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Print Chapter 5 (PDF 166KB) | < - Report Home < - Chapter 4 : Chapter 6 - > |
Introduction
The IAEA’s nuclear safeguards system
Australia’s network of nuclear safeguards agreements
Monitoring China’s AONM and nuclear technology use
Introduction |
5.1 | Australian Government policy limits supply of Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM)1 to countries with which Australia has bilateral safeguards agreements and detailed Administrative Arrangements in place.2 The Agreements under review include safeguards to allow for the transfer of AONM and the cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. |
5.2 | Chapter 5 provides discussion on whether the safeguards included in the Agreements are adequate to ensure the non-military3 use of AONM and the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Other issues arising during the course of the inquiry, relating to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s nuclear safeguards system are also included. |
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The IAEA’s nuclear safeguards system |
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The International Atomic Energy Agency |
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5.3 | The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a United Nations organisation created in 1957. The IAEA is an independent, intergovernmental science and technology-based organisation tasked with promoting safe, secure and peaceful global cooperation in nuclear technologies. The IAEA also helps its member states in planning and using nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes including the generation of electricity. In addition, the IAEA is charged with developing nuclear safety standards and verifying through its inspection system that member States comply with their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other non-proliferation agreements. These agreements provide for the peaceful use of nuclear material and facilities.4 |
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons |
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5.4 | The system of international nuclear safeguards is created by the NPT. In addition, there are two other treaty level agreements which also provide for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in South America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga).5 |
5.5 | The 1968 NPT, was a response to the growing international concern about the use of nuclear weapons and technology. NPT entered into force in March 1970 with over 150 member countries. NPT is premised on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and technology and promotes the peaceful, non-military use of all nuclear material and technology.6 NPT includes:
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5.6 | NPT limits the number of declared nuclear weapon states to five and currently includes all five of the declared nuclear weapon states of China,8 France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the United States of America.9 Although declared nuclear- weapon states are not obliged to conclude safeguards agreements with the IAEA, they have agreed that IAEA safeguards may be applied to all or part of their civil nuclear activities. Nuclear-weapon states have agreed to this to confirm ‘that they will not derive any commercial advantage by not making their civil facilities subject to international inspection.’10 |
5.7 | As well as the NPT, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga also require member countries to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and that any nuclear material held or subsequently acquired be declared and submitted to safeguards.11 |
Verification measures included in the IAEA’s nuclear safeguards system |
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5.8 | Verification measures are designed to assess a member State’s declared nuclear material and nuclear material related activities. Verification includes: on site inspections,12 visits and ongoing monitoring and evaluation. The IAEA uses two types of verification measures:
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Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements |
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5.9 | The Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements is a legal document that came into existence in May 1997 and allows the IAEA to implement measures to strengthen its existing nuclear safeguards system. The Additional Protocol was conceived in response to the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program, in addition to other developments in the early 1990s and focuses on a verification system for undeclared nuclear material and activities.14 |
5.10 | Under the Nuclear Safeguards System, routine inspections were limited to specific ‘strategic points’ in declared facilities. With the Additional Protocols, a State must provide access to all places where there is, or may be activity related to the nuclear fuel cycle. Where access is not possible, the State must immediately make reasonable effort to satisfy IAEA requirements through other means. |
5.11 | Specifically, the Additional Protocol provides for:
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5.12 | The Additional Protocol also provides for improved administrative procedures including streamlined procedures for designating inspectors and providing them with visas.16 |
5.13 | China signed onto the Additional Protocols on 31 December 1998 and the Additional Protocols entered into force for China on 28 March 2002.17 |
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Australia’s network of nuclear safeguards agreements |
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5.14 | Australia has 19 bilateral safeguards18 agreements in place providing for the transfer of AONM19 to 36 countries, including Taiwan.20 |
5.15 | Australia’s bilateral safeguards agreements provide assurances that AONMs is used solely for peaceful purposes and not diverted to nuclear weapons or for other military purposes. These agreements complement the IAEA’s nuclear safeguards system to ensure the peaceful non-explosive use of nuclear material derived from Australia. The safeguards included in the Agreements also reiterate Australia’s nuclear non-proliferation security interests. These bilateral agreements include IAEA safeguards prescribed by NPT and supplemented by separate safeguards agreements between each State concerned and the IAEA, for the full life of AONM.21 In addition, Australia has been Party to the Additional Protocols since 12 December 1997.22 |
5.16 | Complementary to the IAEA prescribed safeguards, Australia also includes in its bilateral safeguards agreements an Administrative Arrangement (AA) that details how each Party will meet its obligations under the safeguards agreement.23 |
Safeguards included in the Nuclear Material Transfer Agreement |
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5.17 | The Nuclear Material Transfer Agreement is modelled on Australia’s existing nuclear safeguards agreements with other NPT nuclear-weapon states, and includes all of the Australian Government’s policy requirements for the control of nuclear materials. Specifically:
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5.18 | The Committee was also informed that China’s other nuclear material suppliers – Namibia and Kazakhstan, do not have in place the same level of safeguards that Australia does. ASNO informed the Committee:
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Administrative Arrangements |
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5.19 | The Administrative Arrangements (AAs) are a confidential, less than treaty status document included in Australia’s bilateral safeguards agreements. The AAs describe how both Parties will undertake to fulfil the obligations contained in the bilateral safeguards agreement. The AAs are drafted in accordance with IAEA safeguards and to avoid duplication, the AAs use the IAEA’s accounting system, but include set procedures by which material included under the corresponding agreement can be identified (country of origin may be traced).26 |
5.20 | The AAs apply to nuclear material, material, equipment and technology transferred between Parties. The requirements included in the AAs apply to both Parties and ensure the transfer of material and or equipment and tracking within the recipient’s fuel cycles. Once, AONM has been converted into a usable form it becomes subject to IAEA safeguards and inspection activities become responsible for ensuring that nuclear material is used for peaceful purposes.27 |
5.21 | For the transfer of nuclear material and technology to take place between Australia and China, and in addition to ratification of the Agreements, ASNO, the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and CAEA must conclude:
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5.22 | ASNO would have responsibility for administration and accounting for all uranium exports. ASNO and ANSTO would together be responsible for requirements under the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.29 |
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Monitoring China’s AONM and nuclear technology use |
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China’s compliance with the IAEA’s nuclear safeguards system |
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5.23 | The IAEA provides that since 1982, China has emulated the laws and regulations relating to nuclear safety as they apply in advanced nuclear power countries, consulted IAEA nuclear safety codes and guides establishing its own nuclear safety regulations system. China’s nuclear safety regulation system consists of laws, administrative regulations of the State Council, department rules, nuclear safety guides, standards and specifications.30 |
5.24 | In accordance with China’s nuclear material safeguards agreement with the IAEA and procedures under the Agreements, monitoring of AONM would be based on procedures applied at the facilities where AONM is handled. ASNO would check reports on AONM provided by China for consistency with information from the IAEA and from other sources. While China would have the right to choose which facilities are eligible for IAEA inspections under its agreements with the IAEA, any facilities using AONM must be jointly agreed by ASNO and the CAEA, and must be subject to the China-IAEA nuclear material safeguards agreement.31 |
Tracking AONM in China |
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5.25 | ASNO’s A Guide to Administrative Arrangements provides that the system of accountancy and control established under AAs enables Parties to account for AONM as it moves through the nuclear fuel cycle after it is exported in its raw form from Australia.32 |
5.26 | The system of accountancy does this through the principles of proportionality and equivalence. These principles recognise that uranium atoms regardless of origin are indistinguishable. The proportionality principle provides that a recipient country can track AONM through its fuel cycle by attributing a quantity of uranium hexafluoride as being AONM in the same proportion as the original quantity of AONM before conversion. Processing losses are accounted for in the same way. 33 |
5.27 | Equivalence does not allow for substitution of lower quality material to be included as material that is subject to the Agreement. Reports are regularly exchanged between Parties to enable each Party to account for all nuclear material subject to the Agreement. Reports are updated as material arrives, departs or changes form and takes into account all inventory increases and decreases.34 |
Concerns about inadequate safeguards |
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5.28 | The following concerns relating to the IAEA’s international nuclear safeguards system and Australia’s nuclear safeguards under the Agreements were raised. In particular, concerns were centred on how the Australian Government can ensure that AONM is used only for peaceful purposes by China and not diverted to make nuclear weapons. The concerns are listed below:
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Concerns about tracking AONM in China |
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5.29 | FOEA makes the claim that all of Australia’s uranium exports to China could be used in nuclear weapons without breaching the terms of the agreement as long as an equivalent amount of nuclear material is transferred into safeguards, as safeguards do not apply to conversion facilities. The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), the Medical Association for the Prevention of War ( Australia) (MAPW) and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (Australian Section) (WILPF) reiterate this view.35 |
5.30 | ASNO responded to this claim and stated that an equivalent amount of uranium is tracked and that the outcome is the same as if AONM has been tracked through the conversion plant:
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Concerns about verification measures and procedures |
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5.31 | Concerns were also raised about the effectiveness of IAEA verification procedures. In particular, the Committee was informed that ASNO does not make public any findings of Material Unaccounted For (MUF). |
5.32 | Further concerns were raised that only three facilities are included under the IAEA’s list of agreed facilities for inspection.37 |
5.33 | ASNO responded that there are more than three facilities included:
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5.34 | ASNO confirmed that ten facilities are included and explained how facilities are included on the list of facilities eligible for IAEA inspections:
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Concerns about diversion of AONM for nuclear weapons manufacture and the impact on regional stability |
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5.35 | A number of organisations and individuals raised concerns in relation to China’s potential use of AONM to either divert it to manufacture nuclear weapons or to free up its domestic uranium supplies for the same purpose and the impact this would have on existing regional tensions.40 These concerns are mixed with concerns about China’s breaches of the NPT41 and that China has not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).42 |
5.36 | In addition, several submissions drew attention to comments made by China’s Ambassador to Australia, Madame Fu Ying at a Melbourne Mining Club luncheon in December 200543 where the Ambassador stated that China has insufficient uranium for both its civil and military nuclear program. As the Anti-Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia (ANAWA) and ACF stated, this has sparked concerns that by providing uranium for China’s civil programs, Australia frees-up China’s limited domestic uranium reserves for military use.44 |
5.37 | In relation to China’s past NPT breaches, ASNO stated that China has improved upon its past proliferation record since it joined the NPT in 1992 and became obligated under the treaty to not assist any non-nuclear weapons state to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons:
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5.38 | ACF responded to the information put forward by ASNO:
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5.39 | ACF puts forward the view that the possibility of China’s diversion of AONM for military purposes is because of inadequate safeguards and that China’s civil and military nuclear industries are both managed by China’s military.47 |
5.40 | ASNO provided evidence to the Committee that the Australian Government is confident that China takes its obligations under the NPT and membership of the nuclear export control regimes seriously.48 |
5.41 | ASNO added that in addition to IAEA safeguards, Australia was relying on trust that AONM would not be diverted to non-peaceful uses by China and that China had no reason to divert AONM to other than its intended purpose:
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5.42 | ACF recommends that in view of inadequate safeguards that there should not be any provision for enrichment or reprocessing facilities under the Agreements. ACF reiterated the threat of nuclear arms races and the need to stop providing nuclear material for armament. 50 |
5.43 | ANAWA shared this view and added that the Australian Government is side-stepping the issue of China’s past nuclear proliferation record:
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5.44 | ASNO argued that by including China as one of its bilateral safeguards partners Australia was strengthening nuclear safeguards.
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Concerns about Administrative Arrangements |
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5.45 | Concerns were raised about the confidentiality attached to AAs that will apply to the bilateral safeguards included in the Agreements. In particular, that AAs are confidential on the request of bilateral partners ahead of due process and transparency in Australia. ACF and MAPW stated:
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5.46 | ASNO responded to concerns about AAs stating that it was practice for AAs to be confidential:
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5.47 | ASNO also informed the Committee that the Australia/China AAs are almost entirely agreed upon and will be concluded by the end of 2006.55 |
China’s nuclear emergency procedures and occupation health and safety |
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5.48 | The Committee was concerned about information it received that China does not have a system in place for adequate emergency planning to deal with nuclear emergencies. |
5.49 | ANSTO informed the Committee that China is not complacent about its emergency planning:
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5.50 | Concerns about inadequacies in elements of the IAEA’s safeguards system consisting of the NPT and Additional Protocols includes tracking AONM and the IAEA’s verification and inspection processes. A number of submissions have put the view that the IAEA’s safeguards system is close to collapsing. |
5.51 | In this regard, ANAWA stated:
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5.52 | Several organisations have supported the view that the IAEA’s safeguards system is weakening because of comments made by the IAEA Director-General, Dr Mohamed ElBaradei on 25 March 2006 in relation to the IAEA’s verification budget. Dr ElBaradei stated that the IAEA’s verification budget operates on 100 million Euros per annum, which is comparable to the budget of a local police department:
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5.53 | The Director General of ASNO appeared to argue that the IAEA’s verification budget is adequate:
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5.54 | ASNO clarified that the IAEA budget was being spent in more effective ways than it used to be:
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5.55 | ASNO explained that the IAEA Board of Governors was reviewing the IAEA inspection and verification budget for the purpose of strengthening safeguards, particularly through improvements in efficiency:
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5.56 | The Committee was interested to know whether Australia was involved in measures to increase the safeguards budget. |
5.57 | ASNO informed the Committee that Australia is not currently putting forward a particular proposal in this regard, but rather assessing whether it can make efficiency savings in its operations:
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1 | AONM is defined in the Nuclear Material Transfer Agreement as Australian uranium and nuclear material derived from it. E.g. Plutonium. Back |
2 | Regulation Impact Statement (RIS), p. 1. Back |
3 | Military use, which is not permitted, includes: any direct military application of nuclear energy such as nuclear weapons, military nuclear reactors, production of tritium for military purposes, military nuclear propulsion and depleted uranium munitions. RIS, p. 2. Back |
4 | IAEA, viewed 26 October 2006 , <www.iaea.org>; Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006 , p. 20. Back |
5 | IAEA, Origin of comprehensive safeguards agreements, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
6 | IAEA, International Conventions and Agreements, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
7 | IAEA, Origin of comprehensive safeguards agreements, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
8 | China acceded to the NPT on 9 March 1992 . IAEA, Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Chronology of Key Events, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
9 | Fisher, David, History of the IAEA: The First Forty Years, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
10 | IAEA, Origin of comprehensive safeguards agreements, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
11 | IAEA, Origin of comprehensive safeguards agreements, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
12 | These include: ad hoc, routine, special and safeguards inspections and visits. Back |
13 | IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
14 | IAEA, Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, May 2005, p. 6, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
15 | IAEA, IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, viewed 8 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
16 | IAEA, Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Security: IAEA Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, May 2005, p. 6, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
17 | IAEA, Safeguards and Verification: Strengthened safeguards system: Status of Additional Protocols, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
18 | Australia ’s safeguards agreements are with: the Republic of Korea , the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Finland , the United States of America , Canada , Sweden , France , Euratom (European Atomic Energy Community), Philippines , Japan , Switzerland , Egypt the Russian Federation , Mexico , New Zealand , Czech Republic , the United States of America (covering Taiwan ), Hungary and Argentina . NIA Attachment. In addition, Australia has an NPT safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, concluded on 10 July 1974 . Australia also has an Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement with Singapore Concerning Cooperation on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which entered into force on 15 December 1989 . Back |
19 | AONM refers to uranium and nuclear material derived from it. E.g. plutonium. National Interest Analysis (NIA), para. 10. Back |
20 | National Interest Analysis (NIA), para. 10. Back |
21 | NIA, para. 10. Back |
22 | IAEA, Safeguards and Verification: Strengthened safeguards system: Status of Additional Protocols, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
23 | ASNO, Exhibit 11, A Guide to Administrative Arrangements, p. 1. Back |
24 | NIA, para. 11; RIS, pp. 3-4. Back |
25 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, p. 31. Back |
26 | ASNO, Exhibit 11, A Guide to Administrative Arrangements, p. 1. Back |
27 | ASNO, Exhibit 11, A Guide to Administrative Arrangements, pp. 1-2. Back |
28 | RIS, p. 7. Back |
29 | RIS, p. 7. Back |
30 | IAEA, People’s Republic of China, viewed 1 November 2006, <www.iaea.org> , p. 226. Back |
31 | NIA, para. 13. Back |
32 | ASNO, Exhibit 11, A Guide to Administrative Arrangements, pp. 1-2. Back |
33 | ASNO, Exhibit 11, A Guide to Administrative Arrangements, pp. 1-2. Back |
34 | ASNO, Exhibit 11, A Guide to Administrative Arrangements, p. 2. Back |
35 | ACF & MAPW, Submission 26, p. 6; Mr David Noonan , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006 , pp. 2-3; Ms Ruth Russell , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, p. 18. Back |
36 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 3. Back |
37 | MUF is where an accounting discrepancy has been found. FOEA, Submission 24, p. 11. Back |
38 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, p. 26. Back |
39 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 1. Back |
40 | Ms Ruth Russell , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006 , p. 18; Mrs Judith Blyth , Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006 , p. 18. Back |
41 | Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving general and complete disarmament. NPT also establishes a safeguards system managed by the IAEA, which takes responsibility under the NPT in areas of technology transfer for peaceful purposes. IAEA, International Conventions and Agreements, viewed 6 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
42 | The CTBT was opened for signature in September 1996 and prohibits nuclear tests and explosions by member states. CTBT has been ratified by 136 countries of the 176 that are signatories. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, viewed 7 November 2006 , <http://pws.ctbto.org/>. Back |
43 | ANAWA, Submission 27, p. 4; ACF & MAPW, Submission 26, p. 7. Back |
44 | ANAWA, Submission 27, p. 4; Mr David Noonan , Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006 , p. 3; Mr James Courtney , Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006, pp. 3-5. Back |
45 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 5. Back |
46 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, p. 4. Back |
47 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, p. 5. Back |
48 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 5. Back |
49 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 4 September 2006, pp. 27-28. Back |
50 | Mr David Noonan, Transcript of Evidence, 5 October 2006, p. 5. Back |
51 | Mr James Courtney, Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006, p. 4. Back |
52 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 4. Back |
53 | ACF & MAPW, Submission 26, p. 5. Back |
54 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 3. Back |
55 | ASNO, Submission 30, p. 3. Back |
56 | ANSTO, Submission 20, p. 1. Back |
57 | Mr James Courtney, Transcript of Evidence, 6 October 2006, p. 2. Back |
58 | Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Putting Teeth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Regime, 25 March 2006 , viewed 7 November 2006 , <www.iaea.org>. Back |
59 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, p. 30. Back |
60 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, p. 30. Back |
61 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, p. 30. Back |
62 | Mr John Carlson, Transcript of Evidence, 25 October 2006, pp. 30-31. Back |
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