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Print Chapter 4 (PDF 226KB) | < - Report Home < - Chapter 3 : Chapter 5 - > |
Introduction
Background
The economic impact of the sale of uranium to China
Environmental and social concerns arising from the sale of uranium to China
Energy alternatives to nuclear power
Introduction |
4.1 | Chapter 4 deals predominantly with the impact of the intended purpose of the Nuclear Material Transfer Agreement, that is, the sale of uranium to China. In addition to receiving evidence in this regard, the Committee also received evidence on the potential environmental opportunity cost and social impact of selling uranium to China. |
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4.2 | The second agreement under review, the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement provides for research programs, the use of OPAL1 for advanced materials science and expands the scope of future collaborative research and development with China.2 The Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is not expected to provide an economic benefit in the short term,3 but rather provides benefits in the research and development of nuclear technology. |
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Background |
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4.3 | China has predicted that by 2020, it will consume four times more nuclear energy than at present and is seeking a secure, long-term source of uranium to satisfy its expanding nuclear energy program. China currently sources the majority of its uranium domestically, but will need to import uranium to meet its future energy demands.4 |
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4.4 | Australian uranium producers are interested in exporting uranium to China, but are currently denied access to this export market due to long-standing Australian Government policy. This policy limits supply of Australian uranium to countries with which Australia has bilateral safeguards agreements and detailed administrative arrangements in place.5 |
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4.5 | While China is a potential new market for uranium producers, there is currently no bilateral safeguards agreement in place with China. This led Australian uranium mining companies6 together with Chinese Government officials to approach the Australian Government in 2004 to request that the Australian Government consider negotiating a bilateral safeguards agreement with China.7 The treaties under review resulted from these negotiations. |
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4.6 | The short-term impact of the Nuclear Material Transfer Agreement (which includes safeguards provisions) is expected to increase the volume of uranium exported from Australia by existing uranium producing companies, agents and agencies.8 |
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4.7 | The obvious impact the Agreements would have in the medium to long term is an increase in uranium production leading to the expansion of Australia's uranium industry. However, whether Australia's uranium industry can expand its production (in response to increased demand for uranium), is based on commercial decisions by mining companies, and approvals by relevant State, Territory, and Federal Governments.9 |
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The economic impact of the sale of uranium to China |
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World uranium demand and supply |
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4.8 | The Committee received evidence that the world demand for energy is growing quickly with total electricity consumption forecast to grow from 15 000 billion kWh per annum to approximately 24 000 billion kWh by 2025. The Australian Uranium Association (AUA) informed the Committee that approximately 3300 billion kWh of the 2025 total electricity consumption would be attributable to nuclear power generation. Currently, coal continues to be the primary source of electricity generation, with nuclear and natural gas also widely used.10 |
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4.9 | Further, by 2010 world uranium demand is expected to grow to 71 500 tonnes per annum and by 2020 to grow to 84 700 tonnes per annum. In 2006, primary production will have yielded 44 300 tonnes of uranium and secondary production will have yielded 21 100 tonnes of uranium. Secondary sources, which currently make up 35 per cent of nuclear generator demand are derived from: diluted weapons grade uranium (17%), reprocessed uranium (12%) and mined stocks (6%).11 |
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4.10 | There is consensus that as secondary supplies are declining, primary production will need to rise to meet demand.12 AUA provides that because of the decline in secondary supplies, by 2020, global uranium production will have to rise by nearly 60 per cent to 70 500 tonnes per annum to meet demand.13 |
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4.11 | However, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD) latest Red Book,14 global uranium resources (supplies) are more than adequate to meet the projected global demand for uranium. As can be seen (by country break down) in Table 1.1, the total global uranium resource that can be mined for less than $US130 per kilogram is approximately 4.7 million tonnes. Based on the 2004 nuclear electricity generation rate of demand, the amount of uranium resources available is sufficient for 85 years of use. Use of fast reactor technology would extend this timeframe to over 2500 years.15 |
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4.12 | In addition, continuing advances in nuclear technology will allow for the more effective use of uranium. Development is underway on reactors that can extract more than 30 times the energy of current reactors.16 |
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4.13 | The IAEA provides that the price of uranium has increased by 500 per cent since 2001 providing the impetus for new initiatives and investments in uranium exploration. Based on geological evidence and knowledge of uranium in phosphates, it is considered that there is more than 35 million tonnes of uranium available for exploiting. In 2005, global uranium exploration investment accounted for approximately $200 million, up by 50 per cent since 2004. The growth in uranium exploration is expected to increase the uranium resource base and the world's uranium production capacity.17 |
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4.14 | The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) informed the Committee that China has a long standing contract with Canada for the supply of uranium and recently signed transfer of nuclear material agreements with Kazakhstan and Namibia. ASNO informed the Committee that Australia would not be disadvantaged by other countries' long standing supply of uranium to China:
Table 1.1: Known recoverable naturally occurring uranium resources at less than US$130 kg/Uranium19
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China’s demand for uranium |
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4.15 | China is the world’s largest country with a current population of approximately 1.3 billion people, a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately US$2.3 trillion20 and was ranked as the fourth largest economy globally in 2005.21 China’s real GDP growth rate in 2005 was 9.9 per cent.22 Following the United States of America (US), China is also the world’s second largest energy consumer23 and carbon dioxide emitter.24 It is estimated that by 2030, China will generate as much electricity as the US, Japan, Canada and Germany currently do together.25 China is also Australia’s third largest trading partner. In 2005, China was Australia’s largest energy export market.26 |
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4.16 | In 2001, China’s total installed energy generation capacity (of electricity) was 338.6 Gigawatts of which 74.4 per cent was from thermal power,27 24.5 per cent was from hydropower and 0.7 per cent was from nuclear power. In 2001, electricity production in China had an annual growth rate of 8 per cent with only 1.2 per cent of electricity produced from nuclear power. The Chinese Government has given priority for the increased use of natural gas, hydropower, and nuclear power for electricity generation.28 |
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4.17 | While China will continue to rely on coal and natural gas to power its growing electricity consumption,29 it is expected that China will become more reliant on nuclear power as an alternative energy source, particularly for coastal regions where populations are growing rapidly and there is a recognised shortage of energy resources.30 |
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4.18 | The Committee was informed that in China nuclear power is favoured as an alternative to coal fired power generation because it does not produce greenhouse gas emissions:
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4.19 | China has supported the generation of nuclear power for energy since 1970 and by June 1983 began construction on the Qinshan nuclear power plant. By 1991, the Qinshan nuclear power plant was connected to the electricity grid and nuclear power generation began on China’s mainland. Following Qinshan, the Daya Bay nuclear power plants were the result of a joint venture and began operation in 1994.32 |
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4.20 | Since 1964, China has conducted research into various types of nuclear power generation including: liquid metal fast reactors, advanced passive pressurised water reactor simulators and high temperature gas reactors. Currently, pressurised water reactors are favoured for nuclear power generation, whilst other types of reactors are considered where appropriate.33 The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) informed the Committee:
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4.21 | China presently has nine nuclear power reactors in commercial operation and a further nuclear reactor will commence operations in 2007, bringing the total to ten.35 China plans an almost 500 per cent increase in its nuclear capacity by 202036 with another five nuclear power plants (NPPs) under construction, 13 planned NPPs and a further 50 proposed NPPs.37 |
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4.22 | ASNO informed the Committee that China’s nuclear power capacity in 2020 would be approximately 40 Gigawatts (equivalent to 40 large power reactors) and represents 4 per cent of China’s expected installed electrical capacity at that time and 6 per cent of China’s electricity output. This level of electricity production will be larger than the whole of Australia’s current total electricity output.38 |
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4.23 | According to the IAEA, China has approximately 1 per cent (of the world’s uranium resources) or 60 000 tonnes of known low cost recoverable uranium. The World Nuclear Association estimates that China has 10 000 more tonnes of low cost recoverable uranium or 70 000 tonnes. This is enough for China to meet its current energy requirements. However, if the planned and proposed NPPs come online, China will need to import uranium to meet its energy needs.39 |
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4.24 | China’s current uranium production is 840 tonnes and this supplies 65 per cent of China’s nuclear energy requirements. China imports the remaining 35 per cent from Kazakhstan, Namibia and Russia. It is estimated that China has a capacity to process 1320 tonnes of uranium per annum. China has also stepped up its domestic exploration efforts and has two new mines proposed that together will yield 300 tonnes of uranium per annum.40 |
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4.25 | The main consideration for China’s future energy requirements is ‘how to provide economically secure and stable power … and reduce the environmental impacts of generating this power.’41 |
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4.26 | The Committee was informed that the Australian Government expects that China would not seek to source more than approximately one third of its uranium requirements from any one-supplier country including Australia.42 This would equate to around 2.5 thousand tonnes of uranium a year sourced from Australia.43 China already has bilateral agreements with other countries and sources uranium from these countries.44 |
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Australia’s uranium supply |
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4.27 | As Table 1.1 shows, Australia has 24 per cent of the world’s low cost recoverable uranium reserves. The Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (AMEC) informed the Committee that not all the known recoverable uranium reserves are economically recoverable. Australia has 36 per cent of world uranium reserves which are recoverable at low cost (approximately US$40 per kilogram). As exploration activities are regulated, only limited exploration occurred between 1985-2005. Increased uranium exploration could result in the discovery of greater uranium reserves.45 |
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4.28 | AMEC stated that Australia’s low cost recoverable uranium puts it at an advantage to countries such as Kazakhstan and Canada:
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4.29 | AMEC informed the Committee that approximately 97 per cent of Australia’s uranium resources at a cost of recovery of less than US$40 per kg are located in the following deposits:
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4.30 | In addition, since 2001, Australia’s production and exports of uranium have almost doubled from 5989 tonnes per annum (2001-2002) to 11 489 tonnes per annum in 2005-2006.48 |
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4.31 | International demand for uranium is increasing and the trend appears likely to continue. China is expected to increase its nuclear power generation capacity by almost 700 per cent in the next 25 years.49 |
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4.32 | By expanding its uranium exports, Australia could meet China’s long-term uranium demand.50 As already stated, China’s planned total nuclear electricity capacity by 2020 will require an annual supply of about 8000 tonnes of uranium, which is a little less than Australia’s total annual uranium exports over recent years.51 |
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4.33 | Representatives from the Government of South Australia provided evidence about the life expectancy of Australia’s uranium mines:
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4.34 | Representatives from the Government of South Australia added that there are no new proposals for uranium mines:
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4.35 | The Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) provided that because of strict uranium mining regulations in other Australian States, Australia’s increase in uranium production would come from the expansion of Olympic Dam and from the Honeymoon Mine:
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4.36 | The Committee received evidence that no forward contracts for the sale of uranium to China had been entered into, but anticipates that once the Agreements enter into force that uranium could be exported to China in the first half of 2007. Representatives from the Government of South Australia and AMEC agreed.55 In relation to forward contracts, ASNO stated:
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Value of Australian uranium exports |
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4.37 | ASNO informed the Committee that the economic benefit of the Agreements would provide an estimated value of an additional A$250 million per annum57 for Australia once they enter into force. |
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4.38 | In 2005, Australia’s uranium exports were worth A$573 million.58 With the Agreements in place, uranium exports would be worth around A$820 million per annum. |
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4.39 | Friends of the Earth Australia (FOEA) stated that the expected return of A$250 million per annum from the sale of uranium to China is equivalent to approximately 0.33 per cent of the value of Australia’s total exports to China in 2005. FOEA, the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), the Medical Association for Prevention of War (Australia) MAPW, the Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia (ANAWA) and one other submission59 put the view to the Committee that for such a small return, Australia was risking the misuse of its uranium (namely for weapons manufacture) and contributing to the environmental and social problems associated with nuclear waste management.60 FOEA added that it believes the amount of A$250 million is an overestimate:
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Other issues |
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Recruitment of skilled technicians and graduates |
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4.40 | The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) informed the Committee about Australia’s situation in relation to the recruitment of skilled technicians and graduates in the area of nuclear technology:
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Selling uranium to India |
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4.41 | The Committee was interested to know about the possible sale of uranium to India. In particular, the Committee was interested in whether there had been any changes to Australia’s policy to only sell uranium to NPT63 Party countries and where bilateral safeguards agreements are in place. A representative from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade informed the Committee:
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Environmental and social concerns arising from the sale of uranium to China |
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4.42 | A number of organisations that provided submissions to the Committee are opposed to uranium mining and the sale of uranium because of its potential negative environmental and social effects.65 |
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4.43 | In brief, opposition to the treaties for environmental reasons was raised in the relation to:66
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4.44 | Organisations were also opposed to entering into the Agreements with China because of claims that:67
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China’s accountability and transparency |
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4.45 | A number of organisations raised particular concerns in their submissions about accountability and transparency stemming from China’s system of Government and the governance mechanisms inherent in its organisations and companies.68 These organisations have recommended that Australian uranium not be sold to China based on these concerns in combination with claims that the safeguards system (which provides for non-military use of uranium) is inadequate. ACF), MAPW, FOEA and People for Nuclear Disarmament Western Australia (PNDWA) provide more detail about these concerns. Safeguards concerns are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. |
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4.46 | ACF and MAPW instanced claims of China’s human rights abuses constituting breaches of the United NationsConvention Against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.69 |
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4.47 | In relation to the United NationsConvention Against Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, ACF and MAPW stated:
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4.48 | In relation to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, ACF and MAPW drew attention to China’s one child policy and its cultural preference for male offspring resulting in the ill treatment of female offspring, and China’s continuing use of child labour.71 |
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4.49 | In addition, China’s industrial pollution and safety record is also questioned with the environmental damage and social impact caused by explosions at a chemical plant owned by the China National Petroleum Corporation; and a safety failure at the Shaoguan Zinc Smelter which released ten times the acceptable level of toxic cadmium into the Biejiang River. Both incidents occurred late 2005 polluting water supplies, devastating natural ecosystems and having a negative impact on the human population.72 |
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4.50 | From claims of China’s human rights abuses and environmental incidents and their mismanagement, ACF and MAPW have concluded that it is not certain that China can fulfil its core obligations under the Agreements, nor can the peaceful use of Australian uranium be ensured:
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4.51 | FOEA shares the same view in relation to China’s lack of accountability and transparency and drew attention to the media censorship in China and lack of whistleblower protection:
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4.52 | PNDWA were also concerned about media censorship and its implications for the sale of uranium to China and stated:
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4.53 | In addition, FOEA raises concerns about public safety and environmental issues around China’s use of nuclear power:
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4.54 | ACF stated that it is relevant to the Agreements to discuss China’s level of accountability:
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Nuclear waste management |
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4.55 | Nuclear power, the waste it creates and its management is another concern raised by a number of organisations.78 Issues raised in relation to nuclear waste management are centred on the detrimental permanent effects on humans and the persistence of radioactive pollution in the physical environment. |
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4.56 | ACF draws attention to the non-inclusion of nuclear waste management in the treaty texts of the Agreements:
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4.57 | In relation to China’s nuclear waste management, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (Australian Section) (WILPF) have stated:
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4.58 | PNDWA states that the issue of nuclear waste is an unresolved global issue:
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4.59 | In addition, WILPF drew attention to the detrimental effects to humans and the physical environment of radioactive pollution which can result from the mismanagement of nuclear waste:
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4.60 | MAPW elaborates on the use of nuclear material and its serious permanent, toxic impact on the environment and states:
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4.61 | Another issue of importance in discussion on nuclear waste management is the reprocessing of uranium for further use and its detrimental effects on the natural environment. The Committee received evidence that there is a current global stockpile of 270 tonnes of plutonium separated at reprocessing plants, which is enough to build around 27 000 nuclear weapons. Reprocessing of uranium is considered environmentally dirty and less than satisfactory by at least one director of the World Nuclear Association but under the Agreements reprocessing is permitted.84 FOEA recommends that reprocessing be removed from the treaty text:
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4.62 | In response to concerns raised by organisations in relation to China’s waste management practices, ASNO stated:
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4.63 | In addition, ASNO provided that in 1994, China constructed the Lanzhou Nuclear Complex, a centralised store for civil Spent Fuel (SF) with an initial capacity of 550 tonnes. For reprocessing, China has a growing inventory of spent fuel and proposes to recycle the fissile content of large quantities of SF. In 1998, in the Lanzhou Nuclear Complex, at the same site as the centralised SF store, construction of a pilot civil processing plant began. The plant has a planned capacity of 50 tonnes SF per year. In addition to this plant, a larger reprocessing plant with a capacity of up to 800 tonnes of SF per year is also being constructed to be completed by 2020.87 |
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4.64 | ASNO states that China also has waste repositories for the disposal of low level waste and intermediate level waste operating in the northwest of China:
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4.65 | ASNO informed the Committee that China’s level of nuclear planning was developing and improving as new technology becomes available:
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Energy alternatives to nuclear power |
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4.66 | Many of the organisations and individuals opposed to uranium mining and to the Agreements advocated the use of alternative energy options that are environmentally sustainable (unlike coal fired power generation).90 |
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4.67 | ACF stated that China and India are the only two countries in the world with proposed major nuclear power expansion. Several European countries have phase-out policies. ACF advocated that Australia help China to find alternative methods of energy production such as solar, wind and energy efficient initiatives that are sustainable.91 |
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4.68 | ACF added that there is considerable economic benefit from selling renewable energy to China without the worry of creating nuclear waste:
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4.69 | FOEA believes that Australia should encourage China to adopt safer alternative energy production, instead of nuclear power, which also does not contribute to greenhouse gas emissions:
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4.70 | Future Directions International (FDI) believes that the Agreements represent an opportunity for Australia to shape changing global energy patterns and requirements, securing its prosperity and security.95 |
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4.71 | FDI advocates the use of thorium reactors, which overcome the use of uranium and sideline much of the debate in relation to misuse of uranium intended for energy generation.96 Further, thorium reactors are considered environmentally compatible as they pollute less than any other major form of power generation and Australia is resource rich in Thorium with 25 per cent of the world’s reserve. FDI proposed including thorium in addition to uranium in the treaty texts of the Agreements.97 |
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4.72 | FOEA however, offered the opposing view stating that thorium may be converted to fissile material and used to manufacture weapons if desired:
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1 | OPAL is a 20 megawatt pool reactor using low enriched uranium fuel, and cooled by water. OPAL is a multipurpose facility for radioscopic production, irradiation services and neutron beam research. Its compact core is designed to achieve high performance in the production of neutrons. The building is constructed from reinforced concrete; it is seismically qualified and has a metallic grillage for protection from a light aircraft crash. Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, viewed 21 August 2006 , <www.ansto.gov.au>. Back |
2 | RIS, p. 4. Back |
3 | RIS, p. 4. Back |
4 | Regulation Impact Statement (RIS), p. 5. Back |
5 | RIS, p. 5. Back |
6 | BHP Billiton (Olympic Dam Mine, South Australia ), Energy Resources Australia (Ranger Mine, Northern Territory ), Heathgate Resources ( Beverley Mine , South Australia ) and other mines given approval to operate. RIS, p. 6. Back |
7 | Regulation Impact Statement (RIS), p. 1; Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 33. Back |
8 | Nuclear Material Transfer Agreement National Interest Analysis ( NMTA NIA ) Consultation Annex, para. 1. Back |
9 | RIS, p. 5. Back |
10 | Australian Uranium Association (AUA), Submission 34, pp. 3-4. Back |
11 | AMEC, Submission 31, p. 3. Back |
12 | AUA, Submission 34, p. 4; AMEC, Submission 31, p. 3; Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 34. Back |
13 | AUA, Submission 34, p. 4. Back |
14 | The full title of the Red Book is Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand. The Red Book is the recognised world reference on uranium and is based on official information received from 43 countries. IAEA, Global Uranium Resources to Meet Projected Demand, Staff Report, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
15 | IAEA, Global Uranium Resources to Meet Projected Demand, viewed 2 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
16 | IAEA, Global Uranium Resources to Meet Projected Demand, viewed 2 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
17 | IAEA, Global Uranium Resources to Meet Projected Demand, viewed 2 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
18 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 34. Back |
19 | IAEA, Uranium 2005, Resources, Production and Demand (Red Book); AMEC, Submission 31, p. 2; Dr Justin Walawski, Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006, pp. 15-16; MCA, Submission 32, p. 8. Back |
20 | For the year 2005. IAEA, People’s Republic of China , viewed 1 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org> , p. 211. Back |
21 | International Monetary Fund, viewed 1 November 2006, <www.imf.org>. Back |
22 | US Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Background Note: China , viewed 8 November 2006 , <http://www.state.gov>. Back |
23 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 20. Back |
24 | Australian Uranium Association (AUA), Submission 34, p. 8. Back |
25 | Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), Submission 32, p. ii. Back |
26 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 20. Back |
27 | derived from coal and natural gas. MCA, Submission 32, p. ii; Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006 , p. 20. Back |
28 | MCA, Submission 32, p. ii; Mr Peter Morris, Transcript of Evidence, 16 October 2006, p. 6. Back |
29 | MCA, Submission 32, p. ii; Mr Peter Morris, Transcript of Evidence, 16 October 2006, p. 2. Back |
30 | IAEA, People’s Republic of China , viewed 1 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>, p. 214; AUA, Submission 34, p. 8. Back |
31 | Mr Peter Morris, Transcript of Evidence, 16 October 2006, p. 2. Back |
32 | IAEA, People’s Republic of China, viewed 1 November 2006, <www.iaea.org>, p. 216. Back |
33 | International Atomic Energy Agency, People’s Republic of China, viewed 1 November 2006, <www.iaea.org>, p. 216. Back |
34 | Mr Steve McIntosh, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 32. Back |
35 | AMEC, Submission 31, p. 1; AUA, Submission 34, p. 9. Back |
36 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 20. Back |
37 | Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (AMEC), Submission 31, p. 1; MCA, Submission 32, p. ii. Back |
38 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 20. Back |
39 | MCA, Submission 32, p. 4. Back |
40 | MCA, Submission 32, pp. 4-5. Back |
41 | MCA, Submission 32, p. ii; Mr Peter Morris, Transcript of Evidence, 16 October 2006, p. 2. Back |
42 | RIS, p. 5. Back |
43 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 22. Back |
44 | MCA, Submission 32, p. 5. Back |
45 | AMEC, Submission 31, p.2; Dr Justin Walawski, Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006 , p. 14. Back |
46 | Dr Justin Walawski, Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006, pp. 15-16. Back |
47 | AMEC, Submission 31, p. 3; Dr Justin Walawski , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006 , p. 16. w Back |
48 | AMEC, Submission 31, p. 3. Back |
49 | AMEC, Submission 31, p. 3. Back |
50 | NMTA NIA, para. 9. Back |
51 | RIS, p. 1. Back |
52 | Dr Edward Tyne, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, p. 25. Back |
53 | Dr Edward Tyne, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, pp. 26-27. Back |
54 | Mr Peter Morris, Transcript of Evidence, 16 October 2006, p. 4. Back |
55 | Dr Edward Tyne , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006 , p. 24: Dr Justin Walawski , Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006 , p. 16. Back |
56 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 22. Back |
57 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 22. Back |
58 | RIS, p. 6. Back |
59 | Ms Carol G. Williams, Submission 15, p. 3. Back |
60 | FOEA, Submission 24, p. 33; Dr Jim Green , Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, p 8; Mr David Noonan, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, p. 3; Mr James Courtney , Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006, p. 5. Back |
61 | Dr Jim Green, Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, p. 8. Back |
62 | Mr Steve McIntosh, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 32. Back |
63 | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament. NPT also establishes a safeguards system managed by the IAEA, which takes responsibility under the NPT in areas of technology transfer for peaceful purposes. IAEA, International Conventions and Agreements, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
64 | Mr John Sullivan, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 38. Back |
65 | Submissions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 36 . Back |
66 | Submissions 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 36. Back |
67 | Submissions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29. Back |
68 | Submissions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29. Back |
69 | ACF & MAPW, Submission 26, pp. 33-34; Mr David Noonan , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006 , p. 4. Back |
70 | ACF & MAPW, Submission 26, pp. 33-34. Back |
71 | ACF & MAPW, Submission 26, pp. 33-34. Back |
72 | ACF & MAPW, Nuclear Safeguards and Chinese Accountability, Submission 26, p. 30. Back |
73 | ACF & MAPW, Nuclear Safeguards and Chinese Accountability, Submission 26, p. 37. Back |
74 | FOEA, Submission 24, p. 29. Back |
75 | Mrs Judith Blyth, Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006, p. 19. Back |
76 | FOEA, Submission 24, p. 31. Back |
77 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, p. 12. Back |
78 | Submissions 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 29, 36. Back |
79 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, pp. 4-5. Back |
80 | WILPF, Submission 29, p. 4. Back |
81 | PNDWA, Submission 19, p. 3; Mrs Judith Blyth , Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006 , p. 20. Back |
82 | WILPF, Submission 29, p. 2; Ms Ruth Russell, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, p. 16. Back |
83 | Dr Tilman Ruff, Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, p. 13. Back |
84 | Mr David Noonan , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006 , p. 14; Dr Jim Green , Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006 , p. 9. Back |
85 | Dr Jim Green, Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, p. 10. Back |
86 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 6. Back |
87 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 6; Mr John Carlson , Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006 , p. 37. Back |
88 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 6. Back |
89 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 37. Back |
90 | Submissions 6, 13, 15, 17, 22, 24, 27, 36; Mr David Noonan , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006 , p. 4; Ms Ruth Russell , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, pp. 17-19. Back |
91 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, pp. 8-9. Back |
92 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, p. 8. Back |
93 | The drug dealer’s defence applied to the sale of uranium to China provides that if Australia does not sell uranium to China , China will source its uranium from another uranium producing country. FOEA, Submission 24, p. 31. Back |
94 | FOEA, Submission 24, p. 31s. Back |
95 | FDI, Supplementary submission 28.1, p. 1. Back |
96 | FDI, Supplementary submission 28.1, p. 1. Back |
97 | FDI, Submission 28, p. 4; Mr Craig Lawrence, Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006, p. 10. Back |
98 | Dr Jim Green, Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, p. 9. Back |
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