THE PARLIAMENT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Joint Standing Committee
on
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade



AUSTRALIA'S PARTICIPATION

IN PEACEKEEPING

December 1994

Australian Government Publishing Service

Canberra

Cover: Somalian Child Next to Australian Wheat Sack in Danuungy
Photograph by Corporal Gary Ramage
Courtesy of the Department of Defence

CONTENTS

TERMS OF REFERENCE

In view of Australia's involvement in Cambodia and Somalia, to inquire into Australia's participation in peacekeeping activities (including UN, UN-authorised and non-UN activities), with particular reference to:

- Australia's defence policy and strategic environment;
- impact on the ability of the Australian Defence Force to perform its primary roles;
- costs and impact on the Defence budget;
- non-military organisations (eg Australian Federal Police, Australian Electoral Commission) and non-government organisations;
- potential for regional cooperation; and
- the need for change in UN management of peacekeeping operations.

*The term 'peacekeeping' is used generically to include peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacebuilding and other peace support operations.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE JOINT STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE

37th Parliament

Senator S Loosley (Chairman)
Hon M J R MacKellar MP (Deputy Chairman to February 1994)
Mr R G Halverson OBE MP (Deputy Chairman from February 1994)

Senator M Beahan (to February 1994)
Senator V W Bourne
Senator D G C Brownhill
Senator C Chamarette (to September 1993)
Senator H G P Chapman
Senator B K Childs
Senator N A Crichton-Browne
Senator K J Denman (from February 1994)
Senator B Harradine
Senator G J Jones
Senator D Margetts (from September 1993)
Senator D MacGibbon (to August 1993)
Senator The Hon M Reynolds
Senator B C Teague (from August 1993)
Mr R A Atkinson (from February 1994)
Mr A R Bevis MP (to May 1994)
Hon N Blewett MP (to February 1994)
Mr G Campbell MP
Hon M J Duffy MP (from February 1994)
Mr L D T Ferguson MP
Mr E J Fitzgibbon MP
Mr G D Gibson MP
Mr E L Grace MP
Mr D P M Hawker MP
Mr N J Hicks MP
Mr C Hollis MP
Mr D F Jull MP (from June 1994)
Hon R J Kelly MP (from May 1994)
Hon J Kerin MP (to February 1994)
Mr J V Langmore MP
Hon L S Lieberman MP
Hon J C Moore MP (to June 1994)
Hon L R S Price MP
Hon D W Simmons MP
Rt Hon I McC Sinclair MP
Mr W L Taylor MP

A/g Secretary: Mr P Stephens (to May 1994)
Secretary: Ms J Towner (from May 1994)

SUB-COMMITTEE PHOTOGRAPH



Committee Members: (left to right)

Standing:

Mr E L Grace, MP; Senator D G C Brownhill; Senator D Margetts; Hon L S Lieberman, MP; Mr N J Hicks, MP; Senator B C Teague; Ms G Gould (Secretary); Mr W L Taylor, MP

Sitting:

Mr D P M Hawker, MP; Hon M J R MacKellar, MP; Hon L R S Price, MP, Chairman); Senator S Loosley; Hon D W Simmons, MP; Mr E J Fitzgibbon, MP

Absent:

Rt Hon I McC Sinclair, MP (Deputy Chairman); Mr R G Halverson, OBE, MP; Senator G N Jones; Mr G Campbell, MP

MEMBERSHIP OF THE DEFENCE SUB-COMMITTEE

37th Parliament

Hon L R S Price MP (Chairman)
Rt Hon I McC Sinclair MP (Deputy Chairman)

Senator D G C Brownhill
Senator G N Jones
Senator S Loosley (ex officio)
Senator D J MacGibbon (to August 1993)
Senator D Margetts (from October 1993)
Senator B C Teague (from August 1993)
Mr R A Atkinson MP (from March 1994)
Mr A R Bevis MP (to May 1994)
Mr G Campbell MP
Mr E J Fitzgibbon MP
Mr E L Grace MP
Mr R G Halverson OBE MP
Mr D P M Hawker MP
Mr N J Hicks MP
Hon J Kerin MP (to February 1993)
Hon L S Lieberman MP
Hon M J R MacKellar MP (ex officio) (to February 1994)
Hon J C Moore MP (to June 1994)
Hon D W Simmons MP
Mr W L Taylor MP

Secretary: Gillian Gould

Inquiry Staff: Marina Ellis
Rashida Khanbai
Lesley Cowan

Alan Tebb (Executive Development Scheme)

GLOSSARY

ACFOA	Australian Council for Overseas Aid
ACRES-A	Assistant Chief of the General Staff - Reserves
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFA	Australian Defence Force Academy
ADFWC	Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
ADSC	Australian Defence Studies Centre
AEC	Australian Electoral Commission
AFP	Australian Federal Police
ANZUS	Australia New Zealand United States Alliance
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CAA	Community Aid Abroad
CIPTC	Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre
CISS	Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CDF	Chief of the Defence Force
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CMF	Commonwealth Monitoring Force - Zimbabwe
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DHA	Department of Humanitanian Affairs (United Nations)
DPKO	Department of Peace Keeping Operations
FPDA	Five Power Defence Arrangements
HQADF	Headquarters Australian Defence Force
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IPSO	International Polling Station Officer
JSCFADT	Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MIF	Maritime Interception Force
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
PMC	Post Ministerial Consultation
PRC	Peace Research Centre
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
1RAR	1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
2/4RAR	2/4 Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment
RDF	Ready Deployment Force
RHC	Reinforcement Holding Company
RSL	Returned and Services League
SSCFADT	Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade

UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNBRO	United Nations Border Relief Operation
UNCIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF II	United Nations Emergency Force II
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNOMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNITAF	Unified Task Force in Somalia
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMCTT	United Nations Mine Clearance Training Team - Pakistan
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPKO	United Nations Peacekeeping Operation
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission in Iraq
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervisory Operation
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
WVA	World Vision Australia

LIST OF TABLES/FIGURES

FOREWORD

On 28 July 1993 the Minister for Defence referred the issue of Australia's participation in peacekeeping to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade for investigation. The Joint Committee charged its Defence Sub-Committee with the conduct of the inquiry.

The Committee considered the reference from the Minister timely. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War had ushered in a new era in international relations in which peacekeeping played an increasingly significant role. Since the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade tabled its report entitled *United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia* in the Parliament in May 1991, not only has there been a dramatic increase in the total numbers of personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations but there has also been a fundamental shift in the nature of peacekeeping. The Committee recognised that there were new matters to be considered which had resulted from changes arising from the ending of the Cold War and the significant commitments by Australia to peacekeeping.

In Australia the changes have been reflected in several ways. There has been a substantial increase in the numbers of Australian Defence Force personnel engaged in peacekeeping missions. In February 1993 a peak of 2012 ADF military personnel was engaged on a range of missions in troubled parts of the world. The significance of peacekeeping to Australia was reflected in the creation of the peacekeeping wing of the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre at Williamtown and an upsurge in the publication of monographs on peacekeeping.

Australia has become increasingly involved in non-traditional peace support activities such as facilitating elections, assisting in law and order and providing humanitarian relief.

Other governmental organisations have been drawn into peacekeeping in new and significant ways. The changed nature of peacekeeping has created different and extended roles for the Australian Federal Police and officers of the Australian Electoral Commission.

Non-government organisations have come to play a highly prominent role in post-Cold War peacekeeping, particularly where the mission has been concerned with the provision of humanitarian assistance or the care and repatriation of refugees.

The growth in peacekeeping has had implications for the commercial sector in Australia through the provision of goods and services both in support of the peacekeepers and the local communities.

The terms of reference for this inquiry focus to a large extent on the Australian Defence Force. Very early in the inquiry however it became evident to the Committee that peacekeeping is no longer an almost exclusively military activity but one which is increasingly involving civilian organisations.

While the military will undoubtedly continue to play a significant role in peacekeeping, it is likely that in future the long-term success of peacekeeping will depend to a very large extent on civilian organisations.

The overwhelming conclusion of this inquiry is that the nature of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War world has changed so dramatically that a quite fundamentally different approach must be taken to peacekeeping.

Firstly, the Committee believes that, if peacekeeping is to succeed in bringing about global peace and stability, an *integrated plan* must be devised cooperatively by the various components of each mission. This means that civilian organisations must be brought into the planning of peacekeeping by the United Nations and the Australian Government at an early stage.

Secondly - and most importantly - *long-term strategic goals* are integral to peacekeeping missions. No longer does it necessarily suffice to bring adversaries to the negotiating table. Experience in Somalia and Cambodia has demonstrated, in different ways, that the establishment of conditions to ensure ongoing peace and stability after the peacekeepers have withdrawn may be critical to the success of such missions.

The support given to this inquiry by the members of the Defence Sub-Committee, the interest shown by the wide range of individuals and organisations who provided evidence and the contribution of the staff of the Committee secretariat are greatly appreciated.



Hon Roger Price, MP
Chairman
Defence Sub-Committee

RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter One - Introduction

Recommendation 1

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade consult with appropriate non-government organisations to agree as a matter of urgency on a common terminology with respect to peacekeeping. (paras 1.3-1.8)

Chapter Two - The Changing Global Perspective: Implications for the United Nations

Recommendation 2:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government make provision for the fluctuating nature of its peacekeeping commitments in its budget arrangements for peacekeeping. (para 2.10)

Recommendation 3:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government give greater recognition to the increasing importance of the civilian functions in peacekeeping operations and seek to place appropriately skilled Australians in United Nations headquarters as well as in specific peacekeeping missions. (para 2.16)

Recommendation 4:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government give serious consideration to the likely prospects for ongoing peace and stability before committing Australian personnel to peacekeeping. (para 2.24)

Recommendation 5:

The Committee recommends that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade continue its efforts to focus the attention of the international community on preventive strategies and peace building. (para 2.26)

Recommendation 6:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government exert pressure on the international community to enter into the process of reform of the United Nations. (paras 2.29-2.32)

Recommendation 7:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government support current efforts to increase the safety of United Nations peacekeeping personnel, including through developing an effective international legal regime. (para 2.45)

Recommendation 8:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government make available to the United Nations officers with particular expertise in the development of concepts of operations and strategic planning. (para 2.47)

Recommendation 9:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to appoint and involve force commanders early in the planning stages of peacekeeping operations. (para 2.50)

Recommendation 10:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to expand the planning cell of the United Nations Secretariat to include military, civilian and financial experts. (para 2.52)

Recommendation 11:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to establish a strategic level headquarters comparable to the strategic headquarters of a national defence force; and that the strategic level headquarters also include representatives of civilian organisations. (paras 2.54-2.56)

Recommendation 12:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to create a United Nations General Staff for Peacekeeping. (para 2.61)

Recommendation 13:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government make available middle to high ranking officers, both military and civilian, on a long-term basis to the United Nations General Staff for Peacekeeping. (para 2.61)

Recommendation 14:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to provide Special Representatives and Force Commanders with the funds, staff and authority which would allow them to run their missions in a more autonomous and efficient matter. (para 2.64)

Recommendation 15:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to establish a permanent full time command and control operations centre in United Nations headquarters to support the field commanders and to integrate the operational, logistic, planning and intelligence requirements of each peacekeeping operation; and that a liaison officer for each force commander be located at the command and control operations centre. (para 2.65)

Recommendation 16:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government provide resources to the United Nations to assist in the development of a consistent command and control doctrine. (para 2.66)

Recommendation 17:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to press for urgent reform within the United Nations in New York. (para 2.80)

Chapter 4 - The Decision to Participate

Recommendation 18:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to respond positively to requests for Australian participation in peacekeeping operations. (para 4.1)

Recommendation 19:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government retain case by case consideration of requests to contribute forces to peacekeeping. (para 4.2)

Recommendation 20:

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence be provided with full supplementation for costs incurred where overseas deployments are involved. (para 4.12)

Recommendation 21:

The Committee recommends that the Government develop and publish an integrated policy on peacekeeping, taking into account the diversity of peacekeeping activities and objectives in the evolving international order. (para 4.36)

Recommendation 22:

The Committee recommends that the Government examine the feasibility of allocating an annual amount for peacekeeping. (para 4.38)

Recommendation 23:

The Committee recommends that a permanent secretariat be established to coordinate peacekeeping policy and decision-making. The secretariat staff should include representatives of all organisations involved in peacekeeping missions, namely the Department of Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Federal Police, Australian Electoral Commission, Non Government Organisations, the Defence Industry Committee and private suppliers. The secretariat should be sufficiently flexible to include representatives of other organisations which may come to be involved in peacekeeping. (paras 4.76-4.77)

Recommendation 24:

The Committee recommends that criteria should be developed for determining when Australia should contribute to and withdraw from peacekeeping and enforcement operations. (paras 4.78-4.81)

Recommendation 25:

The Committee recommends that any decision for Australian troops to operate under Chapter VII provisions of the United Nations Charter be endorsed by the Australian Parliament. (para 4.83)

Recommendation 26:

The Committee recommends that Australia should continue to make specialised contributions to peacekeeping operations which draw upon the particular expertise of the Australian Defence Force and Australian Federal Police and the

experience in civilian areas such as electoral assistance and administration of justice.

Chapter 5 - Impact on the Australian Defence Force

Recommendation 27:

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence consider international, and in particular United Nations, arrangements in force structure deliberations. (para 5.31)

Recommendation 28:

The Committee endorses the decision of the Government to create a fifth infantry battalion and recommends that it be established within two years. (para 5.67)

Recommendation 29:

The Committee recommends that a register of the availability of General Reservists for peacekeeping service be maintained; and that the register be updated on an annual basis. (para 5.76)

Recommendation 30:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force aim to reach a target figure of 25 per cent involvement of members of the General Reserve in peacekeeping activities. (para 5.76)

Recommendation 31:

The Committee recommends that the Defence Act 1903 s.50F (1) be amended to insert the words *and peacekeeping or peace operations* after the phrase *for the defence of Australia.* (para 5.79)

Recommendation 32:

The Committee recommends that legislation be enacted to ensure that civilian employment of the reserve personnel is protected for the period of call-up. (para 5.82)

Chapter 6 - Family Welfare and Support

Recommendation 33:

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence rigorously monitor the impact on Service families of deployment on peacekeeping missions, both during the deployment, and after the return, of ADF personnel. (para 6.24)

Chapter 7 - The Cost of Peacekeeping

Recommendation 34:

The Committee recommends that the Government reimburse the Department of Defence for all expenditure on peacekeeping activities. (para 7.27)

Recommendation 35:

The Committee recommends that special funding be allocated to the Australian Federal Police to support its contribution to peacekeeping. (para 7.34)

Chapter 8 - Involvement of Government Organisations

Recommendation 36:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government support the development of, and inclusion of, 'justice packages' as part of the peacekeeping and peace building missions in countries where the rule of law, and the infrastructure needed to support it, have manifestly broken down. (paras 8.19-8.21)

Recommendation 37:

The Committee recommends that consideration be given to the feasibility of attaching a representative of the Australian Federal Police to the Australian Mission to the United Nations in New York. (para 8.46)

Recommendation 38:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government provide the funding to enable the Australian Federal Police to expand its capacity to provide training opportunities for UNCIVPOL, especially in professionalism and human rights. (para 8.65)

Recommendation 39:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Federal Police peacekeeping role be given formal recognition as one of its specific roles. (para 8.66)

Recommendation 40:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Electoral Commission be included in the early planning phase of peacekeeping operations in which the conduct of elections is a significant element of the mission. (para 8.78)

Recommendation 41:

The Committee recommends that the finances allocated to the Australian Electoral Commission take into account its peacekeeping function. (para 8.78)

Chapter 9 - Non-Government Organisations

Recommendation 42:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force appoint a liaison officer to contingents deployed on

peacekeeping to coordinate the work of the military with the activities of Non-Government Organisations. (para 9.22)

Recommendation 43:

The Committee recommends that consideration be given by the Australian Defence Force to facilitating secondment of officers to Non-Government Organisations on rotation. (para 9.23)

Recommendation 44:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force involve Non-Government Organisations in pre-deployment briefings with a view to drawing upon the in-country experience of Non-Government Organisation workers and setting up appropriate mechanisms for liaison while on deployment. (para 9.41)

Recommendation 45:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force offer places in appropriate training courses to representatives of Non-Government Organisations. (para 9.48)

Recommendation 46:

The Committee recommends that Cabinet contribute as much effort to post-deployment assistance as to the immediate needs of a crisis and factor both priorities into planning for a peacekeeping response. (para 9.63)

Recommendation 47:

The Committee recommends that unless provision can be made for post-deployment assistance the value of contributing to peacekeeping is diminished and should be rigorously re-assessed. (para 9.63)

Chapter 10 - Potential for Regional Cooperation

Recommendation 48:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government take steps to encourage regional cooperation in the sphere of peacekeeping. (para 10.27)

Recommendation 49:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government encourage regional countries and major allies to become more engaged in and contribute to peacekeeping operations. (para 10.27)

Chapter 11 - Training for Peacekeeping

Recommendation 50:

The Committee recommends that an Australian Peacekeeping Institute be established within the Australian Defence Studies Centre. Further, the Government undertake a feasibility study to determine whether or not the Australian Defence Studies Centre is the most appropriate location for the Institute. (para 11.64)

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 This inquiry into Australia's participation in peacekeeping has coincided - not unintentionally - with momentous changes in the nature of peacekeeping and in the levels of commitment of forces to peacekeeping missions by the international community.

1.2 'Peacekeeping' has extended beyond its traditional role of unarmed or lightly armed troops monitoring cease-fire agreements between combatants or supervising territories in dispute to encompass a wide range of activities from diplomatic actions aimed at removing the source of conflict before violence erupts to operations little short of outright war.

1.3 The terminology used to describe the various missions and operations which are aimed at containing conflict is evolving rapidly. The Committee recognises that, given the diversity of post-Cold War missions, it is no longer satisfactory to group all United Nations activities in support of peace under the traditional generic title of 'peacekeeping'. Indeed, some submissions suggest that 'peacekeeping' has a very specific meaning within the spectrum of peace support activities and expressed concern that the Committee should be using the term generically to include peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacebuilding and other peace support operations.

1.4 However, the problem which faced the Committee throughout this inquiry was finding a universally accepted terminology.

1.5 Both the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade furnished the Committee with their own definitions for different aspects of peacekeeping-type activities.[1]

1 These definitions are located at Appendix 4 of this report.

1.6 As the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade rightly observes, the lack of clarity and consistency in the use of terms has given rise to some confusion.[2]

1.7 While the Committee has itself experienced some awkwardness during hearings over the application of different terminologies, it has been more concerned that these differences will cause difficulties in the decision-making process within government.

1.8 In the absence of agreed and common terminology, for the purposes of this report the Committee has continued to use the traditional term *peacekeeping* as an encompassing term for all activities involving military operations in support of peace - peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement - unless specifically indicated otherwise.

Recommendation 1:

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade consult with appropriate non-government organisations to agree as a matter of urgency on a common terminology with respect to peacekeeping.

Conduct of the Inquiry

1.9 The inquiry was advertised in the national press on 7 August 1993. More than 50 submissions and supplementary submissions were received. Six public hearings were conducted in Canberra. Evidence was taken from the departments with particular responsibilities for peacekeeping, namely the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as from organisations and individuals with specific expertise or experience in particular aspects of peacekeeping.

1.10 Formal evidence provided to the Committee through submissions and public hearings was complemented by briefings and informal discussions during the Committee's visits to defence establishments and units. Members of the Committee had opportunities to meet infantry soldiers shortly after

2 DFAT, Submission, p.s228.

their return from Somalia and communicators who had served in Cambodia and Western Sahara.

1.11 It is fitting that the Committee place on record a tribute to the high calibre of the serving men and women who have represented Australia so impressively in the course of their peacekeeping duties overseas. The Committee was struck by their professionalism and zeal for their task. During the course of the inquiry it became apparent that the Committee's high opinion of our peacekeepers is widely shared by the Australian community.

1.12 The Committee also commends the members of the civilian components of peacekeeping missions - the electoral workers, the police and the administrators - as well as representatives of non-government organisations (NGOs) for their splendid contributions to peacekeeping. The Committee believes that many of these people have received far less public acclaim than they deserve yet their participation has been critical to the success of the missions.

Scope of the Inquiry

1.13 The terms of reference limit the scope of this inquiry to Australia's participation in peacekeeping. In dealing with the issues of regional cooperation, therefore, the Committee has focused on how Australia can contribute to furthering cooperation within the region as opposed to investigating the issue from a regional viewpoint.

1.14 Likewise, the need for change in UN management of peacekeeping operations has been approached from an Australian viewpoint. Much has been written elsewhere on the deficiencies of the UN and much has happened by way of reform of the UN. The Committee has focused on aspects of UN organisation which have particular relevance to Australia's participation in peacekeeping.

1.15 The Committee is mindful that the peacekeeping debate has been advanced considerably in recent years by the efforts of academics, departmental officers, military personnel and staff of non-governmental organisations in arranging conferences and seminars to address various aspects of peacekeeping. Members of the Committee have been privileged to attend a number of these functions.

1.16 In addition, the organisers of such conferences have made available to the Committee both published and unpublished volumes of conference papers and discussions. There is a wealth of valuable information available in these conference volumes.[3] Indeed, the Committee believes that a particularly valuable outcome of the conferences and seminars has been the availability of the papers to a far wider audience, including the United Nations organisation in New York. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans' monograph *Cooperating for Peace* also contributes a comprehensive overview of key issues in the debate.

1.17 It is not the intention of this Committee to duplicate unnecessarily the work of other participants in the peacekeeping debate. Rather, the Committee has sought to contribute to the debate through its powers - unique to Parliamentary Committees - to gather evidence not only from government departments, the Australian Defence Force, NGOs and other key organisations but also from a diverse group of citizens whose perceptions of peacekeeping have emerged from their personal experience and observations gained 'in the field'.

1.18 The Committee also acknowledges the valuable work of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade which culminated in the tabling of its report on UN peacekeeping in the Senate in May 1991.

1.19 In assessing the implications for Australia of the enormous upsurge in the levels of our contribution to peacekeeping since 1991, it is the hope of the Committee that this report will assist in ensuring that Australia continues to make a worthwhile contribution to global peace and security through the development of a comprehensive national peacekeeping policy.

3 Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADSC) conference (November 1989) 'Australia and Peacekeeping'; DFAT/PRC/Defence conference (March 1993) 'Peacekeeping at the Crossroads'; Lieutenant General John Grey AC, CGS Exercise (June 1993) 'Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future'; Lieutenant General John Sanderson AC conference (May 1994) 'International Peacekeeping: A Regional Perspective'. See Bibliography for details of volumes.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CHANGING GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

2.1 The international security environment has undergone a process of fundamental change since 1989. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union the threat of East-West confrontation has receded. Cold War threats to global security have been supplanted by a wide array of new security problems, often at regional level, including resurgent and frequently violent ethno-nationalism,[1] as well as social and economic disparity and civil and political rights. Localised conflicts - no longer contained by two dominant superpowers - have emerged as the most serious threat to international stability.

2.2 With the ending of the Cold War the international community - as it had done at the close of the other great wars - sought to find ways and means of dealing with the problems of conflict. The mechanism that appeared most suitable was one that had developed during the Cold War, that is, peacekeeping.

2.3 Post World War II peacekeeping had its origins in the United Nations (UN) in the late 1940s in response to confrontation in the Middle East and India-Pakistan. Initially, it took the form of small numbers of military observers drawn from a range of countries monitoring cease-fires or border areas in regions of conflict. Beginning with the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East in 1956 this was extended to larger formations which consisted of contingents provided by member states and which were stationed in areas of tension.

2.4 Troops were contributed almost exclusively by middle and small powers, not by the permanent members of the Security Council. This reassured parties to a dispute that they would not be subject to great power influence and reassured all UN members that peacekeeping would not be used by the major powers to gain a military presence in the country

1 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (hereafter DFAT), Submission, p.s227.

concerned.[2] Essentially these operations were carried out to maintain the status quo; they contributed to containing a conflict and gained time so that belligerents could be brought closer to the negotiating table and a more enduring settlement achieved.[3]

2.5 While the UN sought to stay out of the Cold War, it nonetheless found that it could play useful roles at the margin.[4] One such role was peacekeeping. Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans QC, also observes that peacekeeping, which is neither defined nor described in the UN Charter itself (although implicitly authorised by Chapter VI), has been fairly claimed as an invention of the UN.[5]

2.6 With the demise of Cold War tensions and the consequent reduction in the exercise of the veto in the UN Security Council, peacekeeping has been recognised for its potential to bring together major, middle and small powers for a common purpose in a way that was not possible during the Cold War.

2.7 Peacekeeping has also allowed states to demonstrate in a practical way their proclaimed concern to reduce the ravages of war and human misery.[6] Unfortunately, there has been no shortage of occasions on which the world has turned to the UN to deal with dire human problems.

2.8 As a result, peacekeeping operations have grown dramatically in number, size, complexity and cost. Eighteen peacekeeping operations have been established by the UN since 1988 compared with only 13 operations undertaken in the first 40 years of peacekeeping.

2.9 Post-Cold War peacekeeping is characterised by the monumental scale of recent interventions. For example, the mission in Cambodia involved 18 901 peacekeepers, the former Yugoslavia 22 063 and Somalia 30 800.[7] Member states of the UN have committed greater resources and numbers

2 Hugh Smith (ed), *International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience*, 1994, pp.201-2.
3 Department of Defence (hereafter Defence), Submission, p.s269.
4 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s292.
5 Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*, 1993, p.99.
6 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s293.
7 Peace Research Centre (hereafter PRC), Submission, p.s101.

of personnel than ever before to multinational efforts to maintain or restore peace.[8]

2.10 Peacekeeping however must necessarily respond to fluctuating demands which relate to international contingencies and decisions by the UN, thereby making it cyclic in nature.[9]

Recommendation 2:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government make provision for the fluctuating nature of its peacekeeping commitments in its budget arrangements for peacekeeping.

2.11 Moreover, the aspirations for a new world order which emerged in the euphoria of the UN's response to Iraq's act of aggression against Kuwait were not realised and the UN was faced with new challenges in Somalia, Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia.

2.12 The ending of the Cold War has brought considerably greater scope for multilateral cooperation in the prevention and resolution of conflict. It is evident that there has been a new determination to utilise the resources of the international community, in particular the UN, to seek to resolve regional conflicts. The international community has recognised that cooperative security arrangements offer the best means of addressing effectively international security concerns in the post-Cold War era.[10]

Nature of Post-Cold War Peacekeeping

2.13 As well as changes in the scale of peacekeeping, a fundamental shift in the nature of peacekeeping has occurred since the end of the Cold War:

> The new kind of peace support operation is far more complex than its predecessor. The level of military effectiveness that may be required from UN and multinational forces can go well beyond the parameters of a traditionally lightly armed peacekeeping force. In the post-Cold War environment, peace support operations are being used to prevent, contain, and help resolve conflicts, primarily between warring factions within

8 DFAT, Submission, p.s227.
9 See Annex 5.
10 DFAT, Submission, p.s227.

> nations. The expectation is that the UN can now play a greater role in resolving conflicts and maintaining order within States as well as between them.[11]

2.14 Indeed, there has been a greater tendency for peacekeepers to become more involved in the internal affairs of troubled nations than was hitherto considered acceptable. The Committee notes that the consent of the parties to the conflict as an essential precondition to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force is being less rigidly observed. The Committee is still of the view that every effort to consult and seek consensus on the peacekeeping role should be sought.

2.15 The Committee recognises however that a difficulty arises to a large extent from the fact that determining the acceptable authority with whom to negotiate is extremely problematical in a nation where law and order has ceased to exist, where the civilian infrastructure has completely broken down, where all opportunities for cooperation and consensus have failed and where, in the extreme, anarchy prevails. The UN was not set up to deal with civil wars and internal conflicts. That is one of its principal challenges today.[12]

2.16 The changed nature of peacekeeping is reflected in the diversity of functions that peacekeepers have been mandated to undertake. These have included supervision of elections and referenda, provision of humanitarian aid, repatriation of refugees, human rights monitoring, facilitation of the re-formation of police and military training.[13] Operations have also sought to establish national administration infrastructure and repatriation of refugees.

Recommendation 3:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government give greater recognition to the increasing importance of the civilian functions in peacekeeping operations and seek to place appropriately skilled Australians in United Nations headquarters as well as in specific peacekeeping missions.

11 Defence, Submission, p.s269.
12 PRC, Evidence, p.8.
13 PRC, Submission, p.s100-1.

2.17 Missions have also become more complex in organisational terms. Prior to 1988 only four of the 13 missions established could be characterised as multidimensional. Of the missions established since then, the majority have had explicit multidimensional functions and have included significant civilian components as well as military forces.

2.18 As Dr Smith pointed out in evidence to the Committee:

> ... the UN has taken on more ambitious tasks than ever before, including the rescue of states that have simply failed as viable entities and the conduct of 'free and fair' elections in states where democracy is unknown. Where once ideology would have driven Moscow or Washington to intervene, the former superpowers are now often reluctant to become involved. The international community, acting through the UN, must pick up the responsibility for dealing with the human suffering that is found on a massive scale in many states. If the UN does not undertake this task, it is difficult to see who will.[14]

2.19 The capacity of the UN for effective action, however, remains in doubt. Recent interventions, particularly in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, have called into question the ability of UN peacekeeping to help build enduring peace in conflict-torn areas.[15] There is a growing concern that the UN has been overburdened with expectations of the role that it can effectively play in dealing with the problems now emerging. Indeed, the expansion in the number, size and complexity of peacekeeping operations has occurred largely without real debate or explicit consensus on the development of the UN's role - and the practical limits to that role.[16]

Stresses on UN Peacekeeping

2.20 The proliferation of crises involving UN intervention has imposed enormous stresses on UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War. The resources of the UN have been stretched to near breaking point both financially and organisationally.

14 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s293.
15 PRC, Submission, p.s101.
16 DFAT, Submission, p.s247.

2.21 For instance, the total cost of UN peacekeeping is estimated to have risen from $US400 million in 1991 to $US3.7 billion in 1993. The UN's regular budget for 1993, by contrast, was just over $US1 billion, with total assessed contributions to specialised agencies amounting to a further $US1.7 billion.[17]

2.22 Human resources have proven woefully inadequate to support the expanding needs of peacekeeping. Of the approximately 14 000 UN secretariat personnel, only about 650 are involved in peacekeeping management. The majority of these are deployed in the field, leaving around 150 officers in New York to manage what is the highest profile and most active function of the UN.[18]

2.23 Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the UN is increasingly being regarded as the first resort in dealing with conflicts and humanitarian emergencies. The inherent danger here is that not only will this overburden the UN but that it may also take the UN into situations where it can have little effect. Peacekeeping missions may find themselves locked into states where no functioning government can be established and no working infrastructure can be set up to ensure that the population is fed and cared for.

2.24 The Committee believes that in considering where the UN should establish peacekeeping forces, due attention must be given to the long-term prospects of political settlement. The UN does not at this time have the resources to intervene in every crisis. Consequently the UN may have to be more selective in its decisions about the situations in which it will intervene.

Recommendation 4:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government give serious consideration to the likely prospects for ongoing peace and stability before committing Australian personnel to peacekeeping.

2.25 The need for selectivity in where to deploy peacekeepers however must necessarily be coupled with greater efforts by the international

17 See Chapter Seven.
18 Colonel Osborn, Evidence, pp.322-3.

community to find ways of preventing emerging disputes from escalating into armed conflict.

2.26 The Committee commends the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and officers of his department for their efforts to focus attention on preventive strategies and peace building in the ongoing debate about the role of the UN and the international community in securing world peace.

Recommendation 5:

The Committee recommends that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade continue its efforts to focus the attention of the international community on preventive strategies and peace building.

2.27 The Committee recognises that the UN is at this stage an imperfect mechanism for dealing with the escalating numbers and complexities of present day conflicts. Not only is the UN constrained by lack of resources, but other factors are likely to influence the UN's response to a particular crisis. According to Professor Dibb:

> The Gulf War showed that, on the one hand, nations will support collective security action where the issues are clear cut and their interests - in that case economic interests - are at stake. On the other hand, there are complex problems, such as in Yugoslavia, that do not have clear cut military or diplomatic solutions and where other nations' vital interests are not at stake.[19]

2.28 Notwithstanding these difficulties, the UN is 'the only fully empowered cooperative security body with global membership we have'.[20] It is likely that the UN will remain the principal agent of peacekeeping as it is the only body with universal standing, the ability to levy assessed contributions to finance peacekeeping and a demonstrated ability to assemble multinational peacekeeping forces. It is the body to which member states first refer - and are likely to continue to refer - threats to international peace and security.[21]

19 Professor Dibb, Evidence, p.237.
20 Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*, pp.188-9.
21 DFAT, Submission, p.s246.

2.29 Any blame for lack of effectiveness and the onus for action rests squarely on the shoulders of the member states which make up the United Nations. The Committee agrees with Colonel Osborn's view:

> The 184 member states of the UN are collectively responsible for the direction, the performance and the wellbeing of the organisation. Ultimately, therefore, any improvements in its performance and efficiency are largely dependent upon the willingness of governments to approve constructive proposals and to back them financially.[22]

2.30 The Committee recognises that many member states are still adjusting to the changing international environment and have not formulated clear-cut policies which allow them to contribute effectively to the debate.

2.31 Moreover, the rapid expansion in peacekeeping operations has occurred at a time when there is global recession and the majority of countries are dealing with shrinking military budgets and considerable reductions in their defence forces.[23]

2.32 It is therefore incumbent upon countries such as Australia, which have considerable experience in peacekeeping, to exert pressure to bring about reform and to bring other member states best placed to do so to enter into the reform process.

Recommendation 6:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government exert pressure on the international community to enter into the process of reform of the United Nations.

The Need for UN Reform

2.33 The deficiencies of the UN are well known and much has been written elsewhere on this issue.[24]

2.34 The Committee is pleased to note that several significant reforms have been achieved in the conduct of peacekeeping. For example, the Secretary

22 Colonel Bruce Osborn, Evidence, p.320.
23 Colonel Osborn, Evidence, p.320.
24 In particular see Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*, Chapter 11.

General has taken action to address such issues as early warning, fact-finding, confidence building measures, personal contacts and 'good offices'. In addition, the UN has put in place new forms of preventive diplomacy. It has created peacebuilding mechanisms such as an office to deal with electoral assistance requests by member states.[25] Experts in training, mine clearance and civilian police have also been recruited by the UN.

2.35 Moreover, a number of structural changes have been implemented in order to improve the effectiveness of the UN in conducting operations. In the first place, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has been restructured which has enabled all UN field missions, including relevant elements of procurement, to be brought together under the one coordinating body. Importantly, the Field Operations Division which is responsible for logistics and procurement for peacekeeping has been integrated into DPKO.

2.36 A particularly welcome reform has been the creation of a 24-hour Situation Room in DPKO to monitor and maintain communications with operations in the field to satisfy the information requirements of decision-makers at the UN. This is a major improvement over the situation where the UN operated on a 'nine-to-five' basis. Steps have also been taken to improve the flow of information between the Department and member states, in particular troop contributors.[26]

2.37 The Committee was advised that work has also begun on developing a comprehensive UN manual on logistics policies and procedures. A small policy unit has been established to work with member states on the evolution of peace support doctrine. There is an urgent need for the UN to complete work on a consolidated manual of standard operating procedures.[27]

2.38 The Committee welcomes these and other reforms but recognises that the process of change will inevitably occur only slowly in a bureaucratic organisation of the size and complexity of the UN. The Committee was therefore somewhat concerned with the proposition by the Minister for Defence that:

25 Defence, Submission, p.278.
26 DFAT, Submission, p.s248; Captain Swinnerton, Evidence, p.23.
27 Defence, Submission, p.s280.

> ... unless the UN can take action to rectify obvious deficiencies in military planning of UN operations, the various defence agencies around the world, Australia included, will be far less likely to want to be involved in UN peacekeeping in future.[28]

2.39 The Committee shares the Australian Government's concern that the UN is overstretched and under-resourced to deal with its growing agenda of international peace and security crises and appreciates the long road to reform. However, the Committee would be reluctant to see Australia withdraw its support for UN peacekeeping on these grounds.

2.40 While welcoming the reforms outlined above, the Committee draws attention to a number of specific concerns relating to mandates, planning for peacekeeping missions and the conduct of operations which were raised in evidence to the inquiry.

Mandates

2.41 Obviously each mission must be clear whether its authority emanates from Chapter VI of the UN Charter which empowers the Security Council to employ peaceful measures to settle disputes (Articles 33-38) or Chapter VII (Articles 39-51) which authorises the Security Council to institute enforcement measures.[29] The goals of any mandate must be clear and the

28 Defence, Submission, p.s282.

29 Article 33 of Chapter VI sets out the means by which pacific settlement of disputes might be pursued: 'negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice'. Under Article 34 the Secretary General may investigate any dispute or situation to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger peace and security. The Secretary General is empowered under Articles 36-38 to recommend means of settling disputes peacefully. Other than the moral suasion derived from Article 33, the Security Council's principal activity under Chapter VI has been to establish, through recommendations under Articles 36-38, military observer missions and peacekeeping forces mandated to determine whether agreed ceasefires are being maintained, and to act as a disincentive or to provide a buffer to reduce the possibility of renewed conflict.

Under Chapter VII the Security Council is empowered to take action with respect to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. This Chapter sets out the Council's principal enforcement powers. Under Article 41 the Security Council may decide what measures (not involving the use of armed force) are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, including economic and communications sanctions. Article 42 authorises the Security Council to 'take such action by air, sea

force structured and resourced to achieve those goals. However, the Committee was told that:

> It has been a continuing and very valid complaint by commanders of UNPKOs that their mandates are political; that they are political compromises worked out in the Security Council; and, in the nature of diplomatic double speak, they are sometimes vague and imprecise. That is the way you reach diplomatic solutions sometimes, but it is not very useful for military commanders in the field; they need precise, realistic and objective mandates. There has been some improvement in that area in recent peacekeeping operations ...[30]

2.42 The documents concerning peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Rwanda, for example, have contained much clearer proposed mandates for the peacekeeping operations than hitherto.[31]

2.43 Developing mandates is easier when the peacekeeping operation is based on a political settlement. The Paris Agreement of October 1991, for example, provided the framework for a clear mandate to be developed for the UNTAC mission in Cambodia. Indeed, the Force Commander, Lieutenant General Sanderson, attributes much of the success of the Cambodian operation to the existence of the clear mission based on the Paris Agreement.[32]

2.44 The problem of mandates is often manifest in the lack of a strategic plan for a mission. The absence of a strategic plan tends to blur the direction in which a mission is progressing, making it difficult for the UN to recognise any fundamental changes in the nature of the mission and to take relevant action. This is particularly true of situations in which there is a shift of focus from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

2.45 The Committee is concerned that to change or extend an original mandate to encompass enforcement could place at risk the peacekeeping forces which may not be prepared or equipped for such a role. Such a

or land forces as may be necessary' to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockades and other operations by air, sea or land forces of UN member states. See Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*, pp.18-24.

30 Mr Boreham, Evidence, pp.105-6.

31 Mr Boreham, Evidence, p.92.

32 Lieutenant-General Sanderson, Evidence, p.503.

change in role could also bring into question the neutrality of forces designated for peacekeeping.[33]

Recommendation 7:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government support current efforts to increase the safety of United Nations peacekeeping personnel, including through developing an effective international legal regime.

2.46 The Department of Defence in its submission to the inquiry suggested that mandates include sunset clauses to prevent protracted peacekeeping operations such as UNFICYP.[34] This view is borne out by the case of Cyprus where several nations have withdrawn or are about to withdraw their personnel on the grounds that no progress has been made towards a settlement.[35]

Planning for Peacekeeping

2.47 The Committee was presented with evidence that planning for some missions was not integrated or coordinated but undertaken in a piecemeal way for different components of the mission. It was alleged that, very often, the UN does not develop a 'concept of operations' or 'operations plan' for UN missions.

Recommendation 8:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government make available to the United Nations officers with particular expertise in the development of concepts of operations and strategic planning.

2.48 Of particular concern to Australia is the fact that the cumbersome and disorganised nature of the UN planning procedures reduces the time available for planning at the national level.[36]

33 Defence, Submission, p.s280.
34 Defence, Submission, p.s280.
35 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s304.
36 Defence, Submission, pp.s277-8.

2.49 UN procedures for planning in conjunction with (and not after) the decision to deploy a peacekeeping operation need improvement. This will assist in providing early advice of force composition and requirements which is necessary to allow for effective preparation by troop contributors.

2.50 The Committee believes that commanders for peacekeeping should be appointed early and be directly engaged in the preliminary planning. The UN also needs to provide detailed documentation about the operation and the political environment in the planning phase to help contributors prepare for any such operation.

Recommendation 9:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to appoint and involve force commanders early in the planning stages of peacekeeping operations.

2.51 Some improvement in planning for peacekeeping has emanated from troop-contributing countries establishing early contact with each other and by providing officers to the UN headquarters in New York.

2.52 The Committee believes that the planning cell in the Secretariat should be expanded into a larger, central planning office, combining military and civilian planners and financial experts.

Recommendation 10:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to expand the planning cell of the United Nations Secretariat to include military, civilian and financial experts.

2.53 The UN database on national capacities for contributions of personnel and equipment to assist the UN identification of potential contributors at an early stage should be expanded.

Conduct of Operations

2.54 The Committee was told that the UN Secretariat does not have the resources to provide in a timely fashion the advice and knowledge required

to manage ongoing operations on a day-to-day basis.[37] A strategic level headquarters is required to receive a range of advice on not only military but also civilian issues.

2.55 Captain Swinnerton identified a need for a strategic headquarters comparable to the strategic headquarters of a national defence force. In Captain Swinnerton's view:

> It is almost an intercultural position that is required between the political directive of the Security Council and the requirements of the force commander ... A strategic headquarters is needed that can take that political language and turn it into orders and directives. That headquarters would also be in a position to conduct strategic planning for operations, to better manage the liaison with troop contributing countries, to issue the actual orders that are required to get the operation moving, and then to monitor the operation through its progress in a way that allows changes to be made.[38]

2.56 A well-organised, well-staffed, experienced headquarters is crucial to any military operation.[39] This applies as much to UN operations as it does to national military operations.

Recommendation 11:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to establish a strategic level headquarters comparable to the strategic headquarters of a national defence force; and that the strategic level headquarters also include representatives of civilian organisations.

2.57 In an effort to enhance the UN's capacity to plan and manage peacekeeping operations, several countries have posted military representatives to New York to liaise directly with the UN Secretariat. DFAT advised that, as at 8 December 1993, 50 military staff were seconded to the UN Secretariat from member states at no expense to the UN.

2.58 Thirty-two of these were attached to the Military Adviser's office and were located in the Situation Centre (23), the Standby Forces Planning

37 Colonel Osborn, Evidence, p.323.
38 Captain Swinnerton, Evidence, pp.22-3.
39 Defence, Evidence, p.72.

Team (7), the UNOSOM Planning Team (1) and the Haiti desk (1). They held the ranks of colonel (2), lieutenant colonel (7), major (15), captain (2), warrant officer (1) and staff sergeant (3). Eighteen seconded personnel were attached to the Field Operations Division in the following ranks: lieutenant colonel (2), major (13), captain (3).

2.59 The 50 officers were seconded from the armed forces of 26 member states, namely Australia (2),[40] Argentina (1), Belgium (1), Canada (5), Denmark (1), Egypt (1), Finland (2), France (6), Germany (4), Ghana (1), Indonesia (1), Italy (1), Jordan (1), Netherlands (3), Norway (2), New Zealand (1), Pakistan (1), Poland (2), Russia (1), Sweden (1), United Kingdom (4), Ukraine (1), Uruguay (1), United States of America (3), Venezuela (1) and Zimbabwe (2).

2.60 In addition to the secondment arrangements described above, the Committee was told that some attempt had been made to provide for dedicated permanent military planning staff.

2.61 It was suggested to the Committee that a UN General Staff for Peacekeeping should be created, drawing upon middle and high-ranking officers from member states' military forces and civilians with suitable expertise.[41] This would require a long-term commitment of valuable senior staff to the UN. As Boutros-Ghali has observed, it is not possible to establish permanent structures with staff on loan from member states.[42]

Recommendation 12:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to create a United Nations General Staff for Peacekeeping.

Recommendation 13:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government make available middle to high ranking officers, both military and civilian, on a long-term basis to the United Nations General Staff for Peacekeeping.

40 This has since increased to seven.
41 DFAT, Submission, p.s248; C R Ashwin, Submission, p.s288.
42 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s304.

2.62 One witness raised the idea that, in the absence of resources required to manage operations appropriately, consideration might be given to operations being conducted under the auspices of the UN or UN Security Council resolution by a lead nation.[43] Alternatively, the headquarters staff and early deployment contingent could be formed from groups of countries which have already established cooperative arrangements and capability for interoperability between their armed forces.

Command Arrangements

2.63 Evidence to the Committee suggested that the UN is not well set up to command and control operations.

2.64 Special Representatives and Force Commanders are not given the funds, the staff and the day-to-day authority which would allow them to run their missions in a more autonomous and efficient manner.

Recommendation 14:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to provide Special Representatives and Force Commanders with the funds, staff and authority which would allow them to run their missions in a more autonomous and efficient matter.

2.65 The Committee was informed of the need for a permanent full time command and control operations centre in the UN Headquarters in New York to support the field commanders and to integrate the operational, logistic, planning and intelligence requirements of each peacekeeping operation. In addition, each commander of a peacekeeping operation should have a liaison officer at this centre.[44]

Recommendation 15:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government urge the United Nations to establish a permanent full time command and control operations centre in United Nations headquarters to support the field commanders and to integrate the operational, logistic, planning and intelligence requirements of each peacekeeping operation; and that a liaison officer for each force commander be located at the command and control operations centre.

43 Colonel Osborn, Evidence, p.324.

44 Defence, Submission, p.s280.

2.66 Within the UN there is a need for a consistent command and control doctrine. Moreover, an enhanced system for coordination and dissemination of intelligence input relevant to peacekeeping is necessary for implementation of peace enforcement operations and the security of peacekeeping troops in any operation.[45]

Recommendation 16:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government provide resources to the United Nations to assist in the development of a consistent command and control doctrine.

Training for Peacekeeping

2.67 Dr Smith suggested to the Committee that one of the underlying problems of the UN has been its inability to bring military professionalism to bear on many aspects of military peacekeeping activities. According to Dr Smith, it is the Western countries that are in the best position to bring this kind of professionalism to peacekeeping:

> In the first place [the Western countries] have the personnel and the resources available following the end of the Cold War - assuming, of course, that they do not cash all of the peace dividend. But, more importantly, some Western countries at least can demonstrate the benefits for peacekeeping of intensive training, modern logistic systems, effective discipline, high standards of personal integrity and acceptance of political authority.
>
> There will be some concern about this and complaints have been voiced at the UN that peacekeeping is dominated by white, Western nations. It should be pointed out, however, that the Western military model is not the exclusive domain of white and Western powers. The armed forces of countries such as Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Japan are for a variety of historical reasons based on the Western pattern. It may be possible to

45 Defence, Submission, p.s281.

follow the Western model while avoiding the political disadvantages of making peacekeeping a white man's club.[46]

2.68 While the Committee recognises that the Western model may be an appropriate model for the UN to follow, the Committee notes that professionalism is not the preserve of Western nations alone. Indeed, high levels of professionalism have been brought to peacekeeping by, for example, the Botswanans in Somalia, the Indonesians and Malaysians in Cambodia, and the Fijians in a wide range of peacekeeping missions. On the other hand some European nations - notably Bulgaria - have demonstrated scant regard for the ideals of peacekeeping.

2.69 The Committee believes that rigorous and specialised training for peacekeeping within the framework of military professionalism is essential for military personnel to make a consistently effective contribution to peacekeeping. Dr Salla told the Committee that for the best prepared UN peacekeepers - an estimated 15-20 per cent of peacekeepers currently deployed - training lasts from two weeks to two months. All of these programs are very similar in content. Besides providing some specific mission-orientation information, such as command structure, mandate specifics, and geo-political information, they focus exclusively on non-contact skills.[47]

2.70 The Nordic countries provide the largest number of teaching hours in their training programs for conflict resolution skills and for cross-cultural orientation. To place this in perspective, approximately five per cent of course time in any of the Nordic programs (either national or regional) is spent in these two areas.

2.71 Dr Salla maintains that training across a number of areas is generally poor. Moreover, there is little standardisation of training or empirical research to confirm the effectiveness of training as it relates to field activity.

2.72 Recent peacekeeping operations suggest that there is a critical need for training designed to promote awareness of human rights.[48] In Somalia, for example, some 26 non-governmental organisations filed complaints of

46 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s303.
47 Dr Salla, Submission, p.s525.
48 This issue is addressed more fully in Chapter 5 of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade's report entitled 'A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights', November 1994.

human rights violations against UN troops. This sort of abuse not only undermines the prospects for success of an operation but is also likely to create problems that will persist long after the UN has left.[49] Moreover, it tarnishes the image of the UN.

2.73 It has been suggested that an International Staff College should be established to train the trainers and for officer training. The Committee believes that this is an ambitious project and addresses the question of training institutions in Chapter Eleven.

Is Reform Enough?

2.74 The Peace Research Centre (PRC) at the Australian National University argued in its submission that much has been written on UN reform, financial difficulties, overall management of UN peacekeeping, mandates, command and control with minimal result. A more radical approach is needed.

2.75 In essence, the PRC postulated that if peacekeeping and UN intervention is conceived through traditional approaches, then it will continue to have limited success. In the traditional framework, settlement of disputes has been associated with compromise which has generally favoured the status quo. It is argued that this approach may be effective in cases where conflicts are mainly over territorial or resource issues. It is seriously deficient, however, when the basis of the conflict is the protection of societal values or cultures.

2.76 The PRC submission suggests that most current conflicts involve protection of societal values. Traditional conflict management approaches miss the essential causes. While settlement may initially be reached, it will not provide a long-term sustainable resolution to the conflict - which should be the highest priority.

2.77 PRC's view points to the assumption that violent conflict has traditionally been seen as an inherent, unchangeable aspect of human existence. If, however, violent conflict is seen as being caused by certain sets of social and environmental conditions which can be changed, there is a greater prospect of achieving long-term peace.

49 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s305.

2.78 The primary goal of third party assistance therefore is to facilitate constructive forms of communication and a more positive relationship between the parties, enabling a long-term durable solution to be generated by the parties themselves.[50]

2.79 The diversity of experience in post-Cold War peacekeeping gained through providing, for example, the Force Commander in Cambodia and the deployment of substantial contingents of infantry, communicators and medical personnel, stands Australia in good stead to make constructive proposals to the UN for improving its effectiveness in planning and conducting peacekeeping operations.

2.80 The Committee notes that Australia has identified a number of areas in which the Australian mission to the UN is continuing to press for reform.[51] For example, Australia:

- has recommended a substantive review of the way in which the UN Secretariat is resourced and organised to meet its peacekeeping responsibilities;[52]

- participates on the UN Special Committee on Peace Keeping Operations which was established to find ways of improving the management of UN peacekeeping;

- participates in an informal 'Contact Group'.[53] In close consultation with the UN Secretariat the group reviews a range of management, financial and budget issues. The UN Contact Group has considered, for example, proposals on the issue of the safety of UN personnel;[54]

- is currently urging the creating of a new working collegiate executive of four Deputy Secretaries-General to work with the Secretary-General - responsible respectively for Economic and Social Affairs, Peace and Security Affairs, Humanitarian Affairs and Administration and Management;

50 PRC, Submission, pp.s102-7.
51 These reforms are outlined in the DFAT submission to the committee pp.s247-51.
52 See also Colonel Osborn, Evidence, pp.323-4.
53 DFAT, Submission, p.247.
54 Defence, Submission, p.s281.

- has proposed that the UN develop a dispute resolution service within the UN Secretariat;

- advocates the strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs and increasing coordination, information-sharing and early warning capacity among and between the various elements of the UN system; and

- has proposed reform of the Security Council to enlarge its membership to make the Security Council more widely representative of the broad range of interests and perspectives of UN member states.[55]

Recommendation 17:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to press for urgent reform within the United Nations in New York.

2.81 The Committee supports these and other initiatives of the Australian government in New York.

2.82 Whatever the prospects for long-term solutions, it is clear that peacekeeping - like the UN itself - is going through a period of rapid evolutionary change. Dr Smith points out that, as with evolution in nature, there are likely to be many false starts which lead nowhere, a prodigious waste of effort and resources, and the eventual survival only of those forms which prove most adaptable. It is of course possible that the new demands which peacekeeping makes on the political environment - the willingness of states to make major long-term commitments to dangerous operations - will prove too great.

2.83 A truly reinvigorated international body may be able to ensure the success of all kinds of peacekeeping operations. If, however, the UN fails to develop effective ways and means of avoiding conflicts, it will find itself struggling with the growing demand for peacekeeping. Members will lose

55 Address to the 49th General Assembly of the United Nations by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans, QC, 3 October 1994.

faith and will look to other responses. Either way, peacekeeping is a litmus test of the viability of the international body.[56]

56 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s306-7.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CHANGING GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA

3.1 Two significant implications for Australia of the changing global perspective were raised in evidence to this inquiry in the context of Australia's role in peacekeeping.

3.2 Firstly, as a result of the collapse of the East-West strategic balance, Australia faces a more complex and uncertain strategic outlook.[1] This has implications for Australia's security arrangements and for its overall approach to participation in peacekeeping operations.

3.3 Secondly, as the international community has embraced peacekeeping as the means of dealing with conflict, there have been increasing demands placed on Australia to participate more extensively in multinational peacekeeping operations. This has involved not only the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the organisations traditionally participating in peacekeeping operations, but also staff of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), human rights officials and non-government organisations (NGOs), as well as private enterprise.

Strategic Outlook

3.4 Australia's strategic environment is benign. Australia faces no military threat to its security either now or in the immediate future. There are, however, major strategic changes occurring within the Asia-Pacific region. These changes have been manifested most clearly in the closure of US bases in the Philippines and in the growing influence of regional powers such as China and Japan.

3.5 In evidence to the Committee, Professor Paul Dibb identified a number of potential flashpoints within the Asia-Pacific region:

1 Professor Dibb, Evidence, p.243.

> ... in our own part of the world there are still outstanding territorial issues, the South China Sea being the most obvious example of a potential flashpoint in that regard, and there are still Cold War ideological issues, to wit, the Korean peninsular. If I were to nominate one area that concerns me greatly, it is the potential for eruption for war in the Korean peninsular. The second one is clearly the South China Sea, the third and interesting area is Burma and the fourth one would be India and Pakistan.[2]

3.6 The prospects for Australia's strategic outlook are therefore much more complex and uncertain than they were in the Cold War era.

3.7 Indeed, strategic concerns in the region have provided the incentive for Asia-Pacific states to open a broader and more focused regional security dialogue, including through the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Consultations (PMC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum.[3]

3.8 Against this background Australia continues to maintain a close alliance with the United States which complements the doctrine of self-reliance.

3.9 Professor Dibb warned that, while the alliance with the US remains an important element of defence policy, Australia needs to take into account the fact that the United States, as a result of the disintegration of the Eastern bloc, is in the process of developing a new policy to accommodate the post-Cold War world and is experiencing some difficulties in refocusing. The ANZUS alliance therefore is also in the process of undergoing a fundamental change.

3.10 The concept of regional security was integrated into Australia's defence policy through the 1989 Strategic Review. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) observed that, with the Cold War over and new opportunities to pursue international cooperation on security issues, it appears timely to integrate into our defence doctrine a third concept - that of multilateral security arrangements - as well as self-reliance and regional security.

2 Professor Dibb, Evidence, p.264.
3 DFAT, Submission, p.s236.

3.11 DFAT, in evidence to the inquiry, argued strongly that Australia has a particular stake in the development of effective multilateral security arrangements:

> Australia is a middle level economic power aligned within the ANZUS framework and the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) but it is not a member of any cohesive regional grouping with a political and/or security dimension comparable to ASEAN, NATO, or the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. Demography and economics mean that Australia's relative advantage in national military capacity in our region is rapidly being eroded and the gap will close fast as regional countries' economic growth continues. At the same time, our future prosperity relies on stability and growth in the Asia-Pacific. So we must develop patterns of cooperation with these countries beyond the economic sphere.[4]

3.12 Professor Dibb acknowledged that it is important for Australia to contribute to global endeavours to develop new multilateral security mechanisms - of which UN operations are but one part. Professor Dibb argues, however, that new international security mechanisms which are emerging do not replace the security gained from a strong independent defence posture focused on the defence of Australia, regional strategic commitments and a continuing strong alliance with the United States.[5]

3.13 While not suggesting that Australia abandon its alliance arrangements, the Committee agrees with DFAT that more emphasis should be given to developing regional and multilateral arrangements and to giving greater effect to the collective security provisions of the UN Charter.

> As there are practical limits on our capacity to influence our own security environment, and as we judge that it will be some time, if ever, before regional security arrangements match those globally through the UN Charter, Australia's national interests are served by conflict prevention, management and resolution through UN mechanisms. Indeed, it is a feature of the UN that it affords small and medium-sized countries, such as Australia, a significant say on international issues.[6]

4 DFAT, Submission, p.s233.
5 Professor Dibb, Evidence, p.243.
6 DFAT, Submission, p.s233.

Peacekeeping

3.14 One of the strongest implications for Australia of the changing strategic environment has been in the realm of peacekeeping. As the international community has embraced peacekeeping as the most promising response to local and regional conflicts, new demands have been - and are continuing to be - placed on Australia to participate more extensively in multinational peacekeeping.

3.15 Australia has been involved in 19 of the 31 UN peacekeeping operations which have been conducted since 1948. Up until the deployment of approximately 300 troops to UNTAG in Namibia in 1989-90 however Australia's contributions were relatively small.

Australia's Contribution to Peacekeeping since 1948

3.16 Australia has participated in UN missions in the Middle East, Africa, the Indian Sub-Continent, the Mediterranean and South East Asia. The average number of Australian participants in each mission and the period in which Australia was involved are shown in the table at Appendix 5.

3.17 In addition, Australia has supported UN-authorised peace enforcement operations, namely the Korean War and the Gulf War.

3.18 Australia has also participated in several non-UN, multi-national peacekeeping missions:

- UNITAF - from December 1992 until March 1993 Australia contributed a 937-strong battalion group to the US-led, UN-sanctioned Unified Task Force in Somalia. Australia's mission (*Operation Solace*) was to provide security to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the Baidoa Humanitarian Relief Sector.

- CMF - in 1979-80 Australia contributed a contingent of 152 ADF personnel to the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe;

- Operation Provide Comfort (Habitat) - between 16 May 1991 and 16 June 1991 some 72 Army and 3 RAAF medical, dental, engineering and logistic personnel were deployed to Turkey and Iraq to assist Kurdish refugees;

- MFO - 26 ADF personnel were deployed from January 1993 as HQ staff with the Multinational Observer Force: 23 in the Sinai, 1 each in Cairo, Tel Aviv and Rome; and

- MIF I and MIF II - a RAN Task Group operated in the Gulf of Oman since September 1990 as part of the Maritime Interception Force.

3.19 Up to 9 Army field engineers were deployed on rotation with the UN Mine Clearance Training Team (UNMCTT) in Pakistan and Afghanistan from July 1989 to December 1993.

3.20 Two AFP officers served with the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) on the Thai/Cambodian border from February 1989 until May 1993.

3.21 ADF personnel were also seconded to assist in planning and logistics in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York.

Non-traditional peacekeeping

3.22 The emphasis on peacekeeping in post-Cold War conflict resolution has resulted in Australia receiving requests for, and committing, large contingents to UN or multinational forces. Since the operation in Namibia, an infantry battalion of over 900 soldiers was deployed in Somalia while up to 650 ADF personnel served in Cambodia. Following the decision by Cabinet on 25 July 1994 to support UNAMIR, a contingent of 308 ADF personnel - predominantly medics - was deployed to Rwanda initially for six months.

3.23 Non-traditional peace support activities have, in many cases, altered the function of the defence force from traditional peacekeeping activities to creating conditions in which other agencies can be successful. This has extended to maintaining law and order.

3.24 The changed nature of peacekeeping has also had significant implications for civilian organisations. For example, many peacekeeping operations have over many years had civilian components such as civilian

police.[7] New challenges are being presented for civilians where civil infrastructure has completely broken down.

3.25 Peacekeeping missions in support of free and fair elections have also involved officers of the Australian Electoral Commission in new endeavours. For instance, 28 electoral officers contributed to the election in Namibia in late 1989 and some 50 AEC staff assisted with the Cambodian election from mid-1992 to mid-1993.[8]

3.26 Non-government organisations have come to play a highly prominent role in post-Cold War peacekeeping, particularly where the mission has been concerned with the provision of humanitarian assistance or the care and repatriation of refugees.[9]

3.27 Australia has provided appropriately skilled persons to the UN to perform civilian duties, on a secondment basis, and opportunities have existed for individuals to approach the UN directly to participate in peacekeeping operations.[10]

3.28 DFAT pointed out that an aspect of civilian involvement in peacekeeping which deserves more attention is the role of the supplier of goods and services to these operations.

3.29 The Committee was informed that some Australian businesses quickly seized the opportunities created by increasing peacekeeping activity as the UN's first large-scale, expanded peacekeeping operation got off the ground in Cambodia. Over $150 million in UNTAC contracts alone were won by Australian companies in diverse areas such as telecommunications (AOTC/Telstra), modular housing and office complexes (Ausco and MBS Pty Ltd) and catering services (Morris Catering Australia Pty Ltd). Morris Catering was the sole supplier to UNTAC, providing food and water supplies to over 16 000 peacekeepers throughout Cambodia. Morris Catering was also chosen to supply the 31 000 UN peacekeepers of UNOSOM II - a contract worth over $100 million.[11]

---

7 The implications for civilian police are addressed more fully in Chapter Eight of this report.

8 Further information on the involvement of the AEC is to be found in Chapter Eight.

9 See Chapter Nine for detailed information on the contribution of NGOs.

10 DFAT, Submission, pp.s243-4.

11 DFAT, Submission, p.s245.

3.30 Civilians are involved in all peacekeeping operations at some level. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly accepted that there are many ways and means of contributing to a peace process other than the strictly military or policing functions.

3.31 There are implications for Australia in the increasing involvement of civilians in peacekeeping which relate to the degree and type of civilian participation, the training and preparation of civilians and the possibility of deploying civilian peacekeeping forces in place of military contingents.

3.32 The Committee notes, however, that civilian training is far less planned and organised than military preparation for peacekeeping. It also observes that there is a need for combined civilian and military training.

3.33 There is also the question of providing protection for Australian civilians involved in peacekeeping whether as formal members of peacekeeping operations, seconded officials, private contractors, members of NGOs or individual volunteers.

3.34 The relatively small contributions by Australia to peacekeeping prior to the deployment of the substantial contingents to Namibia, Somalia, Cambodia and Rwanda has meant that until now there has not been a pressing need for the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to plan and implement major policy relating to peacekeeping operations.

3.35 The Committee therefore looked closely at the way in which the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade have approached the issues surrounding Australia's decisions to participate in peacekeeping in recent years. This forms the topic of the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DECISION TO PARTICIPATE

4.1 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Defence together have primary responsibility for providing advice to Government on requests from the UN for Australia to participate in peacekeeping operations.

4.2 Decisions to commit ADF personnel to peacekeeping missions are made on a case-by-case basis.

Recommendation 18:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to respond positively to requests for Australian participation in peacekeeping operations.

Recommendation 19:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government retain case by case consideration of requests to contribute forces to peacekeeping.

4.3 Factors which are taken into account before committing Australia to a peacekeeping operation include:

- support for international institutions, including the desire to be a 'good international citizen' (and to be seen as such);
- humanitarian concerns;
- direct Australian political and strategic interests;
- alliance and regional benefits; and
- benefits to the ADF.

4.4 These factors are balanced against what can loosely be termed the risks and costs of participating in particular peacekeeping operations. These include:

- danger to Australian personnel;
- regional and domestic sensitivities;
- diversion of ADF resources from primary roles; and
- the financial costs of contributing to a particular operation.[1]

4.5 DFAT describes its role with respect to peacekeeping as one of central policy coordination, as distinct from an operational role. According to DFAT, its broad policy role encompasses driving UN reform processes, assessing general UN directions and discussing peacekeeping issues with other governments.

4.6 In relation to particular contributions to peacekeeping, DFAT's responsibilities are to advise the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Minister for Defence and, in significant cases, the Prime Minister, in their joint decision making on particular requests by the UN. The advice will take into account Australia's general policy of support for peacekeeping, interests in the particular country or region and the likely prospects for the success of the peacekeeping operation.

4.7 DFAT relies on the Department of Defence, the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police to advise them on the availability of forces, the suitability of their deployment in specific requests and other operational factors such as whether the level of risk is acceptable.[2]

---

1 Defence, Submission, pp.s271-2.

2 Within DFAT, peacekeeping is primarily the responsibility of the UN Political and Commonwealth Section (International Organisations Branch, International Organisations and Legal Division). The UN Political and Commonwealth Section is also responsible for Australia's support for UN reform and the enhancement of the UN's preventive diplomacy and peacemaking functions. The Section has six staff, including one dedicated peacekeeping desk officer. Provision is made for other officers of the Section and the Branch to assist with specific matters relating to a number of specific peacekeeping operations.

Geographic branches of DFAT provide advice to the UN Political and Commonwealth Section on bilateral and regional factors relevant to Australia's contribution to peacekeeping. In a few cases - the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and the UN Special Commission to Iraq (UNSCOM) - other branches have the lead role in operations. Australian participation in and policy on peacekeeping is also of direct interest to the Strategic Assessments Branch. Procurement issues are handled by the Business Liaison Section (National Trade Strategy and Business Liaison Branch, Economic and Trade Development Division). See DFAT, Submission, pp.s231-2.

4.8 The Department of Defence provides advice on the ability of the ADF to meet the requirements of proposed operations. Defence informed the Committee that its advice is based on consideration of the nature of the operation, its duration, and the logistics of the operation.

4.9 The Department of Defence has published guidelines on factors to be taken into account when considering commitment of ADF personnel to a peacekeeping operation.[3] The Committee observes that lists such as the Defence guidelines are careful to include all possible factors for consideration.[4]

4.10 In evidence to the Committee Captain Swinnerton highlighted the factors which, in practice, are of particular relevance in formulating advice to the Minister for Defence:

- particular skills of ADF personnel which may not be readily available from other nations are taken into account;

- the extent to which Australia's involvement is likely to be influential or decisive. For example, the provision of communications support to the MINURSO operation in Western Sahara was decisive in achieving coherence and consistency in the operation of that group;

- the extent to which the proposed operation has an achievable end state. This may be an arbitrary end-date as in Somalia or a mandated aim such as the referendum in Western Sahara and the election in Cambodia;

- the training value to the ADF of the involvement, given the finite amount of training funds available to the ADF. Operations such as UNITAF, for example, offered effective training in low-level land operations in an arid region similar to Australia; and

- financial considerations - whether the defence budget could support the operations or whether supplementation can be provided.[5]

---

3 *Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role*, pp.12-13.

4 Exhibit No 7, p.4.

5 Captain Swinnerton, Evidence, pp.26-28. Also Exhibit No 7, p.4.

4.11 The Committee was told that the order of priority of these considerations is contingent upon the area in which the mission is likely to occur.

4.12 The Committee believes that financial supplementation should always be provided where additional overseas deployments are involved.

Recommendation 20:

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence be provided with full supplementation for costs incurred where overseas deployments are involved.

4.13 The Committee noted that there are no formal mechanisms such as inter-departmental committees for addressing peacekeeping issues. Consultation between Defence and DFAT occurs on an informal basis. Both departments assured the Committee that this system had worked relatively well.

4.14 While consultation between the departments was effective, the Committee noted that differences of opinion exist between Defence and DFAT on Australia's participation on peacekeeping. The relative differences between the positions of the two departments were characterised in evidence to the inquiry by one observer as a clash between *nationalist* and *globalist* perspectives.

4.15 Arguably the attitude of the Department of Defence is encapsulated in the nationalist perspective:

> The nationalist perspective begins with the interests of Australia. National defence is the first priority, risks are to be avoided, resources are to be harboured. Peacekeeping can be contemplated only if it does not detract from Australia's key military capabilities. Certainly, some benefits may be gleaned from peacekeeping in terms of effective training, the testing of equipment and enhancing the morale of personnel but these are to be set against a possibly serious diversion of effort and funds. The nationalist perspective is somewhat more at ease with peacekeeping in Australia's own region. The link to Australia's security can be more easily perceived, the consequences of failing to act more easily recognised.[6]

6 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s294.

4.16 On the other hand, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade leans more towards the globalist perspective which stresses universal principles:

> Conflict anywhere causes misery and tension which might spread if they are not contained. To help establish democracy is important whether it is close to home or in a distant continent. Human rights by definition have no geographic boundaries. Such an approach sees every reason to send Australian peacekeepers to the Western Sahara, Somalia, the Middle East or Afghanistan.[7]

4.17 The Committee believes that the fundamental difference of outlook between Defence and DFAT is reflected in their respective opinion on the extent to which the ADF should be involved in promoting Australia as a 'good international citizen' through peacekeeping.

Defence of Australia versus 'Good International Citizen'

4.18 DFAT's commitment to Australia's role as a 'good international citizen' has been most recently manifested in its strong support for sending an ADF peacekeeping contingent to assist in providing humanitarian relief in Rwanda. Defence, however, perceives that such use of the ADF is principally serving 'other national interests'.[8]

4.19 Foreign Affairs seeks to take advantage of a perceived 'peace dividend' and a benign strategic environment and therefore focuses on the wider picture and longer-term strategies at the global level. Defence prefers that peacekeeping commitments should be largely confined to Australia's region of strategic interest where they will serve national interests of regional stability and security. This accords with the fundamental priorities for defence policy, namely the defence of Australia. The Committee observes, however, that apart from Cambodia peacekeeping operations in recent times have occurred - and are more likely to occur - outside Australia's area of direct military interest.

4.20 Arguably, Australia's contributions to peacekeeping serve an important national defence interest by generating stable global peace. This interest is as effectively served by operating outside of Australia's area of strategic interest region as within it.

7 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s294.

8 *Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role*, p.4.

4.21 Indeed, the case was put to the Committee that the defence of Australia may best be served by the development of international peace and stability in general. Given that Australia's current strategic environment is benign, Australia is in a favourable position to contribute to global peace and security. In the last analysis, it is argued, Australia's security depends more on the avoidance of global disorder than on building up its own ramparts.

4.22 In the view of the Peace Research Centre, the most important principle guiding participation in peacekeeping is the obligation to fulfil international citizenship responsibilities and the need to work towards a stable world system in the light of ever increasing interdependence among states.[9]

> [P]eacekeeping is really a fulfilment of our international political responsibility ... It should be seen as part of Australia's contribution towards the guaranteeing of international peace and security, even if it is outside of our immediate area of strategic concern.[10]

4.23 In a slightly different vein, DFAT suggested that a pragmatic consideration might be taken into account in contributing peacekeepers outside the region, that is, should the need for UN intervention in the region arise, it would be in Australia's interest that other countries be prepared to contribute to a peacekeeping force outside their own neighbourhood. It follows that Australia should itself contribute to operations further afield than its own region.[11] Defence itself recognises this consideration.[12]

4.24 Notwithstanding these considerations Defence maintains that:

> Demonstration of 'good international citizenship' is insufficient of itself to drive decisions on where peacekeeping fits into Defence priorities.[13]

4.25 In summary, the Committee concludes that the fundamentally divergent views of the two main government departments imply a lack of clear government policy direction on peacekeeping. The Committee believes

9 PRC, Submission, p.s97.
10 Dr Clements, Evidence, p.9.
11 DFAT, Evidence, pp.97-8.
12 *Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role*, p.4.
13 *Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role*, p.1.

that these differences of view can be illustrated by the decision to withdraw the de-mining team from UNMCTT in Afghanistan in December 1993. Though this was not a peacekeeping operation, the decision clearly illustrates the different perspectives of Defence and DFAT.

The Decision to Withdraw from Afghanistan

4.26 Australian de-miners were attached to UNMCTT from 1989 to December 1993 to assist in training Afghan personnel in mine clearance techniques. The team consisted initially of six ADF personnel (later reduced to three) who were rotated every six months.[14]

4.27 Nine nations began operations in UNMCTT in 1989.[15] All nine have now withdrawn their support for the program. Australia was the last nation to withdraw, departing Pakistan in December 1993.[16]

4.28 DFAT described the decision to withdraw as an operational decision by the Minister for Defence.[17] The Department of Defence justified this decision on the grounds that a threat existed to the security of ADF personnel conducting the mine clearance operations and that Australians were not being supported by the people in Afghanistan at the time.[18]

14 Commodore Oxenbould, Evidence, p.67.
15 The countries which have been involved in the UN Mine Clearance Training Team in Afghanistan and the duration of their commitment is as follows:

Country	Start	Withdrawal
Australia	17 July 89	5 December 93
Canada	23 March 89	24 Nov 90
France	1 Feb 89	6 Jan 90
Italy	30 March 89	31 Aug 90
New Zealand	18 April 89	30 Sept 91
Norway	15 March 89	30 April 93
Turkey	2 Feb 89	31 August 90
United Kingdom	21 Aug 89	31 August 90
United States	1 Feb 89	25 Jan 91

Source: Defence, Submission, p.s471.

16 See Evidence, pp.67-71.
17 Mr Boreham, Evidence, p.107.
18 Commodore Oxenbould, Evidence, pp.68-69.

4.29 The Committee received a number of submissions challenging this claim.[19] According to the Head of the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance in Afghanistan (UNOCHA) and Personal Representative of the Secretary General in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Mr Sotirios Mousouris, the threat to the security of the mine clearance personnel was addressed principally by ensuring that these operations were conducted in relatively peaceful areas of the country where there was support by the local people for these operations and appropriate security provided by the local authorities.

4.30 The mine clearance program and the Australian personnel serving in it have over the years received remarkable support from the Kabul government, the local authorities and the Afghan people themselves, despite the occasional tensions and fighting among the rival mujahideen groups which tended to interrupt the work. The government and the people of Afghanistan have very much appreciated the work of the Australian deminers and the contribution of the Australian Government.[20]

4.31 Evidence provided to the Committee suggested that the security of Australian personnel at the time of the decision to withdraw them was probably more assured than at any other time during the period of their attachment to UNMCTT.

4.32 On the basis of her experience with Austcare, Patricia Garcia maintained that:

> From AUSTCARE's direct experience with projects inside Afghanistan, from extensive contacts with NGOs in Pakistan, demining NGOs, there is no basis to assert that there would be very real threats to the lives of the people carrying out this programme nor any other humanitarian assistance programmes, other than those which any peacekeeping operation inevitably faces.
>
> This exaggerated claim of insecurity in Afghanistan from the Defence Department is undermining all the hard work and efforts of the NGOs such as AUSTCARE who are attempting to secure support for the Afghan people. It must be emphasised that donors and non-government organisations are already experiencing difficulties raising funds in Australia and increasing the awareness of the international community as to the plight of Afghan refugees, the largest refugee population in the world. This claim from Australian Government Departments will only serve to deter public support and involvement by those organisations with no previous experience in Afghanistan from becoming involved in the country's reconstruction efforts.[21]

4.33 The Committee believes that by contributing to UNMCTT Australia demonstrated its commitment to in-country peace building. The clearance of mines from agricultural lands and the rehabilitation of communities on those lands assists in the creation of conditions conducive to ongoing stability and peace.[22] After all, as Mr Curtis of World Vision Australia observed, people cannot go back onto their land until their agricultural land is de-mined.[23]

4.34 Given the efforts of DFAT to focus the attention of the international community on peace building, the Committee is surprised that the Government took the decision to withdraw the de-mining team.

4.35 By all accounts it seems that for a relatively small commitment, Australia was providing a very worthwhile and highly valued contribution to the peace building process in Afghanistan. The Committee believes that Australia's 'good international citizen' image has been somewhat tarnished by its withdrawal of support of UNMCTT.

Australia's Peacekeeping Policy

4.36 The Department of Defence promulgated its peacekeeping policy in a document published in June 1993.[24] The Committee commends the Department of Defence for undertaking the review of the role of the ADF in peacekeeping and the prospects for the future. The Committee notes with surprise that, while Defence has published this document, neither DFAT nor the Australian Government as a whole has published a consolidated peacekeeping policy document. This situation needs to be redressed.

19 See Submissions, p.s382, p.s384, p.s446.
20 Dr Maley, Submission, pp.s450-51.
21 Ms Patricia Garcia, Submission, p.s385.
22 DFAT, Submission, p.s461.
23 Mr Curtis, Evidence, p.212.
24 *Peacekeeping Policy: the Future Australian Defence Force Role*, Department of Defence, 1993.

Recommendation 21:

The Committee recommends that the Government develop and publish an integrated policy on peacekeeping, taking into account the diversity of peacekeeping activities and objectives in the evolving international order.

4.37 Defence understandably appears to be particularly concerned by the financial impact on the Defence budget of deploying peacekeepers:[25]

> Defence should not be expected to bear the additional costs of peacekeeping where the benefit is principally in other national interests.[26]

4.38 The Committee has some sympathy with this view. Considerable constraints have been imposed on the Defence portfolio which limit the allocation of resources to functions other than those related directly to the defence of Australia. The Committee is of the view that Government departments and bodies should not suffer any penalty for peacekeeping.

Recommendation 22:

The Committee recommends that the Government examine the feasibility of allocating an annual amount for peacekeeping.

4.39 While Defence seeks to place restrictions on its future participation for financial and other reasons, the Committee believes that a more realistic scenario is that Defence will become more extensively engaged in peacekeeping and that special financial provision should be made to enable this to occur.

Level of Commitment

4.40 The Committee found that while Australia's participation in peacekeeping is widely supported within the community, the level of forces that Australia should contribute remains a matter of some contention.

25 *Peacekeeping Policy: the Future Australian Defence Force Role*, p.1.
26 *Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role*, p.4.

4.41 The policy document issued by the Department of Defence states that it is fitting for Australia to demonstrate its support by maintaining an appropriate level of contribution to UN peace support operations.[27] Defence argues that an average base of 200 personnel is an appropriate level of contribution.[28]

4.42 The Department of Defence informed the Committee that the figure of 200 had been derived by relating Australia's level of contribution to the overall scale of UN peacekeeping. The UN statistics which were used to calculate the 200 figure, show that 57 (of 166) member states participated in peacekeeping operations as at 31 January 1992. On average, they contributed about 200 personnel across a range of peacekeeping operations (11) then being conducted.[29]

4.43 This calculation was based on taking averages of the number of peacekeepers deployed over a period of time ie a total of 11,495 personnel divided by 57 member states which comes to an average of 201.7 personnel.

4.44 Data supplied for 31 August 1991 was used to calculate that 10,838 personnel by 54 member states produces an average of 200.7 personnel. Further, sample data as at 31 October 1992 used for a similar calculation (excluding UNTAC and UNPROFOR) have 11,108 personnel from 61 member states producing an average of 182.1 personnel.[30]

4.45 While an element of arbitrariness was admitted by Defence, this figure was considered to be a useful guide to what was a fair contribution to peacekeeping.[31]

> This figure is not a ceiling for Australia's contributions to peace support operations. Rather, the further our total contribution falls below 200 at any one time, the more significant a consideration in deciding contributions would be the need to maintain visible support for such operations. While

27 Defence, Submission, p.s271.
28 *Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role*, p.5.
29 Defence, Submission, p.s439.
30 Defence, Submission, p.s439.
31 Mr White, Evidence, p.75.

> our contribution remained above the 200 figure, the need to demonstrate this support would not be a significant factor in deliberations.[32]

4.46 Defence further argued that:

> Relating our level of contribution to the overall scale of UN peacekeeping (ie 200 'floor' figure), on balance, appears to be a ... sound figure to satisfy our 'international good citizenship' commitments.[33]

4.47 In its supplementary submission the Department of Defence maintained that it was reluctant to make comparisons between Australia's contribution to UN operations and those of other member states not only because there too many variables, but also because such comparisons obscure the different interests and priorities that each member state faces.[34]

4.48 The Committee agrees with Defence that comparisons between member states can be a very inexact process to determine appropriate levels of commitment for UN peacekeeping but strongly disagrees that relating our level of contribution to an average figure for contributions to UN peacekeeping is an appropriate way of arriving at a sound figure for satisfying our 'good international citizenship' commitments.

4.49 The Committee noted that, firstly, the average had been derived when total contributions to UN peacekeeping were in the order of 10-12 000. In 1994 the total figure is in the range of 70-80 000. Using the same method of calculation, an 'appropriate' level of commitment for Australia would be over 1 000 personnel. The Committee noted that Defence has not revised its calculation to take this into account.

4.50 Secondly, there are problems of presentation. The Committee agrees with Dr Smith that the figure of 200 personnel, although highly qualified in government policy, was not a sensible move.[35]

32 Defence, Submission, p.s271. Also see Evidence, pp.74-5.
33 Defence, Submission, p.s440.
34 Defence, Submission, p.s439.
35 Dr Smith, Evidence, p.229.

4.51 As Dr Smith explained:

> It immediately suggests that Australia is half-hearted about peacekeeping and is more concerned to protect its own interests than to promote international goals. It is not something, for example, that the Prime Minister would have wished to highlight in his discussions with the UN Secretary General in September 1993 ...
>
> The figure of 200 personnel is also likely to be misinterpreted by the public at home. It could come to be seen as the normal level, above which Australia may be taking risks with its own security - a view which might seem increasingly plausible as the number of ADF personnel declines by 15% or so over the next few years.[36]

4.52 In evidence to the Committee, Lieutenant General Baker also commented:

> I regret in many ways that that figure of 200 was ever produced in the way it was.[37]

4.53 Thirdly, having set the figure of 200, Defence's policy document then spends much time in explaining how little the figure actually means. 'There is no fundamental defence principle which gives a lead or guidance on a base level of peacekeeping'(para 14). It would be 'inappropriate to specify a rigid formula for what our long-term level of peacekeeping should be' (para 15). The document also notes the 'lumpiness' of operations (para 18) which means that the tendency for numbers to fluctuate widely renders an average meaningless.[38]

4.54 This barrage of qualifications seems to undermine any conceivable value in setting a figure in the first place. This would depend on a number of national and international factors.

4.55 Finally, Defence suggests one further argument. A small commitment, it is claimed, 'would reflect the fact that Australia, as a country with a relatively small defence force, provides quality rather than quantity' (para 16c). However, as one submission observed:

36 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s297.
37 Lieutenant General Baker, Evidence, p.491.
38 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s298.

It is difficult to see how a small quantity is supposed to demonstrate high quality. On this basis Luxembourg beats Australia hands down for quality - with 40 peacekeepers out of its army of 800.[39]

4.56 It is clear from evidence to the Committee that the Department of Defence has received very little support for setting a figure of 200. DFAT argues, for example, that Australia should be prepared to consider a larger commitment than 200 as multilateral cooperative security arrangements develop and become more effective.

4.57 The Committee believes that the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign and Affairs of Trade have failed to coordinate policy on an appropriate level of contribution.

4.58 The Committee sees no value in recommending either 200 or any other figure. Any figure distracts from the real criteria which should be addressed in determining peacekeeping contributions.

4.59 Furthermore, if Australia wants to see itself as a leader of peacekeeping in the region, then it will have to make very considerable and substantial efforts in order to achieve that leadership. A number of countries in the Asia Pacific region have made very large numerical contributions to peacekeeping. See Table 4.1 below.

39 Dr Smith, Submission, p.298.

Table 4.1: Asia-Pacific Contributions to International Peacekeeping[40]

Country	Population[a] (Millions)	Armed Forces[a] (Total No)	Contribution (No of Personnel)	
			1/6/92[b]	1/6/93[a]
Australia	17.9	63,200	*480	*710
Fiji	0.8	3,900	1,130	1,003
Indonesia	186.8	270,900	*1,186	*1,818
Japan	124.8	237,700	--	*663
Malaysia	19.2	114,500	*910	*1,970
Philippines	62.2	106,500	*92	*127
Singapore	3.1	55,500	17	17
Thailand	57.7	295,000	*721	*731

Sources: [a] *The Military Balance 1993-94*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (October 1993)
[b] *The Military Balance 1992-93* (October 1992). The figures include non-UN peacekeeping missions; they do not include civilian police.
* Includes a contribution to UNTAC in Cambodia

4.60 It is true that the quality of Australia's contributions to peacekeeping makes up to some extent for small numbers of personnel. However, the Committee noted that several countries of similar size and wealth with modern, professional armed forces have made substantially larger contributions. See Table 4.2 below.

40 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s486.

Table 4.2: Contributions to International Peacekeeping[41]

Country	Population[a] (Millions)	Armed Forces[a] (Total No)	Contribution (No of Personnel)	
			1/6/92[b]	1/6/93[a]
Australia	17.9	63,200	480	710
Austria	7.7	52,000	966	836
Belgium	10.0	80,700	521	1,753
Canada	27.0	78,100	2,356	2,734
Denmark	5.2	27,700	1,279	1,329
Finland	5.0	32,800	1,309	1,345
Ireland	3.5	13,000	861	739
Netherlands	15.2	74,600	874	1,858
New Zealand	3.5	10,800	122	149
Norway	4.2	29,400	967	1,285
Sweden	8.7	64,800	724	976

Sources: [a] *The Military Balance 1993-94*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (October 1993).
[b] *The Military Balance 1992-93*, (October 1992). The figures include non-UN peacekeeping missions; they do not include civilian police.

4.61 The Committee believes that Australia's contribution to peacekeeping does not reflect its standing in the international community. Dr Smith observes that Australia's participation in peacekeeping 'is certainly based on quality more than quantity but even the highest quality cannot make up for insignificant quantity'.[42]

4.62 Without denigrating the contribution of any nation, the Committee notes that some countries enjoy a net economic benefit from participating in peacekeeping.

41 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s485.
42 Dr Smith, Submission, pp.s295-6.

Policies of Other Countries

4.63 In the course of this inquiry the Committee was provided with information on a variety of mechanisms that other nations have adopted for dealing with requests for peacekeepers. Some nations have adopted formal sets of criteria for committing troops, others require the assent of Parliament. Examples of how other significant troop-contributing nations, namely, Austria, Canada, New Zealand and Sweden, approach the decision to commit are included for information.[43]

Austria

4.64 Initial, informal, UN peacekeeping requests are considered by the International Organisations Branch of the Foreign Ministry together with the Defence Ministry or, in the case of a request for police, the Interior Ministry. The initial decision to support the proposal, and to seek a formal request from the UN, is taken with the agreement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Defence. The formal request must them be unanimously approved by Cabinet and Parliament must assent to the decision.

4.65 While Austria has taken part in many UN peacekeeping operations, it has not agreed to participate in any UN peace *enforcement* operations.

Canada

4.66 UN peacekeeping requests are considered by the International and Security and Defence Relations Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in consultation with the Directorate of International Policy in the Department of National Defence. In most cases, the formal decision is taken with the agreement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence but Ministers may decide to discuss some UN requests, in particular for peace enforcement operations, in Cabinet.

4.67 The Government requires that an Order-in-Council be tabled in Parliament within ten days of the response to the UN's formal request to

43 These details were provided through DFAT by the Australian missions in Vienna, Ottawa, Wellington and Stockholm. DFAT, Submission, pp.s429-30.

cover active service by Canadian Forces, when significant numbers of military personnel have been deployed overseas or into areas of high risk.

New Zealand

4.68 UN peacekeeping requests are considered by the UN and Commonwealth Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and the New Zealand Defence Force, based on a set of criteria set down by Cabinet.

4.69 The Chief of the Defence Force, alone for small and routine requests or in consultation with the Joint Planning Group or the Chiefs of Staff Committee for larger requests, takes the decision to support or oppose the proposal and develops a joint submission with MFAT to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade and to the Minister for Defence. The formal decision is taken, with the agreement of both Ministers, in Cabinet.

Sweden

4.70 Swedish participation in peacekeeping operations is regulated by an act of Parliament, the *Armed Forces for Service Abroad Act (1993)*. UN peacekeeping requests are considered by and must be approved by the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Finance. The Foreign Relations Bureau, a cross-party committee, is also consulted by convention on all contributions, whether for peacekeeping or peace enforcement. The formal decision is taken by the Government on the recommendation of the Minister for Defence or the Minister for International Development Cooperation and Human Rights.

4.71 For peace enforcement, a specific mandate must be sought from the Parliament.

4.72 The following basic conditions must be fulfilled before a positive recommendation to contribute to a peacekeeping operation is made:

- Swedish military personnel can be sent abroad in peace time only at the request of the United Nations, or in accordance with a decision taken by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and they must serve under the UN;
- the receiving state must give its consent;

- the parties involved should be prepared to cooperate fully with the UN force;
- there should be a clear and defined mandate that can be implemented;
- the costs should essentially be borne by the UN; and
- the Swedish personnel should be recruited on a voluntary basis.

4.73 The Swedish Army has a Standby Force available for peacekeeping duties and special units can also be established on an *ad hoc* basis.

Future Decision Making

4.74 While consultation between the Department of Defence and DFAT apparently works well in most cases, the Committee believes that the changing nature of peacekeeping underlies the need for the decision-making process to be broadened to draw upon expertise from other organisations.

4.75 The Committee believes that a formalised process to deal with peacekeeping matters should be established to ensure that decision-making is informed by the views of all participants in an operation.

4.76 The Committee notes that the Senate inquiry on peacekeeping in 1991 recommended the establishment of a small, permanent secretariat or task force to oversight the many and varied aspects of peacekeeping in the evolving international order.[44]

---

44 SSCFADT, *United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia*, Recommendation No 4, p.3. The Senate Committee recommended that 'a small, permanent secretariat or task force be established as a matter of priority to oversight the many and varied aspects of peacekeeping in the evolving international order. The staffing should remain flexible so that adjustments can be made, depending on the level of activity in the external environment. Representatives from the various departments and agencies affected should be seconded to the unit as required. The basic role of the unit should be pro-active, not reactive. Its starting point should be a clear identification of Australia's interests in peacekeeping, both generally, and as specific cases arise'.

4.77 Given the apparent continuing lack of meaningful convergence of views at the senior levels of the relevant departments, and the virtual exclusion of other important players such as the AFP, NGOs and the Electoral Commission, this Committee endorses the SSCFADT's recommendation that a permanent coordinating authority to deal with peacekeeping matters be established.

Recommendation 23:

The Committee recommends that a permanent secretariat be established to coordinate peacekeeping policy and decision-making. The secretariat staff should include representatives of all organisations involved in peacekeeping missions, namely the Department of Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Federal Police, Australian Electoral Commission, Non Government Organisations, the Defence Industry Committee and private suppliers. The secretariat should be sufficiently flexible to include representatives of other organisations which may come to be involved in peacekeeping.

4.78 In the view of the Committee, Australia should commit to UN or other peacekeeping activities only when certain conditions are established. These include:

- a clear mandate for the operation that provides clear strategic direction;
- identification of the means by which the operation proposes to achieve its objectives;
- identification of the roles to be played by the various components of the mission. This is an increasingly important consideration in light of current multidimensional missions; and
- indicators which will enable operation managers to monitor the progress of an operation. In the event of significant changes a reconsideration of strategic objectives may have to be undertaken. It is argued that the drift into peace enforcement in Somalia may have been recognised earlier had such indicators been established.

4.79 Moreover, a regular reporting scheme from the operation in the field needs to systematised to enable recommendations to be made about procedures such as changing rules of engagement.[45]

4.80 While recognising that Australia's participation in any peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation will necessarily continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis, DFAT advocated that criteria be established not only for committing but also for withdrawing personnel.

4.81 When peace operations do not achieve their stated goals within the specified time, criteria for determining whether to continue with an Australian contribution should include:

- degree of progress towards stated goals, and the prospective new timetable for their achievements;
- continued capacity to provide the requested contribution;
- capacity of the UN to find suitable replacement resources; and
- community attitudes.[46]

Recommendation 24:

The Committee recommends that criteria should be developed for determining when Australia should contribute to and withdraw from peacekeeping and enforcement operations.

4.82 Where a contribution is made to a peacekeeping operation, and the situation deteriorates to the point that circumstances require a change in the mandate to one of peace enforcement, then the criteria to be applied should, in effect, be those appropriate to a consideration of a new operation.

4.83 The Committee sees a major distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the costs, risks, community attitudes and the impact of the involvement are all likely to be quite differently measured in a peace

45 Captain Swinnerton, Evidence, p.29.
46 DFAT, Submission, p.s235.

enforcement context.[47] While some of the factors to be considered in peacekeeping also apply to peace enforcement, decisions to participate in the latter need to be appointed in a fundamentally different manner.

Recommendation 25:

The Committee recommends that any decision for Australian troops to operate under Chapter VII provisions of the United Nations Charter be endorsed by the Australian Parliament.

4.84 An implication of the changed strategic environment is therefore the need to develop a comprehensive and unified government policy on peacekeeping. This would ensure that all possible sources of expertise are considered for inclusion in peacekeeping missions.

Recommendation 26:

The Committee recommends that Australia should continue to make specialised contributions to peacekeeping operations which draw upon the particular expertise of the Australian Defence Force and Australian Federal Police and the experience in civilian areas such as electoral assistance and administration of justice.

47 DFAT, Submission, p.s235.

CHAPTER FIVE

IMPACT ON THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

Benefits to the ADF

5.1 The Committee noted that considerable benefits have accrued to the ADF through participation in peacekeeping. Firstly, peacekeeping has provided practical experience for ADF personnel in situations which cannot be simulated in routine exercises in Australia. This experience has contributed to and enhanced the skills of ADF personnel. Secondly, peacekeeping has allowed the ADF to test its training methods, equipment, systems and organisational capabilities in difficult and challenging situations over extended periods of time. Thirdly, peacekeeping has developed the ADF's ability to interface with other organisations of various kinds and with the local population.

5.2 The communicators who were deployed with UNTAC, for example, gained experience in installing advanced communications technology. ADF personnel were required to work in close cooperation with Telstra (then OTC) to develop a complex, satellite-based communications system to replace the relatively simple military communications system. Involvement in this project provided on-the-job experience at advanced levels for communicators at all ranks over a period of some 15 months.[1]

5.3 The deployment to Cambodia also had training value for personnel in support roles such as drivers, tradesmen, cooks and logisticians who were exposed to challenges they would not have in Australia.

5.4 Deploying ADF personnel in arduous and demanding environments has enabled assessments to be made about how well their training has prepared them to perform in stressful conditions over extended periods. By all accounts, the achievements of ADF personnel have reflected highly appropriate training.

1 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert, Evidence, pp.381-2.

5.5 The participation of peacekeepers in operations in Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda has tested the ADF's ability to deploy and maintain relatively large contingents. The Committee was told that in deploying the battalion group to Somalia - which was the largest formation to have been deployed since Australian troops served in Vietnam - the ADF encountered and overcame a number of difficulties in mounting, preparing and equipping a contingent of that size, and in providing in-country support.

5.6 It has also provided opportunities for testing the effectiveness of the ADF in maintaining logistic support and in command and control arrangements.[2]

5.7 A particular benefit to the ADF is that peacekeeping provides realistic opportunities which may not otherwise be available to test equipment. Deficiencies discovered in the course of peacekeeping are likely to be deficiencies that would apply to the defence of Australia. Peacekeeping therefore provides opportunities to prove equipment and to rectify any deficiencies.[3]

5.8 Similiarly, peacekeeping allows the ADF to monitor the demands of duty on personnel and to make appropriate adjustments. The Committee was told, for example, that the tour of duty of 12 months in Cambodia proved too long. There was a considerable and noticeable drop in the individual performance of personnel during the last three or four months. Six months would have been more appropriate, with eight to nine months duty for key personnel to allow continuity between rotations of contingents.[4]

5.9 Peacekeeping has also assisted the ADF to develop skills that are essential to its primary roles. These include, inter alia, experience in multi-national headquarters and operations and the reinforcement of links with the forces of other nations, especially those from the Asia-Pacific region and the US.

5.10 Public relations benefits have accrued to the ADF. The image of the ADF has been considerably enhanced by the achievements and professionalism of Australian Service personnel in recent peacekeeping

2 Defence, Submission, p.s274.
3 Rear Admiral Doolan, Evidence, p.78.
4 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert, Evidence, p.383.

operations. Indeed, peacekeeping has enabled Defence to demonstrate its capabilities to the Australian public in an unprecedented way.

Disadvantages to the ADF

5.11 The benefits to the ADF of participating in peacekeeping have to be weighed against a number of disadvantages. These include wear and tear on equipment and the loss of training for the defence of Australia.

5.12 The Committee was told that the cost of wear and tear on equipment is factored into the amount sought by Defence in reimbursement for peacekeeping operations. The costs of restoring armoured personnel carriers used in Somalia to standard condition and bringing replacement equipment out of stores, for example, was taken into account.[5]

5.13 Nor was the finite life of the 36 APCs deployed to Somalia affected. Although the conditions in Somalia and the workload of the APCs caused a high consumption of track link and track pads, this was not deemed to be a serious problem.[6]

5.14 Defence maintained that the deployment of equipment such as APCs and Black Hawk helicopters caused no more wear and tear than if the equipment had remained in Australia. The Committee was told, for example, that the usage rate of Black Hawk helicopters in Cambodia was not measurably higher than if the helicopters had remained in Australia.[7]

5.15 Notwithstanding this, the Committee is concerned that there may be hidden costs to peacekeeping which will need to be borne by Defence's constrained budget.

5.16 Professor Dibb warned that significant commitments to peacekeeping could result in a loss of training and exercising in Australia. Maintaining a high degree of professional capability for the defence of Australia requires

5 Mr Tonkin, Evidence, p.56; Defence, Submission, pp.s469-70. The 36 armoured personnel carriers used in Operation Solace in Somalia travelled 142 638 track kilometres at an additional cost of $1.538m. According to Defence, this was factored into the supplementation for additional costs associated with Operation Solace.
6 Defence, Submission, p.s469.
7 Defence, Evidence, p.58.

the acquisition, maintenance and application of skills in a variety of contexts that are not always reflected in peacekeeping operations.

5.17 The Committee strongly opposes any significant loss of training which occurs as a result of commitments to peacekeeping.

5.18 Another consideration, according to Defence, is that the overall training value is diminished when the UN requirement calls for the deployment of ADF units in small numbers which do not match the normal unit or sub-unit organisations.[8]

5.19 The Committee is concerned about the extent to which the deployment of the signallers to Cambodia and the battalion group to Somalia impacted on the capacity of the ADF to carry out its normal activities for the defence of Australia.

5.20 The Committee was told, for example, that the deployment of a significant proportion of Signal Corps' communications equipment and personnel to provide communications support to UNTAC affected the ability of the divisional signal regiment to provide communications within Australia. The Melbourne-based 2 Signal Regiment - one of Army's two field communications regiments - was used as the core of the Australian contingent deployed to Cambodia. The military system which was established by UNTAC, however, required access to more equipment than was held by 2nd Signal Regiment. Consequently, 1st Signal Regiment was required to contribute equipment to make up the shortfall.[9]

> What that meant was that the rump of 2 Signal Regiment which was left in Australia, which continued to have some of its roles, and the divisional signal regiment - 1 Signal Regiment in Brisbane - were significantly stripped of equipment. Both those units would have been unable to fulfil their doctrinal roles should the need have arisen, because of [a lack of] equipment.[10]

5.21 The Committee regards any impact on ADF capabilities as a matter of grave concern.[11] Force structure considerations are therefore addressed

8 Defence, Submission, p.s274.
9 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert, Evidence, pp.383-4; 388-89.
10 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert, Evidence, p.389.
11 This issue was also addressed in the JSCFADT report *Stockholding and Sustainability in the Australian Defence Force*, 1992, Chapter 5.

in some detail with particular reference to the impact of contributing a peacekeeping contingent to Somalia.

Force Structure Considerations

5.22 The mission of the Defence organisation is to promote the security of Australia and to protect its population and its interests. The four principal elements of Australia's defence posture are:

a. the development of a Defence Force structured for the defence of Australia in the narrow sense;

b. the maintenance of strong alliances with the United States and New Zealand;

c. the development of closer regional strategic engagement with the countries in the region; and

d. the development of, or contribution to, global efforts to secure a peaceful world, of which support for UN peacekeeping is a very important part.[12]

5.23 Defence argues strongly and consistently that, of these four elements, only the first should be used for determining force structure. It is endorsed policy that the ADF is structured for the defence of Australia and that forces deployed on peacekeeping operations or like activities be drawn from this force.[13]

5.24 Defence contends that structuring for Australia's defence provides sufficient flexibility to enable the ADF to meet its UN peacekeeping obligations.

5.25 The ADF has demonstrated that it is capable of making a significant and varied high quality contribution to peacekeeping from the force which has been structured for the defence of Australia. Indeed, the deployment to Somalia proved:

12 Mr White, Evidence, p.43.
13 Rear Admiral Doolan, Evidence, pp.39, 42.

> ... the capacity of the ADF, particularly the Australian infantry, to make a very fast, very significant contribution ... the fact that the Australian battalion left behind it a very favourable reputation for cooperation with the local people enhance Australia's reputation internationally for providing troops to peacekeeping operations who are efficient, do their job well but who are also sensitive to the local environment.[14]

5.26 The Committee recognises that the first priority for the ADF is the defence of Australia and it therefore follows that the ADF should be structured primarily for that task. Professor Dibb observed - and the Committee agrees - that force structuring:

> ... is a serious and long-term endeavour, not to be deflected by current international fashions or short-term political whim.[15]

5.27 In the view of the Committee, however, peacekeeping is likely to be a significant long-term responsibility for the ADF.

5.28 The Committee believes that Australia should continue to accept peacekeeping responsibilities. The force structure and the size of the defence force however must be appropriate to enable Australia to accept such responsibilities without significantly affecting the ability of the ADF to perform its primary task.

5.29 The Committee is aware that there is scope at the margins of force structure decision-making for specifically accommodating peacekeeping requirements through, for example, acquiring additional equipment for particular peacekeeping operations.[16]

5.30 The Committee believes, however, that if peacekeeping is not factored into the calculations in a realistic way, additional peacekeeping responsibilities accepted by the ADF may be detrimental to force structure.

5.31 The Committee believes that international, and in particular UN, arrangements need to be taken into consideration in force structure deliberations.

14 Mr Boreham, Evidence, pp.93-4.
15 Professor Dibb, Evidence, p.240.
16 Professor Dibb, Evidence, pp.239-40.

Recommendation 27:

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence consider international, and in particular United Nations, arrangements in force structure deliberations.

5.32 In the past when UN peacekeeping operations were characterised by the establishment of buffer zones with small numbers of troops in static observation posts, Australia's ability to meet UN demands was not compromised by force structure limitations.

5.33 The recent trend to ask Australia to contribute military forces to larger, more complex multidimensional UN missions is likely to continue. The increasing focus on multidimensional missions which address socio-political and/or humanitarian aspects of conflict have ramifications for force structure.[17] This emphasises the need mentioned in para 4.78 to produce a set of policy guidelines to deal with changed mandates, particularly where changes to a mandate have peace enforcement implications as was the case in Somalia.

5.34 In its publication on peacekeeping policy, the Department of Defence indicates the kinds of capabilities that might be offered to the United Nations for peacekeeping operations.[18] The list comprises predominantly Army assets and, except for the infantry battalion, the nominated capabilities are of sub-unit size or smaller.

5.35 The Committee recognises that there are tasks that Australia would not be able to undertake due to the nature of the shape of the ADF. In the view of the Committee, however, the list is indicative of the constraints that current force structure imposes on Australia's ability to raise forces for peacekeeping contributions.

5.36 The Committee's real concern is that offers of the type listed may simply be insufficient by global and regional standards for a nation of Australia's relative standing. While peacekeeping should not be a force structure determinant, force structure is a seriously limiting factor in the type of peacekeeping operations Australia can mount.

17 Peace Research Centre, Submission, p.s99.
18 *Peacekeeping Policy: The Future Australian Defence Force Role*, p.11.

5.37 The Committee believes that current force structure in its widest sense is an inhibiting factor that will limit the options available to Australia in meeting these requests. In reaching this view, the Committee took particular note of the impact of the commitment of the battalion group to Somalia.

Somalia

5.38 Notwithstanding the argument that Australia currently enjoys a benign strategic environment, it is the view of the Committee that the commitment of the force to Somalia for four months stretched the resources of the ADF beyond acceptable limits.

5.39 The Committee believes that the commitment to UNITAF in Somalia demonstrated the ADF's inability to meet the requirements of the changing situation within Somalia. The Committee is concerned that positive achievements of a peacekeeping operation may be undermined if the ADF is unable to respond to changing circumstances by, for example, extending the period of the commitment to meet a particular need.

5.40 Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Lieutenant General J S Baker, in evidence to the Committee, justified the decision to send the battalion to Somalia for the specified period of 17 weeks on the grounds that:

> ... in any commitment to a peacekeeping operation, the process of decision making with respect to the level of commitment and the nature of that commitment is taken into account. Our commitment to peacekeeping operations is not mandatory; it is discretionary. Had we decided that our commitment to Somalia had been for a period of two years, rather than a period of 17 weeks, we could have done several things. Firstly, we could have sent a lesser force so that we could sustain it longer or, secondly, the government could have provided the ADF with more resources so that we could position people to enable the rotation of a battalion sized commitment indefinitely ... in the present strategic circumstances from the existing army asset, we could have maintained a battalion in Somalia for longer than 17 weeks but only at the detriment of other things we needed and still need to do; for example, our level of exercising and training in the region, which is another one of our priorities.[19]

5.41 Another factor suggested to the Committee for limiting the deployment to seventeen weeks may have been in part because the ability

19 Lieutenant General Baker, Evidence, p.481.

to rotate the battalion with another battalion from Australia was beyond the current capabilities of the Army.[20]

5.42 According to General Baker, to keep one unit in the field two similar units are needed out of the field. One of these units will be preparing to replace the unit in the field; the other unit will have recently returned from the field. It takes about six months after its return from an operation to get a unit back to full operational capability, to reconstitute it at high state of readiness.[21]

5.43 Major General Clunies-Ross (Rtd) postulated that if Australia had been forced to rotate another battalion through Somalia for longer than the period specified, it would have left Australia without any operational capacity in the Army - given the need to stand 1 RAR down on its return.[22]

5.44 Indeed, the Committee is particularly concerned that the difficulties which accompanied the deployment of the battalion group for the purposes of peacekeeping would also apply if the battalion group were required to be deployed in the defence of Australia.

5.45 The Committee was concerned to discover the extent to which the regular infantry forces in Australia were affected by the deployment of one battalion group to Somalia.

5.46 In evidence to the Committee Defence stated that:

> Of the two battalions which normally comprise the ready deployment force, one was deployed overseas and the other one, which would normally be on a form of stand-down and on lesser activity, had to be maintained on a high level of training activity. So it would have been difficult to sustain that for a prolonged period. It was manageable over the four months of the deployment of the 1st battalion to Somalia. If we were required to stay longer in Somalia or we had to rotate the battalion, it would then become more difficult for us with manpower problems.[23]

20 Major General Clunies-Ross, Evidence, pp.184-5.
21 Lieutenant General Baker, Evidence, p.482.
22 Major General Clunies-Ross, Evidence, pp.184-5.
23 Commodore Oxenbould, Evidence, p.58-59.

5.47 The Committee was told that the other two Sydney-based regular infantry battalions were unaffected, except for a small transfer of manpower from them to support the reconstituted battalion in Townsville.[24]

5.48 The Committee understands, however, that the deployment of the First Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR) to Somalia at its full strength of six companies ie four rifle, one support and one administration company, impacted significantly on the Second/Fourth Battalion (2/4 RAR).

5.49 Upon the deployment of 1RAR, 2/4 RAR - left as the 'on call' battalion in the RDF - should have been at full strength for that task.

5.50 The only way this could have been achieved would have been to take troops from the two Sydney based battalions, 3 RAR and 5/7 RAR, or take out the regular cadre from one of the Ready Reserve battalions, and thereby effectively halting any meaningful work in that battalion.

5.51 The difficulty here is that both Sydney-based battalions are not the same as the RDF battalions because of their reduced establishment strength, (three rifle, one support and one administration company) and they in turn are undermanned because of the priority given since 1991 to recruitment to the Ready Reserve.

5.52 The present reality is that the two Sydney based battalions cannot field three full-strength rifle companies, a support company and an administration company. Current manning shortages might allow these battalions to field slightly more than two rifle companies, but in every respect as a fighting force, three undermanned rifle companies do not constitute a viable combat unit.

5.53 To deploy one full strength battalion out of Australia and to leave one full strength battalion on call as a rapid deployment force would in effect appear to leave the remaining two regular battalions dysfunctional.

5.54 The Committee believes that the deployment of the battalion group to Somalia revealed serious weaknesses in Australia's combat capability. The Committee is particularly concerned that if a battalion group is deployed overseas for any reason, the capability of the ADF may prove inadequate to deal with a contingency that might arise.

24 Commodore Oxenbould, Evidence, p.48.

5.55 In the view of the Committee this situation is unacceptable. The degree of organisational gymnastics that was required on the part of Army to field Australia's commitment to Somalia borders on the impractical.

5.56 The issue is much broader than the availability of troops for peacekeeping. There is a need to examine carefully the relatively modest capacity of certain parts of the Defence Force, particularly Army. In particular, the fact that Army has only four regular battalions is a force structure issue for the entire ADF.

5.57 The critical issue to be addressed is not force structuring for peacekeeping but structuring for a higher level of combat capability.[25]

5.58 While the choices outlined by Lieutenant General Baker in connection with UNITAF might be available for decisions about peacekeeping, those same options may not apply in the event of circumstances requiring the deployment of a battalion in defence of Australia.

5.59 The Committee is extremely concerned that Australia's regular infantry force is now reduced to a bare minimum.

5.60 Professor Dibb pointed out that in Australia, with 28 000 regulars and 25 000 reservists, there are only 14 rifle companies, yet New Zealand with an army of less than 5 000 soldiers can produce eight rifle companies. Professor Dibb also argued that this was not a force structure issue for peacekeeping but rather a force structure issue for Army.[26]

5.61 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Army will continue to be most affected by Australia's role in support of peacekeeping operations. Yet this is the area where, increasingly, savings through personnel reductions are being targeted.

5.62 Attention needs to be given to the question whether the current four regular infantry battalions gives Australia sufficient flexibility to provide a credible defence of Australia and, at the same time, participate in UN operations in ways appropriate to Australia's status as a middle order power.

25 Professor Dibb, Evidence, p.249.
26 Professor Dibb, Evidence, pp.249, 251-2.

5.63 The Committee received evidence supporting a reconsideration of Defence funding and force structuring in the light of the changed strategic circumstances:

> ... in that broader context of greater regional turmoil and greater uncertainty, it is not only not the time to be cutting the Defence budget - and it demonstrably is not - but, as we get more involved in the region, it is time to be reflecting on the change in requirements on the force structure. I think that there are resource and force structuring implications for our greater regional involvement, and I think it applies to a greater or lesser extent to all arms of the service.[27]

5.64 How to get more combat capability into the Army remains a matter for serious consideration. This is crucial not only to the defence of Australia but also impacts on other options required for increasing regional commitments and options that would be required for peacekeeping operations.

5.65 The Committee has grave misgivings that the lack of regular rifle companies can be overcome by a combination of ready reserve and general reserve infantry units, not least because of the considerable social and legislative barriers to doing so.[28]

5.66 At present the state of regular infantry forces in the Army stands as a clear indication that force structure planning of the Army has gone too far in terms of trying to maintain a force to meet all mission requirements with a shrinking human resource base.

5.67 The Committee does not accept the view that four regular battalions, supplemented by the ready reserve scheme of two battalions, is the right balance for the Australian Army. The Committee therefore endorses the recent decision of the Government to create a fifth infantry battalion. The Committee believes that the fifth battalion should be established within two years.

27 Professor Dibb, Evidence, p.254.
28 Refer to paragraphs 5.74 to 5.79.

Recommendation 28:

The Committee endorses the decision of the Government to create a fifth infantry battalion and recommends that it be established within two years.

Involvement of the ADF Reserves

5.68 The Committee noted that the benefits derived from involvement in peacekeeping activities by the ADF Regulars extend in only limited ways to the ADF Reserves.

5.69 The commander of the second division, Major General Glenny, provided background information on Reservists' experience in peacekeeping. Prior to 1964 the CMF provided the bulk of UN observers because of the smallness of, and other priorities for, the regular forces. Observers were drawn from the ranks of captain to colonel and were deployed for twelve months. After 1964 peacekeepers were drawn largely from regular forces.

5.70 The Chief of the General Staff Advisory Committee endorsed General Reserve participation in peacekeeping in March 1993. Notwithstanding the concept of the total army only very small numbers of the General Reserve have participated in peacekeeping operations. Major General Glenny indicated that only 12 reservists were involved in peacekeeping in 1993.[29]

5.71 The Committee believes that if Army is serious about gaining acceptance of the concept of the total army, greater efforts should be made to include general reservists in peacekeeping operations. Statements supporting the concept of the total army should be reflected by action. Such action would increase the pool of specialist personnel.

5.72 As Professor Dibb pointed out:

> If you are thinking about a total force, and indeed a total army, you cannot have a first XI and a second XI ... To have a total force must mean exactly that. A first XI and a second XI situation - and there is still a tendency to think like that in some quarters - is only exacerbated when you exclude people from opportunities to participate in areas such as the United

29 Major General Glenny, Evidence, pp.360-2.

Nations, with all the interest, professional training and, indeed, prestige that brings about.[30]

5.73 If there are benefits to be gained by the regular ADF from participation in peacekeeping, it follows that those same benefits could be experienced by all components of the ADF. In addition, there would be some advantages in having Reservists operating within regular units on peacekeeping operations.

5.74 The Committee recognises that there are some obstacles to be overcome in deploying reservists. The Force Structure Review requirement for army to reduce the size of its regular force has been frustrated by low separation rates which have, in turn, impacted on the opportunities for the General Reserve to participate in peacekeeping.

5.75 There has been a financial regulation that after 28 days General Reserve personnel go onto full-time service and cease to be reservists drawing army reserve training days. This procedure adds to the difficulty that Army is already experiencing in managing its regular salary vote. This acts as a constraint on the employment of Reservists in peacekeeping missions.[31]

5.76 One argument put forward against involving General Reservists is that, because of their civilian commitments, they may not be available for deployment when required. The Committee believes that this problem could be overcome by the ADF maintaining a register of General Reservists available for peacekeeping service.

Recommendation 29:

The Committee recommends that a register of the availability of General Reservists for peacekeeping service be maintained; and that the register be updated on an annual basis.

30 Professor Dibb, Evidence, pp.250-1.
31 Major General Glenny, Evidence, p.361.

Recommendation 30:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force aim to reach a target figure of 25 per cent involvement of members of the General Reserve in peacekeeping activities.

Legislation

5.77 On 1 July 1988 the legislative provisions in the Defence Act for call-out of the reserve force in times of war or defence emergency were extended to permit their call-out for the defence of Australia 'otherwise than in time of war or defence emergency'. According to the Chief of Reserves (Army), this clause for peacetime call-out provided for increased flexibility in the use of general reserves.

5.78 The amendment to the Defence Act enabled Reservists to be called out for the defence of Australia and to serve alongside regulars on a continuous full-time basis, either within the country or overseas, and at all levels of potential conflict. As the Ready Reserve scheme has been established within the framework of existing legislation, the same call-out provisions apply.[32]

5.79 The Committee notes that the inclusion of the words *for the defence of Australia* in the amendment has effectively prevented call-out of the General Reserve and the Ready Reserve for peacekeeping unless the peacekeeping operation can be justified as being essential for 'the defence of Australia'.

Recommendation 31:

The Committee recommends that the Defence Act 1903 s.50F (1) be amended to insert the words *and peacekeeping or peace operations* after the phrase *for the defence of Australia.*

5.80 The Committee believes that such an amendment to the legislation would provide the government with more flexibility to contribute ADF

32 David Horner (ed), *The Army and the Future: Land Forces in Australia and South-East Asia*, 1993, p.305.

personnel to peacekeeping operations, should the need arise, and is consistent with the rhetoric of total army.

5.81 The Committee noted that no legislative provision exists for the protection of civilian employment of General Reservists who may be called out for the defence of Australia. The Committee believes that the strong community support which exists for peacekeeping is conducive to legislative change.

5.82 Moreover, the Committee believes that the likelihood of increasing demands on Australia to participate in peacekeeping means that more flexible legislative provisions should be implemented immediately.

Recommendation 32:

The Committee recommends that legislation be enacted to ensure that civilian employment of the reserve personnel is protected for the period of call-up.

CHAPTER SIX

FAMILY WELFARE AND SUPPORT

6.1 There is no doubt that deployment of ADF personnel overseas for lengthy periods places stress on families.[1] This is part of the human cost of peacekeeping. The Committee would be concerned if deployment on peacekeeping exacerbated family breakdown.

6.2 The Committee received evidence which suggested that some military personnel who serve in UN operations experience problems of family separation. Some encounter readjustment difficulties on their return. One witness told the Committee that the principal symptoms of these difficulties are alcohol abuse, marital problems and breakdown, emotional explosiveness, impatience and intolerance.[2]

6.3 The Committee was pleased to note that Defence has taken steps to minimise negative impact on families of deploying ADF personnel on peacekeeping missions. Counselling and support services for both ADF members and their families have been implemented prior to, during and after deployment.

Pre-deployment

6.4 The Committee was told that pre-deployment interviews were conducted for the majority of married and de facto families of members deploying to Cambodia. The purpose of the interview was to ascertain:

- the stability of the relationship;
- any health concerns;
- excessive financial commitments; and
- child behavioural problems.

1 Lieutenant General Baker, Evidence, p.479; Rear Admiral Doolan, Evidence, p.40.
2 Lieutenant Colonel Boyd, Submission, p.5.

These interviews were conducted mainly in the family home with both the Service member and spouse present.

6.5 Personnel are prepared for separation from their families prior to deployment during concentration training at the Reinforcement Holding Company at Randwick:

> We sat the contingents down in groups of about 50 and talked to them from a command perspective and we brought in a psychologist to talk to them about the stress associated with long separations. We talked to them about ways to try to overcome it, through letter writing, telephoning and those sorts of things. We talked to them about the fact that they were going to get two periods of leave. Every four months they would get a week back home, et cetera. So we tried to prepare them in that regard by just telling them about some of the things they would be going through and, perhaps more significantly, some of the things their family, their partner or their children would be going through at home.
>
> That was accompanied by a number of booklets, handouts, et cetera, which we gave them to take to Cambodia with them. At the same time, there was a package sent to each spouse and to each nominated partner. ... Once we got to Cambodia, one of the things I did was try to set up a number of public telephones so that access was relatively easy to phone home and a number of receive-only telephones so that partners could ring into Cambodia. We constantly talked to the personnel about making sure they were ringing home ...
>
> The one-on-one counselling at the lowest level, at troop or platoon level, between the platoon commander and each of his personnel was pretty intense. If there was problem perceived, we immediately did some counselling using the padre, the Salvation Army person, the psych or the doctor and tried to resolve the problem there. We also employed the welfare coordination cell back here in Australia to try to do something at this end as well.[3]

6.6 Army Community Services were involved in support activities with these families. These included pre- and post-deployment seminars, information sessions, outings and social activities and one-to-one support when required.[4]

3 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert, Evidence, p.385.
4 Defence, Submission, p.s434.

During Deployment

6.7 In view of large numbers of personnel being deployed overseas, Army had raised a Welfare Coordination Cell at Land Headquarters in Sydney. The cell is staffed by an officer, warrant officer, sergeant and corporal and is designed as a central point of contact between the families and the members overseas. In addition a spouse representative has been employed on a permanent part time basis for 20 hours per week.

6.8 The cell ran three toll-free numbers - one for Cambodia and MINURSO, one for Somalia and the Sinai and a third one established on 26 October 1993 for all personnel returning from overseas deployment. Through these numbers families could receive the latest news and information from the area in which the member was serving. Families were able to leave messages for members, discuss with members of the cell any problems they were encountering or be referred to specialist advice and assistance. The cell staff was on 24 hour call.

6.9 During the deployment to Somalia an additional member was added to the staff of Army Community Services in Townsville. A welfare cell was established at 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR) and a support group, Spouses of Somalia, formed voluntarily. It was given additional support by the welfare agencies in Townsville. Navy arranged a similar group for the crew of HMAS Tobruk.[5]

6.10 During the deployment period, Army Community Services maintain regular contact with ADF members' families. A Family Liaison Officer is normally allocated an area and negotiates with each family as to the frequency and type of contact required.

6.11 In addition, sponsor units, nominated by the Welfare Coordination Cell at Land Headquarters, maintain contact by telephone, unit newsletters and activities.

Post-Deployment

6.12 Army Community Services have also conducted reunion programs in conjunction with psychologists, chaplains, medical and community

5 Colonel Mellor, Evidence, p.41.

development officers two to three weeks before the return of the Service member. Attendance is by invitation and voluntary.

6.13 Colonel Mellor told the Committee that prior to the Battalion Group returning to Australia from Somalia:

> ... a site debriefing team of about four officers came over. It had an extensive program of debriefing everybody on the mission in terms of the sorts of stresses they had gone through and what to expect in terms of the stresses of getting back together with their families. A similar debriefing team was made available to spouses in Townsville and Brisbane.[6]

6.14 Counselling is available to all personnel and their families on return from a UN deployment should they request it.[7]

Effects on Families of Peacekeeping

6.15 The Committee found no conclusive evidence which proved that the rate of marriage breakdown of ADF personnel deployed on peacekeeping is any higher than that of the general population.

6.16 Figures provided by Army show that of the 1 680 troops who served in Cambodia only 22 per cent were recorded as married members on deployment.

6.17 Of those deployed married, only 15 (4 per cent) have since changed their status in military records to 'separated'. However, as the Family Law Act requires a minimum of 12 months separation following marriage breakdown before a divorce can be granted, at the time that these figures were provided many soldiers had not met the qualifying period.[8]

6.18 Lieutenant Colonel Hurley, in evidence to the Committee, estimated that there were about 12 marriage breakdowns in the battalion of 650 soldiers in Somalia.[9]

6 Colonel Mellor, Evidence, p.41.
7 Defence, Submission, p.s468.
8 Defence, Submission, p.s466.
9 Lieutenant Colonel Hurley, Evidence, p.538.

6.19 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert expressed the view to the Committee that the tour of duty in Cambodia of 12 months had resulted in the breakup of a number of relationships both during the period of absence and after the return of ADF personnel to Australia.[10] Some of these breakups, in his view, were directly related to the length of the tour of duty.

6.20 A small study based on the troops deployed to Namibia revealed that a number of marriages had broken down as a result of stresses imposed by that mission.[11]

6.21 The Committee was told that readjustment difficulties were more apparent in military personnel who were individual reinforcements, not part of a cohesive unit, or who completed their UN service as an individual in the UN organisation, with little scope for support from other Australians.[12]

6.22 The Committee is pleased to note that the human factor is not ignored by Defence. In addition to establishing support services such as those described above, the Army Psychological Unit is conducting surveys to determine the effects on families of ADF personnel participation in peacekeeping operations.[13]

6.23 The Committee commends Defence for initiating such surveys. Indeed, without accurate information on the impact on families, it is difficult to determine what support services will be needed.

6.24 The Committee believes that family breakup is too high a price to pay for peacekeeping. Defence must ensure that serving men and women who have won international recognition, as well as the thanks of the nation, do not suffer a personal cost as a result of their participation.

10 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert, Evidence, p.383.
11 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert, Evidence, p.386.
12 Lieutenant Colonel Boyd, Submission, p.s5.
13 Lieutenant General Baker, Evidence, p.480.

Recommendation 33:

The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence rigorously monitor the impact on Service families of deployment on peacekeeping missions, both during the deployment, and after the return, of ADF personnel.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE COST OF PEACEKEEPING

7.1 The dramatic increase in the number, size and complexity of UN peacekeeping operations is reflected in the increase in total cost to member states from US$400 million in 1991 to an estimated US$3.7 billion in 1993.[1] In 1993 the UN's Regular Budget was just over US$1 billion and total assessed contributions for the specialised agencies was about US$1.7 billion.

7.2 The financing of UN peacekeeping operations has been relatively *ad hoc*, with UNFICYP until June 1993 being funded wholly from voluntary contributions, UNTSO and UNMOGIP funded from the UN's regular budget and the remainder funded from special accounts established from UN contributions.

7.3 DFAT advised that the assessed contributions for peacekeeping are additional to those for the UN's Regular Budget:

- least developed countries pay at a scale of 10% of their contribution to the UN Regular Budget;
- developing countries pay at a scale of 20% of their contribution to the UN Regular Budget;
- developed countries pay at the same rate as they contribute to the UN Regular Budget (including Australia, for which the current rate is 1.51% of the total budget); and
- the permanent members of the Security Council pay at the same rate as they contribute to the UN Regular Budget but also, between them, pay the amount by which the less developed countries' contribution falls short of what their Regular Budget contribution would have been.[2]

1 DFAT, Submission, p.s240.
2 DFAT, Submission, pp.s240-1.

7.4 The accounts estimated for peacekeeping operations are used to pay the costs of the mission and to reimburse troop contributing countries as follows:

- for military observers, a per diem allowance; and
- for troops, from a scale of rates which includes amounts for pay and allowances, supplementary payment for specialists, usage of clothing, equipment and weaponry.

7.5 For high cost defence forces, such as those of Australia, the UN rate of reimbursement does not match the actual cost of deployment.

7.6 In its submission to the inquiry, DFAT pointed out that:

> Reimbursement is often delayed - in some cases for years - because of the deficit in financing UN peace keeping. We stress that the cause of this problem is member states' own failure to meet their obligated payments; if arrears were met, all troop contributors could be reimbursed without delay. It is ironic that some countries which complain of slow rates of reimbursement are amongst those with the worst payments records.
>
> The biggest problem facing the financing of UN peace keeping is that a number of member states are constantly in arrears in meeting their assessed contributions, notwithstanding that these contributions are mandatory, under Article 17 of the Charter. In August 1993, the UN peace keeping budget had over $1 billion outstanding, comprising arrears from previous years and late payment of assessed contributions for this year. The resultant backlog in UN reimbursements to member states for the costs of contributing forces to peace keeping operations has the potential to erode the ability of member states to agree to UN requests for troops.[3]

7.7 The Committee was gratified to find that Australia has consistently paid its assessed contributions in full and on time - which has significantly enhanced Australia's influence in budgetary and other matters.

7.8 While, clearly, the most satisfactory solution to the UN's financial problems would be for all member states to pay their contributions in like manner, DFAT identified other options which it put before the UN General

3 DFAT, Submission, p.s242.

Assembly to enhance the efficiency of peacekeeping financing and streamline costs. They are:

- ensure that the UN 1994/95 Regular Budget outcomes reflect Australian priorities through redeployment of resources to the Department of Peace Keeping Operations for the purpose of improving the planning and preparation of peacekeeping operations budgets;
- improve arrangements for start-up funding, for example, more timely disbursements to cover forward elements of peace keeping operations;
- support establishment of a unified peacekeeping budget, based on a single annual assessment to member states, in order to streamline multiple assessments for peacekeeping operations, with attendant delays in payments due to different national budget and administration systems; and
- explore the possibility of amendment of Article 19.2 of the UN Charter, ie reduce the grace period for arrears from two to one year before the right to vote in the UN General Assembly is lost.[4]

7.9 The Committee fully supports DFAT's initiatives to strengthen the UN's effectiveness.

7.10 The Committee was told however that it is unlikely that there will be any improvement in the status of nations' payments of assessed contributions to the UN in the short term.

7.11 Other - somewhat radical - suggestions for financing peacekeeping have been raised. One suggestion is that the UN should be permitted to borrow money on international financial markets. This, it is argued, would create a strong vested interest in the success of the UN among creditor nations and institutions, especially in the developed world.

7.12 Another radical proposal is that consideration should be given to the application of levies on certain kinds of international transactions like air travel or foreign exchange. It is argued that an international levy on such transactions would be an equitable way of putting a price on an important

4 DFAT, Submission, p.243.

public good. The total value of global foreign exchange turnover, for example, is expected to amount to over $US300 000 billion in 1995. A levy on these transactions of only 0.01 per cent, if it could be collected, would yield over $US30 billion. A flat rate of $10 added to the price of air tickets for each international sector travelled would yield $3 billion a year.[5]

7.13 A suggestion put forward by the UN Secretary General in 1992 was that contributions to the peacekeeping budget (as opposed to the direct costs borne by defence) be financed from the defence vote rather than the foreign affairs vote. According to Dr Smith, the proposal is based on the assumption that since defence budgets are usually much larger it will be easier for costs to be paid from them.

> What the suggestion overlooks is the lower priority which ministries of defence tend to give to peacekeeping compared with the apparently urgent requirements of national defence.[6]

7.14 Senator Evans has extended the Secretary General's suggestion to proposing that member states donate five per cent of their defence spending towards a permanent voluntary peacekeeping force.

The Costs to Australia

7.15 Australia's assessed contributions for UN peacekeeping operations have increased from A$40.9 million in FY 1992/93 to an estimated total of A$67.5 million in FY 1993/94. Australia's assessed contributions for peacekeeping and for the UN regular budget, UN specialised agencies and a number of voluntary contributions to UN programs, are all funded from the DFAT portfolio budget as outlined below.

5 Address to the 49th General Assembly of the United Nations by Senator the Hon Gareth Evans, QC, 3 October 1994.

6 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s299.

Table 7.1: DFAT Portfolio Financial Contributions to the United Nations System ($A million)[7]

	1992/93	1993/94 (est)
UN Regular Budget	22.8	23.9
UN Specialised Agencies and other	19.8	23.5
UN Programs*	76.8	80.3
UN Peace keeping	40.9	67.5
TOTAL	160.3	195.2

*Funded from AIDAB budget; replenishment funds for International Financial Institutions (IFIs) not included.

7.16 The Defence portfolio funds the costs associated with deployment of ADF personnel and equipment to UN peacekeeping and other multinational operations.

7.17 The following table, provided by the Department of Defence, shows the actual 1992-93 and estimated 1993-94 additional costs of Defence peacekeeping operations. The table shows the total or gross additional cost, the level of supplementation received by Defence and the net additional cost. These costs exclude the direct salaries, allowance and overhead costs of participating Defence personnel, and that element of equipment operating costs that had already been provided for in the Defence budget.

7 DFAT, Submission, p.s241

Table 7.2: Costs of ADF Deployments in Peace Support Operations (1992 and 1993)[8]

Deployment		1992-93 Actual $m	1993-94 Estimate $m
Gulf War - Residual Costs	Gross Supplementation Net	3.916 3.910 0.006	- - -
Gulf Deployment	Gross Supplementation Net	5.184 0.847 4.337	2.438 0.278 2.160
United Nations Transitional Authority - Cambodia (UNTAC)	Gross Supplementation Net	26.787 26.787 Nil	23.235 16.867 6.368
Operation SOLACE - Somalia	Gross Supplementation Net	22.198 19.557 2.641	- - -
United Nations Operation - Somalia (UNOSOM)	Gross Supplementation Net	1.297 0.797 0.500	1.461 1.439 0.022
Multinational Force & Observers - Sinai	Gross Supplementation Net	0.283 0.283 Nil	1.023 1.579 -0.556
United Nations Mission for the Referendum - Western Sahara	Gross Supplementation Net	1.537 Nil 1.537	0.489 Nil 0.489
United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation - Middle East	Gross Supplementation Net	0.034 Nil 0.034	0.900 Nil 0.900
United Nations Mine Clearance Training Team - Afghanistan/Pakistan	Gross Supplementation Net	0.114 Nil 0.114	- - -
United Nations Special Commission - Iraq	Gross Supplementation Net	0.758 Nil 0.758	1.120 Nil 1.120
United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance Programs - Afghanistan	Gross Supplementation Net	0.200 Nil 0.200	0.200 Nil 0.200
Secondments to UN Headquarters	Gross Supplementation Net	0.900 Nil 0.900	0.900 Nil 0.900
United Nations Protection Force - Yugoslavia	Gross Supplementation Net	0.300 Nil 0.300	0.300 Nil 0.300
TOTAL	Gross Supplementation Net	63.508 52.181 11.327	32.066 20.163 11.903

8 Defence, Submission, p.284.

7.18 The Department of Defence pointed out to the Committee:

> By their very nature, peace support operations costs are difficult to identify and hard to plan for in advance: Defence is liable for sizeable unscheduled outlays in any financial year. The costs of mounting particular support operations depend on the very nature of the contribution. For instance, the Australian contingent with UNTAC involved additional outlays for 1991-92 of $12.5 million and for 1992-93 of $26.8 million (UN recoveries for these two years were $9.1 million). The deployment of 100 personnel and six helicopters to Cambodia for a period of six weeks cost approximately $13.3 million, $0.8 million of which fell in 1992-93. The estimated additional cost for 1993-94 is $23.2 million which brings the total expected additional costs over the three year period to $62.5 million (of which some $31.7 million will be recovered from the UN and returned to the Consolidated Revenue Fund). The cost to Defence of our involvement in UNTAC over this period has been $6.4 million.[9]

7.19 The extent of supplementation provided to Defence for peacekeeping operations is determined by Cabinet on a case-by-case basis. Defence has tended not to seek supplementation for smaller scale activities such as Iraq (UNSCOM), whereas supplementation has been sought for larger scale deployments such as Somalia (UNOSOM) and Cambodia (UNTAC).[10]

7.20 In its policy document, Defence indicated that, overall, total additional outlays on peacekeeping over the past three years have totalled

9 Defence, Submission, p.s274.
10 Defence, Submission, p.s275.

approximately $50 million (of which some 44% would be recouped from the UN).[11]

7.21 The Committee notes that the residual to be found by Defence represents 0.1 per cent of its total budget of $9 150 million.

7.22 One submission pointed out that the question of costs comes back not simply to 'how much?' but 'who pays?' It was argued that in the case of peacekeeping there is a natural tension between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Defence.[12]

7.23 Australia's contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget is paid from the DFAT budget regardless of whether Australia is involved in an operation or not. It does not cost DFAT any additional funds to commit the ADF to a peacekeeping operation.

7.24 The Defence perspective is rather different. It must use and to some extent lose its principal assets. The costs come in two forms - financial and functional. The monetary costs to Defence derive from additional expenditure in mounting peacekeeping commitments (less supplementation received by the Department) and from the myriad of incidental costs which are not reimbursed such as wear and tear on equipment, use of minor stores and lost items. Though a minute fraction of the Defence budget, these costs are not insignificant given the large proportion of defence spending taken up by fixed costs and the declining defence budget.

7.25 The Committee believes that the way in which peacekeeping is funded may have influenced the attitude of the Department of Defence towards accepting peacekeeping as a formal task of the ADF. It appears to have reinforced the ADF's point of view that peacekeeping is a supplementary activity to be performed once higher priorities have been met.

7.26 In the opinion of the Committee, the value for Defence and for Australia of involvement in UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Somalia - and now Rwanda - has been worth the investment made in human and dollar terms. Comparatively, the money spent on peacekeeping by Defence put its capabilities before the Australian public and the world in a way that no other aspect of defence activities has been able to duplicate.

11 *Peacekeeping Policy: the Future Australian Defence Force Role*, p.9.
12 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s298.

7.27 The Committee believes however that the Department of Defence should in no way be penalised for its contribution to peacekeeping.

Recommendation 34:

The Committee recommends that the Government reimburse the Department of Defence for all expenditure on peacekeeping activities.

The Australian Federal Police

7.28 One of the most significant problems faced by the AFP in responding to UN requests is financial resources.

7.29 Because of the length of time (since 1964) that the Australian Federal Police (and formerly the Commonwealth Police) has been involved in Cyprus, budget provision exists for twenty personnel to be deployed to this UN commitment. The AFP is reimbursed by the government the total cost of providing personnel to Cyprus, that is, salaries and the expenditure on supporting them. It was also reimbursed the total salaries, allowances and costs that were incurred in Cambodia.

7.30 The UN provides AFP members in Cyprus (and Cambodia) with accommodation and meals and pays them an incidentals rate of allowance, or the mission subsistence allowance. In Cambodia they paid the mission allowance; in Cyprus they provide meals and accommodation.[13]

7.31 Apart from this, no surplus capacity exists within police services in Australia, and particularly the AFP, to respond to UN requirements without supplementation. Police strengths in Australia are set by respective Australian and State/Territory Governments based on their own jurisdictional requirements and priorities. They are not able to maintain reserve capabilities.[14]

7.32 On deployment on peacekeeping operations, AFP officers receive their basic salary in accordance with their rank. Allowances are tailored towards the particular circumstances of the mission to which they are being posted.

13 Mr Ireland, Evidence, p.140.
14 AFP, Submission, p.s334.

For example, the AFP pays a commuted overtime allowance of 40 per cent to officers serving in Cyprus which covers the requirement to undertake shift work and overtime. Officers serving in Cambodia were paid an allowance of about 60 per cent of salary because of the restrictive situation. In effect, they were required to be on duty on a virtually 24 hour day basis.

7.33 Costs incurred on these deployments are met in their entirety by the Australian government. The AFP provides the individuals, fully equipped, clothed and trained. The UN provides operational support in the field.

7.34 The following chapter describes the very worthwhile contribution that the AFP has made to peacekeeping. The Committee believes however that the AFP's contribution has been severely hampered by financial constraints and supports the allocation of increased funding to enable the AFP to raise the level of its support of peacekeeping missions.

Recommendation 35:

The Committee recommends that special funding be allocated to the Australian Federal Police to support its contribution to peacekeeping.

CHAPTER EIGHT

INVOLVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS

8.1 Two Government organisations, apart from the ADF, which have made significant contributions to peacekeeping are the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC).

Australian Federal Police

8.2 Australian Federal Police have had an involvement in peacekeeping from 1964 to the present day. AFP members have served with UNCIVPOL in a number of missions.[1]

8.3 The first peacekeeping mission in which AFP members participated was UNFICYP. In May 1964 a contingent of 40 police drawn from both State and Commonwealth police forces was deployed to Cyprus to assist in the task of maintaining demarcation lines between the hostile Turkish and Greek communities. UNCIVPOL was also required to facilitate humanitarian liaison between the displaced members of the two communities and to assist both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot Police.

8.4 The failure of negotiations to promote a peaceful solution in Cyprus has resulted in a long-standing UN commitment to UNFICYP. The lack of any prospect of a satisfactory outcome has, since 1992, caused a number of nations to withdraw from the UNFICYP mission. The number of peacekeepers on Cyprus fell from almost 3 000 in 1992 to 1040 in 1993. In view of this drastic reduction, it has been necessary to restructure UNFICYP. This has led to a significant expansion of the role of UNCIVPOL - and the AFP - in that mission. Australia continues to contribute 20 members of the AFP to this operation.

1 The following summary is drawn from the AFP submission to the inquiry. More detailed descriptions of each mission are to be found in the published papers of the conference held by Lieutenant General Sanderson.

8.5 The expanded role includes not only liaison between, and assistance to, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Police but also involves:

- investigating criminal offences committed in the Buffer Zone between the two communities;
- preventing and investigating breaches of the cease-fire agreement within the Buffer Zone;
- facilitating medical treatment to, and humanitarian contact between, displaced Greek and Turkish Cypriots located on opposite sides of the partition; and
- responsibility for the western sector of the Buffer Zone including patrol and response to incidents.[2]

8.6 UNCIVPOL's role in Cyprus can be likened to community policing without the normal recourse to arrest and presentation of evidence in a court of law. Where criminal offences are concerned the UNFICYP role is largely one of liaison and negotiation with local police to obtain a satisfactory solution.

8.7 Notwithstanding the expansion in the role of UNCIVPOL, the UNFICYP mission retains many of the characteristics of traditional peacekeeping.

8.8 A new role for police in peacekeeping was introduced in 1989 when UNCIVPOL was asked to assist in the conduct of the election in Namibia. Australia contributed a contingent of fingerprint experts who were drawn from the police forces of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and assigned to UNTAG.[3]

8.9 The AFP was again involved in assisting with elections in May 1992 when ten AFP members were deployed to Cambodia to participate with

2 The Australian police were given responsibility for the entire Buffer Zone between the withdrawal of the Swedish Police Contingent and the arrival of the replacement Irish Police Contingent. AFP, Submission, p.s339.

3 AFP, Submission, pp.s331-2; for historical details of the AFP's involvement in Cyprus, Cambodia and Somalia, see AFP Submission, pp.s338-342.

UNCIVPOL in the UNTAC peacekeeping mission.[4] In Cambodia the AFP contingent was required not only to assist in bringing about a situation conducive to the holding of a free and fair election but also to investigate human rights violations and to supervise and train local police.

8.10 From 1989 until late 1993 members of the AFP also participated in the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) on the Thai/Cambodian border where they assisted in providing security for displaced Cambodians located in refugee camps.

8.11 An AFP officer was seconded to the post of Senior Police Officer to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Somalia with the UNOSOM II operation. This officer was tasked with providing advice on monitoring civilian police and organising the development and training of the civilian police authority in Somalia.

8.12 In March 1994 sixteen AFP officers were deployed to UNOMOZ in Mozambique to examine the newly appointed Mozambique police force and to assist in developing an appropriate ethos in Mozambique. The police were deployed in eight units to different regions in Mozambique to provide training in managerial skills and human relations skills.[5] The contingent will be rotated each six months until the anticipated end of the mission in November-December 1994.

8.13 The changed nature of peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War has had significant implications for the AFP. Requests for AFP participation in peacekeeping missions have increased substantially. The functions which AFP members have undertaken have expanded considerably. This can best be illustrated by reference to the experience of the AFP contingent in Cambodia.

Cambodia

8.14 UNTAC was the first UN operation to include large numbers of civilian police. Some 3 600 police from 45 countries were deployed in the UNTAC mission.

4 The contingent was gradually expanded to 36 members, including five German Border Police, six Tunisian, eight Indian and eight French police. AFP, Submission, pp.s340-1.

5 Mr Eaton, Evidence, p.466.

8.15 AFP police were deployed to Cambodia to assist in creating appropriate conditions for holding the election. Their duties included:

- establishing an UNCIVPOL presence in an area of 2 500 square kilometres in the Banteay Meanchey Province;

- investigating human rights violations and reporting on such to UN command. From 1 July 1992 to 15 August 1993 some 205 cases involving the death or injury of 355 persons were investigated by contingent members;

- controlling and supervising factionalised local police; and

- provision of training and development for local police within their area of responsibility. Contingent members trained 438 or 42.9 per cent of the total police personnel in the Thmar Pouk District.[6]

8.16 In attempting to create conditions of stability for holding the election, however, the AFP contingent found that:

> ... in our area there was no law and order, no courts, no gaols, no justice system whatsoever ... [7]

> The most fundamental structure in society is the rule of law. Without law and order no other structures essential to national rebuilding can be successfully completed. Governmental services, transport systems, communications networks, free and fair trade systems, will all fail if there is lawlessness operating within a community. Without law and order, abuses of human rights and criminal activity flourish with little or no possibility of detection.[8]

8.17 The Committee was told that the AFP members identified a need and took it upon themselves to perform additional tasks to their formal duties to redress the situation. In Lieutenant General Sanderson's view:

> ... the very small Australian Federal Police contingent did a remarkable job in Cambodia. Its members numbered 10 out of a total civil police force of 3 600. If there had been 360 groups of that potency, I think we would have had a much more significant impact on the outcomes in Cambodia because the law is the key issue in this. While we were not the sovereign authority in Cambodia, the process of taking the law down to the grassroots and getting it implemented there ... was the key process, and the Australian Federal Police contingent did that ... the contingent actually wrote the body of law, established the school and the police station, and supervised the activity.[9]

6 AFP, Submission, p.s341.
7 Mr Bradley, Evidence, p.154.
8 Mr Bates, Evidence, p.138.

8.18 Indeed, in the view of the Committee, the AFP's success in Cambodia arose from this element of 'mission creep' where the AFP took the initiative of developing law enforcement through the establishment of local police and judiciary. The Committee believes that the local system benefited considerably from the Australian police presence.

8.19 One suggestion put forward for overcoming lawlessness was that UN 'justice packages' be included as part of peacekeeping and peace building missions in countries where the rule of law, and the infrastructure needed to support it, have manifestly broken down.

8.20 It was proposed that 'justice packages' would include:

- provision of a body of criminal law and procedures which draw upon universal principles;

- creation of civil police forces, with training as well as law enforcement responsibilities;

- a panel of judges, prosecutors and defenders who would work with, and train, their local successors; and

- adequate correctional facilities, including personnel to staff them while local personnel are trained in appropriate tasks.[10]

8.21 The Committee fully supports this proposal. The Committee agrees with DFAT that the building of a functioning criminal justice system is a particularly crucial priority if the gains of a peacekeeping operation are to be consolidated and a relapse into conflict avoided.[11]

9 Lieutenant General Sanderson, Evidence, pp.506-7.
10 DFAT, Submission, p.s462.
11 DFAT, Submission, p.s462. The issue of 'justice packages' is addressed in more detail in Chapter Five of this committee's report entitled 'A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights', November 1994.

Recommendation 36:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government support the development of, and inclusion of, 'justice packages' as part of the peacekeeping and peace building missions in countries where the rule of law, and the infrastructure needed to support it, have manifestly broken down.

8.22 In Cambodia the Australian police contingent was unique in that it was the only group which had a district command within the country (apart from one other which collapsed). The contingent was responsible directly to the UN Police Commissioner (from the Netherlands). The UN Police Commissioner was directly responsible to UN Special Representative Akashi. It was a different chain of command - being used for the first time - from the chain of command in Cyprus where police worked through the military system to the Special Representative.[12]

8.23 The Committee believes that the lessons learned by the AFP in Cambodia will have direct relevance to future peacekeeping. Future UN operations are more likely to occur in countries which have either limited or no civilian infrastructure or law and order.

8.24 It would appear that the task of establishing a criminal justice and law and order infrastructure that is sustainable will fall increasingly to police in future peacekeeping operations.[13] Moreover, the Committee believes that there will be increasing pressure on the AFP to contribute to peacekeeping. It is timely therefore for the AFP to consider very carefully its decision-making processes, its training and the level of commitment it can sustain.

Deployment of AFP

8.25 The Committee was told that the decision to deploy AFP personnel is taken by Cabinet or very senior ministers because it involves a budget supplementation. The AFP does not have the capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations without supplementation of its budget.

12 Mr Bradley, Evidence, p.153.

13 Mr Eaton, Evidence, p.464. The two AFP superintendents working with UNBRO contributed towards the achievement of a court and prison system and writing a criminal code and regulations for the police, the court and the prisons.

8.26 The AFP has served in UN operations under two arrangements:

a. secondment of officers of the AFP to the UN which has employed them under contract; or

b. deployment to UN operations while continuing to be paid by the Australian Government.

8.27 In both capacities police officers are covered by UN immunities and obligations. They wear a uniform - including the blue beret and scarf - which indicates that they are from Australia and that they are part of a UN operation. They travel on official passports which are annotated to indicate that they are engaged in UN peacekeeping duties.[14]

8.28 The Committee noted that CIVPOL performs its tasks unarmed. According to the AFP, this facilitates the acceptance of civilian police in the community and demonstrates the principles on which a police service is based.[15]

Training for Peacekeeping

8.29 The AFP claims that the role that the police perform in the UN peacekeeping environment is an extension of their domestic policing role. The skills that police develop in a democratic society are the same skills that are required to meet the demands placed on them in a peacekeeping operation, for example, investigation skills and conflict resolution.

8.30 The police hold that the training which police normally undertake is appropriate for peacekeeping. In essence, police are trained to uphold the rule of law and to deal with people in difficult situations. Specific training for peacekeeping focuses on providing information on the area to which police are to be deployed and preparation for the operation of equipment.[16]

8.31 That training might include, for example, familiarisation with the local culture and the local environment, language training, four-wheel drive training:

14 Mr Ireland, Evidence, p.139.

15 AFP, Submission p.s333.

16 Mr Eaton, Evidence, p.464.

> We do an assessment on each mission case that comes up. That assessment looks at the skills, the threats such as mines and health, and all those sorts of things. As a result of that, we structure the training around the culture, the people, the language, the mine threats, the hazards that maybe extend to animals or snakes, the health risks. For example, for Cambodia, we sent two chaps away to do the SAS regiment medical officer patrols course, two to Melbourne to do the Khmer language course, and the remainder of the men covered a lot of that training here in basic training. Again, in the people going to Cambodia there were no people involved on that particular selection that had to undertake four-wheel drive training. They were already qualified. Where they had to requalify was mainly in the firearms testing area because we took new firearms over there - a different style - even though they were not issued and were not used.[17]

8.32 With respect to human rights training the Committee was told that human rights underpin the basic training of a police officer, their recruitment and the whole underlying philosophy.[18]

8.33 The Committee was told that the police role in any peacekeeping operation is underpinned by the fundamental principles which govern the operations of a police service within a democratic and free society. These principles include:

- upholding the rule of law;
- upholding the rights of the individual; and
- resolving incidents with the minimum use of force.[19]

The use of police in UN peacekeeping operations is, therefore, a direct extension of their domestic role.

Problems Encountered by the AFP

Limited Resources

8.34 In evidence the Committee was informed that the total strength of the AFP was 3,100. Of these about 700 were staff members and 2 300 - 2 400 were sworn police officers.

17 Mr Bradley, Evidence, p.146.
18 Mr Ireland, Evidence, p.151.
19 Mr Bates, Evidence, p.137.

8.35 From this strength the ADF is able to contribute to UN operations 50-70 officers at any one time and to maintain a rotation for a set period of time. Any increase in that number would require the assistance of the state police forces. For example, during the Cambodian operation state police forces (Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria) provided fingerprint experts to verify electoral documents.

8.36 State police were included in the Cyprus contingent when it comprised 50 members. When the contingent was reduced to 20 it was decided that the AFP could continue to support the operation alone.

8.37 The AFP advised that AFP and state forces can operate together as a composite force because their basic skills are essentially the same. When the initial contingent was deployed to Cambodia, for example, it was only five weeks from the time of the government making a decision to the time of deployment. This was possible - with supplementary training - because officers of all forces had comparable basic skills.

8.38 The Committee was told that the UN had requested that Australia provide 75 police personnel to UNTAC. The AFP and State/Territory police forces agreed that this request could be met, providing that the Australian Government or the UN undertake the payment of all costs associated with the deployment, including the payment of salaries.

8.39 The final decision was that 10 peacekeepers would be deployed to UNTAC. The total cost was met by both the government and the UN.

8.40 The AFP suggested that in considering future requests the UN consider financing the deployment of police personnel on a similar basis to that of the military. This would be consistent with the need for such participation to be recognised, and funded, by the international community through the UN.[20]

Planning for Peacekeeping

8.41 If an integrated approach to planning is to be taken, then representatives of the component parts, including police, should be represented in the planning phases of any mission and in the development of philosophy and principles at UN headquarters. Without a police

20 AFP, Submission, p.s335.

presence at this stage, the assumption is sustained that peacekeeping is primarily a military function.

8.42 The Committee believes that the police should be involved in the early planning stages of a peacekeeping mission to enable:

- the role of police to be clearly identified;
- the objectives for the police to achieve to be clearly identified; and
- the numbers of police required to be established.

8.43 The police have encountered some difficulties in negotiating with the UN. The Committee was told that some improvement has resulted from the placing of a UN police liaison officer in the peacekeeping secretariat to provide immediate law and order advice as a peacekeeping operation is being worked out.[21]

8.44 The police have relied on the Australian Mission to the UN to represent them in New York. The appointment of a Defence Attache to the Australian Mission to the UN in January 1991 resulted in direct contact between the Defence Attache and the AFP if issues raised at the UN were likely to have implications for the AFP.[22]

8.45 The Committee recommends that Australia ensure as a matter of course that the AFP is represented at the UN in the early planning stages of any operation in which Australian police officers are likely to be involved.

8.46 The Committee believes that the AFP ought to have a representative attached to the Australian Mission in New York to assist in planning of peacekeeping missions.

Recommendation 37:

The Committee recommends that consideration be given to the feasibility of attaching a representative of the Australian Federal Police to the Australian Mission to the United Nations in New York.

21 Mr Eaton, Evidence, p.464.

22 The committee noted that Colonel Bruce Osborn took up the appointment as Australia's first Defence Attache to the Australian Mission to the UN in January 1991. Direct communication between the Defence Attache and the AFP was established as a result of fortuitous circumstances.

Standards of Training and Professionalism

8.47 The Committee is concerned that some serious problems exist within the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL). One of the criticisms of the police role in Cambodia related to the ineffectiveness of some of the international police contingent.

8.48 A particular difficulty experienced by CIVPOL is the wide range of backgrounds of police forces which participate in peacekeeping missions.

8.49 The Committee heard evidence from a variety of sources on the problems of misbehaviour and general ineffectiveness of CIVPOL in Cambodia. For example, one UN Volunteer who had assisted with preparations for the elections told the Committee that many of the CIVPOL were untrained in police work in their own countries. Some national police contingents arrived without equipment or basic requirements, such as fuel and water. Many CIVPOL were unable to drive.[23]

8.50 ACFOA observed that the Cambodian situation has shown that, unless properly trained, given clear directives and provided with resources to carry out the task, UN police forces could actually undermine the success of a peacekeeping operation. ACFOA agreed that some national police contingents in Cambodia - and CIVPOL generally - had the reputation of being 'undisciplined, untrained and generally useless'.[24]

8.51 The Committee was assured that the general criticisms which have been made of CIVPOL were in no way applicable to the AFP contingent who established a fine reputation for themselves and who by their own initiative gave some indications of what a properly managed CIVPOL force might have been able to achieve in Cambodia.

8.52 The Committee heard that the ability of Australian personnel to develop good interpersonal relations with the communities in which they were posted contributed to their safety. In effect the community ensured the protection of the police.

23 Mr Bowers provides an account of his experiences as a UN Volunteer in Cambodia in his submission. See C Bowers, Submission, pp.s379-80.

24 ACFOA, Submission, p.s429.

8.53 In the view of one witness, the number of UN personnel could be reduced and the savings used more productively. For example, there were 3 600 UN police in Cambodia. Their tasks could have been effectively carried out by '500 fewer' officers. The savings on airfares and allowances as a result of this reduction would have funded 50 000 local police, provided vehicles, salaries, and built or rebuilt police stations.[25] The greater the degree of local involvement, the more cost effective is the operation.

8.54 According to Lieutenant General Sanderson, the UN faces considerable difficulty in recruiting efficient police forces to UN missions. In the first place, there are few police forces of the calibre of the AFP and secondly, police forces do not have the surplus capacity to contribute to peacekeeping missions.

8.55 Given the commendable achievements and performance of the AFP in peacekeeping missions, the Committee believes that Australia could make a worthwhile contribution to peacekeeping through expanding the ability of Australian police to participate.

Military or Police?

8.56 A number of submissions suggested that consideration should be given to using civil police instead of military forces. Senator Gareth Evans also canvasses this idea in his book *Cooperating for Peace*. It is argued that civil police are particularly suited to basic law and order functions such as crowd control, criminal investigation, arrest and detention. Moreover, civil police would be distinguishable from the military peacekeeping personnel and this would advance the principle of separation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.[26]

8.57 Consideration should be given to whether in some circumstances a police unit might be more appropriate than a military unit. The Committee received some evidence which suggested that a police unit may have been more effective in Somalia. The critical factor in many areas is to establish a police force and develop a system of law and order in the very early phases of the operation.

25 Mr Bradley, Evidence, p.156.
26 AFP, Submission, p.s332.

8.58 It was put to the Committee that Somalia would have benefited from an early police presence to provide some continuity when the military withdrew. It is possible that committing the military in the first instance will produce a negative reaction, particularly if the military is perceived as an invading force itself.

8.59 There is a role for police forces in some situations where it may be inappropriate for deployment of military forces. The Committee was told, for instance, that the withdrawal of UN police from northern Iraq has caused concern among the local population but it would be inappropriate to send a military force there.

8.60 A clear distinction needs to be made between the roles of the various components. The philosophy of civilian police is clearly different from that of the military. Police should not undertake the role of the military in peacekeeping operations or vice versa.[27]

8.61 The AFP made it quite clear to the Committee that they firmly rejected the idea of police undertaking the role of the military in peacekeeping operations.

Benefits for the AFP

8.62 The AFP identified direct and indirect benefits for Australian law enforcement from participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Direct benefits include:

- the ability to identify potential criminal threats from countries emerging from peacekeeping operations. For example, there is a growing body of evidence that criminal interests are quick to exploit vulnerable governments and communities. Similarly countries with immature police and law enforcement systems can unwittingly provide havens for criminal operations;

- the development of contacts within emerging societies and the reinforcing of the police network and principles; and

- the development of police skills within a community and a heightened awareness of human rights in emerging police organisations. This

27 Mr Bradley, Evidence, p.138

enables more effective cooperation and mutual assistance to stop the international operation of criminal groups.

8.63 Indirect benefits include personal development of police officers and an increased understanding of police in a free and democratic society.[28]

8.64 Several submissions and witnesses drew attention to the commendable performance of the AFP in peacekeeping missions. The Committee believes that the substantial experience and expertise of the AFP is of major benefit to the UN organisation.

8.65 The Committee believes that the AFP should take a leading role in creating opportunities for nurturing an awareness of human rights.

Recommendation 38:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government provide the funding to enable the Australian Federal Police to expand its capacity to provide training opportunities for UNCIVPOL, especially in professionalism and human rights.

8.66 Although peacekeeping has been a continuing role for the AFP for some thirty years, the Committee noted that peacekeeping is not formally acknowledged as a primary role for the AFP.

Recommendation 39:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Federal Police peacekeeping role be given formal recognition as one of its specific roles.

Australian Electoral Commission

8.67 Australia's international interest in the provision of electoral assistance within the context of UN peacekeeping operations began with UNTAG in early 1990 and continued in the same year with preparatory work in connection with the proposed referendum in Western Sahara for MINURSO.

28 AFP, Submission, p.s334.

8.68 The Committee noted that the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 was amended in December 1992 to give the AEC a wider latitude in the provision of international electoral assistance. This has allowed the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to develop a policy for providing assistance in this area and thus move away from the previous ad hoc approach in responding to requests from the UN and the Commonwealth of Nations.[29]

8.69 AEC involvement was accelerated with the secondment of AEC officers to the electoral component of UNTAC. In mid-1992 six AEC officers were released to assist in the detailed long-term planning and implementation of the election in Cambodia. One of these was the Senior Deputy Chief Electoral Officer (Operations and Computerisation) - Mr Michael Maley - in the Electoral Component of UNTAC.

8.70 Another of these officers, the Director Applications Development, spent six months in New York developing computer systems to support the election.[30]

8.71 During the polling and counting period in May and June 1993 some 67 Australian Government officers, including 44 Electoral Commission officers, served as International Polling Station Officers at polling stations and counting centres throughout Cambodia.[31]

8.72 Individual Australians were also recruited by the UN Volunteer Programme to work as provincial or district Electoral Supervisors.

8.73 Volunteers for this operation were recruited through the Overseas Service Bureau on behalf of the UN Volunteer Office in Geneva. AEC permanent staff members who volunteered to assist in the election process were granted leave without pay to go to Cambodia.

8.74 The Acting Electoral Commissioner, Dr Bell, told the Committee that administrative problems were encountered in dealing with the UN when sending volunteers to Cambodia:

29 DFAT, Submission, pp.s244-5.

30 As part of the voter registration system, the first non-Personal Computer Khmer keyboard was produced.

31 Dr Bell, Submission, pp.s312-3.

> It was extremely difficult to settle many arrangements a reasonable period before departure. We appreciate that UNTAC operated in a difficult environment, but it should have been possible to advise something as basic as the rate of *per diem* payments well before the event. Nor were volunteers advised of departure dates or likely locations in Cambodia until almost the last moment. Travel arrangements were in a shambles ... such uncertainties troubled volunteer staff, made it hard for us to advise/reassure their families as to their welfare whilst abroad, and limited our ability to do our best for their security and welfare in Cambodia.[32]

8.75 During the Cambodian elections, 23-28 May 1993, Australia was one of 42 countries to provide national contingents of International Polling Station Officers (IPSOs). Australia provided the largest national contingent of 68 officers (from AEC, Defence and DFAT) out of a total of 963 IPSOs.

8.76 Australians were involved in all phases of the Cambodian elections - planning, registration, training, polling and counting - in what is considered to have been the UN's most successful endeavour in this field.

8.77 Mr Maley observed that the Cambodian election gave rise to more complex practical difficulties than any previous election with which the UN had been involved. The UN Organisation:

> ... had full responsibility for the conduct of the poll, which was not the case for example in Namibia, and also had to cope with major language difficulties, an absence of infrastructure, and a much less settled political environment than had been contemplated in the Paris Agreements. Despite these difficulties the exercise was ultimately successful, and it is reasonable to suppose that Cambodia will be the primary reference model for elections organised and conducted by the UN for some time to come.[33]

8.78 The AEC shares the same limitations as the AFP. It does not have large numbers of staff that can be made available on short notice to peacekeeping missions. However, the AEC does have officers with a great deal of expertise in providing technical advice on all aspects of the election process, including formulation of electoral systems, budgeting, voter registration, computing, training, electoral information and education, preparation of manuals, the conduct of polling and counting of votes, as well

32 Dr Bell, Submission, p.s311.

33 Michael Maley in Hugh Smith (ed), *International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience*, 1994, p.45. In this paper Mr Maley provides a detailed account of the AEC's involvement in the election in Cambodia.

as officers available to serve as election monitors, trainers and scrutiny supervisors.[34]

Recommendation 40:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Electoral Commission be included in the early planning phase of peacekeeping operations in which the conduct of elections is a significant element of the mission.

Recommendation 41:

The Committee recommends that the finances allocated to the Australian Electoral Commission take into account its peacekeeping function.

34 Dr Bell, Submission, p.s313.

CHAPTER NINE

NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS

9.1 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have traditionally provided humanitarian and development assistance to communities in need. With the upsurge in peacekeeping operations and the expansion in recent years of the military role to the provision of humanitarian relief, NGO staff have increasingly found themselves working alongside military personnel on peacekeeping missions.

9.2 In the past NGOs have had few formal links with the military. Recent involvement of the military in providing humanitarian aid, however, has meant that both NGOs and the military have had to find ways of cooperating with one another and coordinating their activities to ensure that aid is delivered effectively.

9.3 The Committee was told that NGOs would welcome a greater sharing of information with the military. In situations where law and order has broken down, lives may depend on intelligence and information from a range of sources.

9.4 In Somalia an NGO consortium was established early in the operation and responsibilities were allocated on a geographical basis. ACFOA told the Committee that, despite the ample possibilities for cooperation, NGOs perceived that information was not being provided to them by the UN, nor was the UN interested in receiving information from the NGOs.[1]

9.5 During this inquiry the Committee found a wide range of perceptions on the degree of cooperation that exists between NGOs and the military. In some cases extensive structures had been instituted but often liaison occurred on an *ad hoc* basis.

9.6 In Somalia, for example, meetings chaired by a US Marine Colonel were held every day at UNOSOM headquarters to coordinate military and NGO activities.

---

1 ACFOA, Submission, p.s420.

9.7 In Baidoa a working group which represented all NGOs was set up to liaise with the Australian force. One of the tasks of the ADF in Baidoa was to ascertain and provide for the security needs of NGOs in that area. The ADF appointed a major to liaise with the NGOs.

9.8 According to Colonel Mellor effective liaison and working relationships were established with the NGOs in Baidoa. This was to some extent attributable to relationships begun in Australia where NGOs were able to provide information on local conditions and key figures in Baidoa prior to the deployment of defence personnel.[2]

9.9 World Vision Australia (WVA) agreed that relationships between members of the ADF battalion group and both the NGOs and the local population in Somalia were excellent.[3]

9.10 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert told the Committee that in Cambodia much of the contact between NGOs and the military occurred on an informal basis. Interaction had taken place at all levels. Generally, NGOs and the military had worked well together.[4]

9.11 There were differences between the NGOs in the degree of cooperation they reported. World Vision Australia, for example, considered that contact between UNTAC and NGOs had been minimal.

> High level officers of UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in Cambodia, for example, are reported by NGO staff as being paternalistic towards NGOs. There was little contact between the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and NGO humanitarian relief projects in Cambodia. Lack of cooperation and liaison between UN organisations (such as UNICEF, UNDP and UNHCR) has been noted by NGO fieldworkers. This exemplifies the unnecessary and avoidable compartmentalism - or segregation/ fragmentation of inter-related organisations, programs, projects and personnel - which characterises to varying degrees many UN peacekeeping operations.[5]

9.12 Care Australia, however, stressed to the Committee that it had developed a cooperative relationship with UNTAC and that the assistance

2 Colonel Mellor, Evidence, p.52.
3 Mr Curtis, Evidence, p.208.
4 Lieutenant Colonel Studdert, Evidence, p.394.
5 World Vision Australia, Submission, p.s353.

provided by UNTAC to their team was invaluable, particularly in relation to escorting convoys and refugees.

9.13 Mr Ian Harris, National Director of Care Australia, told the Committee that cooperation with the military forces is essential for the delivery of aid.[6] Military forces provide the security which enables NGOs to carry out their missions. NGOs working in places such as Angola, where military peacekeeping forces have not been deployed, are less effective without the security provided by military contingents.

9.14 Care Australia actively fostered the creation of productive relationships by dedicating staff to this end. Care Australia has also employed ex-Defence Force personnel who can offer skills in logistics and in conducting operations. Such personnel can also contribute to an understanding within the organisation of how the military operates.

9.15 Care Australia considered its approach and attitude to the military to be unusual among NGOs.

9.16 Given the variety of perceptions on the levels of cooperation between NGOs and the military, the Committee believes that steps must be taken to facilitate better understanding between them.

9.17 The Committee welcomes the steps that have already been taken to achieve this. Firstly, NGOs have been included in major conferences organised by the ADF. Representatives of NGOs both attended and addressed the CGS Exercise in June 1993 which focused on peacekeeping.[7] The question of NGO participation in peacekeeping was also addressed at the conference on international peacekeeping which was arranged by Lieutenant General Sanderson. On that occasion a representative of Care Australia made a presentation on the role of NGOs in the provision of humanitarian relief.[8] The Committee noted that Community Aid Abroad invited Lieutenant General Sanderson to address its seminar organised for NGOs.

6 Mr Harris, Evidence, pp.278-9.
7 World Vision Australia, Submission, p.s354.
8 Hugh Smith (ed), *International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience*, 1994, pp.131-6.

9.18 Secondly, the peacekeeping wing of the ADF Warfare Centre at Williamtown has invited NGO representatives to its international seminars.[9]

9.19 Thirdly, as Major Kelly observed, close cooperation with ICRC had been established as part of the Kangaroo series of military exercises in recent years.[10] The Committee believes that there is scope for more realistic incorporation of NGOs into military exercises held in Australia.

9.20 The Committee encourages further interaction of this kind between the military and NGOs and urges the organisers of such conferences, seminars and exercises to continue this trend.

9.21 On some operations NGOs and the military have appointed individuals to assist in developing better liaison and cooperation. This appears to have occurred largely on an *ad hoc* basis.

9.22 The Committee sees benefit in establishing formal structures to coordinate the work of NGOs and the military. For example, officers could be allocated a specific liaison role within contingents on deployment.

Recommendation 42:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force appoint a liaison officer to contingents deployed on peacekeeping to coordinate the work of the military with the activities of Non-Government Organisations.

9.23 A further step would be to second officers or Senior Non-Commissioned Officers to NGOs to assist in their operations outside the context of peacekeeping.

Recommendation 43:

The Committee recommends that consideration be given by the Australian Defence Force to facilitating secondment of officers to Non-Government Organisations on rotation.

9 See Chapter Eleven.
10 Major Kelly, Submission, p.s397.

NGOs and the UN

9.24 In its submission to the Committee, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) pointed out that from an NGO viewpoint overall coordination of operations has been confusing:

> Communications and chains of command between military, UN humanitarian and civilian elements has not been clear in the various operations in which Australian NGOs have been involved. There is a strongly perceived inability to co-operate and a competitiveness between the various UN bodies involved at the operational level (notably UNHCR, UNDP, and in the Cambodian case UNBRO). Working relationships are thus poor. There has also been a demonstrable inability to liaise/co-ordinate effectively with NGOs, people with a lot of background and local knowledge; NGOs are viewed paternalistically, not seen as major players.[11]

9.25 World Vision Australia claimed that:

> While there has been greater openness to NGO involvement in various UN fora, there remains significant resistance in some UN agencies, including some of those involved in peacekeeping operations. [12]

9.26 In some missions, however, the UN has set up daily conferences where all the players bid for resources and indicate the areas in which they intend to work. The UN can take a lead in advising on the safety of an area.[13]

9.27 According to ACFOA, the establishment in April 1992 of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to improve co-ordination and effectiveness of the humanitarian work of the UN agencies, has not achieved its desired impact. Poor co-ordination among UN agencies continues, largely due to DHA's lack of adequate resourcing.

9.28 The International Council for Voluntary Agencies has a secondment with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs to work on the issue of coordination in emergencies, on how NGOs contribute internationally to more effective UN coordination, on how NGOs can be part of that more effective coordination in emergencies and on what NGOs can do to help strengthen DHA through providing information or approaching governments

11 ACFOA, Submission, p.420.
12 World Vision Australia, Submission, p.s353.
13 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, p.349.

to increase their support to DHA. NGOs are thereby involved in a range of activities from the very practical to planning debates and dialogue and contributing to the process of reform.[14]

9.29 With respect to the 50th anniversary of the UN in 1995, the Committee was told that Australian NGOs have been encouraged by the Australian government to plan activities which will contribute to the debate about the future role of the UN.

NGOs relationships with each other

9.30 The Committee was told that there is as much variance in the degree of professionalism of NGOs as there is amongst military forces from different nations.

9.31 However, ACFOA told the Committee that co-ordination between NGOs working in conflict or emergency situations is generally very good. Regular meetings are usually organised to share information and to coordinate programs and activities. There is a high level of cooperation and a sharing of expertise in the field, for example, NGOs working in Cambodia have been meeting weekly since the early eighties, and sectoral meetings have been taking place in more recent years. According to ACFOA, these meetings have been invaluable and have ensured the maximum use of scarce resources. Moreover, UN bodies and some government instrumentalities have also been represented at these meetings.[15]

9.32 World Vision Australia also expressed the view that cooperation and coordination between NGOs in the field are very good:

> ... there are NGOs with specific sectoral expertise and, particularly in relief situations, the NGOs would get together through a central forum and they would allocate their own expertise to the problem, so there was a very high level of cooperation.[16]

14 Mr Rollason, Evidence, pp.406-7.
15 ACFOA, Submission, p.s420.
16 Mr Davenport, Evidence, p.219.

9.33 The Committee was told that the NGO consortium in Somalia met for the purpose of coordinating activity. The NGOs decided to establish the consortium because of the failure of the UN to play a coordinating role.[17]

Contribution of NGOs to Peacekeeping

9.34 The Committee was told that in many instances NGOs are working in conflict areas prior to the decision by the UN to deploy peacekeeping forces. Through their relief and development assistance and their work with refugees and displaced people, NGOs develop an intimate knowledge of areas of conflict, the major players, the background to problems, the social and environmental circumstances, and the likely impact of prolonged conflict.

9.35 Such has been the case in Somalia, Mozambique and Cambodia, where NGOs have been working for some years and had built up a great deal of knowledge and expertise.[18]

9.36 NGOs are therefore in a good position to contribute to peacekeeping. Indeed, World Vision Australia pointed out to the Committee that NGOs - more than most other participants in peacekeeping - are likely to:

- have a greater understanding of the local interpersonal, social, economic and political context;
- have greater experience of working directly with local communities and of relevant community-building methods, for example, community development and participatory planning;
- have a more highly developed sensitivity to local culture;
- have a longer time-frame for understanding and intervention;
- have a greater capability to function as part of informal 'early warning' and 'early response' network before the situation deteriorates into disaster and crisis;

17 Mr Rama, Evidence, p.219.
18 ACFOA, Submission, p.s419.

- have greater freedom of action than either governments or UN peacekeeping personnel, for example, NGOs have at a local level, sponsored peace talks between rival factions;[19] and

- operate at a lower cost than UN operations.[20]

9.37 In the course of conducting their missions, NGOs create networks and links within the local community. By the time UN peacekeepers arrive, therefore, a system of liaison with the community is often well established.

9.38 One of the key claims of non-government organisations is that in situations of conflict there are local organisations and local networks still functioning. UN peacekeeping operations should seek to strengthen this local capacity because it is this local capacity that will ultimately provide for durable solutions in a situation of conflict. NGOs can provide access to these local networks.[21]

9.39 Moreover, NGOs argue that they have the capacity to recognise early indications of potential crises through their monitoring facilities. WVA is critical of the fact that UN peacekeeping operations have been late reactions to full-blown crises rather than anticipatory and preventive early responses.

9.40 The Committee agrees with DFAT that there is a reserve of expertise in NGOs with programs operating in countries to which the UN plans to send peacekeepers. NGOs should be consulted and, where possible, their advice and capacities should be utilised by peacekeeping operations.[22]

Pre-deployment Briefings

9.41 On the basis of their experience in particular locations, NGOs are well qualified to brief other participants in peacekeeping missions on characteristics of the regions to which they will be deployed.

19 The committee was told that Community Aid Abroad (CAA) had facilitated negotiations between various groups of Somalis. CAA funded the process which ultimately reached a satisfactory conclusion. See ACFOA, Submission, p.426.
20 World Vision Australia, Submission, p.s353.
21 Mr Rollason, Evidence, p.399.
22 DFAT, Submission, p.s245.

Recommendation 44:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force involve Non-Government Organisations in pre-deployment briefings with a view to drawing upon the in-country experience of Non-Government Organisation workers and setting up appropriate mechanisms for liaison while on deployment.

9.42 One witness expressed to the Committee the view that personnel deployed by Australia were not sufficiently well briefed and well trained or aware of the cultural needs and mores of the area:

> If you took the group that went to Somalia, it was a rush job to get them trained and to put material together to give them some idea of what they were going into ... there is a perceived need that there does need to be more training on the part of defence personnel to meet various cultural and different situations in which they will find themselves.[23]

9.43 The Committee recommends that the ADF seek to involve NGOs in pre-deployment briefings to provide information on country conditions such as climate, culture and politics, and the role of the NGOs operating within that region. Structures for in-country liaison could be formulated at this pre-deployment stage.

Training for NGOs

9.44 The challenges presented to NGOs by the post-Cold War situation have in turn brought about a need for new approaches to training NGO personnel. That training is vital for NGOs was reinforced to the Committee by the assertion that competent administrators were considered by some NGOs to be a higher priority than funding.[24]

9.45 The Committee observed that an important benefit could perhaps be gained by different component groups training together. NGOs would benefit from a better understanding of working alongside the military in a

23 Mr Harris, Evidence, p.290.
24 This assertion was made to Mr Kerin during his visit to Somalia, Kenya and Mozambique in 1993. See Evidence, p.349.

conflict situation. The Committee was told that some training of this kind is provided by a private consultancy - TorqAid.[25]

9.46 TorqAid is a relief and development consultancy offering services related to support for overseas relief and recovery situations. It has provided training assistance including country orientation briefings to both NGOs and ADF personnel. TorqAid has run workshops for the Australian Army at the Reinforcement Holding Company at Randwick Barracks on the work of UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs in general. The workshops have also included specific details for troops going to both Somalia and Mozambique. TorqAid also briefed the members of the contingent deploying to Rwanda prior to their departure.[26]

9.47 The Committee recommends that in addition to involvement of NGOs in ADF activities the ADF offer representatives of NGOs places in training courses relevant to the needs of NGOs. This will further enhance the ability of the ADF and NGOs to work together cooperatively on peacekeeping missions.

9.48 Training courses might include, for example, the use of modern communications equipment, the handling of 4WDs and heavy trucks in rough terrain, logistics and stores management, navigation and team leadership in harsh conditions.[27]

Recommendation 45:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Defence Force offer places in appropriate training courses to representatives of Non-Government Organisations.

9.49 It is clear to the Committee that there is now a greater need for close cooperation between NGOs, the UN and the military forces.[28]

25 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, pp.335-6.
26 TorqAid Brochure.
27 World Vision Australia, Submission, p.s354.
28 Major Kelly, p.s397.

Concerns of NGOs

9.50 The escalation of violence within communities since the end of the Cold War has had a significant impact on the work and role of NGOs. More than ever NGOs find themselves in situations where law and order has broken down and the performance of their primary tasks is in jeopardy. NGOs rely on the military element for security and protection. This is a new situation for them just as new forms of peacekeeping are a challenge for the military.

9.51 A matter of concern raised by ACFOA was that UN peacekeeping operations may themselves have an adverse impact on local communities. ACFOA contended that the arrival of foreign troops, UN personnel and infrastructure can destabilise and even undermine the local economy. According to ACFOA the impact on the Cambodian economy of high *per diem* living allowances of many units from Western countries has been profound:

> Rents skyrocketed (sending many long term NGOs to cheaper accommodation further out of town) and a plethora of hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, brothels and other entertainment establishments 'boomed'. Many Cambodians had to vacate their 'inner-city' accommodation to make way for this property boom. Perhaps the greatest impact, however, was for the ordinary Cambodian when the price of rice increased and the price of protein (fish) increased in one 12 month period from $1.50/kg to $5/kg.[29]

9.52 ACFOA suggested to the Committee that *per diem* allowances of UN peacekeeping personnel should be reduced to a more modest level.

9.53 ACFOA also raised with the Committee the conclusion of the UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) that the UNTAC presence in Cambodia diverted labour and investment away from the production of essential goods towards tertiary sector activities providing services essentially for foreigners living in Cambodia.[30]

9.54 A further concern is the tendency of peacekeeping to react to emergencies rather than address the needs of long term development. In its submission to the inquiry, World Vision Australia argued that current peacekeeping missions can be characterised as the 'sheriff's posse' approach,

29 ACFOA, Submission, p.s425.
30 ACFOA, Submission, p.s9.

that is, 'mustered at the last minute to prevent the worst'. NGOs tend to be marginalised by this approach yet they have potentially useful roles to play in what WVA describes as 'people-centred' peacekeeping which focuses more on creating conditions of peace which can be maintained.[31]

9.55 World Vision Australia therefore advocates a paradigm shift from the 'sheriff's posse' response to a more people-centred orientation, summarised as follows:

Figure 9.1: Peacekeeping Continuum[32]

People Centred		Sheriff's Posse
early	⟷	late
long-term	⟷	short-term
development	⟷	emergency relief
pro-active	⟷	reactive
systematic	⟷	ad hoc
preventive	⟷	crisis-oriented
civilian	⟷	military
socio-political	⟷	technical
integrated	⟷	compartmentalised
participatory	⟷	authoritarian
high local influence	⟷	high foreign influence
high poverty focus	⟷	low poverty focus

9.56 WVA pointed out that another of the problems of the 'sheriff's posse' approach is that it tends to promote negative reactions on the part of local nationals to 'foreign' intervention - as occurred in Somalia.

9.57 In emergency situations, the guiding factor becomes the pressure to respond rather than looking at the long-term implications of how we

31 World Vision Australia, Submission, p.s352.
32 World Vision Australia, Submission, p.s350

respond. ACFOA's concern is that humanitarian needs are increasingly being defined in an emergency context and this is to the detriment of the development of long term planning.

9.58 While the media can motivate the international community into providing assistance, the media tends to focus on an emergency for a very short period before dramatising another emergency. On the one hand there is some benefit from the media highlighting crisis areas but on the other hand it distorts the reality of the need for assistance within the international community.[33]

9.59 There is a need to provide a more even response to humanitarian needs through the UN system rather than be driven by what the media identify as the issue of the day.

9.60 From the very beginning it must be a process that is fundamentally developmental which means that it is strengthening local capacity. The NGOs provide a mechanism to make the contacts and to start that process.[34]

9.61 It should be recognised that NGOs remain in an area after peacekeeping operations have concluded. It is important that this be kept in mind and that development aid is not reduced because of peacekeeping. For example, the Committee was told that as soon as peace was achieved in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, while there had been high levels of humanitarian assistance throughout the period of conflict, development assistance was drastically reduced.[35]

9.62 It is clear to the Committee that steps must be taken to promote the view that peacekeeping operations should be planned and implemented with more sensitivity to the broader and longer-term social, political, economic and institutional context and should be conducted in an integrated way with extensive local participation.

9.63 Local and international NGOs should be included in the preparation of peace plans as well as in monitoring the humanitarian aspects of threatening situations.

33 Mr Rollason, Evidence, p.405.
34 Mr Rollason, Evidence, p.409.
35 Mr Rollason, Evidence, p.409.

Recommendation 46:

The Committee recommends that Cabinet contribute as much effort to post-deployment assistance as to the immediate needs of a crisis and factor both priorities into planning for a peacekeeping response.

Recommendation 47:

The Committee recommends that unless provision can be made for post-deployment assistance the value of contributing to peacekeeping is diminished and should be rigorously re-assessed.

CHAPTER TEN

POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

10.1 As outlined in Chapter Two of this report, the international community embraced UN peacekeeping as a way of dealing with conflict in the post-Cold War world. The new forms of peacekeeping, however, have been characterised by high costs and difficulties arising from conducting operations with military personnel from widely differing backgrounds. A number of troop contributing countries including Australia are therefore looking for more effective means of conducting peacekeeping.

10.2 Several submissions to the inquiry saw benefit in a regional approach to peacekeeping. The Department of Defence told the Committee that many countries in the Southeast Asian region have shown an interest in a regional approach to UN operations and that Senator Ray had raised the notion of a regional peacekeeping force during informal discussions with the defence ministers of Malaysia, Singapore and New Zealand.

10.3 The Committee believes that regional cooperation in peacekeeping is a logical extension of Australia's defence policy which seeks to promote strategic stability and security by a policy of engagement in the region.

10.4 An important plank of defence policy is the Defence Cooperation Program which facilitates cooperative activities with the countries of South East Asia and the South Pacific. Expenditure for Defence Cooperation in 1993-94 was $77.1 million.[1] This has been increased to an allocation of $80 million for 1994-95.

10.5 The ADF participates in joint exercises with nations of the region. Joint exercises provide opportunities for regional defence forces to gain knowledge of each other's procedures, equipment and organisation. In addition, representatives of regional defence forces have attended ADF exercises as observers.

1 *Defence Annual Report 1993-1994*, pp.8, 367.

10.6 Defence personnel from the region have undertaken military training alongside ADF officer cadets and officers at institutions such as the Royal Military College, the Australian Defence Force Academy and the Joint Services Staff College over a period of many years. Officers from regional defence forces also undertake postgraduate courses at the Defence Academy with officers of the ADF and civilian staff of the Department of Defence.

10.7 There has been regular interaction and exchange of ideas by officers of regional nations at military conferences and seminars. For example, in recent years the CGS Exercise and ACRES-A conference have focused on international themes and have extended invitations to regional participants. This trend has been continued at the peacekeeping centre at Williamtown.

10.8 The Committee believes that these activities provide a sound foundation for regional cooperation in the peacekeeping field.

Organisation of Regional Peacekeeping

10.9 The Committee notes that the Minister for Defence, in raising the idea of a regional peacekeeping force, does not envisage that any formal mechanisms would be put in place. Decisions on contributions would be entirely a matter for individual governments on a case-by-case basis.[2]

10.10 The Committee does not support the creation of a standing regional force. Such a force would be impractical, not only because of the inherent difficulties in creating it but because of the broad range of possible needs in crisis-torn areas. The Committee views a regional standing force as a longer term consideration.

10.11 The Committee believes that the government should continue to consider requests by the UN for peacekeepers on a case-by-case basis but supports the notion of establishing a specific regional contribution to meet a particular UN request where appropriate.

10.12 Indeed, the Committee favours a regional response. Regional nations could undertake to furnish particular units or specialist skills to build up a regional force which would have the potential to operate more effectively than the present *ad hoc* arrangements.

2 Mr White, Evidence, pp.73-4.

10.13 Clearly, forming such a force in response to a specific request would require early formulation of a mandate and identification of the force composition. The Committee believes that over time a range of contingency plans could be developed among regional nations.

10.14 As Defence pointed out, the involvement of a large number of nations in the mission in Cambodia provided a useful foundation of shared experience for regional countries.[3]

10.15 Operating as a regional contingent would also have significant benefits in promoting and enhancing regional cooperation.

10.16 DFAT believes that Australia can expect to derive significant benefit from working with neighbouring countries in peacekeeping operations - as occurred with Malaysia and Indonesia in Cambodia. Involvement of this sort would seem particularly valuable in facilitating contact and dialogue between the ADF and regional forces, and enhancing the capacity for acting together in other situations as required, including through common preparation, complementary deployment and access to interoperable or shared equipment.[4]

10.17 Another side to the question of regional peacekeeping is whether or not operations would take place under the auspices of the UN. There are precedents for non-UN operations in missions such as the Multinational Force and Observers (Sinai). Defence observed that:

> It is certainly conceivable that we could ... undertake peace support type operations within a non-UN framework. But ... the liberation of the UN from the end of the Cold War makes it increasingly likely that, where such things are undertaken around the world, the UN will have some sort of relationship with it. One thing that has been raised, for example, by Senator Evans in his book is the possibility that forces or operations could be organised regionally by regional powers rather from New York, but nonetheless still be run as UN-sponsored operations. The range of different combinations, of different ways of doing things, is potentially quite broad.[5]

10.18 DFAT pointed out that, in the absence of collective security institutions or regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, the UN remains the most

3 Defence, Submission, p.s276.
4 DFAT, Submission, p.s246.
5 Mr White, Evidence, p.74.

accepted and likely forum through which regional countries will effect their commitment to multilateral security.[6]

10.19 The Committee notes that the peacekeeping force which has been proposed to monitor Bougainville falls outside the auspices of the UN and that personnel have been drawn from Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu. It is evident that such a regional peacekeeping force will succeed only with the consent of the warring parties. In the case of Bougainville this seems not to have occurred. Where Australia is to be involved in transport and other support roles, it is important that this should also be with the consent of the warring parties.

10.20 DFAT suggested that there is scope for regional cooperation not just in peacekeeping, but in broader peace making and peace building efforts related to regional conflicts, including activities in coordination with the UN. For example, Defence personnel have an obvious expertise in the area of de-mining which offers definite scope for regional cooperation, particularly in the context of expanded peacekeeping activities.

10.21 Another recurring problem, the solution to which is often partly dependent on the success of de-mining, is the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and the provision of adequate support for them on return. In this, defence personnel can plan an important part, including coordination with regional counterparts.[7]

Advantages of Regional Cooperation

10.22 Regional cooperation in peacekeeping could serve to reduce the burden on nations in the region who would wish to participate in a particular UN operation but are unable to commit the resources to make a substantial contribution of their own. In these circumstances, it may be possible for two or more countries in the region to cooperate to put together a contingent drawn from their separate forces.[8]

10.23 Cooperation between Australia and its regional neighbours may also be of value in reforming the UN. For example, Malaysia, Indonesia and Fiji have all been significant contributors of troops to the UN while Singapore,

6 DFAT, Submission, p.s245.
7 DFAT, Submission, p.s247.
8 Mr White, Evidence, pp.73-4.

Thailand and the Philippines are also beginning to play a bigger part. All share an interest in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of operations in which their troops are liable to be participating. A strong regional push for reform could assist the efforts of other nations in this direction as well as strengthen regional relations in the Asia-Pacific.[9]

10.24 The Committee is concerned that the current way in which peacekeeping forces are constituted sometimes results in ADF personnel having to operate with other national contingents whose procedures and equipment are not compatible with those of the ADF.

10.25 The Committee is also concerned that ADF troops may be required to operate with forces or troops from other countries which are ill-equipped, ill-trained and ill-disciplined, and that this may place Australian troops at a disadvantage and perhaps in danger. These problems could be largely overcome if peacekeeping forces are drawn from forces which have had opportunities to train together.

10.26 Cooperation between the ADF and regional defence forces complements Australia's broader defence policy of military cooperation with the regional nations. The Committee believes that the expansion and development of regional cooperation in the field of peacekeeping will significantly enhance Australia's defence policy in this respect.

10.27 The Committee notes that many of the factors relating to cooperation between regional armed forces also apply to cooperation between police forces in the region. The AFP provides training to regional police forces and this may assist in developing cooperation in peacekeeping operations. There may also be scope for expanding cooperation between NGOs such as the ICRC on a regional basis. This may assist, for example, in highlighting humanitarian law considerations with forces who may not have the resources to devote to humanitarian law instruction to their own troops.[10]

Recommendation 48:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government take steps to encourage regional cooperation in the sphere of peacekeeping.

9 Dr Smith, Submission, p.s304.
10 Major Kelly, Submission, p.s397.

Recommendation 49:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government encourage regional countries and major allies to become more engaged in and contribute to peacekeeping operations.

10.28 The Committee also notes that regional cooperation between defence forces, police and NGOs will assist in providing early warning of possible conflicts. The importance of dealing with conflicts at an early stage must be emphasised. Regional cooperation related to peacekeeping may indirectly contribute to the settlement of conflicts by regional organisations and hence obviate the need for peacekeeping operations.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

TRAINING FOR PEACEKEEPING

11.1 Standard military training is held by the ADF to provide the fundamental skills appropriate for participation in peacekeeping. ADF infantry training, for example, emphasises care in the identification of targets and discipline in the employment of graduated levels of force. In the case of Somalia, this training was crucial in ensuring that rules of engagement and orders for opening fire were rigorously observed.

11.2 Of particular relevance to peacekeeping, according Major Kelly, was training undertaken by infantry for:

- low level operations and credible contingencies in northern Australia;
- Service Protected Evacuations; and
- offshore law and order restoration operations.[1]

11.3 Major Kelly stressed in his submission that it is essential that planning and training for low level operations be continued and improved. This training not only prepares Australian soldiers for the direct defence of Australian interests but also serves them well in the peacekeeping roles they may be required to perform. In addition, such training demonstrates the seriousness with which Australia regards its obligations under International Humanitarian Law.[2]

11.4 In evidence to the Committee, Lieutenant Colonel Crago argued that military training is '90 to 95 per cent correct for peacekeeping'.[3]

> The basics for being a good peacekeeper is the discipline and the understanding of things military ... he just needs that little bit more to teach him what the mission is about, who he is going to be working for, and what his responsibilities are.[4]

1 Major Kelly, Submission, pp.s397-8.
2 Major Kelly, Submission, p.s398.
3 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, pp.336-7.
4 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, pp.340-1.

11.5 The additional training which is specific to peacekeeping includes briefings on the region to which ADF personnel are being deployed. The Committee was told, for example, that prior to the departure of the contingent to Somalia:

> ... a number of people were brought to Townsville to speak specifically on Somali history, culture and the Somali way. These included such people as Phoebe Fraser, who had been in Baidoa with the Care Australia organisation ...[5]

11.6 Peacekeepers need information related to particular situations in which they are likely to find themselves. For example:

> A truck driver drives a truck in Shoalwater Bay or he drives a truck in Cambodia. All he needs to know is that in Cambodia there are going to be mines, and we train him to identify a likely mine site or, if he finds a mine, how to deal with it, or if he finds an incident where someone has been injured in a mine accident, how to deal with that. So their basic core training that they get to do their trade is sufficient to be a peacekeeper.[6]

11.7 Much of the mission-specific preparation of a contingent for deployment on peacekeeping takes place at Reinforcement Holding Company (RHC) at Randwick. RHC is under the command of the Land Commander and has the role of preparing and training contingents, individuals and reserves for deployment overseas. This includes the detailed administrative preparation of all members warned for deployment.

11.8 Preparation training includes:

- information on mission background, UN mandate, military task;
- task-related training;
- personal safety (weapon training, mine clearance, health); and
- administrative aspects.[7]

11.9 The training package varies from two days to three weeks depending on the nature of the mission. For the most part, training constitutes familiarisation with the scenarios that peacekeepers may encounter. This

5 Colonel Mellor, Evidence, p.42.
6 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, pp.340-1.
7 Major General Blake in Clements & Wilson (eds), *UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads*, 1994, p.95

may include human rights awareness, negotiation skills and conflict resolution skills.[8]

11.10 Several submissions to the Committee stressed the need for training in human rights and people-related skills. ACFOA, for example, pointed out that peacekeepers may need to deal with people who are traumatised and displaced from homes and families. Training is therefore needed in cross-cultural communications, cultural, social and gender sensitivity, negotiation and conflict management and resolution. Such training should provide peacekeepers with an understanding of international covenants and conventions relating to peacekeeping.[9]

ADF Peacekeeping Centre

11.11 For the training of officers the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) established a peacekeeping centre in 1993 as a wing of the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre (ADFWC) located at RAAF Base Williamtown. CDF envisaged the peacekeeping centre as a 'centre of excellence' and repository for the corporate knowledge of Australian involvement in peacekeeping operations.[10]

11.12 An additional function of the peacekeeping centre is to develop peacekeeping doctrine for the Australian Defence Force and to produce training documents. The centre intends to build up a library of materials related to peacekeeping.

11.13 The centre has a broad responsibility to manage peacekeeping training within the ADF through the creation of training packages aimed at ensuring that ADF personnel are thoroughly prepared for peacekeeping commitments. This is executed through:

- the conduct of two two-week seminars per year at the peacekeeping centre which are directed towards strategic and operational level training for middle-ranking officers of the ADF;

8 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, p.340.
9 ACFOA, Submission, p.s422.
10 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, p.347

- input into the peacekeeping component in officer training programs at establishments such as the Joint Services Staff College, in junior staff courses, and in core training within each of the Services;

- provision of current information on changes in peacekeeping doctrine to all officer training courses; and

- contributions to the training package offered by the Reinforcement Holding Unit.[11]

11.14 Reports of peacekeeping commitments are monitored at the peacekeeping centre. The Committee believes that there is a need to expand that function to include the debriefing of personnel returning from operations and missions, thereby developing an institutional memory on peacekeeping.

11.15 The peacekeeping centre is becoming more involved in working directly for the United Nations. At present this represents 30 per cent of the centre's work program. For example, the centre is engaged in writing the UN *Handbook for Military Observers*. The centre is also developing training packages for the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) as a faculty member of the Institute.

11.16 The centre is staffed by four officers of the ADF - the director (at lieutenant colonel level) is supported by three Staff Officers Grade Two - a major, a squadron leader and a lieutenant commander. Each of the staff at the time of this inquiry had had some peacekeeping experience.[12]

11.17 The centre conducted a pilot five-day seminar in July 1993 and its first international seminar in February 1994. Of the 34 participants in the February seminar, 15 were drawn from HQADF and the three joint command headquarters. Several regional countries (in particular Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Fiji) had expressed an interest in having their students attend courses at the centre. Consequently the seminar was attended by 14 participants from the region, most of whom were drawn from the armed forces.

11 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, pp.339-40.
12 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, p.339.

11.18 The Committee was informed that while the seminar was specifically designed for ADF and regional officers, five non-military students - from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Electoral Commission, CARE Australia and the University of New England - were invited by the peacekeeping centre to participate in the course. The inclusion of these participants from non-military organisations served to provide the course with a broader perspective.

11.19 The scope of the seminar was also widened by inviting a broad range of people with expertise in peacekeeping to make presentations to the participants. Presentations were delivered by academics and representatives of organisations which had practical experience in the field. Members of the AFP and NGOs were given an opportunity to describe their respective peacekeeping roles and their interaction with the military.

11.20 The course is primarily aimed at preparing staff for involvement in the planning and conduct of Australian peacekeeping activities but also for employment on peacekeeping tasks at UN Headquarters. It targets officers at lieutenant colonel and senior major level (or equivalent).

11.21 The seminars aim to address the operational, planning and conceptual elements of peacekeeping. For example, four main themes were addressed at the February seminar:

- UN processes/procedures and how those processes/procedures might be improved;
- prospects for regional cooperation;
- peace restoration strategies; and
- conditions for UN involvement in peacekeeping operations.[13]

In addition, the seminar includes analysis of peacekeeping doctrine and conflict negotiation/conflict resolution skills.

11.22 The Committee was told that the total cost of the course to Defence was $58 000.[14]

11.23 The Committee received very favourable evidence on the success of the seminar from participants from DFAT and the Australian Federal Police

13 Lieutenant Colonel Dobbie, Evidence, p.432.
14 Lieutenant Colonel Dobbie, Evidence, p.430.

who cited, as strengths of the seminar, its timeliness, the international orientation of the seminar, the quality of the presentations, the provision of factual information as a basis for exploring the issues and the opportunity for access to a range of people:

> A particular strength of the seminar was that it brought together people from all the different perspectives - diplomatic, military and various civilian perspectives, the NGOs, the academics and so forth, as well as the various regional perspectives. Participants greatly benefited from the very broad range of specialised expertise and experience there. For people who are involved in making decisions about peacekeeping operations and participating in peacekeeping operations, it was very valuable to hear the different points of view and the different concerns and issues. There are certain things in the actual conduct of operations that civilian participants are more concerned about than military participants would be and vice versa.[15]

11.24 The AFP believe that by involving police in the course the peacekeeping centre has facilitated a greater degree of understanding between the ADF and the AFP of their different command structures and operational procedures.[16] Moreover, the AFP had been consulted about human rights training during the planning of the course.

11.25 The Committee fully endorses the establishment of the ADF peacekeeping centre and congratulates its staff on the success of its international seminars.[17]

11.26 The Committee has some reservations, however, about the ability of the centre to meet the expectations held by the Department of Defence. According to Defence the formal training offered at the peacekeeping centre serves the following functions:

- it ensures that forces deployed are properly prepared prior to departure;
- it further demonstrates our commitment to peace support operations;
- it provides a timely and relevant initiative, consistent with broader national efforts to promote Australia's security at the global level; and

15 Mr Armitage, Evidence, p.460.
16 Mr Eaton, Evidence, p.467.
17 The second international seminar was held in October-November 1994.

- it dovetails with our regional engagement strategy, with courses offered to regional countries.[18]

11.27 The Committee believes that the peacekeeping centre has difficulty in meeting these expectations given its present structure and staffing arrangements.[19] The staff of the centre, for example, are serving officers on relatively short-term postings. To undertake the range of tasks outlined in the Defence submission would, in the Committee's view, require not only a larger staff but some elements of permanent staffing.

11.28 One witness noted that the postings system make the creation of an institutional memory difficult for armed services in fields where theory and practice is changing rapidly as is clearly the case with international peacekeeping.[20] Staff may have been on a peacekeeping mission but will not necessarily understand the wider political perspective on peacekeeping. Nor might they have had time to look historically at peacekeeping or develop conflict resolution skills. There is clearly a need for longer-term appointments which will allow people to become more specialised in peacekeeping.

11.29 The location of the peacekeeping centre at RAAF Williamtown, furthermore, isolates the centre from the political, diplomatic and academic environment of Canberra. The government departments engaged in the development of peacekeeping policy are located in Canberra as is the nucleus of academics at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) and the Australian National University with expertise in peacekeeping.

A National Peacekeeping Centre?

11.30 Several submissions to the Committee made reference to the desirability of having a peacekeeping centre in Australia. Support for the centre was predicated on recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of peacekeeping and the need to bring together representatives of the diverse range of organisations for training and developing a uniform approach to peacekeeping.

18 Defence, Submission, pp.s276-7.
19 See para 11.16.
20 Dr Smith, Evidence, p.303.

11.31 The peacekeeping centre at Williamtown has gone some way towards meeting this need. Defence witnesses emphasised, however, that the main focus of the peacekeeping centre is to train military personnel in the planning and management of peacekeeping activities.[21]

11.32 The Committee believes that there is a clear need for a national institution in Australia which draws together all elements of peacekeeping for training, research and development. Moreover, a national peacekeeping organisation would facilitate the development of an integrated plan for peacekeeping operations and would serve to ensure that all component elements of peacekeeping coordinate their efforts more effectively.

11.33 At the same time the Committee recognises the point made by Defence that in any expanded peacekeeping centre there would still be a requirement for a centre specifically to train ADF officers.

An Australian Peacekeeping Institute

11.34 The Committee favours the establishment of a peacekeeping institute in Australia along the lines advocated in the submission by the Australian Defence Studies Centre (ADSC) at the Australian Defence Force Academy.[22]

11.35 ADSC proposed that an Australian Peacekeeping Institute be established to:

- provide training for all Australian and regional personnel involved in peacekeeping and related activities;
- conduct research into all aspects of peacekeeping and related activities; and
- serve as a focus of information and expertise in Australia, including a publications program;
- develop cooperation with regional defence forces and institutions concerned with peacekeeping; and

21 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, p.335.
22 Australian Defence Studies Centre, Submission, pp.s501-507.

- act as a point of contact for Australian and overseas organisations involved in peacekeeping.

11.36 According to the proposal, the Institute would not confine itself to military aspects of peacekeeping but would extend to all of the elements of contemporary peacekeeping, including civilian police, electoral, civil administration, human rights and humanitarian elements. While the primary focus of the Institute would be peacekeeping, it would also concern itself with preventive diplomacy and peace enforcement and would cover issues such as refugees, mine clearance and the role of UN volunteers as they relate to peacekeeping.

11.37 It is envisaged that the training activities of the proposed Institute would include:

- short and medium term training courses, conferences and seminars;
- instruction modules as required by the ADF, Commonwealth Departments, AFP, NGOs and other organisations involved in peacekeeping;
- providing information to schools, universities, and other interested institutions.

11.38 The proposed Institute would not replace the specific training provided by the RHC at Randwick. It would, however, be able to contribute to this training in the same way as the ADF peacekeeping centre.

11.39 The Committee agrees with ADSC that establishing a broadly-based Peacekeeping Institute would strengthen Australia's contribution to international peacekeeping in general.

11.40 Moreover, such an Institute would enhance cooperation with Australia's regional neighbours, including - but not limited to - the defence forces of regional countries.

11.41 The Institute would develop the theory and practice of multi-dimensional peacekeeping by bringing together the diverse elements of contemporary peacekeeping. The Committee notes that the need for a 'strategic alliance' in peacekeeping between the military and other components, in particular non-government organisations, has been

emphasised by Lieutenant General Sanderson, Force Commander in Cambodia.[23]

11.42 The Committee also believes that an Institute of this kind could benefit in particular from the involvement of NGOs and other community workers for programs in social and cultural skills, cross cultural communications, community development and conflict resolution.

11.43 Clearly, the role of such an Institute would be far wider than that of the ADF peacekeeping centre at Williamtown.

11.44 It is the Committee's view that a peacekeeping institute along the lines proposed by the ADSC would benefit by being located in Canberra. Location in Canberra would permit access to the many organisations that are involved in peacekeeping. The Institute would thus be able to draw upon the expertise of ADF, police, electoral, public service, parliamentary, government, diplomatic and academic personnel who have experience in and knowledge of peacekeeping.

11.45 The ADSC submission proposed that the Institute be located at the Australian Defence Force Academy and in particular at the Australian Defence Studies Centre.[24]

11.46 The ADSC is a Centre of the University College, University of New South Wales at the Defence Academy. The Centre has established a strong reputation for bringing together academic, military and official expertise to focus on practical problems. The proposed Institute would thus be under the aegis of the Australian Defence Studies Centre which is a centre of the University College, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. This would provide both the institutional and intellectual basis for the new Institute.

11.47 The Committee noted that agreement would be necessary from both the Department of Defence and the University of New South Wales, together with other sponsoring organisations, to establish the Institute and

23 Lieutenant General Sanderson in Hugh Smith (ed), *International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience*, 1994, p.xiii.

24 ADSC, Submission, p.s504.

to develop an appropriate charter, together with management and funding arrangements.[25]

Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre

11.48 During this inquiry the Committee received details of the Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (CIPTC) recently established at Cornwallis. CIPTC operates under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS).

11.49 With the increasing demands of contemporary conflict prevention and resolution, and given the scope of Canadian involvement in international peacekeeping activities around the world, a requirement emerged for a focal point for Canadian peacekeeping activities.

11.50 Building on the strong reputation of CISS and its ongoing commitment to furthering Canadian understanding of international peace and security issues, the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade jointly invited CISS to establish a private and independent peacekeeping centre using facilities at the former Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis.

11.51 The Centre is mandated to provide research and education on peacekeeping in all its forms, while also serving as a uniquely Canadian point of contact for peacekeeping information. It will not, however, conduct the military training required by Canadian Forces personnel assigned to peacekeeping duties.

11.52 The Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade jointly provided an initial start-up grant of $5 million, to be followed by yearly grants totalling about $1 million for the Centre's operations. Both Departments anticipate that other interested organisations, foundations and citizens will wish to assist the Centre, with additional financing realised through grants and tuition fees.

11.53 In addition to carrying out research into peacekeeping, CIPTC will support non-governmental organisations, and provide assistance where possible to the academic community and other private interests in matters germane to peacekeeping. The centre will coordinate national and

25 ADSC, Submission, p.s504.

international level conferences, workshops and seminars and generally act as a reserve for new ideas and 'best practice' with regard to all aspects of peacekeeping.

11.54 Consonant with the United Nations' promotion of the "training the trainers" concept, the Centre will offer short courses in peacekeeping, conflict resolution and related issues.[26]

11.55 The concept of CIPTC is comparable to that envisaged for a peacekeeping institute for Australia. The Committee noted that it is intended that CIPTC courses will be open to other nations with an interest in peacekeeping operations.

Value of an Australian Peacekeeping Institute

11.56 An Australian Peacekeeping Institute builds on the valuable example of the ADF peacekeeping centre. Two particularly commendable achievements, in the view of the Committee, have been the involvement of organisations outside the ADF and of nations from the region in its seminar programs.

11.57 An Institute of the kind proposed would further develop the concept of integrated peacekeeping missions where representatives of police forces, non-government organisations, electoral officers and other participants in peacekeeping missions - both from Australia and from the region - could participate in a common program and could share their experience and expertise.

11.58 Such an Institute would promote Australia's standing in the international community. Australia is unlikely ever to be a contributor of large numbers of peacekeeping personnel to peacekeeping operations compared with other nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia. It is the Committee's view that Australia's contribution to peacekeeping can best be enhanced through providing expanded support and opportunities for training.

11.59 A national Institute could enhance cooperation with regional states. The Committee was told that both Malaysians and Indonesians, having

26 Lieutenant Colonel Dobbie, Submission, p.s443.

worked with Australians in Cambodia and Namibia, recognise Australia's skills.[27] Such an institute could also make use of the skills and experience of regional nations, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Fiji which has made a significant long-term contribution to peacekeeping.

11.60 The Institute would also serve to enhance coordination in peacekeeping operations and support peacekeeping training in the region. For example, arranging attachments of officers from other regional nations to the staff of the institute would contribute to the development of a common approach to peacekeeping.[28]

11.61 Providing a forum for the exchange of information and ideas would be a valuable function of the Institute. In particular, there is potential for an Institute to establish links with other centres in the region. The Committee was told that Indonesia was giving consideration to establishing a peacekeeping centre. There is scope for a number of centres within the region to operate in concert and to exchange information.[29]

11.62 The Committee sees no duplication of effort with the Canadian centre which is likely to have a European focus. An Australian Peacekeeping Institute would focus on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, in line with UN support for regional cooperation in peacekeeping.

11.63 ACFOA told the Committee that there is an acknowledged and growing need for an international training package for UN peacekeeping operations to ensure a consistently high level of performance. An Australian Peacekeeping Institute would contribute to the development of peacekeeping training on a global basis.

11.64 Coordination with relevant UN organisations would ensure that the training provided was of an appropriate standard and in accord with agreed UN practice. The Committee believes that an Australian Peacekeeping Institute offers scope for a significant Australian initiative in establishing effective and high quality training.[30]

27 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, p.348.
28 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, p.347-8.
29 Lieutenant Colonel Crago, Evidence, pp.344-5.
30 ACFOA, Submission, p.s422.

Recommendation 50:

The Committee recommends that an Australian Peacekeeping Institute be established within the Australian Defence Studies Centre. Further the Government undertake a feasibility study to determine whether or not the Australian Defence Studies Centre is the most appropriate location for the Institute.



Senator Stephen Loosley
Chair

December 1994

LIST OF PUBLIC HEARINGS AND WITNESSES

12 October 1993

Mr Kevin Boreham
Assistant Secretary, International Organisations Branch
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Dr Kevin Clements
Head, Peace Research Centre
Australian National University

Rear Admiral Kenneth Alan Doolan, AO, RAN
Assistant Chief of Defence Force - Development

Dr Betts Featherston
Peace Research Centre
Australian National University

Dr William Maley
Private Citizen

Colonel William Julian Andrew Mellor
formerly Commander, Australian Forces, Somalia
Department of Defence

Mr David Peter Morris
Peacekeeping Desk Officer
United Nations Political and Commonwealth Section
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Commodore Christopher John Oxenbould
Director, General Joint Operations and Plans
Australian Defence Force

Mr David Gordon Stuart
United Nations Political and Commonwealth Section
Department of Foreign Affairs

Captain Russell Edwyn Swinnerton
Visiting Naval Fellow RAN,
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Australian National University

Mr Robert Henry Tonkin
Assistant Secretary, Resources Policy and Programs Branch
Resources and Financial Programs Division
Department of Defence

Mr Hugh John White
Acting First Assistant Secretary, international Policy
Department of Defence

Tuesday 4 November 1993 (Canberra)

Mr Brian Charles Bates
Deputy Commissioner, Operations
Australian Federal Policy

Superintendent Robert Alexander Bradley
Officer-in-charge, UN Support Branch
Australian Federal Police

Mr James Rollo Brett
Secretary, Defence Committee and Deputy National Secretary
Returned and Services League of Australia

Major General Adrian Clunies-Ross
Member, Defence Committee
Returned and Services League of Australia

Mr Ian Sidney Curtis
Group Executive, Government and Corporate Relations
World Vision of Australia

Mr Paul Edward Davenport
Program Officer, International Programs
World Vision of Australia

Air Commodore Graham Dyke
Member, Defence Committee
Returned and Services League of Australia

Air Vice Marshal Roy Ernest Frost
Chairman, Defence Committee
Returned and Services League of Australia

Mr John Ireland, Assistant Secretary
Policing Policy and Arrangements Division
Australian Federal Police

Mr Michael James O'Connor
Executive Director, Australia Defence Association

Mr Ismo Kalevi Rama
Relief Program Officer, Relief and Rehabilitation Department
World Vision of Australia

Lieutenant Colonel Johannes Bernard Wynen
Project Officer, Returned and Services League of Australia

Tuesday, 9 November 1993 (Canberra)

Professor Paul Dibb
Head, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
Australian National University

Mr Ian Harris
National Director
Care Australia

Friday, 3 December 1993 (Canberra)

Lieutenant Colonel David Jeremy Crago
Director of Peacekeeping
Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre

Major General Warren Edward Glenny
Commander, Second Division, Australian Defence Force Reserves
Headquarters 2nd Division, Randwick Barracks

Colonel Bruce Victor Osborne
former Defence Attache, Australian Mission to the United Nations
Department of Defence

Dr Hugh Smith
Private Citizen

Lieutenant Colonel Martin Charles Studdert
Commander of the Australian Contingent to UNTAC, Cambodia
Department of Defence

Thursday, 7 April 1994

Mr M Armitage, Peacekeeping Desk Officer,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Lieutenant Colonel R W Dobbie,
Director of Peacekeeping
Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre

Mr C J Eaton, Director, United Nations Support Branch
Australian Federal Police

Ms P A Lee, Director, Research and Information
Australian Council for Overseas Aid

Mr R G Rollason, Executive Director
Australian Council for Overseas Aid

Friday, 8 April 1994

Lieutenant General J S Baker,
Vice Chief of the Defence Force
Australian Defence Force

Lieutenant Colonel D J Hurley, SO1 Operations
Headquarters 1st Division, Department of Defence

Lieutenant General J M Sanderson,
Commander Joint Forces Australia
Department of Defence

APPENDIX 2

LIST OF SUBMISSIONS TO INQUIRY

No	From
1	Keith Delany
2	Saskia Kouwenberg
3	Lieutenant Colonel P M Boyd
4	F R J Murphy
5	Australia/South Africa Training Program
6	WO2 John O'Grady
7	D R Knight
8	Michael G Ryan
9	Dr William Maley
9.1	Dr William Maley (Supplementary Submission)
10	Defence Reserves Association, Victoria Branch
11	Mr C R Philpott, IUVDT Asia-Pacific
12	Defence Policy Committee, Returned & Services League, WA Branch
13	Dr Kevin Clements, Peace Research Centre
14	Care Australia
15	Peter Graves
16	Vanessa Bennett
17	Brian W McMahon
18	Christine Taylor
19	Piero P Giorgi, University of Queensland
20	K Ronald Aumann
21	Returned & Services League of Australia, National Headquarters
22	National Party of Australia, Queensland
23	Greg Platt
24	CONFIDENTIAL
25	Michael O'Connor
26	Lieutenant Colonel David Grierson
27	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
27.1	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Supplementary Submission)
28	Department of Defence
28.1	Department of Defence (Supplementary Submission)
29	Professor Paul Dibb, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre
29.1	Captain R E Swinnerton (Supplementary Submission)
30	C R Ashwin
31	Dr Hugh Smith
32	Russell Meyer
33	R Bell, Australian Electoral Commission
34	F D Rowell

35 A M Whiddett, Australian Federal Police
36 Ian Curtis, World Vision Australia
37 Charles Bowers
38 Fitzroy Boulting
39 Patricia Garcia, Austcare
40 Major M Kelly
41 Australian Council for Overseas Aid
42 Lieutenant Colonel R W Dobbie
43 Australian Defence Studies Centre
44 Dr Salla
45 CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX 3

EXHIBITS

No

1. Pamphlet 'International Union Against the Venereal Diseases and the Treponematoses (attached to submission No 11)

2. Publication, *The World Summit for Children, UNICEF 1990* (attached to Submission No 15)

3. Newspaper clippings and copies of letters (attached to Submission No 15).

4. *An Agenda for Peace*, Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (attached to Submission No 27).

5. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: Statement by the Permanent Representative of Australia H E Mr Richard Butler AM, New York, 22 April 1992 (attached to Submission No 27).

6. Seminar Papers, 'UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads', 21-24 March 1993 Canberra (attached to Submission No 27).

7. Captain Russ Swinnerton RAN, '*The Preparation and Management of Australian Contingents in UN Peacekeeping Operations*' Working Paper No 275, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, July 1993 (attached to Submission No 29).

8. 'United Nations Peacekeeping', Proceedings 1992 Annual Seminar (provided by United Services Institute of Western Australia).

9. 'International Division and other overseas commitments' (provided by the Australian Federal Police).

10. 'Newsline: Issues in World Development', 25 October 1993 (provided by World Vision Australia.

11. 'Australian Participation in Peace Keeping' (provided by Major M J Kelly).

12. David Horner (editor), 'Reshaping the Australian Army: Challenges for the 1990s', Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 77, SDSC, ANU, 1991 (provided by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU).

13 Document 'The Mohonk Criteria for Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies", produced by the Task Force on Ethical and Legal Issues in Humanitarian Assistance, 1994 (provided by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid).

14 Document - title page of Larry Minear and Thomas G Weiss, 'Humanitarian Action in Times of War', Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1993 (provided by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid).

15 Document - 'The Social Consequences of the Peace Process in Cambodia', Recommendations and Findings from an UNRISD Workshop, Geneva Switzerland, 29-30 April 1993), July 1993 (provided by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid).

16 Document - William Maley & Fazel Haq Saikal, *Political Order in Post-Communist Afghanistan*, International Peace Academy, 1992 (provided by Dr W Maley).

17 Document - *Security Dialogue*, Vol 24, No 4, December 1993 (provided by Dr W Maley).

18 Document - William Maley, 'Regional Conflicts: Afghanistan and Cambodia' in *Reshaping Regional Relations* no 9, 1993 (provided by Dr W Maley).

19 Document - *The World Today*, Vol 50, No 4 (provided by Dr W Maley).

20 Document - 'The Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (provided by Lieutenant Colonel R W Dobbie).

APPENDIX 4

DEFINITIONS

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE

Peace maintenance strategies

'Peace maintenance' strategies are those designed to resolve, or at least contain, particular disputes (and some kinds of emerging threats), and prevent them from escalating into armed conflict. These strategies take many different forms, but for present purposes can be conveniently grouped as 'preventive diplomacy' and 'preventive deployment'

- **Preventive diplomacy.** This refers to the full range of methods described in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter - viz 'negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means' - when applied *before* a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict. 'Early preventive diplomacy' involves the provision of skilled assistance through good offices, mediation and the like in order to resolve disputes well before eruption into armed conflict appears likely; 'late preventive diplomacy' - more familiar in the UN system so far - refers to attempts (often involving the Secretary-General himself, working through the Security Council) to persuade parties to desist when such eruptions seem imminent.

- **Preventive deployment.** This is defined here as the deployment of military or police, and possibly civilian, personnel with the intention of preventing a dispute (or, in some cases, emerging threat) escalating into armed conflict. Such deployment could occur on one side of a border only, at the request of the state feeling threatened, or on both sides of the border at the request of both parties. (in *An Agenda for Peace* the concept of preventive deployment is taken as extending further - to deployment of military personnel within a country, at the request of the government or parties concerned, in order to assist in the alleviation of suffering or the controlling of violence. For present purposes, however, we believe it may be more helpful to regard those in-country prevention or assistance activities that do not involve the use of force as forms of 'peace building', and any kind of deployment that does involve the use of force, other than in self-defence, as being a form of 'peace enforcement'.

Peace restoration strategies

'Peace restoration' strategies are those applicable to resolve a conflict *after* it has crossed the threshold of armed hostilities: they are premised on the cooperation, and ultimately

agreement, of the governments or parties concerned. Two basic kinds of response are addressed here: 'peace making' and 'peace keeping'.

- **Peace making.** This is best understood as a close relative of preventive diplomacy, involving the same range of methods described in Article 33 of the UN Charter - ie 'negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or agreements, or other peaceful means' - but applied *after* a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict. As with preventive diplomacy, 'peace making' has at least two distinct chronological dimensions. Initial (or 'Stage I') peace making efforts will usually be aimed at the immediate goals of cessation of hostilities, and stabilisation of the situation on the ground; subsequent (or 'Stage II') efforts -which might continue in parallel with the deployment of a peace keeping mission - might be aimed rather at securing a durable political settlement.

- **Peace keeping.** This involves the deployment of military or police, and frequently civilian, personnel to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between governments or parties who have been engaged in conflict. Peace keeping presumes cooperation, and its methods are inherently peaceful; the use of military force, other than in self-defence, is incompatible with the concept. Although neither described nor defined in the UN Charter itself, peace keeping operations have been - both in the pre-Cold War years and subsequently - the most numerous and visible manifestations of the UN's cooperative security efforts. 'Traditional' peace keeping operations involve not much more than unarmed or lightly armed military contingents being engaged in the monitoring, supervision and verification of ceasefire, withdrawal, buffer zone and related agreements. 'Expanded' peace keeping, by comparison, involves the supplementation of traditional peace keeping with activities such as election monitoring or organisation, human rights protection, and assisting or exercising civil administration functions during transition to independence or democracy.

Peace enforcement stragegies

We are concenred here with responses to conflicts or other major security crises in situations where the agreement of all relevant governments or parties is lacking. The strategies are essentially those described in outline in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and fall into two broad categories: non-military enforcement measures, or 'sanctions'; and military enforcement measures, for which it is convenient, and now common, to reserve the label 'peace enforcement'.

- **Sanctions.** These are measures, not involving the use or threat of military force, designed to compel or bring to an end a course of action by a state or party; they function primarily by dening access to goods, services or other externally provided requirements necessary or important to maintenance of their economic, social or political infrastructure or well-being.

- **Peace enforcement.** This is the threat or use of military force, in purusuit of peaceful objectives, in response to conflicts or other major security crises. Also

relatively uncontroversial, at least in principle, are actions taken to effectively enforce international arms control, disarmament and similar regimes. A more delicate and difficult application of peace enforcement activity is in support of peace keeping operations, for example, in situations where one or more parties to an agreement have subsequently withdrawn from it, and action is required to enforce a ceasefire or re-establish a buffer zone. The most difficult of all peace enforcement applications, both in principle and practice, is where military force is used in internal security breakdown situations in support of specifically humanitarian objectives.

DEFINITIONS: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

As peace support operations have become more complex so too has the debate over peacekeeping terminology and there is yet to be wide-spread agreement in this area, particularly when it comes to describing the more complex peace support operations. For the purposes of the submission we will clarify aspects of the terminology and particularly distinguish between what constitutes peacekeeping as opposed to peace enforcement. In many respects UN interventions since the end of the Cold War have blurred the distinction between the traditional role of peacekeeping and the higher risk role of peace enforcement. it is useful to make the following distinctions:

- **Preventive diplomacy** involves diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at removing the source of conflict before violence erupts, or to limit the spread of violence when it occurs;

- **Preventive deployment** involves the deployment of military and/or police or in some cases civilians to prevent a dispute escalating into armed conflict. Examples of this include the deployment of troops, military observers and civilian police into the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia in 1993;

- **Peacemaking** involves the process of arranging an end of disputes, and resolving issues that lead to further conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or from other forms of peaceful settlement;

- **Peace support operations** is an umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement and preventive deployment. These operations could incorporate elements of security assistance to a civil authority, protection and delivery of humanitarian relief, guaranteeing rights of passage, enforcing sactions, as well as any other military, para-military or non-military action taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking/preventive diplomacy process;

- **Peacekeeping** involves non-combat operations (exclusive of self defence), that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute;

- **Peace enforcement** operations are a form of combat, armed intervention, or the threat of armed intervention, that is pursuant to international license authorising the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions - the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly accepted by the international community;

- **Peace building** involves post conflict diplomatic and military actions that seek to rebuild the institutions and infrastructure of a nation that is torn by civil war; or build mutually beneficial bonds amongst nations formerly at war in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

APPENDIX 5

AUSTRALIA'S PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 1948-1993

Peacekeeping Operations	Dates	Mandates and Total Nos Deployed	Average No of Australians deployed
UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organisation)	1948-	Supervise the truce in Palestine; supervise the observance of armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria; observe cease fires in the Golan Heights and the Suez Canal; assist and cooperate with UNIFIL and UNDOF (600)	13 in 1993
UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan)	1949-	Supervise cease fire between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (100)	up to 18
ONUC (UN Operation in the Congo)	1960-64	Ensure withdrawal of Belgian and other forces; assist law and order; maintain Congo's territorial integrity; provide technical assistance (20,000)	several
UNTEA (UN Temporary Executive Authority)	1962-63	Administer West New Guinea in the transition to its transfer to Indonesia; including a UN Security Force (UNSF) to maintain law and order (1,500)	7
UNYOM (UN Yemen Observation Mission)	1963-64	Monitor disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic (200)	2
UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)	1964-	Maintain law and order; from 1974, secure a buffer zone, monitor the *de facto* cease-fire and provide humanitarian assistance (6,500)	20-35 AFP and State police
UNIPOM (UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission)	1965-66	Monitor cease fire along border, except the state of Jammu and Kashmir, supervise withdrawal of all armed personnel to positions held by them before 5 August 1965 (100)	4

UNEF II (UN Emergency Force II)	1973-79	Supervise the cease fire and redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and control the buffer zones in the Suez Canal sector and later the Sinai (7,000)	46 RAAF personnel
UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force)	1974-	Supervise the cease-fire between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights; supervise disengagement and separation of forces (1,500)	several
UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon)	1978-	Monitor withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon; assist restoration of Government authority (7,500)	several
UNIIMOG (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group)	1988-91	Supervise the cease-fire; monitor withdrawal of all forces to recognised boundaries (400)	15
UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group)	1989-90	Supervise transition of Namibia to independence; organise and supervise election (8,000	about 300
MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in W Sahara)	1991-	Conduct referendum on independence or integration with Morocco (500)	45
UNAMIC (UN Advance Mission in Cambodia) UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia)	1991-92 1992-93	Advance mission for UNTAC Supervise government functions and elections; supervise disarmament and demobilisation of rival armies; supervise repatriation and rehabilitation of refugees; monitor human rights (22,000)	65 over 500
UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) *Croatia* *Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*	1992-	Monitor cease-fire in Croatia; supervise withdrawal of Yugoslav forces; ensure UN Protected Areas demilitarised and inhabitants protected. Support UNHCR delivery of humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Herzegovina; ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo airport; protect UN personnel including in the six safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ch VII mandate). Preventive deployment in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (26,500)	1
UNOSOM I (UN Operation in Somalia)	1992-93	Monitor the cease-fire, assist provision of humanitarian relief (1000)	30

UNOMOZ (UN Operation in Mozambique)	1992-	Verify demobilisation and disarmament of forces, and withdrawal of foreign troops; assist and monitor organisation of elections; coordinate humanitarian assistance (7000)	16 AFP in 1994
UNOSOM II (UN Operation in Somalia)	1993-	Ensure the maintenance of a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations (authorised under Chapter VII), including by disarmament; foster national reconciliation and restoration of national institutions (25,000)	38
UNAMIR (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda)	1993-	Incorporating UNOMUR and in cooperation with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG II), supervise the implementation of the peace agreement in Rwanda (authorised to 2,548)	308 in 1994

Note: UNOSOM II has a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate; part of UNPROFOR's mandate is explicitly based on Chapter VII; UNIKOM has a Chapter VII mandate, as it was established to monitor the Gulf War ceasefire agreement resulting from a UN-endorsed enforcement action: all are treated as if they were peacekeeping for UN budgeting and administrative purposes.

Note: Numbers deployed are indicative only. Data on civilian elements are not available in all cases.

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submissions Vol III, pp.S418-421.

APPENDIX 6

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Clements, Kevin & Wilson, Christine, *UN Peacekeeping at the Crossroads*, Peace Research Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994.

Evans, Gareth, Address to the 49th General Assembly of the United Nations, 3 October 1994.

Evans, Gareth, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*, Allen & Unwin, 1993.

Horner, David (ed), *The Army and the Future, Land Forces in Australia and South-East Asia*, Directorate of Departmental Publications, Defence Centre, Canberra, 1993.

Parliament of Australia, *A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights*, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, November 1994.

Parliament of Australia, *United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia*, Report of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, AGPS, Canberra, May 1991.

Peacekeeping Policy: The Future of the Australian Defence Force Role, Department of Defence, Canberra, June 1993.

Smith, Hugh (ed), *Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1993.

Smith, Hugh (ed), *International Peacekeeping: Building on the Cambodian Experience*, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1994.

Strategic Review 1993, Department of Defence, Canberra, December 1993.

MINORITY REPORT
BY GREENS (WA) SENATOR DEE MARGETTS

This report has not amply demonstrated, in my opinion, the inconsistencies between defence policies and practices and our new peacekeeping commitments, nor does it suggest measures to bring them into line. A further concern is how we will go about managing a budget for contributions to peacekeeping operations.

We have tried in this report to outline Australia's position and commitment to peacekeeping to meet international demands for peacekeeping responses to international conflict. We have also tried to make recommendations for Australia to manage equipment and resourcing of peacekeepers in order to amply meet those demands. Some of those international demands have included the dramatic increase in the total number of personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations and the fundamental shift in the nature of peacekeeping and global conflict.

In terms of our broader defence strategies, peacekeeping has a role in both our third and fourth pillars of Australia's defence which are regional security and international security. Our work in these efforts contribute to preventing the transformation of conflict into war and aim to address the roots of conflict which are important measures for Australia's immediate defence. It is therefore alarming that our peacekeeping efforts which embody both the strategies employed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Department of Defence can be at odds with current Defence Department policy. Our current Defence policy is centred around self-reliance which is dependent on commercialisation and exporting services and equipment to be self-sustaining. However the promotion of arms sales in our region has the effect of fuelling internal conflicts or bilateral tensions and actually works to destabilise our region. The idea that somehow our arms sales contribute to others' security and hence our own is a contradiction in terms. We plan our own defence priorities with regard to immediate defence needs based on capability not threat and our arms sales and technology transfer to countries enhance their 'capabilities' even if they are not yet a defined external 'threat'. This policy has two ramifications for our peacekeeping efforts. It directly works against methods of bringing warring or potentially warring parties into peaceful negotiation. It also displays a large opportunity cost of resources and efforts that could otherwise go into peacekeeping efforts which would enhance regional and international security and in turn lessen demands on the defence budget.

Peacekeeping embodies a range of efforts from preventative deployment to peace enforcement. This continuum begins with diplomacy which Foreign Affairs has responsibility for and ends with armed or non-armed intervention which the Defence Department has responsibility for. Peacekeeping itself is not just a military activity and does have civilian components such as the Australian Federal Police as law enforcers, the Australian Electoral Commission to oversee and help conduct elections for example. However, the military component is the most expensive of the peacekeeping effort and

does accrue many training and equipment testing benefits that Defence could not experience other than being 'in the field' during peacekeeping activities.

This report has not adequately addressed how we are going to pay for peacekeeping activities in the future. This is a necessary part of any policy commitment, and it is certain that peacekeeping demands are going to be more demanding in the future and we are going to have to start planning for them now. We therefore need to set a realistic budget for peacekeeping and organise an accountable budget management plan for use in the future.

As I have mentioned, Defence is the main component of peacekeeping operations and makes the decision whether or not we support international peacekeeping operations, what resources and capabilities we devote to an exercise and how we use them. However, this report concurs with the Department of Defence wish to not have to commit their own resources to it. On the other hand, contributing organisations such as the AFP and AEC are expected to be responsible for their own resources committed to overseas operations, subject to supplementation, and yet they may not have the power to make the decision to commit in the first place. Peacekeeping operations are difficult to plan for, and when a budget is set for peacekeeping, it must take into account the post-peacekeeping work that goes with it. This includes any post-military commitment, civilian infrastructure, law and order, and de-mining operations, for example. The majority report recommends that 'the Government examine the feasibility of allocating an annual amount for peacekeeping' (recommendation 22). How that funding is administered will be crucial, and accountability must be paramount. It should not be seen as an 'open cheque', providing funding to every activity that could be grouped under peacekeeping, as this would no doubt lead to inefficiency in expenditure, possible overspending and a lack of Government accountability. Department of Finance approval should be required for each request for additional finance. This would be the only way of keeping down expenditure and offering a satisfactory level of accountability.

I believe it is important for Defence to 'own' peacekeeping and to take responsibility for it. This is important for it to plan for peacekeeping missions within its own force structure planning, policy making and resources devoted to equipment and training. This is important for the maintenance of 'readiness' for peacekeeping missions. The separate budget account for peacekeeping can then be used to supplement for the extra costs of peacekeeping missions that are unplanned. In terms of policy making, it is important for Defence to accept responsibility for peacekeeping in order to maintain consistency in its policy making and policy applications and co-ordinate this with other aspects of its long term defence strategy. Without this occurring, the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade will continue to work against each other and Defence policies will continue to work against our international and regional interests. We need to work together if we are to instigate peace in other nations and keep the peace.



Senator Dee Margetts
December 1994