly earlier in the chapter. Before returning to this option, however, it is instructive to examine two systems that have often been cited as possible models for Australia. These are the systems of command and control that operate in Canada and the United States.

Canada[40]

7.65 The outline organisation and chain of command of the Canadian Forces (CF) is shown in figure 7.3.

7.66 Since 1968, the CF have had a unified functional structure to carry out their tasks. The missions and roles of the CF are carried out by a number of functional commands operating under the control of National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa. Canada also maintains forces in Europe as part of NATO, as well as contributing to certain peace-keeping tasks.

7.67 Each major functional command comprises a number of regular and reserve operational units located at different bases throughout Canada and overseas, and supported by appropriate supply installations, training facilities, communication facilities and so on. The functional commands are Maritime Command, Mobile Command, Air Command and Canadian Forces Communications Command.

Figure 7.3:   Canadian Command Arrangements

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                    ┌─────────────────────────────────────┐
                    │  Minister for National Defence (MND) │
                    └─────────────────────────────────────┘
                                     │
             ┌───────────────────────┴──────────────────┐
   ┌──────────────────────┐              ┌────────────────────────────┐
   │ Chief of Defence     │              │ Deputy  │ Department of     │
   │ Staff (CDS)          │              │ Minister│ National Defence  │
   ├──────────────────────┤              └────────────────────────────┘
   Canadian Forces │ National Defence
   (CF)            │ HQ (NDHQ)
   └──────────────────────┘
```

| Maritime Command | Canadian Forces Europe | Mobile Command | Canadian Forces Training System | Air Command | Northern Region |

To provide an operationally
ready maritime force to meet
Canada's defence commitments
as follows:

— Surveillance, control and
defence of Canadian
territorial waters,
adjacent ocean areas, and
the Arctic Archipelago

— defence of Northern
America in co-operation
with US forces

— contribution to NATO
collective defence
measures

To maintain combat
ready land forces to
meet Canada's defence
commitments

To provide combat ready
air forces to meet Canada's
defence commitments.
AIRCOM is also assigned
regional responsibilities
for Prairie Region

Canadian
Forces Communication
Command

To provide all strategic
communications for DND.
Operate and maintain:

— several narrative
message networks

— various general purpose
and dedicated voice systems

— HF radio spt for SAR

— Communication research
support.

Extracted from : Defence 83; Department of Defence,
Ottawa, Canada, 1983.

Maritime Command (MARCOM)

7.68   The role of Maritime Command is to provide an operationally ready maritime force to meet Canada's defence commitments, including:

    a.   surveillance, control and defence of Canadian territorial waters, adjacent ocean areas, and the Arctic Archipelago;

    b.   defence of North America, in cooperation with United States forces;

    c.   contribution to NATO collective defence measures; and

    d.   assistance to the United Nations and other international bodies.

7.69   Maritime Command comprises destroyer and submarine forces plus a number of support ships and facilities. It has under its operational control a Maritime Air Group which provides surveillance and anti-submarine capabilities.

Mobile Command (FMC)

7.70   The Mobile Command is required to maintain combat ready land forces to meet Canada's defence commitments. It is organised into five categories, comprising operational formations and units, training establishments, supporting bases, reserves, and regional units.

7.71   The FMC's operational units comprise two brigade groups (light infantry forces), a Special Service Force (SSF) and a Tactical Air Group which is a formation of Air Command but is under the operational control of the Commander FMC.

7.72   The FMC also has a large number of militia headquarters
and units organised on an area basis. The role of the militia is
to enhance the deterrence capability of the Regular Force and to
support it in all its operational tasks and activities.

Air Command (AIRCOM)

7.73   Air Command is divided into six functional air groups
reporting to a central headquarters in Winnipeg. The functional
air groups command 16 bases and 21 stations across Canada. The
resources of these bases, stations and units include operational
air fields, training schools, supply installations and
communications facilities. The commander AIRCOM delegates
operational command to the commanders of the air groups over
their assigned resources, but AIRCOM retains responsibility for
flight safety, as well as air doctrine and standards relating to
flying operations throughout the CF. The six air groups are:

        a.   Fighter Group, which provides combat-ready
                tactical fighter and ground environment forces
                required to enforce sovereignty over Canadian
                airspace, support operations and training by
                the FMC and MARCOM and meet Canada's
                commitments to NORAD and NATO.

        b.   Maritime Air Group, which provides combat-ready
                maritime air forces for operational employment
                under the control of Maritime command;

        c.   Tactical Air Group, which provides combat ready
                tactical aviation forces for operational
                employment in support of operations and
                training of Mobile Command;

        d.   Air Transport Group, which provides the CF with
                air transport and search and rescue
                capabilities to meet national goals and
                objectives as well as NATO and NORAD
                commitments;

e.   Training Group, which trains aircrew and other
       air oriented personnel to initial
       classification and trade standards and other
       training as directed by the Commander AIRCOM;
       and

f.   Air Reserve Group, which provides support for
       Regular Forces at AIRCOM bases and units.

Canadian Forces Communication Command (CFCC)

7.74   CFCC provides all strategic communications for the
Department of National Defence.

United States[41]

7.75   The outline organisation of the United States National
Military Command System is shown in figure 7.4. The operational
control of United States combat forces is assigned to nine
unified and specified commands. The chain of command runs from
the President to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the unified and specified
commanders in chief. The Service departments are not in the
operational chain of command.

7.76   A unified command comprises forces from two or more
Services, has a broad and continuing mission and is normally
organised on a geographical basis. The current unified commands
are US European Command, Pacific Command, Atlantic Command, US
Southern Command, US Readiness Command and US Central Command.

7.77   The commander of a unified command has responsibilities
to:

a.   Maintain the security of his command and
       protect the United states, its possessions, and
       bases against attack or hostile incursion;

b.   Carry out assigned missions, tasks, and
       responsibilities; and

Figure 7.4 : United States National Military Command Structure

c. Assign tasks to, and direct coordination among, his subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his assigned missions.

d. Communicate directly with:

(1) The Chiefs of Services on uni-Service matters as he deems appropriate.

(2) JCS on other matters including the preparation of strategic and logistic plans, strategic and operational direction of his assigned forces, conduct of combat operations, and any other necessary function of command required to accomplish his mission.

(3) SECDEF, in accordance with applicable directives; and

e. Promptly advise JCS of significant events in his area of responsibility, particularly those which could create national or international repercussions.

7.78   As operational commander of forces under his command, the commander of a unified command is also authorised to:

a. Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the actions of assigned forces;

b. Conduct joint training exercises, as required, to achieve effective employment of the forces of his command. In accordance with doctrine for unified operations and training as established by the JCS, the commander will establish such training policies for joint operations as are required to accomplish the mission;

c. Exercise directive authority within his command in the field of logistics;

d. Establish such personnel policies as required to ensure uniform standards of military conduct;

e. Exercise direct authority over all elements of his command in accordance with policies and procedures established by higher authority, in

> relationships with foreign governments, including the Armed Forces thereof, and other agencies of the US Government;

f. Establish plans, policies, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of his command;

g. Review the recommendations bearing on the budget from the component commanders to their parent Military Departments to verify that the recommendations are in agreement with his plans and programs; and

h. Participate in the development and acquisition of his command and control system and direct the system's operation.

7.79   A specified command also has a broad and continuing mission, but is organised on a functional basis and is normally made up of forces from a single Service. The current specified commands are the Aerospace Defense Command, Strategic Air Command and Military Airlift Command. The commander of a specified command has much the same authority and responsibilities as those given to unified commanders.

7.80   Unlike Canada, the United States maintains separate Service departments, Army, Navy and Air. The Marine Corps functions as a second armed service in the Department of Navy. Each military department is separately organised under its own civilian Secretary and functions under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of a military department is responsible for the operation of his department. The major functions of the military departments are to:

a. prepare forces and establish reserves of equipment and supplies for the effective prosecution of war, and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war;

b. maintain mobile reserve forces in readiness, properly organised, trained and equipped for employment in an emergency;

c.   organise, train and equip forces for assignment
       to Unified or Specified Commands;

d.   recommend appropriate logistic guidance to
       SECDEF;

e.   prepare and submit budgets to the SECDEF for
       their respective departments;

f.   conduct research, develop tactics, techniques
       and organisation, and develop and procure
       weapons, equipment and supplies;

g.   develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain
       bases and other installations, including lines
       of communication, and provide administrative
       and logistic support for all forces and bases;
h.   provide, as directed, such forces, military
       missions and detachments for service in foreign
       countries; and

i.   assist in training and equipping the military
       forces of foreign nations.

7.81   These alternative systems offer Australia two broad
approaches for pursuing a joint service command structure. We
could fully integrate the three Services and re-organise them
along functional or task-oriented lines, as has been done by
Canada, or we could move only part way towards this position by
establishing joint operational commands and retaining single
Service control of all the basic support functions.

7.82   In view of the nature of Australia's present defence
force structure, the uncertain strategic environment and the
strong interests within the Australian Defence Force, the
Committee considers that it would be prudent at this stage to
adopt an approach closer to that of the United States than
Canada. The Committee also considers, however, that Australia's
command structure should exhibit the important characteristics
which are common to both the United States and Canadian models
and which are not all present in our current structure. These are
that:

a. there should be a single and direct line of command between the senior military commander and his subordinate commanders in the field;

b. the system of command should be organised on the basis of providing for centralised command (direction) and decentralised control (execution);

c. operational command and control should occur along broad functional lines which either completely exclude the Services or relegates them to a place outside the chain of command; and

d. single-Service operational units should continue to 'belong' to their parent Service (or Service-oriented command) but should be able to be placed under the operational control of another command.

7.83   The Committee considers that there are two broad bases on which Australia's joint operational command structure could be established, geographical and functional. Under the first approach, the operational element of the Australian Defence Force command structure would tend to reflect the three basic geographical environments in which Australia's defence would be conducted; sea, land and air. An appropriate structure therefore could be based on the following functional commands:

a. Maritime Defence Command, comprising sea and air forces responsible for defence of Australia's maritime surrounds within Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest and beyond our land and coastal surrounds;

b. Continental Defence Command, comprising air, land and sea forces responsible for the defence of Australia's continental land space and its surrounding coastal waters. The naval assets could include the current patrol boat force and those surface vessels required for maritime defence. The air assets could include the air transport force and a close air support capability;

    c.   Air Defence Command, comprising fighter and air defence systems required for the defence of Australia's continental air space.

7.84   The possible composition and roles of these commands is shown in Table 7.1. Each of these functional commands could have within it smaller, more specialised commands such as a Strategic Strike Command or a Coastal Defence Command. They could also be divided along geographical or regional lines to facilitate control. The Maritime Defence Command, for example, could be divided into two subordinate commands, one reponsible for the eastern and southern approaches to Australia with the other covering the areas to the north and west of Australia.

7.85   One problem with the system of command just described is that it mixes current and projected tasks among and between commands. All three commands would contain some deterrent and defence forces where different elements of each command would be at different states of readiness. A way of overcoming this problem is to devise a command structure that more closely reflects the functional rather than geographical division of responsibilities. Under this approach, Australia could have two major commands as follows:

    a.   Ready Reaction Command comprising all those land sea and air elements required to meet Australia's deterrent strategy and to meet low level threats; and

    b.   Home Defence Command comprising those force elements required for the defence of Australia and its interests should deterrence fail.

A possible composition of these commands is given in Table 7.2. Again each major command could be made up of a number of smaller functional commands and they could be sub-divided along regional or geographical lines.

7.42

Table 7.1 : ADF Command System - Option 1

Command	Responsibilities	Principal Capabilities/Forces
Maritime Defence Command	Defence of Australia's maritime and airspace surrounds within Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest	Australian Submarine Squadron Australian Destroyer Squadrons Maritime Reconnaissance and Surveillance Force Strategic Strike and Long-Range Interdiction Force (1)
Continental Defence Command	Defence of Australia's land areas and coastal surrounds	Ready Reaction Force Vanguard and Home Defence Forces Australian Mine Warfare and Patrol Boat Force Australian Amphibious Squadron

Fixed and Rotary Wing Air Transport Force |
| Air Defence | Defence of Australia's continental and coastal airspace | Surveillance and Early Warning Tactical Fighter Force |

Note: (1) Belongs to Air Defence Command but placed under the operational control of Maritime Defence Command.

Table 7.2 : ADF Command System — Option 2

Command	Responsibilities	Principal Capabilities/Forces
Ready Reaction Command	Deter attack or threat of attack against Australia and its interests and counter low-level aggression within Australia's Area of Principal Defence Interest	Surveillance and Early Warning (P3 Orion, Patrol Boats) Strategic Strike and Interdiction Force (F-111, F/A-18, Oberon) Ready Reaction Force (ODF Patrol Boats, Tactical Air Transport) Vanguard Defence Force (1st Australian Division, Strategic Air Transport, Amphibious Squadron)
Home Defence Command	Defence of Australia's land, sea, and air space against intermediate and high level threats	Maritime and coastal Defence (Destroyer Squadrons, Mine Warfare Force) Home Defence Air Defence

7.86   The Committee considers that the detailed composition of Australia's joint operational command structure should be determined by the CDFS and the Department of Defence, and recommends that studies be conducted into this matter. The Committee notes that there are functional areas involving current peacetime tasks in which joint force headquarters could be established. These areas include surveillance and early warning, coastal surveillance, the deployment of the Operational Deployment Force and air defence. The Committee recommends that consideration be given to establishing permanent joint force headquarters in these areas, both to facilitate joint training and as an initial step towards the implementation of a comprehensive joint service command structure.

7.87   As mentioned earlier, modern command systems should be based on the principles of centralised command (direction) and decentralised control (execution). To properly carry out these principles, the force commander requires both adequate staff support and clearly defined and immediate access to his subordinate commanders.

7.88   The Committee considers that the present chain of command linking the CDFS and his commanders in the field is unduly complicated and subject to conflicts of interest at all levels. The CDFS has to rely on the co-operation and collaboration of the Secretary of the Defence Department and his staff in order to carry out a number of command functions. The CDFS has to exercise command over operational units in peacetime via the Service Chiefs of Staff. Commanders of joint Service units and formations can have responsibilities to both the CDFS and their respective Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs of Staff are entitled to approach the Minister for Defence either collectively or individually on matters of concern affecting their own services.

7.89.   While the potential conflicts of interest inherent in these arrangements may not be important during peacetime, they could undermine the operational efficiency of the Australian Defence Force in times of conflict. The Committee recommends removing the Service Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command. The Chiefs of Staff should remain the professional heads of their Services and they should continue to provide advice to the CDFS and the Minister on single Service matters both on an individual basis and through the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

7.90   The Committee also considers that it is important that the CDFS has sufficient staff to support him in both his command and defence administration responsibilities. The Committee notes that there has been an increase in the staff support available to the CDFS as a result of the recommendation of the Defence Review Committee. The Committee considers, however, that the present staff levels are still inadequate and they would certainly be so if a joint service command structure were established. The Committee recommends that staff support for the CDFS be investigated as part of the studies into an appropriate command structure for the Australian Defence Force. In addition, in view of Australia's on-going peacetime roles and the importance of deterrence to our overall defence posture, the Committee recommends that at least the nucleus of an Australian Defence Force Headquarters be established to exercise operational command over the Defence Force in peacetime.

CHAPTER SEVEN

END NOTES

1. These definitions, among others, are listed as 'Military Definition of Terms' in Appendix 1 to Annex B to the submission by the Department of Defence.

2. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, pages 37 and 46.

3. Australia, House of Representatives, *Debates*, 1941, Vol.169, p1092.

4. *Debates*, 1942, Vol.170, p364-365.

5. *Debates*, 1942, Vol.172, p1690.

6. *Debates*, 1943, Vol.175, p161.

7. D.M. Horner, *High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945*, Canberra, 1982, pp 434-446.

8. Horner, *High Command*, p387.

9-11 Quoted in more detail in Horner, *High Command*, pp390-393.

12. John Hetherington, *Blamey, Controversial Soldier*, p364.

13. Quoted by Hetherington, *Blamey*, p365.

14. Quoted by Hetherington, *Blamey*, p365.

15. Desmond Ball, 'The Role of the Military in Mobilisation', in F.A. Mediansky (ed), *The Military and Australia's Defence*, p79.

16. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War*, p125.

17. Department of Defence, *Submission*, pS32.

18. Department of Defence, *Submission*, pS33.

19. Department of Defence, *Submission*, pS37.

20. Department of Defence, *Submission*, pS33.

21. Department of Defence, *Submission*, pS34.

22. Department of Defence, *Submission*, pS34-5.

23. Department of Defence, *Submission*, pS36.

24. Australia Defence Association, *Submission*, ppS203.

25.   Australia Defence Association, _Submission_, ppS203-4.

26.   Australia Defence Association, _Submission_, pS204.

27.   Robert O'Neill, 'Structural Changes for a More
        Self-Reliant National Defence', Strategic and Defence
        Studies Centre Working Paper No.3, December 1975, p7.

28.   Robert O'Neill, 'Structural Changes for a More
        Self-Reliant National Defence', pp8-9.

29.   Robert O'Neill, 'Structural Changes for a More
        Self-Reliant National Defence', p12.

30.   Robert O'Neill, 'Structural Changes for a More
        Self-Reliant National Defence', p19.

31.   Robert O'Neill, 'Structural Changes for a More
        Self-Reliant National Defence', p20.

32.   Department of Defence, _Submission_, pS36.

33.   Returned Services League, _Submission_, Command and
        Control of the Australian Defence Force, p9.

34.   Rear Admiral Hudson, _Evidence_, 24 May 1984, pp67-8.

35.   Major General Stevenson, _Submission_, pS122.

36.   Major General Stevenson, _Submission_, pS120.

37.   _Evidence_, 4 June 1984, p221.

38.   _Evidence_, 4 June 1984, pp220-1.

39.   Robert O'Neill, 'Structural Changes for a More
        Self-Reliant National Defence', p23.

40.   Information taken from _Defence 83_, Department of
        Defence, Ottawa, Canada 1983.

41.   Information derived from _Defense 83_, US Government
        Printing Office, September 1983; United States Armed
        Forces Staff College Publication No.1, 'Joint Staff
        Officers Guide,' January 1982 and United States Armed
        Forces Staff College Publication No.2810, 'Organisation
        and Command Relationships', Norfolk, Virginia, August
        1982.

CHAPTER EIGHT

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY-MAKING AND THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE STRUCTURE

8.1   A central theme of this report is that Australia's
defence policies and the structure and characteristics of the
Australian Defence Force should stem from broader considerations
of our national interests and objectives. Australia's national
security concerns have moved beyond the almost exclusively
diplomatic and military pre-occupations of the 1950s and 1960s to
encompass newer areas such as trade, energy, natural resources,
immigration, refugees and human rights.

8.2   The reasons for this broad change stem principally from
the recent developments in Australia's strategic circumstances.
The range of potential pressures to which Australia could be
subjected is now much more diverse and the extent to which
Australia can confidently rely on receiving external assistance
in the event of hostilities has lessened. Australia's potential
security problems are compounded by the recent extension of our
interests through the proclamation of the 200 mile fishing zone
and the Law of the Sea Provisions, which give Australia broad
responsibility over an Exclusive Economic Zone covering the same
area - some 3 million square miles around Australia plus 400 mile
diameter circles around Cocos, Christmas, Heard and Macquarie
Islands.

8.3   The need for a more independent and self-reliant
national security posture, focussing on the defence of Australia
and its interests, raises new and challenging problems for our
defence planners, problems which are complicated by a number of
factors including continuing developments in technology, the
nature of our physical environment and renewed pressures to
contribute more to both global and regional security.

8.4   An important consequence of these changes is that
Australia's military capabilities - our ability to deter threats
to our security and to defeat those threats which are not
deterred - will be increasingly dependent on a range of
non-military factors. These include the availability of basic
resources, Australia's industrial capacity, our ability to
mobilise civilian services such as transport, communications,
construction and medicine, and the establishment of a system of
civil defence. In fact, there are probably very few of
Australia's resources which would not in some way contribute to
our overall defence capacity in war.

8.5   The coordination of such a broad range of military and
non-military elements is a complex exercise requiring both
broader capabilities and higher authority than inheres in the
Department of Defence. It is generally argued that planning and
coordination at this level requires some form of national
coordinating machinery which involves all interests, both
government and non-government.

8.6   The Utz Committee, for example, in examining the
suitability of the higher Defence organisation for a defence
emergency, or war, advised the view that:

> '...planning for national administration in the
> event of a defence emergency or war is a matter
> for serious and early consideration. However,
> given the level of national co-ordination
> encompassed in such planning, we doubt whether

> the Department of Defence is the appropriate body
> to have responsibility for co-ordinating such a
> task. In addition to the Department of Defence and
> the Defence Force, such planning would involve
> other Commonwealth departments and agencies as
> well as the States and Territories.[1]

8.7   The Utz Committee proposed that the responsibility for
coordinating the development of planning for national
administration in the event of a defence emergency or war be
given to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet:

> 'We believe that it is best placed to direct and
> co-ordinate the required wide-ranging national
> inputs into the planning and consultative process,
> to resolve any inter-governmental or
> interdepartmental difficulties which may arise,
> and to keep the Government regularly informed of
> progress.[2]

8.8   Colonel J.O. Langtry, from the Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, advanced a similar view when he submitted to this
inquiry that:

> ' Government could not, and should not, be an
> instrument of Defence in times of defence
> emergency. The range of resources entailed in
> mobilisation is so broad that the co-ordination
> needed would involve most aspects of Australian
> public policy. It is hard to conceive of any
> element of Federal and State bureaucracies that
> would not be involved.
>
> Hence there is a need in peace time to create
> national co-ordinating machinery to ensure that
> civil and military aspects of mobilisation
> planning are in harmony. Although the Government
> has created a National and International Security
> Committee of Cabinet, it lacks specific terms of
> reference and is not provided with its own
> secretariat. The Committee is not meshed into the
> national security planning process. It is not
> geared to provide the stimulus for and supervision
> of co-ordinated action across the whole spectrum
> of mobilisation. It needs at least its own
> secretariat adequately staffed to provide
> expertise, continuity and monitoring of Committee
> decisions concerning mobilisation. In the absence

of a full-blown national security council, the
Committee's secretariat should be attached to or
fostered by the Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet, this being the department best placed
to co-ordinate an interdisciplinary approach to
the multi-faceted aspects of national security.
The sooner the Department of Defence is seen to be
having only a part of overall responsibility for
national security, the more likely it is that
government will come to terms with the realities
of marshalling the nation's resources in the
pursuit of increased self-reliance in national
security. It is my view that this is not a matter
to be deferred any longer.'[3]

8.9   A National Security Committee of the Cabinet has also
been suggested by Desmond Ball, who argued in 1980 that:

'... its coverage must extend beyond the
traditional foreign affairs and defence concerns
to also include national and international
economic responsibilities, an appropriate
committee might comprise the following: the Prime
Minister (Chairman), the Treasurer, the Minister
for Defence, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the
Minister for Trade and Resources, the Minister for
Industry and Commerce, the Minister for National
Development and Energy, the Permanent Heads of the
Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the
Treasury, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Industry and
Commerce, Trade and Resources, and National
Development and Energy, the Chief of Defence Force
Staff (CDFS), the Director-General of the Office
of National Assessments (ONA), and the
Director-General of the Natural Disasters
Organisation (NDO).'[4]

Ball further argued that:

'Whatever the particular details of the National
Security Committee itself, it is essential that it
have a secretariat that is a strong, permanent
repository of expertise, initiative and
operational competence, that provides continuity,
that has a capabilty for preparing basic
assessment and guidance drafts, and that is able
to monitor the implementation of Committee
decisions. Such a secretariat would ideally
consist of about 30-40 persons, divided into a
variety of groups tasked with such particular
concerns as (i) military affairs; (ii) political

> affairs; (iii) intelligence correlation and
> assessment; (iv) preparation of the basic
> strategic guidance drafts; (v) long-term planning,
> evaluation and priorities review; (vi)
> international economic matters; (vii) area
> responsibilities, and most especially Australia's
> relations with other countries in this region;
> (viii) mobilisation planning; (ix) monitoring
> implementation of decisions; and (x) public
> affairs.'5

8.10   A similar suggestion was put to this Committee by the
RSL, which submitted that in order to achieve an effective
defence of Australia and the proper direction of the Australian
Defence Force:

> 'There is a requirement for formal top level direction
> from the Government. To provide this, a National
> Security Council should be established, chaired by the
> Prime Minister and with the Ministers for Defence,
> Foreign Affairs and Defence Support and the Treasurer
> as members.'6

The RSL also suggested that the National Security Council be
supported by a National Security Advisory Committee which should
be chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister
and Cabinet, with the Secretaries of other departments and the
CDFS as members.

8.11   The need to coordinate civilian and military resources
at a national level during times of conflict was demonstrated by
the Department of Communications which stated that civil
communications in Australia:

> '... are complex, pervasive and continually
> evolving in terms of physical infrastructure,
> operational control and monitoring, and the
> organisations responsible for the multiplicity of
> systems in the Government (Federal and State) and
> Private Sectors. However the array of well
> developed communications systems and networks
> would seem to provide considerable potential for
> adequately supporting national communications
> requirements in a defence contingency.

> Planning and operational decision-making processes
> have been highly developed within some areas of
> the infrastructure for the purpose of meeting
> emergencies of a national disaster or civil
> nature. While it could be argued that such
> arrangements are satisfactory for low-level
> defence threats, they are largely untested in this
> respect and it would not be prudent to assume that
> such arrangements are adequate for a military
> situation or have no scope for refinement and
> improvement.'7

8.12   The Department considered that there is a need to
examine the arrangements for the coordination and use of the
civil communications infrastructure 'with a view to determining
in advance arrangements which are sufficiently comprehensive,
cohesive, flexible and responsive in marshalling the Civil
Communications Infrastructure to meet defence threats in an
optimal way.'8 While noting that the implementation of civil
defence arrangements is predominantly a responsibility of State
Governments, the Department concluded that:

> 'Planning civilian support for Australia's
> defence, however, is an integral part of defence
> planning and is thus an area for which the
> Commonwealth is responsible. Due regard,
> therefore, must be given to the relationship
> between Federal, State and Local Governments in a
> military threat situation, and the consultation
> and co-ordination measures necessary.'9

8.13   The Department of Defence is also aware of the need to
establish some form of overall coordinating and planning body. A
major objective of the recent Exercise Kangaroo 83 was to
'exercise the Australian Defence Force Command Centre and
designated functional areas of the Department of Defence,
including the Service Offices, in co-ordination with civil
authorities and agencies in planning and conducting low level
joint and combined operations.'10 It was, in the words of a
senior officer involved in the planning of Kangaroo 83,

> '... the first exercise where we have really tried
> to play in a realistic way the decision making
> that the Government and its advisers would be
> taking. Unfortunately, the level of participants
> and the fact, particularly, that they were
> bureaucrats - not using that in a derogatory
> sense, but simply officials working within a
> department - were not able, in our view, to bring
> a realistic reaction to the sorts of problems that
> were posed.'[11]

8.14   According to the witness, the involvement of Ministers
or high-level Government officials in exercises of this kind
would enable them to familiarise themselves with the sorts of
considerations and problems that may arise in an emergency, such
as rules of engagement, the division of responsibilities between
the Federal and State Governments, and the call-out, and use of,
Reserve forces. The exercise further revealed that:

> '... there is currently no existing legislation
> which contemplates the defence of Australian soil
> by Australian servicemen, across the board. There
> is a lack of legislation and published procedures
> at the Federal level, between departments within
> the Federal Government, between the Federal and
> State governments, within State governments and
> downwards through into local government to the
> lowest levels... When faced with the problems of
> getting on with the exercise, people worked
> together and they worked very well, but when they
> looked around for guidance the only guidance they
> could find, extant at the Federal level, was the
> Protective Services Co-ordination Centre which was
> not really a military-type organisation. It caters
> more for terrorist-type or subversive activities.
> It was the only in-place organisation with
> procedures which might have been used. Similarly,
> at the State facility, the State Crisis Centre,
> which is a State emergency services level more
> attuned to natural disasters, along with the
> police, were the only facilities in place.'[12]

8.15   Furthermore, in relation to the call-up and use of
civilian transport assets, it was found that legislation which
may have existed in the past has:

'... dropped out and disappeared until we are now in a situation similar to the legal situation where virtually any interaction between the Defence Force and civil or other transport agencies can only occur on a commercial basis. There are no powers to impress or to use, and we need to develop once again legislation, procedures or some form of procedural manual to get those resources for use in support of the defence forces.'[13]

8.16   These kinds of problems led the Exercise Director to recommend that a review be conducted of Australia's higher level management policies, decision-making processes and relevant organisations for the resolution of military conflict within Australia:

'The review should aim to develop appropriate policies, processes and structures to more effectively achieve national defence of Australia. To facilitate a greater understanding and awareness of the problems of national defence, the associated national framework should be exercised regularly, with participants from all levels of military and civilian bodies, including political representation.'[14]

8.17   As noted in Chapter Four, the Committee considers that both the current structure for determining national security policies, and the guidance itself, are inadequate. The Committee supports the argument that there is a need to review the machinery and procedures for national administration in the event of a defence emergency or war. It considers that these broad concerns are an integral and indispensible part of our national security posture. They need to be established well in advance of any hostilities and should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis.

8.18   The Committee notes that some rudimentary machinery exists in the form of the National and International Security Committee of Cabinet, the Defence Committee and the Council of Defence, but that these are inadequate for the task envisaged.

The Council of Defence was activated as part of the 1973-76 re-organisation when provision was made by regulation for meetings of the Council to be held at least four times per annum. The membership presently comprises the Minister for Defence, the Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, the Secretary, Department of Defence, the Secretary, Department of Defence Support, the CDFS and the three Service Chiefs of Staff. The Council's function is to consider and discuss matters relating to the control and administration of the Defence Force and of the respective arms of the Defence Force referred to it by the Minister. The Utz Committee reported that, from its inception until 1982, Council met some eleven times each year, agenda items normally emanating from the Chairman. The only standing items of business were the previous minutes and reports from the relevant departments. The Council of Defence has no executive powers.

8.19   The Defence Committee has been in existence, in various forms, since 1926. Its present membership comprises the Secretary, Department of Defence (Chairman), the CDFS, the three Service Chiefs and the departmental heads of the Departments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and Foreign Affairs. The designated functions of the Committee are to advise the Minister on defence policy as a whole, the coordination of military, strategic, economic, financial and external affairs aspects of defence policy, and such other matters referred by or on behalf of the Minister. The focus of the Defence Committee (and the Council of Defence), however, is on defence rather than national security concerns. While the Defence Committee includes representatives from other departments, they do not represent all the interests that would be involved in national security planning, and, given the nature and scope of defence policy, there are obvious practical limits on the extent to which these issues could be broadened.

8.20   While the National and International Security Committee plays an important decision-making role, it too suffers a number of shortcomings with regard to national security policy. First, the expertise of the Committee is limited both in terms of the range of portfolios directly involved and the time that is available for such considerations. More importantly, the Committee has no dedicated staff. If the complex and detailed issues of national security are to be properly researched and presented, staff support for the Committee needs to be extended beyond the present arrangements or departmental involvement needs to be increased.

8.21   The lack of progress in this area is evidenced by the current status of the replacement for the 'War Book' - which outlines the required coordination of departmental action on the occurrence of either strained relations or on the outbreak of war. While the Department of Defence has given some attention to its replacement in recent years, there remains considerable work to be done before it is completed.

8.22   While supporting the need to review the national security policy-making process, the Committee is not certain whether the establishment of a national security council or an expanded secretariat to the National and International Security Committee would be the best approach. Either body would take time to establish, would attract key staff from other areas and may be seen by Departments and their Ministers as duplicating existing departmental responsibilities. The Committee acknowledges that the requirements for better coordination of the elements of national security policy, for clearer and more basic strategic guidance and for mobilisation planning will demand an organisational response. At this stage, it may be best to expand the functions and responsibilities of the Defence Committee than to establish a further bureaucratic body with its own interests and views.

8.23   The Defence Committee was used in this way during the
Second World War, and it is instructive to review the practice
and some of the problems of national policy-making during this
period.

8.24   Before the outbreak of World War Two, Cabinet was
advised on defence matters by the Defence Council. Chaired by the
Prime Minister, and created as a statutory body under Section 28
of the _Defence Act_, it consisted of selected Ministers, the
Chiefs of the three Services and the Secretary of the Department
of Defence. At a level below the Council of Defence was the
Defence Committee which in reality was a Chiefs of Staff
Committee by another name, with the addition of the Secretary of
the Department of Defence. The Secretary to the Defence Committee
was a civilian officer of the Department of Defence. On
occasions, when necessary, the Defence Committee would call upon
and consult the Controller General of Munitions, the Controller
of Civil Aviation and the Chairman of the Principal Supply
Officers Committee. The broad function of the Defence Committee
could be summarised as the provision of advice on defence policy
as a whole. Specifically, it sought to advise the Defence
Minister on:

        a.   the coordination of the administrative
                requirements of the three Service
                Boards;

        b.   the coordination of Munitions Supply
                Board activities in respect of Service
                requirements;

        c.   the coordination of financial aspects of
                defence policy including the allocation
                to the Services of available funds;

        d.   the coordination of civil aviation and
                the requirements of defence; and

        e.   policy or principle matters affecting
                the use of defence air assets.

8.25   Despite other changes in higher defence organisation during the course of the war, outlined below, the Defence Committee continued throughout to prepare matters for subsequent War Cabinet consideration and to examine issues referred by War Cabinet.

8.26   The Chiefs of Staff had acted jointly, before the war, on specific strategic plans and appreciations, but a formalised Chiefs of Staff Committee was not established until the declaration of war in September 1939. At the same time, the War Cabinet replaced the Council of Defence by simply removing the officials from its membership. The functions of the Chiefs of Staff Committee were to examine and advise the War Cabinet on strategic and operational issues. The Service Chiefs frequently were called to attend the War Cabinet, and acted both to advise it and then to execute its direction. Hasluck's account summarizes the evolving arrangements for controlling Australia's defence efforts in the early part of the war:

> 'Pre-war proposals were progressively adapted to wartime experience and led to the creation of an organisation for coordinated control of operations centred on the Chiefs of Staff. The main features were a central war room and combined operational intelligence centre at Victoria Barracks, Melbourne; Area Combined Headquarters for naval and air cooperation in trade defence in the focal areas; and Combined Defence Headquarters for coordinating the operations of the naval, military and air forces allotted for the defence of those areas which included a defended port. After June 1941, when the probability of attack on the Australian mainland had increased, an organisation was worked out for preparing joint operational plans by the Chiefs of Staff Committee for the defence of Australia as a whole; by Command Planning Committees for the defence of the various army commands; and by Local Defence Coordinating Committees for the defence of coastal areas.'[15]

8.27   Above the level of Service command, and the channels of Service advice to the War Cabinet, a further body was established to provide input to War Cabinet. This was the Advisory War

Council, comprising members from both the Government and the Opposition. Drawing on its all-party membership, this body enhanced the stability of Government during a critical period in Australia's history. Until General MacArthur's appointment as Supreme Commander in 1942, it was the Advisory War Council which came to dominate the process of decision-making concerning national strategy. Technically only advisory in nature, the Council very quickly came to concentrate on the conduct of the war, both militarily and diplomatically. Indeed, as noted by one observer: 'By the latter half of 1941, the Council was comparable with the War Cabinet as a major centre of deliberation and decision-making on the critical issues facing the nation. [The political changes in 1941]...caused less disruption than might have been feared to the processes of executive decision-making. *For this, much credit must* go to the contribution of the Council in sharing highly sensitive information and establishing a substantial degree of common ground on external policy between both sides of the House'.[16]

8.28   A second, and related, theme of this report has been the lack of clearly defined policy guidance on what constitutes Australia's national security interests and objectives and the broad strategies for achieving them. Given that the structure and capabilities of the Australian Defence Force should be derived from such higher-order considerations, a particular concern of the Committee has been to determine the basis for selecting key equipments and capabilities for the ADF.

8.29   According to senior officials of the Department of Defence, the current selection process attempts to relate force structure decisions to Australia's strategic environment and likely military contingencies facing the Australian Defence Force. The process itself involves the following steps. First, a strategic basis paper is developed which

'... covers the perception of the security situation both in the world and in our region. It includes assessments about the military capabilities that could ... be used against us and in that way it forms a general policy basis for capability assessment in the sense that it provides some views on grading of military contingencies - their possible scale and time scales and the general nature of it. It also provides some policy guidance on the kind of methodology that might be used in assessing military capabilties.'[17]

The strategic basis is developed by the Defence Committee and is endorsed for planning purposes by the Government.

8.30   From the strategic basis are developed draft capabilities guidelines papers,

'... in which the principal objective is to assess the present capabilities of the Defence Force and its supporting infrastructure against those contingencies and to look at the planning that we have in place for future development, and to attempt to make some comments on the consistency between the two. In effect we are developing the Defence Force and its supporting structure in a way which is consistent with the most recent assessment of prospective contingencies.'[18]

8.31   In the past, a single draft capabilities paper would be given to the Services for comment, from which a final Defence Force Capabilities Paper would be developed. This paper would be considered by the Defence Force Development Committee (which is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of Defence and has as its members the CDFS and the Chiefs of Staff of the three Services) and then issued as the formal guidance for resource bids within the context of the Five Year Defence Program. It is then used by the Force Structure Committee in making recommendations to the Defence Force Development Committee on new major equipment items to be acquired for the Australian Defence Force.

8.32   Clearly, the Defence Force Capabilities Paper is of
central importance in both determining capabilities required for
the defence of Australia and in selecting the weapons systems and
equipments that best meet these capabilities. It provides the
basic direction for Australia's defence posture and policies and
it is the vehicle for controlling this development.

8.33   *From evidence provided to the Committee, it seems that*
the Defence Force Capabilities Paper in its present form may not
be appropriately structured to fulfil these roles. In answer to a
question on the current status and structure of the Paper, one
departmental witness stated that the previous system of deriving
this basic guidance:

> '... did not provide us with the facility we felt
> we needed to integrate the capabilities of the
> Defence Force as a whole. It tended to largely
> build on history and to that extent it was
> difficulty to do what is generally accepted to be
> the desirable thing, that is, to see the Defence
> Force as a whole rather than as three separate
> service elements. We are approaching the next
> version of it in a somewhat different way. I do
> not want to go into too much detail about it
> because it is not yet fully firm. But the concept
> behind it is that we will, rather than take it as
> one omnibus document, set up what we are terming a
> guidelines paper, as the first step, and that will
> take strategic guidance and turn it into something
> we think is more precisely aimed at defence
> capability judgement. We then aim to go ahead with
> a series of specific studies or reviews of
> particular issues in the military or defence
> capability area. We shall consider aspects such as
> maritime capability, its relevance as a collective
> whole rather than naval and air capability
> separately; similarly with each of the other

> elements that we see as justifying that kind of
> special study effort. In this way the Defence
> Force Development Committee will get, over a time,
> a series of separate studies, all hopefully
> fitting into an integrated pattern.'[19]

A further witness stated that:

> 'In parallel, with that process, it is also the
> intention, on the military side of the house, that
> we develop our thoughts on the military strategic
> concepts that are relevant to the strategic
> guidance and thus, if you marry those with the
> capabilities that we hope will emerge from the
> study on the other side, you will get a clearer
> definition of what is required for the Defence
> Force. I think the development of those military
> strategic studies is another recommendation that
> came out of the Utz report in fact.'[20]

8.34   The Committee considers that these comments provide
some justification for the argument that there have, in the past
at least, been inadequate attempts on the part of the Department
of Defence to delineate a coherent military strategy for
Australia's defence or to provide clear guidance on the kinds of
military capabilities that are required for such a task. The
absence of such guidance constrains decision-making since it
makes choosing between alternatives more difficult and
facilitates bargaining and compromise between the major interests
involved. Under these circumstances, policy decisions are likely
to reflect the interests and bureaucratic power of the major
participants within the Department and the probability of
establishing an optimum force structure will be reduced.

8.35   The Committee considers that the Department of Defence
should develop clearer policy guidance than currently exists on
Australia's military strategy and the capabilities required for
Australia's defence. These should be couched in functional or
joint Service terms along the lines used in this report.

8.36   The Committee further recommends that a broad statement
of this guidance along with a description of Australia's national
interests, defence concept and strategic environment be published
regularly in a single, comprehensive document, or a White Paper
similar to the Japanese Defense Agency's Defence of Japan series,
or the Federal Republic of Germany's annual White Paper[21]. Such a
document would not only better inform the Australian public about
important defence and related issues, but would also add to the
credibility of our defence capacity in the eyes of potential
adversaries. It would thus form an important component of our
defence posture.

THE HON W.L. MORRISON, MP.
Chairman
October 1984

CHAPTER EIGHT

END NOTES

1.   *The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia*, p192

2.   *The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia*, p192

3.   Colonel J.O. Langtry, *Submission*, ppS70-1

4.   Desmond Ball, 'The Machinery for Making Australian
      National Security Policy in the 1980s', Paper presented
      to the Conference on Australian Defence Policy for the
      1980s, Australian National University, 1980, p22

5.   Desmond Ball, 'The Machinery for Making Australian
      National Security Policy in the 1980s,' p22

6.   The Returned Services League of Australia, *Submission*
      on Command and Control of the ADF, pii

7.   Department of Communications, *Submission*, pS562

8.   Department of Communications, *Submission*, pS562.

9.   Department of Communications, *Submission*, pS561

10.   Department of Defence, *Submission*, pS127-128

11.   *Evidence*, 4 June 1984, pp205-6

12.   *Evidence*, 4 June 1984, p207

13.   *Evidence*, 4 June 1984, p209

14.   Department of Defence, *Submission*, pS136

15.   Paul Hasluck, *The Government and the People, 1939-1941*,
      p440

16.   P.G. Edwards, *Prime Ministers and Diplomats; the Making
      of Australian Foreign Policy, 1901-1949*, p134

17.   *Evidence*, 24 May 1984, p74

18.   *Evidence*, 24 May 1984, p75

19.   *Evidence*, 24 May 1984, p78

20.   *Evidence*, 24 May 1984, p79

21.   See *Defense of Japan* 1983, Japan Defense Agency, 1983,
      and *White Paper 1983: The Security of the Federal
      Republic of Germany*, 20 October 1983.

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence

Dissent

by

Senator Austin Lewis

I agree with the report except as follows:-

1. I dissent from paragraph 28 of the conclusions and
   recommendations in relation to the needs for the
   Royal Australian Navy. The absence of an air-capable
   maritime platform seriously inhibits the Navy in its
   given role.

.2. I am concerned that emphasis is not given to the
   continuing need for sealift and amphibious capability
   and that over-much reliance has been placed on airlift
   capabilities.

3. I believe that the rapid build-up of air and naval
   forces on the Indian sub-continent must have a
   destabilising effect in the Indian Ocean and should
   be of concern to Australia.

Austin Lewis.

PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA
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MEMBER FOR HIGGINS
SHADOW MINISTER FOR TOURISM
AND SMALL BUSINESS

JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE

DISSENTING REPORT by ROGER SHIPTON MP

THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE, ITS STRUCTURE
AND CAPABILITIES

1. Summary of Principal Conclusions
    and Recommendations

    Threats to Australias Security

    (a) I disagree with the wording of paragraph 4.
         I consider that the only circumstances that
         would lead to a serious deterioration in
         relations between the two superpowers would
         be provocative action by the Soviet Union

    Australian Alliance Relationships

    (b) Paragraph 10.   I believe that it is in
         Australia's interests to maintain and
         strengthen the ANZUS Treaty.

2. Chapter 1, paragraph 1.9 - I do not agree with
    the reference to the Palme Commission's Report
    on common security.   Whilst I agree with some
    of these points, I do not agree with all of them.
    I believe that Australia should enunciate its
    own principles.

ROGER SHIPTON

11 October 1984

OBSERVATIONS FROM TOUR OF

NORTHERN DEFENCE FACILITIES

6-10 FEBRUARY, 1984

Introduction

1.   Members of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and
Defence toured selected defence facilities in northern Australia
in the period 6-10 February, 1984. The daily programs for the
visit are attached at Annex 1.

2.   The following Members of the Committee, and staff,
attended all, or part, of the tour:

         Members: Mr M.D. Cross, MP
                     Hon. R.C. Katter, MP
                     Senator D.J. MacGibbon
                     Mr J. Gayler, MP
                     Hon. R.J. Groom, MP
                     Mr W.P. Coleman, MP

         Staff: Mr P.F. Bergin
                     Mr P.N. Gibson, MC
                     Dr G.L. Cheeseman
                     Mr A.H. Lipscomb (Department of Defence)

Aims

3.   The tour was undertaken at the start of the public
inquiry by the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters into the
following reference:

         'the capability of the Australian Defence
         Force to fulfil its role, with particular
         reference to force structure and command and
         control arrangements'.

4.   The aims of the tour were four-fold:

         *   to provide a background perspective on
               the problems of Australia's northern
               defence;

         *   to more fully appreciate the impact of
               distance, terrain and geography on
               command, control and communications;

* to gain first hand perceptions of Australia's defence from those charged with its implementation in the field; and

* to view some of the basic force structure elements of each of the Services.

General Remarks

5.   The tour was an early part of a much wider public inquiry. Public evidence was not taken, nor were submissions received.

6.   These observations are intended to summarise impressions gained during the tour. These early impressions and general observations may evolve into substantive views and recommendations as the basis for lines of further questioning when the Sub-Committee begins to take public evidence.

General Observations

7.   The difficulty experienced in providing logistic support to northern defence facilities impressed itself upon the Sub-Committee. Local tri-service arrangements have been made, in some cases, to attempt to minimise duplication of effort and to improve logistic efficiency. For example, the arrangements obtaining in Darwin, where RAAF arranges the provision of rations and Army provides medical services. The absence of an integrated, joint logistic staff points to potential difficulties in the transition to a situation of low or medium level conflict. This issue will be further explored in the Sub-Committee's deliberations.

8.   The Sub-Committee noted with concern the insufficiency of surveillance resources in the north. This factor, compounded by a cumbersome surveillance command structure controlled from Canberra, by jurisdictional difficulties experienced by officers controlling surveillance resources and by differing Commonwealth/State areas of responsibility will be examined in detail during the Sub-Committee's inquiry. (The Minister's attention has been drawn to this aspect, a copy of the Sub-Committee Chairman's letter is at Annex 2.)

9.   The inadequacy of facilities, particularly at RAAF Townsville, RAAF Darwin, and HQ 7th Military District was remarked by the Sub-Committee. This inadequacy is not without its potential as a factor in lessening morale, when servicemen in the ranks compare facilities on an inter-Service basis. For example, servicemen at RAAF

Townsville may resent Army's relative comfort at Lavarack
Barracks, and soldiers quartered in World War II facilities
in Larrakeyah Barracks, Darwin, may contrast their situation
unfavourably with that pertaining to sailors posted to
Darwin Naval Base or quartered at HMAS Coonawarra. In an era
of inevitable movement towards joint force cooperation in
peace and joint force operations in war, conditions of
employment, service and accommodation should be as equitable
as possible across the Defence Force.

10.   The Sub-Commitee was particularly impressed by the
dedication and professionalism apparent in all Service
establishments which were visited. Operating and training in
a peace-time environment, balancing the requirements for
operational readiness against constraints imposed by
equipment, man-power and training limitations, the Defence
Force serves Australia with distinction. Whether dedication
and professionalism, alone, are sufficient to prepare
adequately for the defence of Australia is a central issue
in the Sub-Committee's inquiry.

Specific Observations

11.   The touring party was briefed on the organisations,
roles, characteristics and tasks of each facility visited.
The specific observations which follow are in part derived
from these presentations. The qualification must be made,
however, that a forward commander's perceived requirements
must always be balanced by higher command or political
direction, particularly in times of equipment or financial
constraint. Few commanders are ever satisfied with existing
resources under command. In the course of its inquiry, the
Sub-Committee aims to make some judgements concerning the
allocation and balance of the broad range of defence
resources, within the force structure as a whole. In the
meantime, the following specific observations are made, with
the foregoing qualifications in mind.

12.   RAAF Townsville

        a. Currently operates two squadrons: 27 Squadron
            (a Reserve squadron), and 35 Squadron, which
            currently maintains 4 Iroquois helicopters (3
            operational at any one time) and 3 Caribou
            aircraft.

        b. The principal role of 35 Squadron is to
            support the Army's Operational Deployment
            Force (ODF). RAAF Townsville is also used
            routinely to support other elements from the

RAAF's Operational Command, e.g. P3 Orion maritime surveillance (both small and large deployments, up to a squadron) as well as short term assistance to the community tasks.

c.   Townsville is one of the few air bases in Australia to be able to support P3 aircraft.

d.   The facilities at RAAF Townsville are currently shared with civilian aircraft. Joint operation does not cause many problems. There may, however, be problems during a major operational deployment of RAAF units.

e.   RAAF Townsville currently utilises Halifax Bay Range, which is suitable and does not appear to be subject to any action by environmentalists or other groups. Other ranges include Shoalwater Bay, East Sale and Learmonth. It is believed that more ranges should be developed, particularly in the north and north west.

f.   Fuel stocks at RAAF Townsville are all above ground, have limited capacity and are non-hardened. In addition, there are no hardened magazine facilities.

g.   Current flying hours are considered insufficient, particularly to support ODF training requirements. Flying hours have recently been reduced by Air Force Office.

h.   There is a general belief that Townsville plays an important strategic role and that a number of additional air facilities should be deployed in the north and north east to support Townsville.

13.   Army Townsville

a.   Lavarack Barracks is the home of the Operational Deployment Force (ODF). The ODF is a light scaled infantry formation designed to have high strategic mobility, but as a result it has low tactical mobility and low fire power. The ODF is capable of conducting independent operations, although this requires considerable administrative resources to be deployed with the formation; it is still not able to be completely air lifted. The movement response times for the ODF are:

       *   company group – within 7 days notice;

       *   a battalion group – within 14 days notice;

          *   a brigade within 28 days notice.

b. It is believed that the ODF can handle all current contingencies. The ODF has high priority for resources and has a current manning level of 95% of authorised peace establishment which is greater than other army units. However, this manning level is still well below war establishment (only 2 of 3 battalions being raised), and as a result the ODF does not have the strength to engage an enemy force of battalion strength.

c. The ODF was the principal formation involved in Exercise Kangaroo 83 last year. Among other problem areas noted were:

        1.   fuel evaporation;

        2.   the huge quantity of maps required;

        3.   media access.

d. Major shortfalls in the ODF Are:

        1.   lack of integral surveillance capacity; in particular no night vision devices, no radar or sensor devices and only limited visual surveillance aircraft.

        2.   lack of tactical mobility. The restriction to light scales has meant that only 1 driver per truck is allocated. As well, the ODF relies heavily on RAAF support.

        3.   a major, and possibly the major problem, so far as Army is concerned, is insufficient helicopter support for either training or operational deployment. Currently only 3 helicopters are available, insufficient to lift a platoon – 15 helicopters are required to lift one company. Additional helicopters can be ordered on two days notice, but

them are still below requirements to lift a battalion much less a brigade.

4. The ODF has limited sustainability for operations — currently 180 days, after which they would require additional support;

5. While training areas for the ODF are considered to be adequate, continuing limited training resources will erode the operational capability of the ODF over the long term.

e. The party also visited 4 Field Regiment, B Squadron 3/4 Cavalry Regiment, 3 Field Support Company and 2/4 Battalion, which are all part of the ODF. Observations from visits to these units included:

1. in normal circumstances artillery would be deployed in two phases:

   * Townsville to a forward base by road;

   * from the base to an area of operations by air.

2. Operational deployment of artillery units is severely limited by availability of air transport, e.g. the aircraft requirements to move the regiment and its weapons and equipment are 9 C130 sorties, 10 medium lift helicopter sorties, 23 utility lift helicopter sorties and 20 short range transport sorties (Caribou).

3. Where APCs are deployed in support of the ODF they need to be deployed by rail, road or sea.

f. The following problems were identified specifically in respect of the infantry battalion and are believed typical of other units:

1. ammunition — small arms and blank ammunition is in short supply and is insufficient to conduct

effective training. There is a particular problem with obtaining specialised ammunition (trip flares, smoke grenades, anti-tank ammunition etc).

2. combat rations — the current mixture of 10 man and 1 man rations is inadequate. Currently fresh food has to be used during operational deployemnts; an increased allocation of 1 man rations would permit greater flexibility and realism in training.

3. There is a need for more helicopters and more flying hours for training.

4. APC support is limited, especially for major training exercises.

5. The capability of units in the ODF is limited by the requirement to carry out external duties (training support for other units etc).

6. There is currently a decline in specialised skills due to decrease in training hours, and shortages of specialised ammunition and money for training. Specific reference was made to loss of rappeling skills, because of the unavailability of a suitable rappeling tower.

7. Current rules of engagement during exercises and operations are very general and vague and are intended to cover a wide range of circumstances. There is a difficulty in translating these rules into a form which is understandable by the soldier.

14.   HMAS Cairns

a. Currently the home of 3 patrol boats; HMA Ships Warnambool, Townsville and Barbette, as well as a hydrographic and oceanographic survey ship, HMAS Flinders, all under the operational control of NOIC Cairns who is responsible to the Fleet Commander.

b.   The area of operations for HMAS Cairns extends from the Queensland/NSW border to the Queensland/Northern territory border and 200 miles out to sea.

c.   Cairns Naval Base is a new establishment and is well appointed. Living accommodation is all off base. There are no working accommodation problems although some supplies are still located at Grafton Street in Cairns proper. The Navy would like to move these supplies to the base. There is currently a design study being developed to address this problem.

d.   The current wharf capacity is 5 alongside berths and 2 covered berths, all for patrol boats. In an emergency, each alongside berth can handle 3 boats. All other fleet vessels would need to be located at other harbour facilities.

e.   Communications between HMAS Cairns and the patrol boats is by HF radio. This has some limitations, although these are overcome by the ability of boats to communicate with other naval communciations stations throughout Australia. Secure HF communictions capability is soon to be included. The only major problem identified was associated with communications command and control aspects relating to coastal surveillance. Under present arrangements requisites, information and decisions relating to surveillance have to be formally passed through separate Defence and Coast Watch chains of command between Cairns and Canberra (via Sydney in the case of Defence). This can involve considerable time and is considered to restrict the freedom of operations of patrol boats under some circumstances. In some cases there is informal liaison between Defence and Coast Watch authorities at Cairns itself.

15.   ## HQ 7th Military District - Darwin (NORFORCE)

a.   NORFORCE is an Army Reserve unit which is primarily a surveillance and reconnaissance force. It does not have traditional infantry capabilities and roles; in particular it is unable to be concentrated in an assault against an enemy or conduct other normal infantry operations. The NORFORCE establishment is currently under review and is likely to change.

b. It is doubtful whether the current strength of the unit (40 ARA and 360 ARES) could be increased.

c. The unit is experiencing difficulties with training and retaining Aborigines and believes that it would be better to utilise Aboriginal skills in their traditional mode.

d. There is scope for use of hovercraft or air boats.

e. NORFORCE plays an important public relations role and enjoys much local support, although there are difficulties in getting some private employers to release employees for duty.

f. Whilst not specifically stated, it was clear that there are difficulties in negotiating use of aboriginal land for exercises through the Northern Land Council. Normal clearance time was anything up to three months. This is a major factor in the planning of training exercises for NORFORCE and units coming from other Military Districts.

16. <u>Navy - Darwin</u>

a. The Darwin Naval Base is also a new establishment and is very well appointed. There are no major working accommodation problems.

b. Operational problems or limitations identified by Navy included:

    1. the need for extensive cooperation between State and Commonwealth officials and sometimes conflict in the jurisdictional responsibilities between the two groups arises. While there is usually cooperation the freedom of operation of patrol boats can be restricted and there is a need to streamline these procedures;

    2. limited fuel supplies place some restrictions on the operation of patrol boats (cruising speeds, deployment times etc);

3. much of the coastal areas in the area of responsibility for Darwin are inadequately charted;

4. there appears to be disagreement over whether the current patrol boat assets are sufficient for the surveillance of the area of operations. Current establishment is four patrol boats; opinion varied over the need, between 4 and 12 boats.

17. RAAF Darwin

a. Overall accommodation, while adequate, required considerable maintenance and repair in some areas.

b. Division of opinion was detected over the possibility/desirability of relocating part of RAAF Darwin to a new base at Tindal, when the FA-18 is introduced into service.

c. RAAF Darwin currently shares Darwin Airport with civilian operators; this arrangement works satisfactorily in peacetime.

d. An important limitation is the lack of access to training area; e.g. at the time of Committee's visit the Mirage Squadron was deployed to Williamtown, NSW, to conduct live firing practice.

Conclusions

18. The tour of northern defence facilities was an excellent means of beginning the Sub-Committee's inquiry. It met all of its aims, and laid the basis for fruitful further investigation by the Sub-Committee within its terms of reference. The Sub-Committee is now considering visits to the Australian Defence Force Command Centre, Canberra, in March, and to single Service operational headquarters in the Sydney area in April. This may be followed by a tour of defence facilities in South Australia and in Western Australia in June.

19. The cooperation of the Minister for Defence, Department of Defence and the Defence Force contributed in no small measure to the success of the tour. In particular, the Minister's consent to the use of an aircraft of the RAAF Special Purpose

Squadron for the tour enabled the tour to incorporate, in one visit, all major defence installations in the north and north-east. The use of the aircraft not only facilitated the administrative arrangements for the tour but more importantly, it enabled Members to more fully appreciate the significant constraints imposed by distance, time and geography on the ability of those relatively small elements of the Australian Defence Force currently deployed in the northern defence of the nation.

TOUR OF DEFENCE FACILITIES, NORTHERN AUSTRALIA

PROGRAM, 6—10 FEBRUARY, 1984

Monday, 6 February

1300	RAAF Base Townsville — Briefing and tour of facilities
1630 to 1730	Informal discussions organised by Mayor of Townsville (Alderman Mike Reynolds)

Tuesday, 7 February

0820	Briefing HQ 3rd Brigade — Commander's Mess, Lavarack Barracks
0930	Tour and Briefing, Fourth Field regiment — Royal Australian Artillery
1020	Morning tea
1050	Briefing and Tour — B Squadron, 3/4 Cavalry Regiment
1145	Briefing and Tour — 3 Field Supply Company
1230	Lunch — Commander's Mess
1330	Briefing and Tour, 2/4 Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment
1530	Depart Townsville
1615	Arrive Cairns

Wednesday, 8 February

0830	Briefing — HMAS Cairns
1000	Morning tea
1015	Tour of Base and HMAS Barbette
1200	Lunch
1315 to 1530	Inspections — North Queensland Engineers and Agents Pty. Limited.

1600   Depart Cairns

1755   Arrive Darwin

1800 to Drinks RAAF Officers Mess
1900

Thursday, 9 February

0830   Briefing, HQ 7th Military District — Larrakeyah
        Barracks

0900   Briefing — Army activities in the North, including
        NORFORCE

0930   Briefing, Naval Officer Commanding Northern
        Australia

1030   Morning tea

1100   Tour of Darwin Naval Base

1200   Lunch — Combined Mess

1340   Tour HMAS Coonawarra

1440 to Tour and Briefing RAAF Base, Darwin
1630

1700   Informal discussions, Chief Minister and Members,
        Northern Territory Government

Friday, 10 February

0900   Depart Darwin

0945   Arrive RAAF Base, Tindal — Inspection

1100   Tour of Katherine

1130   Civic Reception/Informal discussions, Katherine
        Town Council

1300   Depart Katherine

1500   Arrive Mt Isa

1520   Depart Mt Isa

1735   Arrive Brisbane

1815	Depart Brisbane
2035	Arrive Sydney
2055	Depart Sydney
2135	Arrive Canberra

Annex 2 to
Appendix 1

<u>SUB-COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE MATTERS</u>

DMA.C7   17 February, 1984

My dear Minister,

I am writing with reference to an issue which emerged during
the Sub-Committee's recent visit to the Headquarters of the
Naval Officer Commanding Northern Australia (NOCNA), based
in Darwin. During the course of his briefing to the
Sub-Committee, NOCNA briefly outlined the circumstances
involving HMAS Gawler's pursuit and apprehension of an
Indonesian fishing vessel, the Teluk Bayur, in the period
5-8 January, 1984. The speed with which HMAS Gawler was
despatched in pursuit of the Indonesian vessel and doubt
about the intentions of the Teluk Bayur created a potential
jurisdictional difficulty for the Captain of HMAS Gawler, in
the distinction between authority to act under Commonwealth
law and under State law.

It seems that HMA Ship Captains are authorised to act
outside the three-mile limit under acts such as the
Commonwealth Fisheries Act, and the Continental Shelf Living
Natural Resources Act. However, uncertainty arose in this
incident when it seemed that the Indonesian vessel might be
within the three mile limit off the coast, and therefore
subject to Western Australian state jurisdiction. In this
case, sound liaison between Defence and the West Australian
Government meant that the Captain and the executive Officer
of HMAS Gawler were rapidly authorised by Certificate of
Appointment as Inspectors of Fisheries under the West
Australian Fisheries Act 1905. In the event, action under
this appointment was not necessary.

It occurred to the Sub-Committee that it may be appropriate
for naval officers in command of HMA ships operating in
coastal surveillance duties to be permanently appointed for
the term of their appointments under all relevant State
legislation to act within the three-mile limit in their
areas of operation. There may also be legislation covering
customs, health or immigration aspects under which such
naval officers might also be appointed to act.
We appreciate that the Department of Defence will no doubt
have taken action to rectify what might in future create
similar difficulties, but the Sub-Committee felt that it

should take an early opportunity of drawing this potential
difficulty to your attention.

Your advice would be very much appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

(M.D. CROSS, MP)
Chairman

OBSERVATIONS FROM TOUR OF DEFENCE FACILITIES,

SYDNEY AREA - 10-11 APRIL, 1984

Introduction

1.   Members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters visited
Defence facilities in the Sydney area on 10-11 April, 1984. The
program for the visit is attached at Annex 1.

2.   The following Members of the Sub-Committee, and staff, took
part in the visit:

    Members: Mr M.D. Cross, MP
              Hon. R.C. Katter, MP
              Senator D.J. MacGibbon
              Mr J. Gayler, MP

    Staff: Mr P.F. Bergin
              Dr G.L. Cheeseman
              Ms K.M. Johnston (Department of
              Defence)

Aim

3.   The visit was part of the Sub-Committee's inquiry into the
following reference:

    'The capability of the Australian Defence Force to
    fulfil its role, with particular reference to
    force structure and command and control
    arrangements'.

4.   The aim of the visit was to inspect single Service
operational headquarters, and to examine their functions within
the Australian Defence Force as a whole. Headquarters visited
were:

    a.   Headquarters, Her Majesty's Australian
          Fleet;

    b.   Headquarters, Field Force Command; and

    c.   Headquarters, Operational Command, RAAF

5.   While in the Penrith/Richmond area, the Sub-Committee took
the opportunity to visit RAAF Base Richmond, and was briefed on
its organisation and tasks.

Observations

6.   The Sub-Committee visited Fleet Headquarters at Garden Island, and was briefed on:

* the organisation, role and characteristics of Fleet Command;
* the planning and conduct of joint maritime operations; and

* fleet capabilities and the operation of the fleet.

7.   The Australian Fleet comprises some 56 combatant ships and over 7000 all ranks. The Fleet is deployed throughout Australia and regularly conducts exercises and tours throughout Asia, South East Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. Last financial year, ships from the Fleet sailed over 1 million miles at a fuel cost of $33 million. Major points raised in discussion were:

* Navy is making concerted efforts to reduce fuel and operating costs;

* existing River Class destroyers are becoming very expensive to modernise, but replacement is also expensive;

* Phallanx weapons sytems are to be given to all major surface combatant ships.

8.   Most future maritime operations will be joint operations involving both Navy and Air Force units. Joint procedures are presently being promulgated. With increased involvement of the RAAF in close support of the Fleet, new procedures will have to be developed.

9.   During exercises, the Maritime Commander is usually given operational control over Air Force maritime surveillance assets. RAAF strike aircraft, however, remain under command of the Air Force and are allocated in support of naval forces, as required.

10.   The Chief of Naval Staff is responsible for the protection of merchant shipping within an agreed area of operations around Australia. This is part of an international agreement between Australia and its allies. The responsibility for tasking merchant shipping, establishing convoys, etc., belongs to a Navy Control and Protection Organisation which essentially involves Reserve personnel. The agreement essentially means that Australia must maintain a two-ocean Navy (East and West).

11. *Other points raised were:*

* the present Fleet Operations Centre is inadequate and cannot be expanded;

* the Maritime Headquarters has to be activated separately from Fleet Command;

* a new Maritime Command Centre is to be built which will house in one, purpose-built building Fleet Headquarters, the Fleet Operations Centre and the Maritime Headquarters. It will also house the Naval Command and Support System which will have links to the Australian Defence Force Command Centre.

12. In his briefing to the Sub-Committee, the Fleet Commander made the following points:

* forces assigned to maritime operations should be under the operational control of a single commander even in peacetime. The current arrangements for dichotomous command are unique and are not in line with present US and UK practice. The maritime commander should be a naval officer, preferably the Fleet Commander;

* there is presently no permanent joint command arrangement. Joint Force headquarters are only formed during exercises. This does not allow for transition from peace to war. Nor does it provide proper training for wartime operations;

* it is doubtful whether a separate Maritime Command could or should be formed in peacetime. Its nucleus should be formed on Fleet Command;

* from July 1984, air defence of the Fleet at sea is a RAAF responsibility. At present this amounts to limited protection (up to 500 miles from shore and for limited periods). This will improve with the introduction of the FA-18;

* deployment of helicopters on small surface ships does not provide sufficient anti-submarine warfare capabilities in defence of the Fleet. Properly used, helicopters provide an effective means of countering submarines. It would not be expensive to modify a commercial design craft to carry a number of helicopters;

* providing air defence for the Fleet requires a major
increase in flying hours for the RAAF, particularly
in view of the long transit times involved. It is
doubtful whether RAAF could provide the amount of
support required without affecting its own
operational requirements;

* while the present operational capability of the
Fleet is reasonable, given present tasks, there is
difficulty in supporting the Fleet at sea over a
protracted period, particularly at long distances
and in view of the need to effectively sustain a
two-ocean Navy;

* an airborne early warning capability is a high
priority requirement as a means of supplementing
over-the-horizon-radar and providing effective air
support of the Fleet.

13. At the end of the briefings, the Sub-Committee inspected
HMAS Brisbane, part of the RAN's First Destroyer Squadron.

14. **Headquarters Field Force Command:**

Following luncheon at the Officer's Mess, Victoria
Barracks, the Sub-Committee was briefed on the organisation of
Field Force Command, on command and control aspects and some of
the problems currently facing the field army. Major points raised
were:

* the limited tactical and strategic mobility
of the Operational Deployment force (ODFD).
Field Force Command believes that the ODF
should have available to it at least 18
transport helicopters and 3 fire support
helicopters. These would provide a lift
capability for one infantry company and
would permit realistic training. The
helicopters should be placed under the
operational control of the army commander;

* limitations in operating funds are serious
in the areas of specialist ammunition,
training activities and armoured running
hours. Reductions and shortfalls in these
areas means that the Army is not achieving
the required proficiency in a number of
individual and collective skills. There is
increasing complacency among junior officers
and NCOs. There is also limited flexibility
for training and it is getting harder to
exercise units and formations;

* while single-Service training is being run down, units are still expected to take part in joint exercises involving allied troops.

* current manpower ceilings are too low. Members of 6 Brigade are shadow posted to the ODF logistic support group (LSG), for example, which means that 6 Bde would have difficulty supporting the ODF in its main role. The LSG has not been deployed or exercised properly;

* the addition of new capabilities to the Field Force normally means that manpower has to be redistributed from other areas (especially headquarters) in order to man and operate new units. This can lead to a further decline in the capabilities of existing units;

* the Army Reserve would be primarily used in an expansion role to meet higher level contingencies. But there is a problem in the legal definition of callout;

* both the SAS Regiment and the Commando Regiment are overcommitted to meet both the counter-terrorist and normal roles;

* Exercise K83 identified a number of weaknesses in command and control arrangements and the deployment of forces during combined exercises;

* Field Force Command has had to use existing resources to accommodate the cadet corps. This could have some detrimental effect on the Army Reserve.

15. Headquarters Operational Command, RAAF (HQ OPCOM).
On 11 April, the Sub-Committee visited and was briefed on the organisation and roles of OPCOM and joint operational (including maritime) procedures. Major points which emerged were:

* the RAAF is presently considering a proposal to locate more helicopters at Townsville to provide support for the ODF. The ability to support Army is still constrained by the deployment of 8 helicopters to the Sinai;

*   close air support to ground units is currently provided by Mirage aircraft and helicopters. This role will be taken over by the FA-18;

*   Hercules C130 aircraft are currently used in both strategic and tactical air transport roles;

*   at present, P3C Orion activities are limited by the availability of operational crews (12 per aircraft), rather than by insufficient aircraft or flying hours. The RAAF is presently attempting to increase its flying crews from 12 to 18. Individual crew members typically fly 800 to 900 hours per year;

*   OPCOM tasks are primarily single-Service oriented and are extensive. It is difficult to envisage a single joint command and control system that would cover all circumstances;

*   the RAAF believes that it can meet the additional requirement to provide close air support to the Fleet, although this may means reducing some existing operational capabilities unless extra crew can be obtained. The naval requirements are only a small proportion of the RAAF's present flying hours;

*   it was agreed that airborne early warning was an important capability, particularly for air defence;

*   it would be uneconomical to establish a permanent joint maritime headquarters;

*   civilian aircraft could be readily used to provide a strategic airlift capability, but the number of places into which these planes could fly is limited. There would still be a need for both medium and short-range aircraft.

16. RAAF Base, Richmond:

The Sub-Committee toured and was briefed on RAAF Base Richmond. Issues which were raised included:

*   both C130E and Caribou aircraft are very old and present considerable problems in maintenance and operation. The preferred replacement for the Caribou is the C130, although Army's needs must be taken into account;

* the current Boeing 707 aircraft are well regarded
  and it is recommended that at least two more be
  purchased. The availability of these aircraft,
  however, is rapidly diminishing;

* facilities at Richmond are tightly co-located and
  could be unsafe. There is little room to expand,
  although Air Force is acquiring some land to the
  north and north east of the base;

* some married quarters are sub-standard and there
  is a very high maintenance requirement for housing
  and other buildings. There is never sufficient
  money allocated for these purposes (allocation is
  usually well short of the funds bid for);

* it would be possible to relocate some facilities
  to Dubbo, but it would be expensive;

* currently, the major constraint on operations is
  crew availability and facilities rather than
  aircraft availability

TOUR OF DEFENCE FACILITIES, SYDNEY
PROGRAM 10-11 APRIL, 1984

TUESDAY, 10 APRIL

0900-0915	Discussions with Fleet Commander.
0915-0940	Briefing - 'The Fleet Command' - the Chief of Staff.
0940-1000	Briefing - 'Planning and Conduct of Joint Maritime Operations' - Fleet Warfare Officer.
1000-1015	Briefing - 'Force Capabilities and Operation of the Fleet' - Fleet Commander.
1015-1045	Discussions
1045-1105	Visit Fleet Operations Centre and Maritime Headquarters, Garden Island dockyard;
1105-1215	Visit HMAS Brisbane;
1215	Depart for Victoria Barracks;
1230	Luncheon, Officers Mess, Victoria Barracks
1400	HQ Field Force Command - briefings and facilities tour Victoria Barracks and Victoria Barracks museum.
1600	Depart Victoria Barracks.

WEDNESDAY, 11 APRIL

0900	Assemble HQ Operational Command, Penrith;
0900-1120	Briefings on HQ Operational Command.
1120	Depart Penrith for Richmond;
1200	Working luncheon Richmond Air Force Base, followed by tour of base facilities;
1430	Depart Richmond by Caribou for Mascot Airport;
1515	Arrive Qantas Maintenance area;
1550	Departure Sydney.

OBSERVATIONS FROM TOUR OF DEFENCE FACILITIES
SOUTH AUSTRALIA & WESTERN AUSTRALIA
18-20 JUNE 1984

Introduction

1.   Members of the Sub-Committee on Defence Matters,
accompanied by other Committee Members, toured Defence facilities
in South Australia and Western Australia in the period 18-20
June, 1984. The program is attached at Annex 1.

2.   The following Members of the Committee, and staff,
attended all or part of the tour:

         Members: Mr M.D. Cross, MP,
                   Hon. W.L. Morrison, MP
                   Senator R.C. Elstob
                   Senator R. Hill
                   Senator D.J. MacGibbon
                   Senator K.W. Sibraa
                   Mr R.F. Edwards, MP
                   Mr R. Jacobi, MP

         Staff: Mr P.N. Gibson, MC
                   Dr G.L. Cheeseman,
                   Mr J.J. O'Callaghan (Department of Defence)
                   Mr G.F. Keogh (Office of the Minister for
                                                        Defence

Aim

3.   The visit was the third of a series of visits to
Defence facilities around Australia, the others being to northern
Australia (6-10 February, 1984) and to the Sydney area (10-11
April, 1984). As with the earlier visits, this visit formed part
of the Sub-Committee's inquiry into the following reference:

     'The capability of the Australian Defence Force to
     fulfil its role, with particular reference to force
     structure and command and control arrangements'.

4.   The aims of the visit were to inspect defence
facilities in South Australia and Western Australia, to continue
gathering impressions from members of the Defence Force on
aspects relevant to the Sub-Committee's current inquiry, and to
complete the Sub-Committee's first-hand impressions of the basic
existing force structure elements of each of the Services.

5.   Units and facilities visited were:

> * HQ 4th Military District, Adelaide, SA;
> * 16 Air Defence Regiment, Woodside, SA;
> * RAAF Base Edinburgh, SA;
> * HQ 5th Military District, Perth, WA;
> * Special Air Service Regiment, Swanbourne, WA;
> * HMAS Stirling, Garden Island, WA; and
> * RAAF Base Pearce, WA.

Observations

6.   **HQ 4th Military District** The Sub-Committee visited HQ
4th Military District (HQ 4MD) and was briefed on its
organisation and roles, and on the regular reserve and integrated
units located within the Military District. HQ 4MD currently has
67 Regular Army staff and 21 civilians, with Army Reserve members
of the HQ being grouped into a Reserve Plans Group, different
from other Military District HQ.

7.   General points which arose during the briefing
included:

> * training areas within the Military District were
>   adequate, with some reservations. Kultana, near
>   Port Augusta, was the main field firing range and
>   the closest training area for combined training
>   for armoured personnel carriers. Murray Bridge
>   training area, of 40 square kilometres, was
>   closer and had a variety of ranges, but had
>   limited mortar and artillery range capacity. Two
>   other areas, Shaggy Ridge and Leigh Creek, had
>   been used occasionally, but the proclamations on
>   these areas were due to expire at the end of
>   1984. Training areas near Woomera were
>   occasionally used by 16 Air Defence Regiment;
>
> * the re-development of the Woodside military area
>   would cost $15 million, and is due for completion
>   by early 1986;
>
> * some public disquiet existed about various
>   proposals for land acquisition for proof range
>   requirements at Port Wakefield. There were three
>   options under consideration:
>
>   1. extend the existing range to the south, taking
>   over Parham Beach and Webb Beach (estimated
>   cost $4m);
>
>   2. move existing range head and facilities 4km to
>   the north (estimated cost $26m); and

      3. relocate the entire Proof and Experimental
         Establishment from Port Wakefield, possibly to
         Herbert Creek in Queensland - this could cost
         at least $40 million.

* the environmental impact study on the various
  Port Wakefield proposals is expected to be
  released for public exhibition and comment by
  October 1984, with a final decision expected in
  1985; and

* apart from cost considerations a clear advantage
  of the Port Wakefield site lies in its capacity
  for skip-function proof testing over a wide tidal
  sand area, one of only two such facilities in the
  world. This provides a very economical form of
  proof testing.

8. **16 Air Defence Regiment (16 AD Regt), Royal Australian Artillery** The Sub-Committee drove to Woodside, in the Adelaide Hills, and was briefed on the organisation, role, characteristics and tasks of 16 AD Regiment. The Sub-Committee was entertained at lunch in the Officers' Mess, following which it inspected a static display of some of the Regiment's equipment.

9. Major points to emerge from the briefing included:

* the role of 16 AD Regiment is to assist in the
  provision of low-level and very low level (i.e.
  to 15,000 ft) air defence, a responsibility
  shared with elements of the RAN. RAAF is
  responsible for air defence above 15,000 ft.

* its current strength was 385 all ranks. Principal
  weapons are the RAPIER missiles (capable of
  engaging aircraft flying at up to 1.2 mach over
  distances of 12 km) and Redeye (450 knots).
  Redeye is soon to be replaced.

* There were three projects within the current Five
  Year Development Plan which have direct
  implications for 16 AD Regt:

    1. Redeye replacement, the main contenders for
     which seem to be the Stinger (US), the Mistral
     (French), the Blowpipe Javelin (UK) and the
     RBS-70 (Swedish);

    2. Rapier upgrading, due for incorporation in the
     Regiment in 1986-87; and

3. the rebuild of Woodside, by early 1986, at a cost of $15 million.

* Training areas for 16 AD Regiment were more than adequate, and were one of the advantages of the Regiment's current location.

10. **RAAF Base Edinburgh** The Sub-Committee was briefed on the organisation, role, characteristics and tasks of RAAF Base Edinburgh. Points to emerge from the briefing and inspections included:

* units located at Edinburgh area:

    . HQ RAAF Base, Edinburgh;
    . Base Squadron, Edinburgh;
    . 92 Wing (P3 Orion aircraft) consisting of:

        . 10 Squadron) operational martitime
        . 11 Squadron) squadrons;

        . 492 Squadron (maintenance)
        . 292 Squadron (training and operational analysis)

    . 1 Recruit Training Unit (1 RTU)
    . Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU);
    . 24 Squadron (Air Force Reserve)
    . Airman Aircrew Flying Training School (AAFTS)

* 92 Wing has a major operational role in surveillance, but also has search and rescue responsibilities. Surveillance patrols are conducted regularly within the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ), after consultation with the Australian Coastal Surveillance Centre. Detailed sortie planning is done at Edinburgh. Some 50 per cent of the current Orion tasking would still occur during wartime.

* Authorised aircraft establishment strength of 92 Wing is 20 aircraft - 10 P3B and 10P3C. Four old P3B have been sold back to Lockheed; replacement P3C begin arriving in October 1984. Effective operational strength at any one time is 14 aircraft.

* In addition to fishery surveillance patrols, 92 Wing also conducts open ocean patrols, primarily over the Indian Ocean, from the Royal Malaysian Air Force Base,Butterworth, Malaysia. It also has search and rescue (SAR), anti-submarine warfare and minelaying roles and capabilities.

* The Officer Commanding RAAF Base Edinburgh is responsible to the Air Officer Commanding Support Command in his command responsibilities for ARDU, IRTU and AAFTS, and to the Air Officer Commanding Operational Command for all other Edinburgh-based units.

* Other unit roles are:

    * **ARDU**: conducts all flying and weapon testing for the RAAF, develops test flying techniques, conducts original research, experimental and development work;

    * **IRTU**: conducts the recruit training of all other rank recruits to the RAAF, men and women. It does not train officer recruits or apprentices.

    * **24 Squadron**: recruits reserve personnel with special skills assessed as necesary within overall RAAF requirements. The reservists are located in other units in Edinburgh and they are eligible for exercises and operational training.

    * **AAFTS**: trains all airmen aircrew for the RAAF. Other trade training, following recruit training, is conducted at different RAAF establishments.

11.   The Sub-Committe inspected the facilities of RAAF Base, Edinburgh, and then flew from Adelaide to Perth on a P3B Orion aircraft. En route, Sub-Committee members were able to observe the methods of operation of various items of surveillance equipment and were briefed on the equipment and capability differences between the obsolete P3B aircraft and the new P3C aircraft.

12.   **HQ 5th Military District, Perth, (HQ 5MD)** The Sub-Committee was briefed on the role of HQ 5MD and on activities conducted within the Military District (MD). Points which emerged in the briefing and subsequent questions were:

* as with all MD Commanders, Commander 5MD has four 'hats' as a commander. He is responsible directly to Army Office as a military district commander, but also has three-fold command responsibilities, to the General Officers Commanding Field Force, Logistic and Training Commands, for aspects of the command of various units located within the military district.

* 5MD is mainly an Army Reserve MD, the major Regular
  units being the Special Air Service Regiment and 22
  Construction Squadron. Army Reserve strength in the MD
  is approximately 3000. Regular strength is
  approximately 1300.

* Accessible training facilities/areas within the MD are
  fairly limited; this situation is likely to worsen,
  especially with the return to State control of the
  Rottnest Island facilities by 1 January 1985.

* With the exception of the south-east of the State and
  the Pilbara region, much of Western Australia is not
  adequately covered in terms of military mapping.
  Perhaps only 20-25% of the State is mapped at 1:50,000
  scale, and only perhaps 40% by 1: 100, 000 cover. The
  remainder has 1:250,000 coverage, but this is
  inadequate for tactical military purposes.

* The command arrangements established for Exercise
  Kangaroo 83 enabled many valuable lessons to be learnt.
  There seemed to be a potential for conflict between
  over-lapping headquarters, with differing command
  responsibilities as units were deployed forward.

* The WA Government has directed the State Emergency
  Service to establish continuous links with Defence
  through a Joint Planning Committee located in HQ 5MD.

13.   The Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) The
Sub-Committee visited the SASR at Campbell Barracks, where it was
briefed on aspects of SASR roles, organisation and tasks.
Training facilities were inspected, and the opportunity was
provided, through luncheon in the SASR Sergeants' Mess, for
informal discussions with Warrant Officers and Senior NCOs of the
Regiment.

14.   The Sub-Committee, in addition, received a classified
briefing on SASR current responsiblities for counter-terror
operations.

15.   Major points which emerged from the unclassified
briefing included:

* the nature of SASR's conventional role requires a
  higher proportion of officers/senior NCO's than
  in other units of the Field Force.

* SASR intelligence gathering operations fall into
  two categories, surveillance and
  reconnaissance.Another major role of the SASR is
  the 'recovery' from enemy control of personnel or
  equipment.

* SASR operations, in a war environment, should be commanded and controlled at the highest level, consistent, however, with both the nature of the task and the theatre of operations.

* the SASR is not capable of simultaneously maintaining both its conventional operational role and its specially assigned counter-terror role.

* the need to retain counter terrorist roles and capabilities detracts from the unit's ability to practice and maintain its conventional roles.

16.   **HMAS Stirling** The Sub-Committee travelled to Garden Island, on Cockburn Sound to the south of Perth. It was briefed on the organisation and roles of HMAS Stirling and inspected the facilities of the base. From the briefing and questions, several points arose:

* HMAS Stirling has a capability to provide concurrent dockside support for up to four destroyers and three submarines. It presently provides home porting for one destroyer, a survey ship, an Attack-class patrol boat and a Fremantle-class patrol boast. In 1985 it is planned that a second destroyer and another Fremantle-class patrol boat will be home ported at HMAS Stirling.

* HMAS Stirling's design permits a fourfold expansion capacity above the present level of home ported vessels.

* Approximately 360 Service personnel are currently based at HMAS Stirling; they are supported by about 50 civilians also working on Garden Island.

* HMAS Stirling provides servicing facilities to foreign naval visits to Western Australia. The most frequent visits are by the US Navy. The base has permanently installed nuclear monitoring facilities.

* A major problem for HMAS Stirling will arise when the facilities at the Fremantle slipway (owned by the WA Government) will be withdrawn in the near future. There are no comparable facilities in the west to enable out-of-water work on larger vessels; home ported vessels will then be required to go to eastern facilities. A dry dock facility could be constructed on Garden Island, but there is potential for a degree of incompatability in co-locating an operational naval base and a civilian staffed dockyard.

17. **RAAF Base Pearce** The Sub-Committee travelled 45 km to the north east of Perth to visit RAAF Base Pearce. It was briefed on the organisation, roles, characteristics and tasks of the Base, and its units. An inspection tour of base facilities was also undertaken.

18. Major points arising included:

* RAAF Base Pearce is responsible to, and under command of, the Air Officer Commanding Support Command for normal daily responsibilities. In circumstances where the bare RAAF base at Learmonth is activated, OC RAAF Base Pearce becomes additionally responsible to the AOC Operational command in respect, solely, of responsibilities connected with Learmonth.

* The roles of RAAF Base Pearce are:

> . advanced flying training;
> . engineer cadet training;
> . support to current RAAF operational activities (e.g. Indian Ocean surveillance operations).

* Personnel strength at June, 1984 totalled 1140; 1103 Service personnel and 37 civilians.

* The role of 25 Squadron (Air Force Reserve) is to provide a basis for expansion if required and to provide specialist/skilled support to the host base where possible. The squadron faces a number of problems:

   * **finance**: the annual wages bill is $0.3 million; this equates to 40 man days/year when up to 60 man days/year is the assessed requirement;

   * **manpower**: there is only a relatively small population base from which to draw in recruiting; and

   * **distance**: most specialist training is done only in eastern states, which imposes quite significant travelling costs.

* Engineer Cadet Squadron, Detachment A was established in January 1982 at Pearce, to meet an expansion need from RAAF Frognall. Its role is as for RAAF Frognall — to provide a Service facility from which cadets can attend civil engineering training at local institutions. Current cadet strength is 53. 1985 will

be the final first year intake; by 1988 the Squadron will wind down, consistent with the opening of the Australian Defence Force Academy from 1986.

*   The role of No.2 Flying Training School (2 FTS) is to train RAAF and RAN student pilots to graduation standard on Macchi jet aircraft. Its current rate of effort is 15,500 hours/year. It has 53 officers on staff, with 47 Macchi jet trainers, 1 Caribou and 2 Iroquois helicopters. The average failure rate is 25%, which has been a relatively stable figure over 20 years. 2 FTS also has a secondary role to provide an RAAF search and rescue capability as required.

PROGRAM: TOUR OF DEFENCE FACILITIES
SOUTH AUSTRALIA & WESTERN AUSTRALIA
18-20 JUNE 1984

Monday, 18 June 1984

1. 10.30 am: arrive HQ 4th Military District, Keswick Barracks

2. 10.30 - 11.00 am: briefing, HQ 4th Military District

3. 11.00 - 11.30 am: travel to Woodside

4. 11.30 - 12.30 am: briefing, 16 Air Defence Regiment (16 AD Regiment)

5. 12.30 - 1.15 pm: lunch, Officers' Mess, 16 AD Regiment

6. 1.15 - 2.00 pm: travel to Edinburgh

7. 2.00 - 5.00 pm: briefing and inspections, RAAF Base, Edinburgh

8. 5.30 (CST) - 10.00 pm (WST): travel to Perth, RAAF P3 Orion aircraft

Tuesday, 19 June 1984

1. 9.00 - 9.30 am: briefing, HQ 5th Military District

2. 10.00 - 12.00 noon: briefing and inspection, Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment, Swanbourne Barracks.

3. 12 noon - 1.00 pm: lunch, Sergeants' Mess, SAS Regiment

4. 1.00 - 2.00 pm: travel to HMAS Stirling

5. 2.00 - 4.00 pm: briefing and inspection, HMAS Stirling

6. 4.00 - 5.00 pm: return to Perth

7. <u>5.00 pm</u>: discussions with Mr Mal Bryce, MLA, WA Deputy Premier, Minister for Industrial Development, Technology and Defence Liaison. (Conference Room, 8th Floor, 32 St. George's Terrace, Perth).

<u>Wednesday, 20 June 1984</u>

1. <u>9.30 - 12 noon</u>: briefing and inspection RAAF Base, Pearce

2. <u>12 noon - 1.30 pm</u>: lunch, Officers' Mess, RAAF Base, Pearce

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

Sub. No.	Author	Page	Date Authorised For Publication
1	Mr J.H. Robinson	S147	28 February 1984
2	Brigadier R.A. Sunderland	S150	28 February 1984
3	The National Council of the Australia Defence Association	S194	28 February 1984
4	Mr Hinze	S224	28 February 1984
5	Mr G.J. Browne	S246	28 February 1984
6	Major General J.D. Stevenson (Rtd)	S101	28 February 1984
7	R.D. James	S257	28 February 1984
8	Mr P.G.C. Body	S262	28 February 1984
9	Sperry Computer Systems	S263	6 March 1984
10	Brigadier H.V. Macdonald	S265	6 March 1984
11	Commodore J.A. Robertson, RAN (Rtd)	S269	6 March 1984
12	Wing Commander J.A. Treadwell RAAF (Rtd)	S304	6 March 1984
13	Warrant Officer 2 I.A. Kuring	S319	6 March 1984
14	Rear Admiral G.R. Griffiths, RAN, (Rtd)	S72	6 March 1984
15	The Navy League of Australia	S347	6 March 1984

16	Colonel J.O. Langtry, (Rtd)	S59	20 March 1984
17	Mr C.M. Brigden	S360	20 March 1984
18	Gruman International Inc.	S420	20 March 1984
19	C3 Pty Limited	S478	20 March 1984
20	Department of Defence	S1	20 March 1984
21	Department of Defence Support	S53	20 March 1984
22	The Returned Services League of Australia	S494	27 March 1984
22A	The Returned Services League of Australia		30 August 1984
23	Citizen Military Forces Association	S498	5 June 1984
24	Department of Communications	S523	5 June 1984
25	Department of Foreign Affairs	S42	24 May 1984
26	Brigadier P.J. Greville (Rtd)		13 August 1984

Witnesses Who Appeared at Hearings

Department of Defence	Date	Place
Sir William Cole, Secretary	20 March 84	Canberra
Air Chief Marshal Sir Neville McNamara, KBE, AO, AFC, AE, RAAF, then Chief of Defence Force Staff	20 March 84	Canberra
Rear Admiral M.W. Hudson, RAN, Assistant Chief of Defence Force Staff	20 March 84 24 May 84	Canberra
Mr A.K. Wrigley, Deputy Secretary	20 March 84 24 May 84	Canberra
Air Vice Marshal R.G. Funnell, RAAF, Chief of Operations and Plans, Air Force Office	23 May 84	Canberra
Rear Admiral I.W. Knox, RAN, Chief of Naval Operational Requirements and Plans, Navy Office	23 May 84	Canberra
Major General N.R. Smethurst, MBE, Chief of Operations, Army Office	23 May 84	Canberra
Air Vice Marshal B.H. Collings, RAAF, Chief of Joint Operations and Plans	24 May 84	Canberra
Air Commodore I.B. Gration, AFC, RAAF, Director-General Joint Operations and Plans	4 June 84	Canberra
Air Commodore G.W. Talbot, AFC, ADC, RAAF, Director, Service Intelligence, Joint Intelligence Organisation	4 June 84	Canberra
General Sir Phillip Bennett, AO, DSO, Chief of Defence Force Staff	13 Sept 84	Canberra
Air Marshal S.D. Evans, AC, DSO, AFC, RAAF, Chief of Air Staff, Royal Australian Air Force	18 Sept 84	Brisbane
Vice Admiral D.W. Leach, AC, CBE, MVO, RAN, Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Australian Navy	18 Sept 84	Brisbane

Department of Defence Support

Mr C.H. Halton, CBE, Secretary	24 May 84	Canberra
Mr C.W. Barclay, Acting First Assistant Secretary, Defence Industry and Purchasing Division	24 May 84	Canberra
Mr B.W. Oxley, Assistant Secretary, Central Secretariat	24 May 84	Canberra

Department of Foreign Affairs

Mr J.H.A. Hoyle, Assistant Secretary, Pacific Branch	24 May 84	Canberra
Mr R.J. Percival, Assistant Secretary, International Security and Policy Planning Branch	24 May 84	Canberra
Mr M.R. Ovington, Head, Defence Plans and Policy Section	24 May 84	Canberra

Returned Services League of Australia

Sir William Keys, OBE, MC, National President	9 May 84	Canberra
Major General D. Vincent, CB, OBE (Rtd), Defence Adviser to the National Executive	9 May 84	Canberra
Commodore K.D. Gray, DFC, RAN (Rtd), Member, National Defence Committee	9 May 84	Canberra
Mr I.J. Gollings, National Secretary	9 May 84	Canberra

Private Citizens

Rear Admiral G.R. Griffiths, AO, DSO, DSC, RAN, (Rtd), 105 Neerim Road, Castle Cove, New South Wales	24 May 84	Canberra
Colonel J.O. Langtry, DCM, (Retd), Executive Officer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory	24 May 84	Canberra
Major General J.D. Stevenson, AO, CBE, (Rtd), 69 Stevenson Street, Kew, Victoria.	24 May 84	Canberra